Afghan pilot kills 8 US troops, contractor in Kabul attack

An Afghan pilot opened fire on NATO soldiers at an airbase in Kabul today, killing eight US troops and an American contractor. The attack is the latest setback for Afghan security forces.

The International Security Assistance Force confirmed the attack, but did not release the names or nationalities of those killed.

“At 10:25 a.m. local Kabul time this morning authorities received notification of small arms fire at North Kabul International Airport,” ISAF stated in a press release. “A quick reaction force responded to the incident. Eight International Security Assistance Force troops and a contractor were killed in the incident.” Pajhwok Afghan News claimed that the attack took place during a meeting at a “command centre.” The eight troops and the contractor were later identified as Americans.

The US soldiers and the contractor likely were members of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, which is responsible for training the Afghan National Security Assistance Force. NATO Air Training Command Afghanistan is based out of North Kabul International.

The motive for the attack is unclear. Both Pajhwok Afghan News and Al Jazeera reported that an Afghan pilot opened fire on the ISAF troops after a heated dispute. Al Jazeera said the pilot was a seasoned colonel, while one source told Pajhwok Afghan News that the colonel was retired.

“For the past 20 years, he has been a military pilot,” General Mohammad Zahir Azimi, an Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman told Al Jazeera. “An argument happened between him and the foreigners and we have to investigate that.”

The Taliban, in a statement released on their propaganda website, Voice of Jihad, claimed credit for the attack, and said that “a Mujahid uninformed [sic] as a soldier” struck at a recruiting center as a meeting was underway. The Taliban have not provided the name of the attacker, as they have done on previous occasions when they claim suicide attacks. In the past, the Taliban have attempted to claim credit for other attacks by Afghan soldiers and policemen, although not all of these claims could be substantiated.

Afghan forces plagued by missteps, attacks

Today’s attack is the latest in a series of recent setbacks for Afghan security, including Taliban infiltration attacks, attacks on ISAF forces by Afghan soldiers, and even a massive jailbreak in Kandahar that resulted in the escape of more than 450 Taliban commanders and fighters. The Taliban have shown the ability to penetrate high-security facilities; three attacks in the past two weeks have taken place at such facilities.

On April 18, a Taliban suicide bomber dressed as a soldier penetrated security at the Afghan Ministry of Defense in Kabul, killing two Afghan soldiers and wounding several aides to top Afghan officials in a gunfight before he was able to detonate his vest. The suicide bomber managed to reach the third floor of the ministry and wounded several top aides.

On April 16, a suicide bomber wearing a police uniform detonated his vest at a combined Afghan and ISAF training base in the Qarghayi district in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman. ISAF later confirmed that the suicide bomber was indeed an Afghan soldier.

On April 15, a Taliban suicide bomber from the Mullah Dadullah Mahaz, or Mullah Dadullah Front, assassinated the chief of police for Kandahar province and killed two of his bodyguards. The suicide bomber was dressed as a policeman and detonated after hugging the police chief in his office.

These attacks have been major setbacks for the nascent Afghan security forces, which have struggled to develop into a professional fighting force. The Taliban attacks and a string of recent attacks by Afghan security forces on ISAF personnel serve to sow distrust among ISAF troops assigned to work closely with their Afghan counterparts.

ISAF and NATO have placed great emphasis on the training of Afghan forces, in preparation for drawing down NATO forces in the coming years. The Afghan National Security Forces are expected to take control of security by 2014. The security forces are currently undergoing rapid expansion, which is leaving room for Taliban infiltration as well as the recruitment of unqualified personnel.


Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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  • someguy says:

    does anyone know how long it usually takes for NATO/ ISAF, to release names? I’m worried about a friend..

  • WillThrill says:

    @someguy….In the case of american isaf troop deaths(however the nationality of the k.i.a. troops hasn’t been released) It is common for the communications blackout to remain in effect until all next of kin have been notified. This case may be different do to the circumstances and possible investigation complications

  • CJR says:

    Usually about 1-3 days. The next of kin need to be notified before a name is released.
    The release will be posted here:

  • ArneFufkin says:

    @someguy: It usually takes a couple days. The Pentagon locates and informs family and then releases the identities. The releases are usually published here:
    // but local media outlets usually report the news earlier.
    I hope your friend is okay.

  • Justin says:

    There are multiple reports that Americans were those who were killed. I hope your friend is safe.

  • Mat says:

    “The Taliban have not provided the name of the attacker, as they have done on previous occasions when they claim suicide attacks. In the past, the Taliban have attempted to claim credit for other attacks by Afghan soldiers and policemen, although not all of these claims could be substantiated.”
    Does it really matter who did it? I think it’s obvious to any but the most die-hard lawyers who are obviously running the show that training in the Afghan Army is not going as well as claimed.
    Whether the Taliban had or didn’t have the name is absolutely irrelevant (seriously, how the heck can you fight a war with this sort of legalistic nonsense?). What’s relevant is that one enemy managed to take out 9 of our soldiers. So the question now is what do are we going to do about that?

  • Bill Roggio says:

    Your characterization that this is some kind of attempt to use legalese to muddle the issue is odd, and misplaced.
    It matters if you want to know whether the Taliban carried out the attack or whether a member of the Afghan Army carried out the attack, or if the attacker was a Taliban infiltrator/turncoat.
    NTM-A and ISAF certainly are interested in knowing who executed the attack. If it was a security breach, they’ll want to try to fix that. If it was an Taliban plant, they’ll want to try to fix that. And if it was a disgruntled officer, as it seems to be, then that matters too.
    None of that takes away from the fact that the ANSF has some serious issues, as I’ve documented.
    Or, we can take a simplistic approach, as you did, and just label the murderer as an “enemy” and put zero effort into thinking about what just happened here. If we did that, we can be sure we’d learn no lessons.

  • Spooky says:

    Excellent response, Bill. Painting this situation with too broad a brush is dangerous.

  • TLA says:

    The Barrista tribe are coming in from the hills.
    Sorry, I’m not sure how commonly barristers are referred to in U.S. legal jargon.

  • Mat says:

    How is it “odd or misplaced?” We’re fighting a war, not playing lawyer in some courtroom. We know who did it. We’re just playing “legal nice” so that we don’t offend Afghans. God forbid that we actually do that.
    Good people are dying and we’re using a silly legalistic system to try to methodically figure out what happened.
    I mean, what if we did this nonsense after Pearl Harbor? “Well, we’re pretty sure that elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy bombed some of our ships, but we have to make sure that it wasn’t sanctioned by the Imperial Army or the Emperor of Japan. Also, we have to see if any Italian or German armed forces were supporting this as well.” Sound silly? Yeah, the process surrounding this current incident does too.
    I think it’s pretty safe to say that it was a Taliban plant. Even if it wasn’t, it doesn’t change the fact that nine Americans are dead. And for no real good reason other than the fact that we insist on fighting this war through legal and not military means.
    To say that the ANSF has issues is an understatement.
    Too broad a brush? From my viewpoint, there’s no brush at all. How is that any better? When you fight a war, people get killed. It’s unavoidable. However, instead of actually trying to fight a war, we have to make friends. Well, when you’re killing the enemy, it’s rather difficult to make friends, don’t you think? You honestly think that if you kill someone’s brother, son, etc. that the rest of the family is suddenly going to love you because you’re being nice? Of course not.
    When you fight a war, to break the enemy’s stuff and their will. You do so regardless of what the enemy thinks. The problem is that we worry too much about how the other side feels. I can guarantee you that if the roles were switched they wouldn’t give a hoot.

  • Bill Roggio says:

    Mat, it is odd and misplaced because if you spent some time around here, you’d know this isn’t a lawfare crowd. Anything but. So your accusation is laughable on its face.
    If you’ve followed the news on this story, you’d know it wasn’t a Taliban plant. If you want to lump in the ANSF in with the Taliban and declare them both enemies, by all means feel free to do so. Just don’t expect some of us to take you seriously.

  • Jose says:

    I’m going to have to side with Mat on this one. It’s obvious to most people that Mat is responding emitionally, as any human would in response to traumatic news that hits us all in the gut. I think in many cases, this blog gives too much credance on what the Enemy says or not. Sort of like listening to your neighbors argue over something mundane and silly.
    Real men’s men would likely be quiet and give Mat his space, knowing he is reacting as some do under this kind of bad news. Giving him his space without instant commentary is the best approach. Instantly responding back to his comments is a very womanly approach. Would you agree?

  • Bill Roggio says:

    So real men get all emotional in times of stress? That’s too funny.
    You may not like what the enemy says, but you really should listen to it. I’ll give you a good example. Our intel community and military can’t even define what al Qaeda is, and defaults to a silly notion that all AQ is exclusively madeup of individuals who personally swear bayat to Osama bin Laden. But if you listen to what top al Qaeda leaders say, they’ll give you an entirely different definition (bayat, plus a large cadre of volunteers, plus allied groups). We make bad policy using our narrow definitions. So it is a good idea not to listen to AQ?
    Here’s another example: everyone, including the international media, the US and Pakistani intel services, etc. claimed Hakeemullah Mehsud & Qari Hussain Mehsud were killed in Jan. 2010. But if you watched the reports from the region and coupled this with statements from the Taliban, it became clear they weren’t killed. I was the only person saying he was alive. When the Times Square bombing (failed) occurred I was proven correct. They both appeared on videotapes.
    I could go on & on citing example of why it is indeed valuable to monitor what they say.
    You are free to ignore their words at your own peril.
    A question for you: I guess you’d think it would have ben a terrible idea to read Mein Kampf to gain some insght on Adolf Hitler and his designs for world domination?
    Now I’m sure you’ll try to characterize my words as some kind of feminine hissy fit (which is an emotional response, as was your previous comment). But I’ll respond by challenging you to prove me wrong on the facts.

  • Soccer says:

    I tend to agree with everybody here. While we are not a lawfare crowd (FAR from it), sometimes we seem to have a little too much sympathy for the enemy, or the “other side”. If it was reversed, they just would not care, and they would take our soft nature as a way to massacre us even easier.
    I watch jihadi videos all the time because it is like a real time insight, a window into what is REALLY happening with the jihadists. You can’t trust a lot of reports these days, hence the “suspected”, “reported”, terms thrown in the mix. If jihadis do not confirm a death, then it didn’t happen. Same with Qari Hussain Mehsud, and Hakeemullah Mehsud. The ONLY exception is when Ibn Amin died. They didn’t release a martyrdom statement, but they did kill their own commanders and soldiers in revenge for his “death”.
    At this point, from reading the ISAF releases all indications show he is a disgruntled ANSF soldier. I think it’s a mistake to lump everything into “the Taliban did it!”, because times such as this don’t tend to favor that notion.
    By the way Bill, Kavkaz center released a martyrdom confirmation of Mullo Abdullo; if you want, I can send it to you. Or I can post it here.

  • mike says:

    the part which disgusts me is for a 20 year military vet – a pilot no less – to become unhinged so violently without an immediately known provocation ( ie physical altercation, family member killed etc) really could reflect pretty poorly on the ANA, which we are counting on to stabilize the area when we leave.
    i hate to sound simplistic, but frankly we are moving deck chairs on the Titanic in AfPak area, where we neither can grasp the scope of their strategic goals nor can we afford to confront – literally and figurativley – the corruption, drug use, mysogeny, tribal/feudal culture and abject hate the vast majority of those folks have for the US and our choices/way of life.
    Get out while we can and spend 1/100th of the mones we currently are on K2 airfield and have drones do the dirty work – every year we keep them fighting eachother and we take out those who raise their heads make us that much stronger and less exposed

  • TMP says:

    +1 Bill – Keep up the serious work and analysis –
    @Mat, your concerns about JAGs and Civ Lawyers having to much influence is a valid one….but on the whole distictions between who are real enemies are along with what our real enemies are saying (and doing) is a must.

  • Charu says:

    This was a very unfortunate incident and needs to be investigated closely. Early indications point to the killer having snapped precipitously. However, the early reports also mentioned that the killer’s brother (?) had been interviewed following the incident. I would suspect that the Taliban had enough informers among the public to identify the killer in order to propagandize deceptively on their behalf.
    More importantly, except for security guards, could there be a policy that no weapons are brought to these meetings? This may be naive and unforceable, but having all attendees first go through metal detectors/scanners could prevent these “suicide” attacks.

  • Johno says:

    What is it with you people.You need to focus. This man was a retired colonel who was a pilot. What does that tell you? He played wide receiver with the The Juice? No….ok he pitched for the Yankees? Shooting guard for the Lakers? Umm.. let me see… pilot… colonel (20 years service at least). Oh yeah! He trained in USSR to bomb his own countryman for the best part of 10 years.
    The 8 ISAF soldiers have joined hundreds of innocent people he has murdered.
    Well knock me down with a feather. If only we had thought for a moment.

  • TMP says:

    First my grammer errors above are ridiculous (our & are). With that noted I would also say there is much here that does not make sense to me yet. How the hell 9 American’s were gunned down without taking this guy out just does not add up to me.

  • Soccer says:

    JohnO, I do not believe that is you. The JohnO I know is very pro military and committed to the mission in Afghanistan.
    It seems everyone in this thread is getting angry. Everybody just needs to calm down.

  • Neo says:

    Afghanistan has been at war for thirty years now with no end in sight. People like to think of it as a primitive society. It

  • dwall says:

    They may have made a joke about his favorite goat vs his being a jihadi. No more guns for afghans during training sessions.
    Hell, give pak and afghan to China. they have radically different ROEs and have millions too many men. They can pillage the minerals, leave it a toxic pit like they leave Africa, and get busy in the burkas while they are in country. There are already 10,000 Chinese building train tracks over by Kashmir. Let them put 100,000 troops in the two countries and over the next twenty years bring them up to about the 1400’s.

  • Academy99 says:

    While your debate here is warranted…I think you should take it to another forum. My friend and classmate was shot and killed. He left behind a wife, a son, and a daughter. He was a highly trained F-16 pilot. Maj David Brodeur died serving his country and left this world in too rapid a fashion. Dave was committed to the cause, despite the politics. I miss him and every mission I fly henceforth will be commenced with a thought of him. RIP Dave. The Gold will and still shines. I miss you buddy.
    USAF Academy Class of 1999

  • ES says:

    The officer and pilot who killed the US trainers in KAIA on 27 April has indeed been trained in the USSR as have been most of the ANA officers and the civil servants. Given that these training programmes stopped between 1989 and 1992, no younger generation is available to fill the gap between those above 40 with a technical and secular education and those who started to learn something post 2002 (of unknown quality as generally post Taliban educational reform was quantity but not quality). This generation is our bridge towards those young officers who graduate now from the military academy and are ready to fill their shoes in ten years time.
    While the investigation as to the reason for the killings continues, I want to offer some thoughts:
    All those who knew Colonel M.G. describe him as a worldly secularist, who had some issues though with alcohol and gambling. Originally from the Eastern part of Kabul, his family is known in their area for their progressive views, and the level of education their male and female members obtained, several being currently medical doctors. This is a background far from the Taliban or fundamentalist circles. His lifestyle is telling enough.
    He stayed behind in Kabul after the breakdown of the Najibullah Government in 1992, and also served in the airforce of the Mujahidin and subsequently from 1996 onwards the Taliban government. I personally knew many pilots during this dark period who could not go for exile and had to eke out a living under whatever regime – without ever becoming idologically affiliated with the Taliban. Colonel M.G. stayed on also after the Taliban fell and remained in the rudimentary Afghan air force despite much higher salaries in the emerging prviate sector. This is a sign of devotion to the army and his nation.
    The key to an alternative narrative should be found in the reporting mentioning an argument: I am observing here on a daily basis the liberal use of gutter vocabulary by international personnel from all countries. The same personnel would never dare to let theemselves go in this manner in their own country, but here seemingly many barriers to the use of language have broken down. This is compounded by other factors such as the sometimes extreme salary discrepancies between Afghan soldiers and the international advisors and our notion of ‘teaching’ the Afghans things they already know better than we do (like how to win a war in Afghanistan). Longstanding frustrations can in many cases be the reason for extremely heated disputes.
    Let me also add that I have observed a certain ‘Wild West’ attitude in the international trainer community here, which has made it hard for the Afghan Ministry of Defense to maintain policies on the carrying of firearms inside offices. If the international trainer/advisor element comes in with long weapons and a whole kit for force protection reasons, you can also see that over time the wearing of arms in offices becomes a lot more frequent amongst the Afghans trained by these role models. Not to mention the threat of real infiltrators, complex suicide attacks and the like.
    I want to stress that this does not look like the case of a Taliban infiltrator, and we are doing them and their propaganda a favour by swallowing their lie. What we have to do is to review some of the possible factors that made possible this incident including our own behaviour.

  • hillbilly says:

    if you do not have first hand info and these are just your personal thoughts…hats off to you, very plausible.
    i have met many characters like that in this part of the world…..

  • James, says:

    Please allow me to chime in on this discussion.
    In at least some ways, a comparison to Vietnam can be made to the situation we’re faced with now.
    As in Vietnam, we became too myopic (nearsighted) in dealing with the communist threat by focusing too much of our energy and resources on a region by region (or nation by nation) strategy.
    We need to counter terrorism on a global scale. We may have lost the “battle” (in Vietnam), but we won the “war” (i.e., the Cold War).
    Can it be said that the theory of evolution (“only the fittest survive”) can apply to war? Judging from what we’re going through in Afghanistan, I answer that question with a resounding “yes.” This war effort will have to ‘evolve.’
    We’ve got to develop a winning strategy and stick to it.
    This WOT has to be dealt with on a global scale and it will require the cooperation of at least a significant number of other countries. We don’t have to win the “hearts and minds” of just the Afghan people, we have to win the hearts and minds of the world.
    This is not a conventional war. At best, and at least for now, may I call it a ‘hybrid’ war?
    We may be trying to fight this thing in Afghanistan the wrong way right from the get go. Instead of an “outside in” strategy, why not try instead a “top down” strategy?
    Afghanistan is a mostly mountainous country, and it could be that he who prevails will be he that seizes (and holds) the high ground.
    I say we gradually allow this war effort to be handled by special ops teams that may be based in the high mountain peaks and ranges (with a minimal [if any] conventional force structure).
    This may sound at least on its face to be too simplistic, but why can’t our guys go after and eliminate the bad guys and then just leave?
    When going after the terrorists, they could use hit and run tactics and focus mainly on the foreign borne element(s) of the enemy. The Afghans themselves will have to deal with (or counter) the Afghan element(s) of the enemy.
    Maybe we’ll have to have the Afghans learn (the hard way) who the real bad guys are (which is exactly what happened in Iraq in al Anbar province).
    If we were to seize the high ground and a “Killing Fields II” were to happen (which may very well occur), we may have an escape route and a place of refuge not just for US (our civilians and soldiers), but also for the ‘good’ Afghans.
    They say “clear, hold, and build.” To that I say we fulfill the ‘clear’ phase, the Afghans will have to fulfill the ‘hold’ phase, and the human rights organizations [after they’ve been vetted of their obvious AQ/terrorists moles and sympathizers] will have to fulfill the ‘build’ phase.
    I always had doubts about the McChrystal ‘population-centric’ strategy. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist (or munitions expert) to figure out that those bullets can travel for miles. If you’ve got your troops in a densely populated area and there’s a fierce firefight with the enemy, how can there not be civilian casualties?
    Last but certainly not least, I will also once again strongly suggest that our intelligence services need to work in unison with India’s intelligence services, and that this [at least initially] may have to be done in secret and in an in cognito fashion.

  • Soccer says:

    We already tried that strategy in 2001, with 1300 special forces, massive air-power and Northern Alliance partners.
    It was extremely effective, but the Bush admin. made the mistake of assuming that we drove out all of Al Qaeda and most of the Taliban by June 2002. We then switched from a special ops/partnered assault force to a conventional military that built FOB’S, and went on patrol and handed out humanitarian aid. This was a big mistake, as it allowed the militants to retake the mountainous and remote areas we had drove them out of. While we were busy in population areas, they were busy in rural areas consolidating their power once again, and establishing new safe havens IN Afghanistan to be used to attack the urban areas and Afghan cities.
    When Petraeus came on, he decided to go after these rural and remote areas, such as Marjah and the large Southern Afghanistan operation. But the mistake was fighting the war with conventional military forces which used classical assaults. Another mistake was assuming that COIN would work on a population that saw the Taliban driven from power, and saw them come back in full force. Afghans seem to be too scared of the full consequences of supporting NATO at this point.
    Perhaps the strategy James suggested would work in the areas of Kunar and Nuristan, as well as Helmand and Kandahar. There should be a strategy of dual force, which is using COIN on the highly populated areas while using the spec ops teams on the rugged and unreachable areas of Afghanistan.

  • villiger says:

    dwall, there’s something in your you-want-her, you-can have-her approach to AFPAK. Let it be CHAFPAK. Let the Muslims and the Communists sort each other out.
    The US can then more freely and naturally ally with a more like-minded India. Militarily, that would be a formidable wall to breach.
    Then put sanctions on AFPAK, isolate them and throw them into the arms of the Chinese lock-stock-and-barrel. And Yuan. (Presently, the US is borrowing from the Chinese and sinking it in to the bottomless hole called AFPAK. How can that make sense?)
    The US will then be free to take Pak and its nuclear proliferation the UN route. Let China be the last man standing to side with Pakistan and, ensure that the whole of the rest of the World that wants to move on with this 21st Century, sees the regressive reality of this economic wonder/social blunder power of China.
    The US, for a change, might just have itself a strategy to be liked around the World, rather than constantly being perceived as the World’s police-man.
    When the Arab Spring winds reach the Peoples Republic of China, the US, Europe, India and the rest of the free World will be ready.

  • Johno says:

    The good colonel was a tortured soul?
    I don’t think so.
    When he decided to go to the USSR to learn how to fly a jet fighter he was not concerned with the well-being of 99 % of his fellow Afghans who never owned a TV let alone aware of the “capitalist running dog spies who were attempting to subvert the Afghan proletariat.”
    How was he to know, when Breshnez decided to destroy Afghanistan and its very fragile rural infrastructure that, as a pilot who dropped bombs on defenceless villagers, it would all end in tears?
    This oversight is indicative of why we are losing the war. This man was a criminal before he murdered 8 ISAF personnel & he still is.

  • Soccer says:

    WOW Johno WOW. I remember you making a comment saying that the air force in Nuristan will be the new heroes of this generation, or something like that. You have always been pro airforce and pro Afghan war.
    Please address my comment. Why have you all of a sudden changed tone in favor of “defenseless villagers”?

  • Johno says:

    Soccer – You need to study a bit more history regarding this region. Some of the oldest documented military history ever written describes battles in Kunar & Swat more than 2000 years ago. You’ll find many of the problems have barely changed.
    However this Colonel flew combat operations in the 1980’s. He fought against the ‘soldiers’ who were funded by the US Congress & its allies. Most of those ‘soldiers’ were Afghan villagers. Last week the Colonel decided he wanted to kill some more soldiers who were funded by the US Congress.

  • Hi Bill, I agree with hillbilly here. When you deal with Americans however small may be my exposure to them, it is their lack of patience when dealing with Asian inefficiency and laid bare attitude. You are the richest and most powerful country on earth and naturally your Army and airforce are the best trained and equipped. But this becomes a sort of arrogance when dealing with a guy who has come out hardway and living in his country.The recent throwing out of F18s and F16s in favour of typhoon for MMRCA deal in India is a case in point. The fellows especially the diplomats think that how this Indian Airforce survives on obsolete russian aircrafts and British training. They also do not know how to RESPECT a local pilot.Just because the political leadership of a country kowtows to americans, it does not mean all are footsies.

  • James says:

    Soccer, thanks for your thoughtful considerations to my statements above.
    I’ve never felt it has to be an ‘either/or’ strategy. It can be a combination of strategies. A good question to ask the planners of this whole strategy could be (as in Iraq): “What is Plan B?”
    I’d like to know who this civilian contractor was that was killed in this sad episode, who did he work for and how was he involved.
    You can not, “run a war like you run a corporation,” which some of our people seem to have never learned (and obviously never will) from Vietnam.
    Those were air force guys, they were not marines or combat troops which may at least partially explain why they may have been so unprepared for a scenario like that.
    I am suspicious of this whole incident. It sounds too familiar to what happened with those CIA agents at FOB Chapman.
    Why and how was this guy able to kill so many of our guys before being killed himself? These are questions for the sake of our troops we as Americans need to rightfully demand answers of from our government.
    With all due respect to your statements, this may have not had anything to do with the soldier to soldier aspects of this thing, but may have had more to do with who was that civilian contractor, who did he work for, what was he doing there and what role did his conduct and/or statements play in this incident.

  • meschi says:

    It seems that fatalities included one LT.Colonel,four majors and 2 captains all from US air force.I think this is worst fatality in a single day for US air force in recent 10 years.

  • Paul says:

    I really think some folks don’t understand that we are the occupiers in this land & every afgani has some blood inside him that boils to kill the foreign invaders (us)

  • Soccer says:

    I know the region has barely changed since thousands of years ago. What does that have to do with me asking you why you’ve all of a sudden flip-flopped and changed face?
    Regarding Kunar, I think it is a very dangerous and vital province, and Bill knows how fascinated I am with that province. I think it is very important to pay attention to and we might as well do what we can to at least remedy the problem. I know that the problem won’t be fixed overnight, though.


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