This article was co-written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio and originally published at The Weekly Standard.
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Hangu is the latest district to fall under Taliban control. The government signed peace agreements in the red agencies/ districts; purple districts are under de facto Taliban control; yellow regions are under Taliban influence. |
THE PRE-DAWN SILENCE in eastern Afghanistan’s Nuristan province was shattered on July 13 by the racket of machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades; the attack on the new base was fiercer and the insurgent force larger than American troops could have expected. The first enemy fire struck the mortar pit, then their RPGs blew up a tow truck. Stars and Stripes, the U.S. armed forces’ overseas newspaper, reported that after two hours of combat “some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly.”
The attack on the small base near the remote village of Wanat drew enormous media attention. It was not just the fact that nine American soldiers lost their lives. A reported 200 well-armed insurgents managed to mass around the base and came close to overrunning it. Stars and Stripes noted that “so many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.” This early morning attack quickly came to symbolize the growing difficulties of the Afghanistan war.
Insurgent activity in Afghanistan has spiked in recent months. According to Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, the U.S. commander of NATO forces in the region, there were about 40 percent more attacks in eastern Afghanistan over the first five months of 2008 than during the same period a year ago. Schloesser has also described the attacks as “increasingly complex.” A mid-July ABC News/Washington Post poll found that a surprising 45 percent of Americans “do not think the war in Afghanistan is
worth fighting,” despite the attacks of 9/11.
A critical factor behind Afghanistan’s deteriorating state is the turn of events in Pakistan, where the Taliban and al Qaeda have found a safe haven in recent years. After the October 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan felled the Taliban, most of al Qaeda’s senior leadership relocated to Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas, the remote and mountainous regions that border Afghanistan, and set about finding allies within tribal society.
Pakistan’s military mounted a campaign to flush al Qaeda out of the tribal areas after the group was connected to multiple assassination attempts against Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, but the military suffered so many losses that Musharraf eventually concluded he had no choice but to deal with his would-be killers. In March and September 2006 he consummated the two halves of the Waziristan accords, peace agreements that essentially ceded Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Musharraf also cut deals with Islamic militants in the regions of Swat, Bajaur, and Mohmand. The treaties, punctuated with frequent skirmishes, symbolized Pakistan’s inability to confront its extremists.
The negotiation process only accelerated after a new parliamentary majority rode to power in February on a wave of anti-American sentiment. While negotiations and peace deals with militants have long been part of Pakistan’s political landscape, the scale of negotiations under the new majority was unprecedented. Talks opened with virtually every militant outfit in the country, and the government has entered into seven agreements encompassing nine districts.
It was easy to predict the failure of the Waziristan accords, in which the government received only unenforceable promises from extremists, and there is no reason to believe that the new accords will yield a different result. Rather, they are likely to increase the geographic areas that serve as safe havens for Pakistan’s extremist groups-with predictable harm to Afghanistan.
The primary advantage that terrorist sanctuaries in northwestern Pakistan provide to the Afghan insurgency is the ability to operate with relative freedom in that country. The U.S. military is constrained in cross-border strikes and hot pursuit because Pakistan views the tribal areas as sovereign territory. Not only is Pakistan a U.S. ally, but there are also serious concerns that too heavy a U.S. hand in the tribal areas will destabilize the government and push more members of Pakistan’s military and intelligence communities and civilian population into the extremists’ camp.
Thus, the American military is handcuffed in its ability to respond to attacks when the enemy melts back over Pakistan’s border. Reluctance to strike in Pakistani territory also prevents the U.S. military from disrupting the enemy’s bases and supply lines. The safe havens in northwestern Pakistan give the Taliban and allied groups a virtually untouchable rear area, where they can recruit, arm, train, and infiltrate fighters into Afghanistan.
Pakistan is used both defensively and offensively by insurgents. The July attack in Nuristan was just one of many attacks along the border. Militant groups based in Pakistan have been able to carry out a string of fresh attacks and bombings in the provinces of Zabul, Paktika, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Kunar–all of which sit along the border.
The second advantage that Afghan insurgents derive from Pakistan is the ability to train and gain combat experience. American military and intelligence officials have told us that more than 100 training camps are operating in the North-West Frontier Province and tribal
areas, up from an estimated 29 camps last year in Waziristan. The camps vary in size and specialty, and some are temporary.
At these camps, a host of extremist groups–including local Taliban organizations, hardcore al Qaeda recruits, and Pakistani terror groups focused on Kashmir-are trained in a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Training for the Taliban’s military arm focuses on the fight against the Pakistani army or NATO forces in Afghanistan. Other camps focus on training suicide bombers or preparing al Qaeda operatives for attacks in the West. One camp exclusively services the Black Guard, Osama bin Laden’s elite bodyguard.
In addition to the training camps, insurgents have gained experience fighting against Pakistan’s military, Frontier Corps, and police forces. Though not all Taliban fighters who battle Pakistan’s security forces travel to Afghanistan to fight NATO, some do. The Pakistani theater has allowed the Taliban to refine its tactics against a professional military, and these tactics have in turn migrated into Afghanistan.
The peace treaties that Pakistan’s government has entered into with extremists also allow a greater flow of recruits to join insurgent groups. Some are volunteers, while others are draftees. The author of a remarkable travelogue about Pakistan’s Khyber agency recently published in the English-language daily The News was told by a local business owner that the Taliban forces families to provide one male to join their ranks. “Those who refuse,” he was told, “risk having their homes demolished and a heavy fine … imposed.”
Indeed, once peace agreements are signed, the Taliban frequently establishes a parallel political administration. Two of the top priorities are extracting taxes and recruiting fighters. This provides the Taliban with a robust force that allows it to hold local territory and send more fighters to Afghanistan. In fact, the Nuristan assault was conducted by a broad range of extremist groups. Tamim Nuristani, the former governor of Nuristan, said the attackers were “not only Taliban. They were [Pakistan-based] Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hezb-i-Islami, Taliban, and those people who are dissatisfied with the [Karzai] government.”
In an effort to defeat NATO, the Taliban and allied groups are targeting coalition supply lines through Pakistan. More than 70 percent of NATO’s supplies pass through the Torkham Gate in the Khyber tribal agency. The Taliban runs much of that province, with Pakistani troops heavily patrolling the road to Afghanistan but little else. Despite this military presence, the Taliban still periodically disrupts supply lines. In March, Taliban fighters blew up 36 parked oil tankers destined for Afghanistan in what appeared to be a chain reaction triggered by an initial bomb blast. In July, an armed Taliban squad in Landikotal smashed the windows and punctured the tires of a NATO supply convoy. The Taliban has distributed leaflets threatening drivers who deliver oil or other supplies to coalition forces.
Insurgents in Afghanistan will continue to use the situation in Pakistan to their advantage. One of the keys to a successful U.S. mission in Afghanistan is a sound Pakistan policy. Otherwise, the war may be lost on both fronts.
24 Comments
Good story. Please have more like them. Could LWJ do a story about the supply lines. I ask this because of the following sentences: “In an effort to defeat NATO, the Taliban and allied groups are targeting coalition supply lines through Pakistan. More than 70 percent of NATO’s supplies pass through the Torkham Gate in the Khyber tribal agency. The Taliban runs much of that province, with Pakistani troops heavily patrolling the road to Afghanistan but little else. ” QUESTION: Why do we/NATO have our supply lines running through enemy terrority (tribal western Pakistan)?
Nic,
It seems mainly a matter of that there really isn’t a more expedient option. Afghanistan is a landlocked country. Afghanistan’s southwest neighbor, Iran, somehow I don’t think will be too warm to the idea of US troops rolling down their streets. Same with China to the East, although even if they did, there isn’t exactly much in the way of paved roads in that part of the world.
Airlifting isn’t cheap. I say as long as our convoys are armed to the teeth, keep trucking through Pakistan.
Nic, our supply lines run through enemy terrority because our Sea Port Of Debarkation is Karachi and there are only a few highways and rail lines going from Karachi to Chaman and Torkham. Operation Enduring Freedom’s version of Main Supply Route Tampa is not under friendly control, unless Pakistan is counted as friendly.
We used to have access to our logistical facilities in Germany via rail through Poland, Russia and Uzbekistan, but the Uzbek dictator got a better offer from the Chinese and Russians.
Musharaff’s primary contribution to the war effort has been in keeping the Line of Communications open, for the most part. When Pakistan drops that ball and blockades us, it will be time to drop the hammer on them.
A Sanctuary Counteroffensive Operation ROCK CRUSHER-style incursion into the F.A.T.A using ANA supported by US would be the hammer I’d drop on them. And on the way back out, IF the ANA leaves, they should keep the high ground dominating the natural topographic boundary where the writ of Islamabad stops and the writ of Kabul begins, thus rectifying the Durand Line.
Very interesting article. The situation in Pakistan is very difficult and won’t be an easy problem to solve. Plus, even if we did send troops to P-stan, how would we get our supplies? You think the Pakistani government wouldn’t cut off US supplies? Allies or not, I can garantee you they would. The tribal areas are mountainous, so that means we would need to train more troops for mountain combat? We probably would have problems getting our armor to work up there. In my opinion, we should use artillery and airstrikes to target enemy positions, and Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. This is a very difficult situation and will require careful planning if this were to take place.
I used to serve on a military honor guard at Ft. Rosecrans National Cemetary. I remember a grave stone that said Vera Cruz 1914 Medal of Honor. In 1914 and 1916 the United States Army deployed into Mexico to resist attacks across our border and/or to prevent the Caranza constitutional government from being overthrown. General Pershing pursued Pancho Villa across the border.
In Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was scared to allow U.S. troops to occupy the Ho-Chi-Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia. The Viet-Cong and the NVA had a safe haven in Laos and Cambodia.
We have to go back to a General Pershing type cross border operation. We can not be stuck in a Vietnam style McNamara enermy safe haven situation in Afghanistan.
Enemy operational bases in North West Pakistan need to be occupied and neutralized.
Armies that are out of supply degrade quickly and certainly find maintaining an offensive posture difficult. Thus invading Pakistan now is really not viable. As Bill Roggio suggests, we have no good options and the solution needs to come on the Pakistani side of the border. My hope is that we can get enough capability in Afghanistan when combined with a growing Afghan army to allow us to largely restrain enfiltration.
In the meantime, I think Al Queda and the more adventurous Taliban leaders will tick off enough Pakistanis that they will decide to do something. At that time, we should help and we should recruit Pashtoons that are tired of their children being dragged off to senseless war deaths, having their daughters put in forced marriages with thugs and generally having non local Jihadis lord over them on their own soil. (Insufferable behavior is a jihadi weakness.)
This is the best illustration of how political Islam is parasitical. Like a parasite, it can’t survive on its own, and any state entity it rules (Afghanistan) will quickly fall apart. But by attaching itself to a larger entity, and using that entity’s own defensive systems to protect itself from external enemies, it can thrive. Islamism is the tapeworm of political ideologies.
It’s a pity the Taliban aren’t stupid enough to try and announce a separate state in the NWFP, they’ll know what a sweet deal they have at the moment, and that as long as they’re protected by Pakistani sovereignty, America’s options are limited.
The only long option I can see is enforcing the border to such an extent that Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan becomes incredibly costly. That done, the Taliban will get restless and turn south, thus annoying ordinary Pakistanis so much that Islamabad finally goes after them. Which, if most of their army weren’t currently pointed at India, they could do much more effectively.
What will happen to our supply lines if Musharraf is impeached?
Do we have “force multipliers” on the ground in Pakistan? Seems to me if we train the Pakistani’s how to fight and they can turn the tide in the Frontier areas that the Pakistani people and Government would have a different perspective and be more supportive.
I got an idea, albeit a bit eccentric and far-fetched. You’ve all read Clear and Present Danger, right? Get our B-2s, and maybe also give the F-22 a shakedown to see how it performs on ground attack, and bombard every known AQ or Taliban base with cellulose-encased bombs that leave no fragmentation or direct evidence. Then, just deny that the whole ever thing happened.
Maybe the best we can hope for in the near-term future is a strong ANA that can “box in” the Taliban between the Afghan border and actual Pakistani-controlled territory.
they need to have sound weapons.
that will make the taliban run of in half a second.
Although I doubt any president or general would approve it, the NWFP would be a perfect place for targeted biological warfare. Simply infect a few dozen AQ and Taliban prisoners with the most virulent strains of drug-resistant TB, bird flu and polio and allow these men to escape back to Pakistan in the fall. Given the insurgent’s poor access to medical supplies combined with the close contact and confinement engendered by winter quarters, these diseases would sweep through AQ and Taliban troops, killing or disabling vast numbers of them and, potentially, their leadership and network of supporters. Because these diseases are all endemic to the area, definitively tracing this outbreak back to NATO would be almost impossible. Until World War II, as many soldiers died from disease and infection as died from bombs and bullets.
Moreover, this epidemic of disease among AQ/Taliban troops would disrupt their support from the local Pakistanis in the area. Not only would locals shun the radical Islamists as possible disease carriers and facilitators of polio by their attacks on NGO healthcare workers working to inoculate local children, they would also turn toward the central Pakistani government for medical treatment and prevention. Furthermore, they may also see this plague sweeping AQ and the Taliban as Allah’s judgement upon them, (i.e. revenge for their evil ways), discouraging enlistment and cooperation.
Alex at 3:04—
Remember early in the Iraqi insurgency when the IEDs were often just explosives without casings or shrapnel? Not so deadly. Notice how suicide belts include shrapnel because without it it is not so deadly. In any case, I doubt a bombing campaign would go unnoticed.
RE Batman at 1:03—- I also keep wondering what happens if the Taliban cuts the supply line. I think if Pakistan does not reopen it quickly, our forces would have to get involved. I would rather let Pakistani politics work their way out for awhile and just secure the Afghan border as best we can but since we have no satisfactory land supply route, we would have to act and not necessarily just against the supply line blocks. Surely the Taliban must consider this possibility too. The Pakistani public may be more forgiving of our action on Pakistani soil if it is seen as forced by the Taliban cutting our supply routes and the Pakistani army being unable to reopen it.
Posted by s,dog7 at August 7, 2008 5:07 PM ET:
they need to have sound weapons.
that will make the taliban run of in half a second.
Good point! We can spool up a few of Britney Spears’ latest. I know I would run away!
Resupply questions? Answer: C-17 transport aircraft; ground supply across northern Afghan border at exorbitant prices.
We can not let the enemy have a safe haven across a border. It did not work in Vietnam.
Cordell,
No, on the Bio-warfare – NO, NO, NO
I understand the frustrations surrounding this issue, but the route you are suggesting is pure madness. Let’s not start talking crazy here. That’s a can of worms you don’t want to open up. Germs don’t know national boundries, are completely unpredictable, and don’t discriminate between innocent and guilty.
The Vietnam analogy keeps coming up often. It is a valid example of how difficult it is to suppress an insurgency that has a politically protected safe haven in a neighboring country. Incidently, that is also a big issue with Iraq.
One can not approach any analogy without noting the differences though. The political situation in Pakistan is not analogous to Vietnam. North Vietnam as an entire political entity was fully at war to dominate the south. In the case of Pakistan, we have a government and people that are very divided. Factions within the population and government support the Taliban, others are opposed. The situation is very delicate and the government of Pakistan is very close to disintegration.
In a way, Vietnam was much easier problem to define politically. Pakistan is the mother of all political messes. In some ways Pakistan resembles the Balkans prior to WWI as it sits on a number of political fault lines. Any large political shift in Pakistan has the potential to bring about a clash between regional powers, world powers, religions, and cultures.
Pretty disturbing POVs here! And I absolutely disagree with many of the points the author and the commentators have raised here.
Its even so much disheartening to see such comments coming from Americans after we are fighting their war in our own lands! Pakistan could be never in so much mess as it is today all in the name of providing safety and security to the very Americans who are most probably here criticizing Pakistan!
USA is the one to be blamed for all the mess as USA used a dictator to play the whole messy game. Had they come through the proper channel of siding with a democratically elected Government, things would have been so different today.
And seriously please do some homework, how many times Pakistan has asked Afghanistan to let it either mine the border if not fence it? Why has not the US Government and especially arm-chair critics like you have pushed Karzai for that?
Such POVs really make one wonder – why are we fighting this war which is not even ours?
I see a lot of frustration being expressed here. You tend to see that throughout the political spectrum, right, middle and left. I see the ABC News/Washington Post poll that Bill quoted in the last thread said 45 percent of Americans don’t find the Afghan war worth fighting. A lot of that reflects frustration over both wars. While many people just want to quit, others on the other end of the political spectrum are suggesting doing rash things such as an all out attack against Pakistan or nukeing them all. I think we need to be careful about throwing outrageous suggestions out there. A few commentor’s seem to think you can go knock all the Pakistani’s in the head and be done with it. That’s just crazy talk.
It is not as if NATO forces were taking huge numbers of casualties or in peril of being overrun by the Taliban. The frustration is over the impossible mess that the political situation has become within Pakistan and the fact that no easy solutions can be applied anytime soon. Pakistan’s political situation cannot stay where is currently is. They will eventually either turn against us, or against the Taliban. It is impossible to say which at this point. I tend to be pessimistic but wouldn’t take bets either way.
It has been my contention since the beginning that the Islamic extremists are their own worst enemies. In both Iraq, Chechnya, and a decade earlier in Algeria the militants at some point in the war appeared to be winning. That is until the populous found how awful they really are and turned against them. The militants still had to be beat by armies but the loss of public support made all the difference.
At home, no one is going to make any great changes in policy before a new administration comes in. The new administration will have about a year before the press starts clamoring for something decisive to be done. Something has got to give over the next year or two and things will start to change, one way or another.
What is the answer to the question as to why Afghan President Kharzai will not let Pakistan mine and fence the Afghani-Pakistan border?
Posted by Buff52 at August 8, 2008 7:43 PM ET:
It has been presumed that Afghanistan has claims to more of the Pashtun areas in the frontier areas of Pakistan than currently recognized and mines and fences might tend to fix an undesirable border. I don’t think that has been said publicly by them though so you may want to chalk it up to speculation.
Afghanistan is not going to agree to Pakistan mining and fencing a border they don’t recognize.
The Durand Line agreement has expired. Both the Afghan monarchy and the British Raj are gone. Pakistan wants a puppet rump state in their rear to provide strategic depth against India and won’t negotiate a sensible boundary based on the topographic features of the terrain and the traditional tribal territories of the Pashtuns.
Pakistan seems incapable of exercising the de jure and de facto sovereignty over their border expected of other nuclear powers. If they can’t beat the Taliban, how are they going to beat the American-trained and mentored ANA?
Directed to=> Mr/Miss. Cannoneer No. 4
With the sort of dreams you have forecasted, here is a deal breaker for you. If you believe ANA being mentored by America will be something out of the box, then you are forgetting that first they need to go past the very battle hardened Taleban and pro-Pakistani elements CIA trained in 80s!
You are talking about Pastuns, they are being sidelined in Afghanistan right now!
Two years back on my visit to Chaman-Afghan Border in Balochistan, I saw that the whole border security of ANA was Tajik and composed of NA elements. As per some stats over 90% of ANA is non-Pashtun and we are talking about Afghanistan here which is majority Pashtun! Do you think they will not soon find themselves at losing end and will prefer going on with Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of the line which are the backbone of Pakistani economics today?
And sorry forgot to add, South of Afghanistan and NA/Tajiks seems pretty odd to anyone who has at least some idea about Afghanistan’s ethnic composition!