Last week, French officials declared that they had conclusively identified Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) as the party behind a foiled bombing attempt in Paris in late June. A key question, however, remains unanswered: which senior Iranian official gave the order?
In a newly released message, Islamic State spokesman Abul-Hasan Al-Muhajir boasts that his organization’s men were able to carry out the Sept. 22 terrorist attack in Ahvaz, Iran. Al-Muhajir’s message is intended to underscore the Islamic State’s responsibility for the operation, as there were conflicting claims regarding the identity of the perpetrators.
The Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency has released a short video allegedly showing three of the men responsible for yesterday’s attack on a military parade in Ahvaz, Iran.
Gunmen attacked an Iranian military parade in Ahvaz earlier today. Initial reports say two dozen or more people were killed and dozens more wounded. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility. But media outlets say another group, the Patriotic Arab Democratic Movement in Ahwaz, has as well.
The State Department has released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. As in past reports, State says that “Iran has allowed AQ [al Qaeda] facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria.”
Iran’s willingness to resort to tactical SRBM launches against regional targets warrants a larger discussion about the country’s missile power and escalation dynamics. It also requires an accurate assessment of what occurred on the ground against Iranian Kurds in Iraq and in the media space on this issue since September 8.
AL Qaeda’s operatives are fighting in more countries around the world today than was the case on 9/11. And its leaders still want to target the United States and its interest and allies. The war they started is far from over.
Iran has its tentacles all over Iraq, and the United States has no one to blame but itself. It is a bipartisan failure dating back to the March 2003 invasion. The seeds of this failure can be seen in the interrogation transcripts of Qayis Khazali, the leader of the Mahdi Army’s Special Groups and Asaib Ahl al Haq.