Generation Jihad guest host David Daoud, an FDD senior fellow focused on Lebanon and Hezbollah, talks with Lina Khatib, an associate fellow in Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, about her July trip in southern Lebanon, why the 2006 war never put the LAF in charge of the border, and whether Beirut can take Hezbollah’s weapons now that the group is weaker and Assad is gone.

The IDF says it destroyed more than two kilometers of Hezbollah underground infrastructure beneath Ali al Taher Ridge in southern Lebanon and identified the facility as a central command complex for Hezbollah’s Badr Unit. Israeli Army Radio reported that troops subsequently withdrew from the ridge and redeployed toward Beaufort, and Israel says it will retain control of Ali al Taher through surveillance and firepower.

The Lebanese Armed Forces said its operations in three southern Lebanon pilot areas have produced “operational control.” The military’s first detailed official accounting of arms seizures there shows that roughly 86 percent of its 1,818-item weapons-and-ammunition tally consists of “light ammunition.”

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is intensifying its presence in Nabatieh in southern Lebanon while reinforcing nearby Zawtar al Gharbiyeh, one of the pilot zones of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon. Lebanese reporting says the Nabatieh mission is intended to contain escalation rather than disarm Hezbollah, even though the framework makes the LAF responsible for implementing a process centered on the verified disarmament and dismantlement of non-state military infrastructure.

The IDF says it cleared Hezbollah fighters from underground infrastructure in south Lebanon’s Ali al Taher Ridge and achieved operational control above and below ground. Hezbollah denied losing the strategic position. The battle exposed the limits of Lebanese government efforts to secure the site through negotiation and prompted an Iranian threat of direct retaliation.

The US State Department ordered the departure of all non-emergency government personnel from the US Embassy in Beirut, along with their family members. Many media outlets tied this to rising US regional tensions with Iran. A Lebanese media outlet suggested it was in response to threats to the embassy from Hezbollah.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between November 3 and November 9, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Israel continued operations in Lebanon between July 28 and August 3, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Israel continued operations in Lebanon between June 9 and June 15, 2025. These activities were concentrated in south Lebanon, north and south of the Litani River, and included several targeted killings.

On March 16, the Syria-Lebanon border witnessed intense clashes between the new Syrian government and Lebanese Shiite tribesmen and Hezbollah affiliates.

Lebanon did not thoroughly inspect a Mahan Air Flight suspected of carrying funds for Hezbollah. It engaged in an act of theater to deny Israel justification to resume fighting the group in light of Beirut’s failure to implement its obligations under the November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement.
