Khak-i-Safed District Governor Abdul Khalik eats with chief of police 2nd Lt. Abdul Ghani after a transition shura in Khak-E-Safed district, Farah province, Afghanistan, Feb. 23, 2013. Abdul Ghani was killed by Taliban gunmen on May 17, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Sgt. Pete Thibodeau/Released).
A prominent ant-Taliban police chief in western Afghanistan, 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Ghani, was shot and mortally wounded by Taliban assassins late on Friday night, according to Afghan officials. Abdul Ghani served as the police chief for the Khak-i-Safid district in Farah province, and was best known for leading an effective crackdown against Taliban insurgents in the restive district, eliminating key Taliban leaders and disrupting insurgent activities since last year.
Some additional details were reported by Pajhwok Afghan News:
Khak-i-Safid district police head 2nd Lt. Abdul Ghani was shot dead by two motorcyclists in the Charbagh area of the provincial capital.
Farah Civil Hospital Director Dr. Abdul Hakim Rasuli said Ghani was brought to the hospital in wounded condition. However, he succumbed to his critical injuries on the way to the PRT medical facility in the city.
The Taliban, meanwhile, claimed responsibility for killing Ghani, who recently survived two assassination attempts during this past year.
Farah province was part of the third phase of the transition of security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force to Afghan control, and responsibility for five of Farah’s 10 districts — including Khak-i-Safid — was transferred to Afghan security forces on Dec. 12, 2012.
Within two weeks of the transition, Abdul Ghani was targeted by the Taliban in a roadside bomb attack. The blast tore through Ghani’s police truck as he and his men traveled through the Dahna-i-Khost area of Khak-i-Safid district, injuring police chief Ghani along with five policemen.
The assassination of Abdul Ghani has been a longstanding objective for Taliban militants active in Farah province, and his death will undoubtedly impair the Afghan government’s ability to continue its counterinsurgency campaign in the Khak-i-Safed district.
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