|
|
|
The Baghdad Order Of Battle as of May 13, 2007. Click map to view. |
By Dj Elliott, CJ Radi and Bill Roggio
The past week in Iraq has been a mixed bag of political success coupled with several successful high profile attacks by al Qaeda. As the situation heats up in Diyala, al Qaeda conducted a highly successful assault on a U.S. Army team operating south of Baghdad.
The search is on for the 3 missing soldiers who are believed to have been captured after a complex assualt on a U.S. Army patrol on the outskirts of Mahmudiyah Saturday morning. Over 4,000 troops, along with aerial and satellite surveillance, and elements of the Anbar Salvation Council, are involved. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s political front the Islamic State of Iraq has claimed it has captured the 3 soldiers, but has not offered any evidence. AL Qaeda in Iraq will make every effort to exploit the captive soldiers to both influence the American audience and to shore up its base of support in jihadi circles and beyond.
In Baghdad, there has been very little changes to the disposition of forces. The focus in the eastern zones of the city has been clearing Sadr City. Over 40 percent of the city was reported to hav ebeen cleared since the last update over a week ago. Inthewest, Iraqi and U.S. forces have moved forces into the Bayaa and Doura districts and initiated clearing operations after completing the Mansour district last week.
Diyala province remains the hotest and most dangerous region in Iraq. The tribes of Diyala, tired of al qaeda’s attempts at imposing a Taliban like regime through its Islamic State of Iraq, are beginning to organize along the lines of tribes in Anbar province. Several tribes have banded together, formed the Diyala Awakening and vowed to battle al Qaeda. “Tribesman Sheikh Wameed al-Jabouri told al-Hayat that a number of tribes had signed a cooperation agreement to undertake this mission and to bring the city [of Baqubah back to how ‘it used to be,'” notes Deutsche Presse-Agentur. “The agreement could be considered “a national charter” that proves their rejection of the actions of the terrorist groups, al-Jabouri said.” The tribes have created the Diyala Awakening.
This development comes as U.S. forces are finishing their surge and preparing to retake the province from al Qaeda. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon, the Commander of Multnational Division North and the 25th Infantry Division, briefed on Diyala late last week and stated “I do not have enough soldiers right now in Diyala province to get that security situation moving… We have plans to put additional forces in that area.”
“In Diyala province, we are working in a combined effort with Iraqi Security Forces to achieve tactical parity,” said Maj. Gen. Mixon. “The tactical situation there is very difficult, and the fight is ongoing. Across MND North, we’ll continue to work to improve Iraqi Security Forces, and they will become more capable, and we will work with the police units until they are fully established and capable of providing for their own security.”
Multinational Forces moved a 700 man Stryker battalion to Baqubah n March, and have just deployed an additional Stryker Brigade – the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division into Diyala. “The most recent unit to have arrived up there is the 4th brigade 2nd infantry division, which is comprised of two Stryker battalions and one artillery battalion,” Major General William Caldwell said in a recent press briefing. The Iraqi government has stated it is deploying an unspecified number of Iraqi Army and police to Diyala.
Al Qaeda in Iraq is continuing its suicide bombing campaign in an effort to break both the Iraqi Security Forces and the will of the American people. Al Qaeda was able to conduct eight major suicide attacks nationwide. Three occurred inside Baghdad. A suicide car bomber struck the near the Sadriyah market, killing 7 and wounding over 40. This market has been the site of several mass casualty attacks. In southern Baghdad, two major brigdes were hit with suicide car bombs, while another bridge was struck near Taji. Al Qaeda in Iraq attacked two bridges inside Baghdad in April, and destroyed one of them.
Suicide car bombs remain al Qaeda’s most effective weapon. South of Baghdad in Kufa, the sister city of Karbala, al Qaeda struck with a suicide car bomb near a market, killing 16 and wounding another 70. In the Kurdish regions up north, al Qaeda conducted two major suicide car bomb attacks. The first occurred in the city of Irbil. Sixteen were killed and over 70 wounded after a suicide truck bomber detonated outside the regional Interior Ministry. Al Qaeda claimed credit through its proxy Islamic State of Iraq. The second suicide car bombing occurred the local offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Makhmur, which killed at least 50 and wounded over 70. Early last week, al Qaeda Tconducted a dual suicide car bomb attack in Ramadi, which killed 20 and wounding scores more.
On the political front, several significant developments have occurred over the past week. SCIRI, one of the most dominant Shia political parties has made the move to distance itself from Iran, while progress has been made on the Sunni reconciliation front.
The Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest Shia political party, has changed its name and shifted its center of political and religious support from the Qom school of thought, led by the Iranian Ayatollah in Iran, to the Najaf school of thought, led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This would “mark a shift from SCIRI’s current platform, which says the group gets its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran,” Reuters reported on Friday.
SCIRI has renamed itself the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, dropping the “Revolution” from the name. While the source stated the name change was due to Saddam’s overthrow, the change is far more significant. The term revolution is closely associated with Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power in 1979 and the radical change Khomeini introduced in Shia politics.
Also, on the Sunni side of the political equation, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi has backed down from a threat to withdrawal from the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has offered to give a greater role to Sunnis in securing their regions. “One Sunni Arab politician, Omar Abdul-Sattar, said 11,000 volunteers from Sunni areas west of the capital have been waiting for months to hear news about their applications to join the army,” the Associated Press reported.
The political progress came as the Sadrist bloc in Parliament pulled off a masterful anti American propaganda stunt. The Sadrists pushed a draft of a non-binding resolution through the parliament, called for “a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops and [demands] a freeze on the number of foreign troops already in the country.” The parliament would also have had the authority to approve the UN mission in Iraq, which expires at the end of 2007. The Sadr aide claimed to have 144 of the 275 parliamentarians supporting the bill.
According to Alertnet, the bill is actually a “petition, which is nonbinding,” and must be presented to speaker. “Under Iraqi law, the speaker must present a resolution that’s called for by a majority of lawmakers, but there are significant loopholes and what will happen next is unclear.”
But, the Kurdish block backed the legislation but “only on the condition that the withdrawal timetable be linked to a schedule for training and equipping Iraq’s security forces.” The Sadrists didn’t include this requirement, prompting the Kurdish block to refer to the legislation as “deception.” Expect the bill to be defeated when it comes to the full vote in parliament, as prior versions have been.
As Muqtada al Sadr’s political party plays games in parliament, David Satterfield, the senior adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Iraq, stated that the U.S. is certain Sadr is currently in Iran. “We know he’s out of the country, we don’t think,” Mr. Satterfield told the Associated Press. “He’s in Iran, which is where he has been since mid-January.”
Multinational Forces Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces continue to chip away at Mahdi Army cells that are working with Iran. Over the past week, Coalition and Iraqi forces broke up five of the deadly Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) cells inside Sadr City. Thirteen members of the EFP cells were killed and 23 captured during the series of raids against “members of a secret cell terrorist network known for facilitating the transport of weapons and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq to Iran for terrorist training.”
The Baghdad Secuirty Plan has just completed its third month. Sectarian violence continues to remain at a 0ne year low, while car bombs have become al Qaeda’s most effective weapon in the fight for Iraq. The U.S. still has another brigade to add to the fight, and Diyala looms on the horizon as Anbar has become a Coalition success story. The Iraqi political progress has been encouraging, despite falling short of expectations, while al Qaeda has proven t be adept in its ability to adjust its tactics to the security plan. General Petraeus has stated it won’t be until September until success and failure can be weighed. May is far too soon to pass judgment on the Baghdad Security Plan.
45 Comments
“May is far too soon to pass judgment on the Baghdad Security Plan.”
Agree. There seem to be rapid developments taking place which will continue to roll up al Qaeda elements and supporters.
http://www.alsabaah.com/paper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=42293
Baghdad, May.14 p3
“Sheikhs of more than 289 tribes and military characters and academics in Diala announced their joining to the province survive council.”
Maliki responded to their request for support. I’m guessing this is the Diyala “salvation” council.
Interesting they translate it “survive.”
SCIRI’s move away from QOM is one of those things that doesn’t produce short term results but can be very important in the long run. Since religion and politics are so entwined the religious shift away from Iran is equally political. It also signals confidence that SCIRI thinks its future is local and not directly tied to Iran. Time will tell.
Michael
Al Sabaah uses a machine translator. That is why the articles are hard to read. Word choise is not dependable for attitude judgements as a result.
Bill
Is this a move away from “Mookie” Sadr as well. Also, what play is possible with Sadr in Iran? Does that make him a coward in that neck of the woods?
Anti – Herman:
Moqtada Sadr, head or used to be head of the Mahdi Army or Sadrists (named actually for his father martyred by Saddam). SCIRI has always been rival to this. With the Fadhila group still predominant in Basra and more secular Shia groups, this is the array of Shia political forces. Hopefully Moqtada is much weakened. It is unknown if there is any firm hand in charge of the Sadrists, either their political or militia wings and they make bloated estimates of their protests (or rather their PR is sent to our media to do), still posture in Parliament while other spokesmen make ridiculous threat against Prince Harry (he’s not here yet, and “real” terrorists don’t announce a specific plan ahead of time)
Maliki said he would put more Iraqi forces in Diyala. I wonder where he will take them from.
IMHO Diyala could used maybe a few Iraqi Savlation Council ERUs as well as 4 to 5 thousand more Iraqi soldiers.
The combo of those two things would allow the Diyala Salvation Council or whatever they are calling themselves enough room to get off the ground.
ECH,
maybe 3-9? [Now in North Baghdad province. See DJ’s Baghdad OOB map above] First out of area deployment might coincide with graduation from level C3 to level C2?
For a description of ISF in the province see:
http://billroggio.com/multimedia/OOBpage6-IGFC-KB.pdf
Sending too many Al Anbar Provincial Security Forces so quickly without prep, and allaying Shia, Kurdish, rival Sunni fears, might be politically challenging. Except for special op type opps against Al Qaeda in Iraq.
More over Al Anbar Provincial Security Forces are needed to quickly build on success in Al Anbar and Salahadin. You strike your enemy when they are off-balance and weak. Not wait until they have regrouped and reorganized. ISF and Marines need to hit hard now, with everything they’ve got in Al Anbar.
ECH
Anand
More likely IA 2-9 Tank Bde.
3-9 Tank appears to be taking over local security in and around Taji. Still too green.
1-9 Mech is providing he IA heavy support in east Baghdad and has shifted its logistics base to Rustimayah.
4-9 is still training and equipping…
Probably some Bns from 2nd, 3rd and 4th IADs will go to Diyala instead of Baghdad when they finish their two weeks at Besmaya. 2nd rotation of 90 day Baghdad deployers is in progress and OPSEC is surprisingly better this time…
“Sending too many Al Anbar Provincial Security Forces so quickly without prep, and allaying Shia, Kurdish, rival Sunni fears, might be politically challenging.”
I really don’t give a fig what the Iraqi Islamic Party who are as sectarian as the Sadrists think right now. They allowed al-Qaeda to go unchecked for two years either out of cowardice or most likely to use them as leverage to get political consessions from the Shia and US. As for the Shia in Diyala, al-Qaeda is going about widescale religious cleansing in Diyala 5000 Iraqis mostly Shia have fled Diyala the past 6 days.
The situation there is as bad as one could imagine.
http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/2774/Iraqis_Fleeing_Diyala_Violence
If we don’t make massive progress in weeks not months we lose. We can make massive progress thanks to the ERUs. Bringing in Anbari ERUs who have no beef with the Shia of Diyala on few month rotations there as well as building a few tribal ERUs for Diyala itself is one of the few things that I believe could make the kind of progress that is needed in the time frame we currently have.
We played it conservative for many years in Iraq. Now, with Congress almost ready to cut off funding we have a pro-American and non-sectarian Sunni leader who can stand up paramilitary units on a dime to hunt and kill al-Qaeda terrorists. If we don’t take full advantage of it I think we lose our last best chance given the political situation in the US.
ECH
I am not so sure the Anbar PROVICIANAL Security Force elements would be willing to go so far from family. They did join a local IP element vice the IA for a reason. IP stays on home turf.
What they might do is pull elements of 1st and 7th IA Divisions out of Anbar, send thru two week Besmaya (insp/re-equip/replacements/field train) and then deploy to Diyala vice Baghdad.
1-1 IA Bde would be my bet. Pull it from Ramadi and use PSF to cover their positions in south Ramadi. To quote their Bde Commander: “We are the 1st Brigade”. They go where the fight is…
I wasn’t talking about just the Provincial Force members in Anbar already there.
Anbar has 11 thousands Sunnis waiting for their applications to go through to join the Army that can be used as a quick to stand up paramilitary force for Diyala. We can then take what we like from them and add who we want to the Iraqi Army.
They need training first.
Deploy the trained Bdes of the IA to Diyala.
Leaving cadre behind for forming new Bns from those recruits.
Use PSF to gap-fill for the 8 weeks Bootcamp and 5 weeks formation.
11,000 recruits is 5 Brigades of potential-Junji. They need training, equipment plus experienced NCOs and Officers to lead (cadre).
Issuing a mob rifles and uniforms does not make an effective army.
– Using them to police localy as police auxileries is one thing. They know the turf and the people.
– Using them for out-of-area is very different. They loose the only effective advantages they have.
The Anbar PSF knows Anbar and its citizens, they are practical in Anbar. They do not know Diyala and its citizens.
Re-deploying IA in Anbar to Diyala while using PSF to cover, training up these recruits and forming new units is practical.
And form the Diyala PSF ASAP into a recognized functional force…
DJ’s right. Send in the 1-1 IA to Diyala (after some rest and refit in.) By all accounts they are awesome crack troops.
Agree with DJ 100% on Al Anbar PSF. Let them cover the rear in Al Anbar as 7th and 1st IAD brigaded deploy to Baghdad and Diyala.
ECH, Gov of Iraq is taking your advice by forming 4-7 IA brigade. They are also in the process of over strengthening each bn in 7th and 1st IAD to 110%. Guess who is joining up.
Another way to take your advice would be to add an addition bn to each 1st IAD brigade using that Brigade’s existing cadre. 7th IAD is still too short of Cadre to make this practical in the short term.
But to do this right takes time, care and training. Existing Cadre need to bring fresh recruits up to speed on teamwork and practices. The ISF have a 90,000 at a time throughput (can train 90,000 at a any given time). Its happening.
ECH, while Diyala is important, the other 17 provinces are collectively more important. You can’t take chances with them to save Diyala. And don’t assume that the Shia, Kurd, and some Sunni Arabs are desperate enough to seek help from Al Anbar tribes or countryside “hicks.”
“More likely IA 2-9 Tank Bde.
3-9 Tank appears to be taking over local security in and around Taji. Still too green.”
3-9 is less green today than 1-9 and 2-9 were a year ago when they deployed to Baghdad. 1-9 and 2-9 were both younger than 3-9 when they went into the lead (both were in the lead more than 11 months ago). Iraq’s at war, it can take a chance by deploying 3-9.
Whether it can find ISF to cover Taji while it deploys elsewhere is a different question. 4-4 might send one combat battalion south? 9th SI Brigade might send one battalion?
Any info on the quality of Salahadin state and local police? Its been a black hole in reporting.
There has also been a dearth of reporting on Diyala state and local police. Am I right in guessing that most are a disaster?
Is 5th IAD the worst of the ten original 10 IA division excluding 10th IAD. [Green 7th IAD might now be better than 5th IAD.]
The problem with 3-9 deploying is logistics. Thier BSB is not yet up to out-of-area. Deploying to North Baghdad is easy since Taji is only 27km north of Baghdad.
That is why I say 2-9. Their logistics is FMC.
4-4 is not fully formed yet. IOC is end-month. Will be taking over all of that area from north Baghdad to Samarra when operational. That will free up all of 9th IAD for nationwide QRF. Sometime in Fall/winter.
SI is static security for the pipelines/electrical/etc. 9th SI Bde is not up to same duties as rest of IA and has its own problem areas west of Tikrit.
Salahaddin is apparently progressing according to MG Mixon. No details being released.
Diyala is the problem area of MND-N.
5th IAD is too small for Diyala. That and the lack of dependable IP is the problem there.
Hense the reinforcement.
Also addressed in MG Mixon brief.
By all accounts from those with the 5th, they are getting a bum rap by the press in Baghdad. Div commander made a couple of bad calls early in his assignment and hasn’t been able to live them down.
DJ
If/when would it be possible to draw down from Abnar for Diyala? Are the two provinces interwined for are they separate with Iranian/Syrian support?
Also, is the goal to secure Bagdad for the cleanout of Diyala or is it to get Al Queda to flee to Diyala and then meet their doom in that province?
“Issuing a mob rifles and uniforms does not make an effective army.”
I wasn’t talking about making an effective army. I am talking about creating temporary Sunni anti al-Qaeda death squads to fill in certain significant security gaps I know exist. The idea Negroponte had a few years back of anti al-Qaeda death squads wasn’t a bad idea. The problem was it needed to be Sunnis doing it not Shia militias and it needed a non sectarian Sunni leader the US can trust behind it all something we didn’t really have back then.
We have at most until the end of the year to break al-Qaeda in Iraq’s back for good in Iraq before Congress acts. Something similar to we did with the Northern Alliance might be the best plan. Small groups of US special forces going along with large anti al-Qaeda Sunni death squads operating in 100% Sunni areas not mixed ones. The SF can call in air power as it is needed.
After we don’t need these units anymore they will return to their homes in Anbar at the orders of the ASC or those who want to join the Army can apply.
Most of the current fight is spillover from Baghdad. Look at the map in the article.
– To the west and northwest where it says 1st IAD is Anbar Province (west Belt).
– To the east where it says 5th IAD is Diyala Province (east Belt).
– Off the map to the north (just past Taji) is Salahaddin Province. All of 30 miles from Baghdad city to that border. (north Belt)
– Off the map to the south (25 miles) is Babil Province. (southern Belt)
The fights in Diyala, Eastern Anbar, Northern Babil and southern Salahaddin (Samarra) are all spillover from Baghdad.
– Anbar following the Euphraties is the Rat-line (supply) to Baghdad from Syria. (Syria-Qaim-Haditha-Hit-Ramadi-Falujah-Baghdad.)
– Diyala is the direct route from Iran to Baghdad. All of 75 miles from Iranian border to Baghdad accross Diyala.
(Apparently the principle route is border crossing in Wasit then thru Diyala to Baghdad per MG Mixon’s last brief.)
– Alternate route is north thru Baqubah (25miles from Baghdad) and Muqadiyah then into Iran.
When MNF-I says 85% of all violence in Iraq happens within 35 miles of Baghdad, they are not joking.
Think of Baghdad as DC, Baqubah as Arlington and Falujah as Baltimore.
It is all close and interrelated.
As to drawing from Anbar: They already have been.
4-1 IA Bde was sent to Baghdad in Jan and should be rotating(ed) back to eastern Anbar.
Pulling 1-1 out of Ramadi could be done as soon as 4-1 is back off of leave after their Baghdad deployment…
The real question is how much can they afford to redeploy? IA is the QRF for the PSF…
How much we can draw from Anbar I suspect will be measured by how much support the ASC recieves from the US and the Iraqi government.
I also believe we should be building Provental Security Force units or whatever you want to call them in Saladin. I expect a big surge of al-Qaeda into Saladin when we starting bringing enough troops into Diyala to really wack al-Qaeda.
The problem with “Death Squads” is that they tend to kill the friendly/neutral civilians and not the enemy.
You have not been paying much attention.
We are on the side of the Law.
Death Squads are the enemy.
All Death Squads.
You are suggesting that the US support mass murder and genocide.
I.E.: You are suggesting that we become AQ. You know, War Criminals…
“The problem with “Death Squads” is that they tend to kill the friendly/neutral civilians and not the enemy.”
If they were Shia or Kurdish armed groups with no links to the area then you are certainly right as I said in my last post. But, if we are talking about Sunni armed groups that know the lay of the land and are friends and allies with the locals then you are wrong. In fact I believe completely that this would be the fastest and easiest way to drive al-Qaeda from Iraq.
I am basically saying to take the idea of the ERU, PSF or whatever you want to call it and make a much more mobile version of it which can rapidly hunt al-Qaeda around Western Iraq and has some US SF embeded to call in airstrikes when needed. Basically what we did with the Northern Alliance.
ECH
You are not based in ground truth.
Iraq is still tribal.
The PSF is Tribal Levies.
Tribes with arguments with other tribes.
Unless you want Iraq to degenerate into a mass killing field, you do not even joke about using “Death Squads”.
Not anywhere in the mid-east.
You are proposing a thousand-sided civil war with mass civilian casualties that would spread over the borders.
Note: Your statements could be interpreted under the Law as solicitation of mass murder. A capitol crime in every jurisdiction on this planet.
Bill’s last status report on Anbar was a reality check for me. The local PSF (ERU) will have their hands full finishing the local fights and pushing into adjacent areas. DJ has the essential point about trying to use such forces in Diyala, they lose their only advantage when going too far out of their home region. If more forces are needed in Diyala it should be well trained IA but even then you can only go so far. The PSF units are an essential addition to the forces already in Anbar in the context of being actually from the community. They must have adequate support backing them though. I do see some of the more experienced Anbar fighters being used extensively for special tasks too, such as tribal liaison with other areas, intelligence gathering, and as small strike forces for specific jobs.
Remember, even when you get an adequate force in Diyala it will take a while for their presence to make full impact. It takes a while for a force to get set up, settle in, get to know what’s in their area, and start really becoming effective against them. It’s still going to look bad for a while even when adequate forces are in the area. There’s no real way around that.
“Death Squads”? Don’t even go there.
“If more forces are needed in Diyala it should be well trained IA but even then you can only go so far.”
DJ Elliott,
That would make the US Military and the Pentagon war criminals for supporting the Iraq Salvation Council which runs a less mobile version of anti al-Qaeda death squads. In fact US and Iraqi government funs both are supporting the ASC as we speak an organization that acts as a death squad against al-Qaeda.
“Sheikh Suleiman had strong criticisms for the U.S. military in the Anbar governorate. “In the past we used to capture Al-Qaeda militants and hand them over to Americans, but within two weeks we would see them free again,”
“Death Squads? Don’t even go there.”
I just stated exactly what the Anbar Salvation Council is doing. It is operating as an anti al-Qaeda death squad.
Its easy to use nice fuzzy words like Provenicial Security Force or Emergency Response Units. They are anti al-Qaeda death squads that hunt down and kill al-Qaeda and I believe they are doing necessary work for Iraq’s future.
I simply support improving the mobility of their units and would like US special forces to work with them like they worked with the Peshmerga against Zarqawi’s terror camp at the start of the war.
If we can’t keep al-Qaeda locked up I have no problem with the armed tribal bands dealing with them in a more perment way.
“Sheikh Suleiman had strong criticisms for the U.S. military in the Anbar governorate. “In the past we used to capture Al-Qaeda militants and hand them over to Americans, but within two weeks we would see them free again,”
Death Squads?
The phrase has so many connotations that go well beyond killing known AQI within your tribal area. You are right in the sense that we are willing to allow them to eliminate specific people that are fairly well identified.
The point remains that if you take this sort of thing off home turf into an unfamiliar area it’s looking for trouble. Now if you wanted to augment a local force in Diyala with a limited number of PSF type troops from Anbar you might have a working idea. You would need to monitor closely though.
ECH
Words have specific meanings. Use the correct ones.
– Death Squads: Murder teams. Kill indiscriminately Men, women, children. See terrorists.
– The PSF is a legaly recognized MoI Auxillery Paramilitary Police Force in a war zone.
– Enemy Combatents in civilian cloths in a war zone are legaly subject to field execution as spies/saboteurs under the Geneva Convention.
When you use the term “Death Squads”, you are refering to illegal armed groups commiting murder.
This is another example of incorrect usage of terms by the “moral equivalancy” id10ts.
The difference between Militias and PSF:
1. Militias are not under governmental authority in Iraq.
Anbar PSF is under the Anbar IP and Iraqi MoI authority.
2. Militias are not trained by the GoI/Coalition.
Anbar PSF is receiving training by MoI/Coalition.
3. Militias are not supported or sponsored by GoI/Coalition.
Anbar PSF is an Auxillery Police Force under MoI sponsership.
4. Militias are illegal organizations in Iraq.
Anbar PSF is a legal element of the Iraqi Police.
5. Most Militias are in opposition to GoI.
Anbar PSF is supporting GoI.
Previous president for large scale Auxillery IP force is the Peshmerga which was legaly recognized and authorized as an Auxillery Security Force under the Kurdish Regional Government.
For those that think this is new, think again. Such Auxillery Police have existed since before the US existed. What do you think the official status of a posse deputized by a sheriff is? Same thing. Auxillery Police.
One more: The militia leaders are all self-appointed.
The boss of the PSFs has been appointed by Anbar’s govenor as chief of Counter-terroism for Anbar and confirmed by MoI/PM.
My idea of what to do with PSF is simple:
– Convert them into 3rd INP Division.
Run them all thru IP Academy and make the PSF into a National Police Division. That would make them deployable thruout the country. No Provicianal Borders.
Over time cross attach and transfer with 1st and 2nd INP Divs to fix the sectarian problem in INP (85-90% Shia).
Once trained and using cadre from rest of INP, they could be deployed to Diyala or any other trouble spot.
MoI is supposed to assume the lead over internal security eventualy and this is the purfect opportunity to expand them and balance them out….
anti al-Qaeda death squads = squads of armed tribesman that make al-Qaeda members go bye bye. It was such a squad of armed tribesmen that thought they killed Masri.
You are certainly right Neo-andertal, the Medhi Army and other armed groups have created very negative connotions to the word. I can see how some people automatically might think Medhi Army when they hear the two words put together. Which is why I suspect when Fox was talking about the ASC around the time they thought al-Masri was killed they refered to them tribal hit squads instead of death squads. CNN refered to them the same way.
Whatever, you want to call them they are motivated armed local Sunnis who want to rid Iraq of al-Qaeda forever. And, they are led by someone who has no intention unlike Sadr of using them to take over the country.
ECH,
Let’s please not get into Geneva conventions type arguments either. Leave that one for the legal folks to sort out.
ECH
The usage of the term “Death Squads” goes back to before Saddam was president. It has always refered to Illegal Murder operations. See Latin American Dictatorships.
The PSF is a legal Police Force operating in a war zone. Enemy Combatants in civilian cloths are subject to summary execution in the field under the Geneva Convention.
They are not “Death Squads”…
Neo-andertal, my last post was directed towards you.
DJ Elliott, whatever you want to called the tribal units that are hunting down al-Qaeda members it is pretty subjective.
Are they armed tribal bands, government backed paramilitaries, anti al-Qaeda hit squads, anti- al-Qaeda death squads, or government backed militias?
Sure, they are all of these things, but in my view it doesn’t matter which of these names you call them. All that matters is that they are killing al-Qaeda and not interested in killing Shia or Kurds.
“The usage of the term “Death Squads” goes back to before Saddam was president. It has always refered to Illegal Murder operations. See Latin American Dictatorships.”
Right now they are rounding up and killing al-Qaeda members instead of giving many of them to the coalition which is illegal of course, but I can’t fault them for it given how many al-Qaeda members get released and return to kill because of a lack of courts and evidence.
As Bing West said in his article I posted a link to earlier if al-Qaeda “has a problem with it they can take it up with Maliki”.
To me the connotion of whatever word you want to use for the armed Sunni fighters doesn’t matter, its if they are acting to get rid of terrorists and further a democratic Iraq or not.
ECH, the essential point is that Iraq is a democracy and death squads have no place in a democracy.
Do you agree with General Petraeus that winning the hearts and minds is an essential part of counterinsurgency?
If so, how does language such as “death squads” play to the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people? Can you name any democratic nation that wants death squads in their midst?
General Petraeus never uses the term “death squads”. Surely there is a reason for that.
Propaganda 101
– Your side is always refered to in legitimate terms, the enemy is always refered to as illegitamate.
– AQ/JAM call themselves Army or Militia because they are trying to confer legitamacy on themselves.
Supporters of them will use their self-proclaimed terms for them.
– Those opposed refer to them by their actions: Death Squads, Kidnaping Cells, extortionist, murderors, etc.
They are trying to de-legitimize their actions by highlighting the illegality.
– It is rare that you see neutral terms used and which terms are used defines what side you are on.
The same thing is true of propagandist refering to any military operations. Read some of their writings about the occupation, collaborators, Death Squads, etc. From any war.
A classic KGB method of propaganda was to use a person that was obstensively on your side that used terms that delegitimized your side. Sound familiar?
ECH: You propose an agressive use of a US Allied Country’s police force in a way that does not make much sense and refer to them in terms that indicate they are your enemy.
That says all this retired spook needs to know about you…
PS: Have you ever heard of Einsatzgruppen? Special Action Groups? The SS considered themselves legit. We allies executed members of those “Death Squads”. That is the term we used for them. It has always refered to Illegal elements that commited murder…
ECH,
Yes the attack that killed Masri was an ambush against specific AQI individuals. We will see more of the same, perhaps more. Don’t expect to scale up and try to get them to do what a trained brigade would do though.
Look, I’ve been trying to avoid the whole debate about when and how it’s legal to kill an illegal combatant. It is relevant, but since the legal community hasn’t seen fit to sort this out, I’m not inclined to give it my amateur best. I realize it has become customary to treat illegal combatants as if they were legal. That’s not the way it is written in the Geneva Conventions, but has become default interpretation through a half century of practice. It’s certainly not your grandfathers Geneva Convention rules and I don’t think being that permissive of illegal combatants has been a good idea. But that’s an argument for another time.
Dj is right that the PSF units have legal status. That’s not an unimportant fact. Let’s avoid getting into misplaced hyperbole about how they go about their business.
Time Out. I’m done.
When the enemy (AQI, Sunni Islamist/Nationalists, Mahdi, Kurdish Islamists) routinely use death squads to intimidate and rule the population, you sometimes need to speak in the same language to get them to respect you.
The death squads do not understand any other language. The population will gravitate towards those who show up in the streets with a gun or bazooka and take law and order into their hands and rule the streets.
That is when you need an Intelligence Service (aka “state’s legitimate death squad”) to go and track, trace, pursue, and pick the bad folks up, and make them repent/confess/incarcerated/or disappeared.
This is expected in their cultural norm. Just ask any postcolonial leftist cultural relativist. He will tell you that each society has its own culture and we should not judge other’s culture by our standards. If that is their culture, then you must respect it, and give them more of their own culture – so they say.
I don’t think the anti-Iraq war crowd give a hoot about democracy in Iraq. If the place can be pacified, they will accept it. Their beef is with the US occupation and not with the methods. They will stick the blame on one way or another, sometimes very creatively. Might at least get the place in order.
“A suicide car bomber struck the near the Sadriyah market, killing 7 and wounding over 40. This market has been the site of several mass casualty attacks.”
I just cannot fathom why Coalition forces cannot erect concrete, ‘jersey walls’ around these market places and prevent these horrific VBIEDs. Gen. McCaffrey’s detailed assessment of Iraq pointed out that deploying more concrete barriers around likely targets was critical to success. There is no reason why a market should be attacked multiple times like this. The market area has to be closed to vehicular traffic (or at the very least forced to go through only one or two checkpoints after a *thorough* search) even if that means disrupting traffic patterns or inconveniencing civilians.
Perception is everything in Iraq. Until we close off these market areas to VBIED’s we will see mass casualties over and over again and the perception that security has not improved will be overwhelming. We cannot win without reversing this perception.
We’re using over 4,000 troops to find three missing soldiers? That seems like a questionable use of resources.
What’s the priority–the mission or three missing soldiers?
“We’re using over 4,000 troops to find three missing soldiers? That seems like a questionable use of resources.”
We’re using over 4,000 troops to find three missing soldiers? That seems like a questionable use of resources.
What’s the priority–the mission or three missing soldiers?
Posted by Nick | May 15, 2007 1:44 PM
WOW
YES!!!
We send these men and women to war, We tell them we support them. We tell them we will not leave them behind,ever.
WE OWE EVERY SOLDIER ON every battlefield that committment and we owe them to back it up.
It is that comitment by your brothers and TO your brothers that drives each of these great folks.
Without our Soldiers.
There is no Mission
Question:
Say your sisters(brothers,cousin) 23 year old soldier son is captured, Would you ask this?
I have the feeling that the search for these missing soldiers is producing benefits that aren’t limited to finding the three. We’re collecting valuable intelligence.
Incidents like this give our troops an additional incentive to find out, in detail, what’s going on in these neighborhoods. That knowledge can only help.
“I have the feeling that the search for these missing soldiers is producing benefits that aren’t limited to finding the three.”
Oh boy, you’re really onto something there. Be very afraid when someone begins a statement with “I have a feeling…”
I thought the mission was to restore order in Iraq, not saving face.
Using an insane amount of resources to find three missing soldiers (like the ridiculous war Israel started last year with Hezbollah) looks like face-saving, not mission-fulfilling. Tactics like kidnapping are used by the enemy to divert our resources because they’re counting on our all too predictable capacity to OVERREACT.