Israel continued operations in Lebanon between July 14 and July 20, 2025. These activities included strikes on Radwan Force training camps and targeted killings of Hezbollah operatives.
Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between July 7 and July 13, 2025. These activities included targeted killings of terrorist personnel, including a smuggler for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a senior Hamas operative.
Israel continued its operations in Lebanon between June 30 and July 6, 2025. These operations included targeted killings of Hezbollah operatives, including a smuggler for the IRGC, and a wide-scale attack on Hezbollah assets.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between June 23 and June 29, 2025, including targeted killings of Hezbollah operatives and a wide-scale attack on Hezbollah assets in the Ali Taher Ridge.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between June 9 and June 15, 2025. These activities were concentrated in south Lebanon, north and south of the Litani River, and included several targeted killings.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between June 2 and June 8, 2025. These activities included extensive strikes on Dahiyeh in Beirut that targeted alleged Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities.
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) claimed to have inspected a site in the Mrayjeh-Laylaki neighborhood of Dahiyeh that Israel recently alleged was being used by Hezbollah. Israel previously targeted the site on September 30, 2024, claiming it was an underground Hezbollah weapons production facility.
Israel launched its most extensive series of airstrikes on the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut on Thursday, as well as Ain Qana in south Lebanon, stating it targeted Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between May 26 and June 1, 2025. These operations included several assassinations of Hezbollah operatives and an extensive aerial bombardment of Hezbollah facilities in Lebanon, including near Baalbek but particularly in south Lebanon.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between May 12 and May 18, 2025. These activities included several assassinations of Hezbollah operatives and an extensive aerial bombardment of Hezbollah facilities in Lebanon, including near Baalbek but particularly in south Lebanon.
Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between May 12 and May 18, 2025. These activities included targeted strikes on Hezbollah operatives, including one regional commander.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between April 28 and May 11, 2025. These activities included targeted killings and the destruction of a Hezbollah PGM storage facility in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem called on his group’s followers to vote in strength in the upcoming municipal elections in Lebanon. He also demanded that the Lebanese government end Israel’s operations in the country and rebuild areas damaged in the recent Hezbollah-Israel war.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between April 21 and April 27, 2025. These activities included targeted killings and the destruction of a Hezbollah precision-guided munitions storage facility in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between April 14 and April 20, 2025. This week witnessed an uptick in Israeli strikes against Hezbollah, including several assassinations of the group’s operatives and commanders.
Israel killed Hezbollah Unit 4400’s new deputy commander, Hussain Ali Nasr. The Israel Defense Forces alleged that Iran and Unit 4400 continue to oversee weapons smuggling to Hezbollah, including through Beirut–Rafic Hariri International Airport.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem delivered his first speech thoroughly addressing Hezbollah’s vision for a national defense strategy. He said the group was ready for a dialogue, which remained premature, but would refuse to disarm even after a strategy is set.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between April 7 and April 13, 2025, repeating a lower-intensity pattern from the previous week. The Israel Defense Forces targeted 10 areas and killed one mid-level Hezbollah commander and one Hezbollah operative.
A “Western security source” told Al Arabiya that Hezbollah is using the Port of Beirut to smuggle weapons into Lebanon from Iran. In early March, Israel assassinated a Hezbollah commander in charge of maritime weapons smuggling, saying his activities had continued after the November 27 Lebanon-Israel ceasefire.
Israel assassinated senior Hamas official Hassan Ahmad Farhat in Sidon on Friday. The Israel Defense Forces said Farhat was responsible for attacks on Israel during the recent war, including the February 14, 2024, strike on Tzfat and continued planning attacks against Israel in recent months. Farhat’s son Hamzah, also a Hamas operative, and his daughter, Jinan, were killed alongside him.
Israel continued operations in Lebanon between March 31 and April 6, 2025, though there was a noticeable drop in number and intensity. However, Israel conducted two targeted killings in Lebanon: one in Beirut’s Dahiyeh neighborhood killed a Hezbollah commander and operative, and another in Sidon killed a Hamas commander and operative.
Naim Qassem delivered two speeches last week to mark Quds Day that touched on similar themes, including Hezbollah’s alleged victory in the recent war with Israel. Qassem also vowed Hezbollah would not disarm and cryptically threatened to resume attacking Israel if Israeli operations in Lebanon continued.
The Israel Defense Forces conducted an airstrike in the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut, the second in two weeks and since the November 27 ceasefire, that killed Hezbollah commander Hassan Badeer, his son (another Hezbollah member), and two others. Israel said Badeer was helping Hamas plan an imminent attack against Israeli civilians.
Israeli operations in Lebanon continued on a near-daily basis last week. On Friday, Israel struck in Dahiyeh, Beirut for the first time since the November 27 ceasefire, destroying a Hezbollah drone storage facility. Lebanese officials made equivocal statements on reining in Hezbollah.
Dr. Racha Alawieh, a Brown University physician in the US on a visa, was denied re-entry into the country after returning from Lebanon. A central question is whether Alawieh’s entry was blocked for her exercising First Amendment rights or whether her family’s close links to Hezbollah jeopardized her visa. If the latter justification survives judicial review, the precedent may give US authorities a tool to disrupt Hezbollah’s influence and illicit finance operations in the United States.
On March 16, the Syria-Lebanon border witnessed intense clashes between the new Syrian government and Lebanese Shiite tribesmen and Hezbollah affiliates.
Israel conducted two sets of airstrikes in south Lebanon on March 11 that targeted Hezbollah operatives. The first targeted a senior Hezbollah aerial defense operative, whose fate remains unknown. The second set of strikes targeted Hezbollah members in south Lebanon. Hezbollah-affiliated media announced two of the group’s fighters were killed.
A review of the new Lebanese government’s policy statement reveals some positive changes from the positions of previous governments regarding the official posture on Hezbollah and its arms. Nevertheless, the statement contains subtle but significant loopholes that Hezbollah can exploit to ensure its survival and eventual regeneration.
A comparison of actions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Lebanon after the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, demonstrates that the Lebanese have not taken significant action against Hezbollah.
Israel assassinated Khodr Hashem, the commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force’s seaborn forces, in south Lebanon. Hashem was involved in armed activities and maritime weapons smuggling to Hezbollah before and after the November 27, 2024, Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, activities which constituted a violation of the deal.