The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on September 9 issued what appears to be its first official, public accounting of weapons and munitions confiscated during operations in Zawtar al Gharbiyeh, Froun, and Srifa in southern Lebanon. The United States announced on July 20 that pilot zone operations to restore state control and clear Hezbollah arms had begun in the three southern Lebanese towns under the June 26 Trilateral Framework between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, following Israeli-Lebanese discussions in Rome.
The framework establishes a sequenced process for restoring Lebanese state authority, disarming non-state armed groups and dismantling their military infrastructure, and progressively redeploying Israeli forces from Lebanon. Its Security Annex establishes a four-step pilot zone model:
- Clearance through legal measures against non-state armed personnel engaged in unauthorized activity and the destruction or disablement of their associated weapons and infrastructure.
- Third-party verification of that clearance.
- The presence of LAF units that assume and maintain sole “operational control” to prevent renewed non-state armed activity.
- Lebanese-led reconstruction.
The Annex states that the LAF will lead implementation of this model and that success will be measured by verifiable implementation of the agreed disarmament and dismantlement process.
The September 9 statement was not the first claim that LAF had seized weapons in a pilot area. In a July 29 dispatch, an anonymous Lebanese soldier in Zawtar al Gharbiyeh told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that troops had seized weapons and dismantled explosive devices and other military equipment since deploying there. AFP noted that its source was not authorized to brief the media, and the individual did not provide figures or inventory and did not attribute the materiel to Hezbollah.
The Lebanese military’s new statement, by contrast, provided figures. The LAF said measures undertaken to impose “operational control” included six fixed checkpoints, 13 observation posts, round-the-clock foot and vehicle patrols, removing and confiscating weapons and unexploded ordnance, and preventing the presence of armed groups and unauthorized activities. Troops also opened roughly 12 kilometers of roads and searched an unspecified number of homes “with the consent of their owners.”
The LAF said those measures had enabled it to achieve “operational control” and control movement into and out of the area of operations. The framework’s Security Annex does not separately define the term, but places “sole operational control” at step three, after clearance and verification, and specifies that its purpose is to prevent any resurgence of non-state armed activity. The LAF’s September 9 statement, however, said that the phases of the pilot areas and subsequent steps had not been fully agreed upon. It also called an end to Israeli attacks and violations the “basic factor” needed for the Army to complete its deployment and framework missions.
The September 9 terminology echoes an earlier LAF declaration. On January 8, the army announced that it had “effectively and tangibly” achieved the objectives of the first phase of its weapons-restriction plan in the South Litani Sector, the area between the Litani River and Lebanon’s border with Israel. The LAF said that phase included extending “operational control” over territory under its authority. In the same statement, however, it said that work remained to clear unexploded ordnance and tunnels and address ceasefire-monitoring requests, while Israeli attacks, Israeli-held territory, and delayed military assistance impeded the completion of its tasks.
Less than two months later, Hezbollah reopened hostilities with Israel on March 2, launching missiles and drones after US-Israeli strikes killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, saying it was acting in support of Tehran. By June 19, Hezbollah attacks had killed at least 32 Israeli soldiers and four civilians. Israel and Hezbollah agreed that day to a ceasefire arranged by US and Qatari negotiators with Iranian assistance and scheduled to begin at 4 pm local time.
Against that record, the September 9 statement offers the first detailed official measure of what LAF says its current “operational control” has produced in the pilot areas. Of the approximately 1,818 weapons and pieces of ammunition the LAF said it had confiscated, 1,560 were pieces of “light ammunition.” The statement also listed 10 rocket-launch platforms, seven rockets, six drones, 51 rocket-propelledprojectiles, and 10 aerial bombs, plus a large number of mines and explosive devices.
The LAF did not define the “light ammunition” category or specify its calibers or types. In its own guidance on unexploded ordnance, however, the Lebanese Army lists “light and medium bullets” separately from hand and rifle grenades, artillery and tank shells, and aircraft missiles. Small-arms rounds are therefore the most natural reading of the term used on September 9, although the statement does not offer specifics. The 1,560 pieces account for roughly 86 percent of the 1,818-item total.
The statement also groups the removal and confiscation of weapons together with unexploded ordnance. On August 9, the LAF separately said that specialists had dismantled unexploded missiles and aerial bombs left by Israeli strikes in Zawtar al Gharbiyeh and several other southern towns.
That presentation resembles the LAF’s public messaging after the November 27, 2024, Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. The next day, the army described its southern missions as including temporary checkpoints, road clearing, and detonating unexploded ordnance. On January 29, 2025, it said it was expanding its deployment, assisting residents, implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701—which requires the area between the Blue Line and Litani River to be free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets, and weapons—and carrying out unspecified “field procedures.”
The September 9 statement does not say how many seized items, if any, specifically belonged to Hezbollah. It also does not identify any Hezbollah weapons caches, tunnels, or command centers as being dismantled in the three pilot areas, nor does it state that any Hezbollah operatives were disarmed or arrested.
