ISAF special ops teams are hunting another al Qaeda leader in Nangarhar province. From the ISAF press release, which reported on an April 11 raid in Nangarhar:
In Nangarhar province yesterday, a combined Afghan and coalition forces detained several suspected insurgents while searching for an al-Qaida leader during a security operation in Beshud district. The leader, who operates for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, works primarily in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan. He assists the insurgent networks with the acquisition, movement and employment of weapons and fighters in the Kunar region.
Based on multiple intelligence tips, the combined force searched a compound suspected of insurgent activity in the area. The force isolated the area, before calling all occupants to exit the compound peacefully. After ensuring the safety of the women and children, the combined force commenced their search and interviewed local residents. Several suspected insurgents were detained for further questioning. No shots were fired during the operation.
In a follow-up inquiry to ISAF by The Long War Journal, the military command said the following:
“The guy’s nationality is Uzbek.”
Note that ISAF said the individual targeted “operates for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, works primarily in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
ISAF has targeted al Qaeda and al Qaeda-linked Taliban commanders in Nangarhar and elsewhere in Afghanistan multiple times over the past several years. Here is a recent example of one such operative who was captured, from a March 8 press release:
Afghan and coalition forces captured a Haqqani network leader currently working for the Taliban and al Qaeda during security operations in Chaparhar district, Nangarhar province. The leader commanded approximately 40-50 Taliban fighters within Nangarhar province and planned regular attacks against Afghan and coalition forces. He led a group of Taliban fighters against two coalition force convoys last December and is connected to a March 7 suicide bombing in the city of Jalalabad which killed three Afghans.
Another example of a crossover Taliban and al Qaeda commander is Qari Zia Rahman, who is the regional “dual-hatted Taliban and al Qaeda leader” who operates in Kunar and Nuristan. QZR has been named by ISAF and extensively documented here at The Long War Journal.
Now, if you listen to analysts such as Alex Strick van Linschoten, you’d think that the idea of the Taliban and al Qaeda working together in Afghanistan is “a myth.” Read this piece at Current Intelligence for an example of what he thinks about this subject.
While van Linschoten takes an inordinate amount of space touting his credentials – his time in Afghanistan, his ability to speak the languages, his contacts with “Taliban” leaders, etc. – he doesn’t actually rebut the evidence put forward. He ignores or discounts the information put out by the US military, without explaining why. Special operations teams don’t conduct these raids on a whim; there is a lot of work that goes into the intelligence side leading up to the actual raid.
Van Linschoten can’t explain the close links that the Haqqani Network or the Mullah Dadullah Mahaz have with al Qaeda, or the IMU’s integration with the Taliban in the north, or cases such as the Afghan targeted in Nangarhar who works for both the Taliban and al Qaeda, or other such thorny issues that weaken his argument. Instead, he labels those who point out the linkages as “crackpots” producing works that are “steaming away like something your dog left in the park on a cold winter’s day.” Is this supposed to pass for sophisticated, scholarly analysis and commentary? We hope not.
