The US-led coalition and Iraqi forces recently hunted down senior Islamic State personnel responsible for “overseeing operations conducted within Salah ad Din, Kirkuk, Ninewah and northern Anbar provinces.” The Islamic State claims that is men are especially prolific in these same areas. Over a six-week period from Sept. 27 to Nov. 7, the Islamic State claimed a total of 313 operations in Iraq, with more than 100 occurring in Kirkuk province.
While the Treasury designation focuses on the four Iraqis’ links to Hezbollah, which is described as “a terrorist proxy for the Iranian regime that seeks to undermine Iraqi sovereignty and destabilize the Middle East,” it practically ignores the fact that one of them is the Secretary General of the Imam Ali Battalions, or Kata’ib Imam Ali, a key component of the Popular Mobilization Forces, an official military arm of the Iraqi state that reports directly to the prime minister.
Since early September, the US has issued terrorist designations for Islamic State moneymen operating around the globe, from the Caribbean to East Africa. The designations highlight the diverse sources the so-called caliphate uses to fund its insurgency and terrorist operations.
While Iranian-backed parties are moving to form a government in Baghdad that could force the US to exit the country, they face growing public anger over governance failures that threaten the viability of the system.
Iran’s willingness to resort to tactical SRBM launches against regional targets warrants a larger discussion about the country’s missile power and escalation dynamics. It also requires an accurate assessment of what occurred on the ground against Iranian Kurds in Iraq and in the media space on this issue since September 8.
AL Qaeda’s operatives are fighting in more countries around the world today than was the case on 9/11. And its leaders still want to target the United States and its interest and allies. The war they started is far from over.
Iran has its tentacles all over Iraq, and the United States has no one to blame but itself. It is a bipartisan failure dating back to the March 2003 invasion. The seeds of this failure can be seen in the interrogation transcripts of Qayis Khazali, the leader of the Mahdi Army’s Special Groups and Asaib Ahl al Haq.
A newly released interrogation report shows that Qayis al-Khazali identified Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as the two individuals Iran trusted “the most with attempting to implement the Iranian agenda in Iraq.” The pair went from being marginal players shortly after the US-led invasion in 2003 to leading the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces, one of most powerful and influential military organizations in Iraq.