Mullah Omar goes to Karachi
November 20, 2009 12:13 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
According to The Washington Times, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has helped Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Amir al Mumineen ("the commander of the faithful") for both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, relocate to the southern port city of Karachi: Two senior U.S. intelligence officials and one former senior CIA officer told The Washington Times that Mullah Omar traveled to Karachi last month after the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. He inaugurated a new senior leadership council in Karachi, a city that so far has escaped U.S. and Pakistani counterterrorism campaigns, the officials said. For those paying attention, this should come as little surprise. In late September, The Sunday Times reported that the ISI had begun moving Omar's Quetta Shura to Karachi. It was only a matter of time before Omar followed. And given what we know about the ISI's complicity with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and a host of terror groups, your shock meter should be pegged to zero. Dadullah and Yazid on ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban
November 19, 2009 3:25 PM ET
By Bill Roggio I accidentally ran across this video during a search this morning. The video is of a meeting between Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan, and Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the former military commander of the Afghan Taliban (he was killed by British special forces in May 2007). The short clip, from As Sahab, al Qaeda's media outlet, perfectly drives home the point Tom Joscelyn and I made in "Al Qaeda is the tip of the jihadist spear", that the Taliban and al Qaeda are closely linked and efforts to bribe the Taliban out of the relationship will fail. Below I have provided the text of Dadullah and Yazid's statements in the video, which is subtitled in English. Emphasis is mine. Dadullah: The raids on New York and Washington had a major effect in cementing the ties of the Iman-based brotherhood between al Qaeda and their brothers the Taliban, both commanders and soldiers. As an aside, in the video you can clearly see Yazid's Shadow Army bodyguard, in uniform. US captures al Qaeda Shadow Army trainer in Ghazni
November 19, 2009 1:01 PM ET
By Bill Roggio We've noted several times at The Long War Journal that al Qaeda embeds trainers from the Shadow Army (or Lashkar al Zil) into Taliban units to increase their effectiveness. An International Security Assistance Force press release provides another example of an al Qaeda trainer embedded with the Taliban in Ghazni province: In another operation, an Afghan-international security force killed several enemy militants and detained a sought after al-Qaida IED facilitator and another militant in Ghazni province while searching a compound suspected of militant activity. This facilitator is reported to have supplied IEDs to other militant elements operating in the area and kept direct contact with local al-Qaida and Taliban leaders. Tehran's orbit widens
November 19, 2009 11:40 AM ET
By Austin Knuppe
In geopolitics, as in astronomy, world powers have a certain gravitational pull. Some nations have less force, choosing to orbit in the atmosphere of larger, more powerful states. Other countries, like China, have several satellite nations in their immediate orbit. Distracted by Iran’s attempts at nuclear proliferation, the West has not paid much attention to Tehran’s increasing sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. For many years, the emirate nations of the Gulf have had a strong connection to Saudi Arabia and the United States, providing a natural boundary between the Saudis, Iraqis, and Iranians. In recent months, however, the Gulf countries have begun to reevaluate their relationships with the Islamic Republic. Today’s post will focus on the nations of Oman and Yemen, two countries that have typically distanced themselves from Iran. A few days ago in Oman—a historically strong US ally—Omani foreign minister Youssef bin Alawi Abdullah announced closer cooperation with Iran that will remain unfettered by foreign influence. Last August both nations signed seven Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) covering issues from smuggling and illicit trade to closer economic ties. One agreement of note was an accord on oil cooperation between the Persian Hirbodan Company and the Omani Oil Company. Both nations founded the Hurmuz Petrochemical Company as a joint venture to continue cooperation on construction and energy projects. Closer economic ties between the Omanis and Iranians have the potential to consolidate Tehran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz—a 21-mile-wide choke point through which 17 million barrels of oil per day travel from the Persian Gulf countries to destinations in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Tehran is also suspected of meddling in war-torn Yemen, where Saudi Arabia recently launched a military offensive against the Houthi rebels in the northern territory of Saada. In a statement by Iran’s chief of staff yesterday, General Hassan Firouzabad asserted that the Saudi offensive signals a trend of a ”state of terrorism” that will lead to further violence in the region. Both the Yemeni and Saudi governments claim that the Iranians are funding the Houthi rebels because they also adhere to Shiite Islam. GMU’s Mark Katz argues that this accusation is off base, aimed at securing funds and support from Western nations worried about Iranian hegemony. “The Houthis are indeed Shi’ites, but belong to the Zaidi sect and not the Twelver sect predominant in Iran (indeed, the two sects have historically been rivals),” Katz writes. In fact, until the recent outbreak of violence, the Yemeni government enjoyed fairly good relations with Tehran. So while the verdict on Iranian meddling in Yemen is out for now, this much is sure: Tehran considers Yemen within the Iranian sphere of influence and wants to ensure that the Western powers (and the Saudis) do not interfere. How will the United States and its Arab allies respond to Tehran’s covert drive for dominance in the Persian Gulf? So far, no one seems to have any answers. The shooting of Luqman Abdullah
November 18, 2009 6:17 PM ET
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
In October, a shootout at a warehouse in Dearborn, Mich., claimed the life of Luqman Abdullah, the imam of Detroit’s Masjid al-Haqq, and in the process garnered national attention. Abdullah had been a Detroit representative to al-Ummah, which a criminal complaint filed by an FBI special agent describes as "a nationwide radical fundamentalist Sunni group consisting primarily of African-Americans." (Others, including the Muslim Alliance in North America, strongly deny this characterization.) The next issue of CTR Vantage, a publication of the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, will focus on the shooting incident and the movement that Abdullah represented. Today we provide an advance look at the upcoming issue by publishing an article I co-wrote with Madeleine Gruen that will be the next issue's lead piece. An excerpt: Al-Ummah—which is either a splinter from, or a cover for, the Darul Islam movement—had been led by Jamil al-Amin, who was formerly known as 1960s firebrand H. Rap Brown. Though al-Amin is reportedly still considered al-Ummah’s leader by the group’s members, he has not been involved in day-to-day operations for some time: he is currently serving a life sentence at the Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado, following his 2002 conviction for shooting two police officers in Georgia. To read the full article, click here. Radicalization, links to extremists are themes in Hasan case
November 18, 2009 2:51 PM ET
By Wes Bruer
As more clues emerge and investigations continue in the Fort Hood shootings, the debate rages as to what Major Nidal Hasan's motives were. The facts that are already known, however, seem to paint a pretty clear picture of how these events unfolded, and what Hasan's intentions were. Hasan's suspicious behavior: Hasan had expressed concern to family members over the prospect of being deployed, but his statements and actions went far beyond that. He openly opposed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and said that Muslims fighting other Muslims would result in "adverse effects." After the murder of two Army recruiters in Little Rock, Ark., Hasan stated that more of these types of attacks should be carried out and that US soldiers are legitimate targets at home and abroad. He even posted on the Internet a statement to the effect that suicide bombings are equivalent to a soldier's diving on a grenade to save fellow soldiers. Despite all of these ideas and opinions, Hasan never formally sought permission to leave the Army as a conscientious objector or for any other reason. According to Army psychiatrists, Hasan had become so enamored with Islam that they ordered him to attend university lectures on Islam and terrorism. In 2007, he was due to give a presentation for senior Army doctors on a medical topic. Instead, in a presentation illustrated with 50 slides, Hasan lectured the doctors on Islam, the Koran, and jihad. Hasan did not try to hide where his allegiance lies in this war. As an Army psychiatrist, Hasan was supposed to help the troops deal with traumas they had experienced while deployed. Instead, he checked with superiors to determine whether he could provide evidence against soldiers for alleged war crimes that he discovered in speaking with soldiers in the course of his work. Day of the shooting: The morning of the shooting, Hasan had given away some of his belongings; he had given away a Koran the day before. He phoned one neighbor to say goodbye and told another "I am ready," which she interpreted as "I figured, he’s with God. He’s ready to go fight.” Hasan then made a stop to pray at the Islamic Community of Greater Killeen mosque, where he had attended services for the previous three months. After entering the Soldier Readiness Center, Hasan sat at an empty table, bowing his head for a moment. He then shouted "Allahu Akbar" and opened fire with two handguns. Following the shooting: A lot of finger-pointing has already taken place, and it will continue to distract attention from the facts. Just weeks ago, an FOIA lawsuit forced the FBI to release details of its investigation methods. In the redacted manual that was published, it was revealed that agents are permitted to collect information on an individual based on his or her religion. Many civil liberties groups and privacy advocates are up in arms over this method of investigation. One thing is certain: the controversy underlines the difficulties agents can encounter during an investigation that can lead to mishandling of the case. Certainly information was bungled in this case; it seems there was an interagency communications problem as well. Lawmakers are already calling for investigations into the matter, and the Obama administration has recently ordered an investigation into the handling of intelligence gathering in this case. Representative Pete Hoekstra, ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, is calling for a full investigation into Hasan's contacts with radical cleric Ansar al Awlaki and others. Authorities have also recently opened an investigation into whether Hasan was wiring money to or receiving wire transfers from Pakistan before the shooting occurred. The Defense Department is also taking a harder look at why some of the red flags were ignored or mishandled. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has ordered a probe of Pentagon procedures that go beyond the Army: “Gates wants a probe that hits all corners of the Pentagon,” the Pentagon press secretary stated. Another official said that other warning signs that may have been overlooked will be examined to determine whether the potential exists that other dangerous service members are still active. Although none of Hasan’s superiors saw him as a threat, they did notice a worrisome change in his behavior; the Pentagon probe will also review whether these behavioral changes were properly handled. Hasan is currently facing 13 counts of premeditated murder, and Army Criminal Investigators are considering whether any additional charges will be filed The connection: As noted above, Hasan had been in regular contact with the radical imam Anwar al Awlaki. Prior to the Fort Hood shootings, the FBI had intercepted 10 to 20 emails between the two men, but the investigations were halted after investigators determined the emails' content was "consistent with the subject matter of [Hasan's] research." Most of the subject matter discussed in the emails is said to have been questions posed to the imam regarding spiritual matters. Awlaki is reported to have been a spiritual advisor to 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al-Hamzi, as well as to Nidal Hasan, even presiding at Hasan's mother's funeral in 2001. Awlaki has garnered a following among Western Muslims as most of his sermons are predominantly in English. He incorporates new media and has operated his blog espousing jihad since his release. Just days following the shooting at Fort Hood, Awlaki posted articles expressing his admiration for Hasan's actions. "He is a hero. Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal." Awlaki, who has been hiding out from Yemeni authorities, recently spoke to a Yemeni journalist. The imam claimed to have neither pressured nor ordered the attacks but said that Hasan had become a close confidant and that he had noticed Hasan’s growing discomfort with the US military. When asked why he praised Hasan as a hero, Awlaki responded “I blessed the act because it was against a military target. And the soldiers who were killed were not normal soldiers, but those who were trained and prepared to go to Afghanistan and Iraq.” Background on Anwar al-Awlaki: Awlaki, or Aulaqi, first came to the attention of the FBI in 1999, when he was thought to have been contacted by a "procurement agent" for Osama bin Laden. Awlaki's name appears dozens of times in the 9/11 Commission Report outlining his associations with two of the hijackers. After preaching at the Dar al Hijra mosque in Falls Church, Va., Awlaki left for Yemen in 2002 to continue preaching at a Rabat mosque. He was detained in Yemen in 2006 for ties to terrorists, but was released the following year. In January of this year, Awlaki posted an article on the Internet called "44 ways to support jihad." In it, he states that it is obligatory for every Muslim to engage or assist in jihad against America and its allies. He calls for non-fighting Muslims to provide material, financial, and moral support to those waging war against the West. Awlaki is currently being sought by Yemeni authorities for issuing fatwas (religious decrees) allowing militants to kidnap foreigners. Yemeni officials believe he is presently taking refuge in one of the Yemeni provinces that has a heavy al Qaeda presence. Taliban 'defeated' in South Waziristan: Pakistani Army spokesman
November 18, 2009 10:08 AM ET
By Bill Roggio
Here is a very bad sign that the Pakistani Army views the very narrow offensive against the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in South Waziristan as sufficient to defeat the Taliban. Major General Athar Abbas, the top military spokesman, in Reuters: ‘You have defeated the main, strongest terrorist organisation of the area and it will create effects all around. As I've explained, Hakeemullah Mehsud's forces have regrouped outside of South Waziristan (they were always well established in the tribal areas and the great northwest). They are sheltering in areas where the military cut peace agreements with "good" Taliban leaders. Without taking on the Taliban in these regions, they will not be defeated, but merely displaced. Also see Syed Saleem Shahzad's excellent piece in the Asia Times on this subject. Mullah Fazlullah, in Afghanistan, vows to relaunch Swat insurgency
November 17, 2009 11:39 AM ET
By Bill Roggio Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of the Swat Taliban, has surfaced in Afghanistan and has threatened to reignite the insurgency in Pakistan's Swat Valley. From BBC: "I have reached Afghanistan safely," Maulana Fazlullah told BBC Urdu. "We are soon going to launch full-fledged punitive raids against the army in Swat." The Pakistani military and government had Fazlullah written off as dead several times last summer. It would be interesting to know where Fazlullah is in Afghanistan. Good money would put him somewhere in Nuristan or Kunar, where US forces are shutting down bases and allowing the Taliban to openly govern in parts of these provinces. The Taliban said the US pullback from Nuristan has given the group new life to operate. These claims were dismissed by some Western observers as Taliban propaganda. But Fazlullah's emergence in Afghanistan shows the claims are not merely propaganda. Irish jihadi operates in Swat and Rawalpindi
November 15, 2009 10:35 PM ET
By Bill Roggio The Sunday Times has an interesting and disturbing story of an Irishman who converted to Islam while in a Saudi jail and has left the UK to become a jihadi. Khalid Kelly, as he is now known, is of course training in Pakistan. Interestingly enough, he's in the Swat Valley: After a period underground, Kelly has now re-emerged in Pakistan’s Swat valley, where the army recently drove out the Taliban in a three-month military operation. He travels frequently to Rawalpindi, a garrison city next to the nation’s capital Islamabad, to meet contacts and spread his radical jihadist message. The fact that an Irishman like Kelly feels comfortable enough to surface in the Swat Valley speaks volumes about the security situation there. The military has claimed the Taliban have been defeated in Swat, even though clashes with the Taliban occur there regularly. And the fact Kelly freely travels to and openly operates in Rawalpindi shows that the spread of radical Islam is going on unchecked in the home of Pakistan's military. British advocate negotiations with the Taliban Quetta Shura
November 14, 2009 8:36 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
A British memo that advocates reconciliation with the Taliban - all the way to the top level with the Quetta Shura - has surfaced. The BBC has the report: "We must weaken and divide the Taliban if we are to reduce the insurgency to a level that can be managed and contained by the Afghan Security Forces," begins a section headed "Agenda Items 3". The memo ignores the realities on the ground in Afghanistan and in NATO capitals, and is fueled by a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the Taliban. Continue reading "British advocate negotiations with the Taliban Quetta Shura"Attacks will increase in Pakistan: Qari Hussain
November 14, 2009 2:59 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
Qari Hussain Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban commander and trainer of child suicide bombers, has threatened to step up attacks throughout the country if the military did not end operations in South Waziristan. According to Xinhua, he "challenged the government to stop the wave of suicide attacks if it can." He claimed responsibility for the Friday's suicide attacks on the office of the intelligence agency ISI in Peshawar and police station in the city of Bannu. Up to 20 people were killed and 60 others were injured in the attacks on the ISI office and police station. According to AKI, the Taliban leadership cadre has relocated to "their new base in the town of Shawal, located in neighbouring North Waziristan tribal area," and will step up attacks against the Pakistani security forces nationwide. My sources are saying that is correct, but they add that the Taliban have also regrouped in South Waziristan, Arakzai, and Khyber (I'll expand on this and the state of the South Waziristan operation in the near future at LWJ). The short of it is that the narrow focus of the Pakistani military's operation, absent action in the rest of the tribal areas, will deal only a tactical defeat to the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani generals linked to US terror suspects
November 13, 2009 11:27 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
Mohawat Hussain Rana, one of two US-based terror suspects involved in plots to attack a Danish newspaper as well as targets in India, has two brothers serving in senior positions in the Pakistani Army. Rediff News reported that Rana instructed David Headley, his co-conspirator, to get in touch with his brothers: Sources in both the IB [the Intelligence Bureau, India's equivalent of the FBI] and investigating agencies told rediff.com say they managed to track down Headley's Pakistan army link through the transcripts of his email. Headley interacted with his bosses in Pakistan through the ID mov.monie@yahoo.com. There are reports that one or both of the two unnamed Pakistani conspirators who worked with Rana and Headley are Pakistani military officers. My sources said that Rana's brothers are not the unnamed suspects. Headley is suspected of scouting Mumbai for the Lashkar-e-Taiba prior to the deadly 62-hour terror assault on the city that left more than 170 dead. Headley spent 10 days at the Taj Hotel, which was one of the primary targets of the Lashkar-e-Taiba operation in Mumbai. 'Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al Qaeda'
November 13, 2009 2:29 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a former French investigative magistrate who specialized on al Qaeda and investigated the terror group in Pakistan, has more damning information on al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the groups' ties to each other and the Pakistani state. From Reuters: In an interview, Bruguiere said he was convinced Lashkar-e-Taiba, first set up to fight India in its part of the divided Himalayan region of Kashmir, had become part of an international network tied to al Qaeda. Bruguiere goes on to explain that shoe-bomber Richard Reid and three other Westerns were trained in a Lashkar-e-Taiba camp by Pakistani soldiers who doubled as members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The training camp was supported by the Pakistani Army. "Military supplies were dropped by army helicopters," Reuters reported. Here is some background on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and al Qaeda given to me by US intelligence officials last year: Lashkar-e-Taiba has an extensive network in southern and Southeast Asia. A senior US military intelligence official described the group as "al Qaeda junior," as it has vast resources, an extensive network, and is able to carry out complex attacks throughout its area of operations. "If by some stroke of luck al Qaeda collapsed, LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) could step in and essentially take its place." That final reference to Wanat is evidence of what we now know as al Qaeda's Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army. This is al Qaeda's military organization manned by the various jihadi groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba. For more on Bruguiere's accusations of the Pakistani-jihadi nexus, see "French prosecutor points out Pakistan links to jihadis." Khamenei sanctions new intelligence agency
November 13, 2009 12:03 PM ET
By Austin Knuppe
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a Paris-based group comprised of Iranian exiles (and some insiders in Iran), Tehran’s Grand Ayatollah, Ali Khamenei, has sanctioned the creation of a new intelligence organization charged with shielding the regime from domestic uprisings. Hassan Taeb, previously a lead commander of the Basij militia, is heading the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to unconfirmed reports, this new unit will report directly to the Grand Ayatollah and will incorporate many other agencies previously organized under Tehran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. These seven agencies include: • The old intelligence directorate of the IRGC, consisting of several pursuit and surveillance units. • The IRGC cyber defense unit, called the “Control Center for Internet Activities.” This unit is headquartered in the Firouzeh Palace district in the township of Kamali, where the IRGC also has a covert office. • Select units of the Internal Security Directorate at the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. • The Security Directorate of the Basij paramilitary force, consisting of a domestic espionage and monitoring network. • Khamenei’s personal intelligence unit, called “Office 101.” • Several plainclothes units (which monitor street protests in and around the capital) at the IRGC’s Tehran headquarters. • The “Sarallah Corps,” an elite infantry unit of the IRGC that commands the police and other paramilitary units around the country. This bureaucratic shuffle is more than a simple reorganization. Ayatollah Khamenei—with the tacit consent of the IRGC—is reforming a state apparatus with the sole purpose of quelling domestic protests. It also gives Khamenei more consolidated control should continued fissures develop in the the current regime. By filling the ranks of the IRGC with Khamenei loyalists, the Grand Ayatollah is controlling an organization with its hands in many different facets of Iranian society. Since last June’s disputed presidential election, the IRGC has also gained control over state media by using Mobin, one of the IRGC’s subsidiary companies, to purchase a majority share in the government’s Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). With this purchase, the IRGC now controls both the medium and the message of Iran’s news cycle. One question that has yet to be answered is to what degree the IRGC has autonomy even from the Ayatollah. In a recent news article Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation, observed: “The Revolutionary Guards and security forces are being reorganized not only to provide ultimate control for Khamenei, but for the guards specifically…. I question whether Khamenei is the overall or major driver of these changes. The Revolutionary Guards appear to answer to no one." If Nader is correct, we may see the IRGC take a subtle drift away from both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. As long as Khamenei fills the ranks of the IRGC with his loyalists, however, this will most likely not be the case. Afghanistan: A flaw in the rules of engagement
November 12, 2009 2:20 PM ET
By Bill Roggio
Britain's Ministry of Defence website has an article that perfectly illustrates what is wrong with the rules of engagement in Afghanistan. A British sniper spotted what he believed was a Taliban spotter who was directing fire on the sniper's fellow soldiers, and instead of killing the spotter, he fired a warning shot: The soldier, who can only be known as Corporal Danny for security reasons, shot at the feet of an unarmed man who was apparently directing gunfire at Cpl Danny's unit, an Army spokesman said. Bing West said it best in a videotape he took of recent combat action in Afghanistan: "Leaving your enemy intact is not a smart idea in any war." As long as Taliban spotters know that they are immune from attack for spotting our troops, they will continue to do so. Arrest in Netherlands may yield insight into Shabaab recruiting networks
November 12, 2009 12:47 AM ET
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross Yesterday the Star Tribune (published in Minneapolis-St. Paul) reported on a seemingly significant arrest in the Netherlands related to the al Shabaab recruiting networks that have centered on the Twin Cities area. From the Star Tribune: A 43-year-old Somali man from Minneapolis was arrested this week in the Netherlands for allegedly financing the recruitment of up to 20 young Somali men from Minnesota to train and fight with terrorists in their homeland.... The identity of the man, who was arrested Sunday at an asylum-seeker's center 45 miles northeast of Amsterdam, was not released. But Special Agent E.K. Wilson of the Minneapolis FBI office confirmed Tuesday that the man was arrested in connection with the ongoing counterterrorism investigation that began here when young men began disappearing in 2007. "We are aware of this individual and of this arrest. And it is tied to our ongoing Minneapolis investigation," Wilson said. "We are and have been working closely with Dutch authorities through our legal attaché office in Brussels and coordinating with the Department of Justice Office of International Affairs." Dutch prosecutors said in a statement that the man lived in Minneapolis before leaving the United States in November 2008 and arrived in the Netherlands about one month later. The statement said American authorities asked for the man's arrest and are seeking to have him extradited.... According to the Dutch statement, U.S. prosecutors suspect the man of bankrolling the purchase of weapons for Islamic extremists and helping other Somalis travel to Somalia in 2007 and 2008. The article refers to this as likely "the most significant development yet" in the investigation into US-based Shabaab recruiting networks. This assessment appears to be correct. A recent article in CTR Vantage that examines Shabaab recruiting networks in the West shows that though recruiters seem to play a significant role in these networks, much is still not known about them. Those arrested to date in the Twin Cities case have been people who traveled to Somalia, or those who facilitated the travel, but the recruiters have been largely in the shadows. For example, when 26-year-old Salah Osman Ahmed pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorists based on his travel to Somalia, he spoke elliptically of the recruiters who helped draw him there, mentioning "secret meetings" beginning in October 2007 with people he would only describe as "guys." The arrest of a bigger player in the case may provide greater insight into these networks. Afghanistan’s war on drugs: Child 'chemists' and counternarcotics
November 10, 2009 5:39 PM ET
By Matt Dupee
“I’ve been in this business a long time, but it really disturbs me when I see the opium workshops in Mawand that are completely run with children labor.” This is how Suleiman, a thuggish drug trader from southern Afghanistan, described Afghanistan’s narcotics industry to me when I was in Kandahar this past June. “They would line up around the compound each morning, just hoping and praying they would get picked to work for a wage that’s less than 40 Pakistani rupees [less than $1] a day. They become instant addicts cooking the opium in large vats.” Sadly, Suleiman’s story is not uncommon. According to UN statistics, nearly two-thirds of all Afghan opium, some 6,900 tons last year, is converted into morphine-base or heroin in grubby workshops like those he described before being smuggled out of the country. That’s enough opium to make well over 600 metric tons of heroin. Keep in mind that the United States and Canada, with a combined population exceeding 330 million, consumes approximately 22 tons of heroin annually. Afghanistan’s unparalleled narcotics industry has produced over 90% of the world’s illicit opium and heroin for six years in a row. International efforts to dismantle the Afghan narcotics machine have been insufficient, and only recently has the picture begun to improve slightly. The Obama administration overhauled the US counternarcotics strategy this year, removing forced eradication measures and stepping up interdiction, drug seizures, and attacks on clandestine drug refinement labs across the country. The revised strategy, along with the increase in interdiction activity that was begun late last year, is apparently having an effect. According to the UNODC, during the first half of this year NATO and Afghan operations destroyed over 90 tons of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, 450 tons of opium poppy seeds, 77.5 tons of narcotics, and 27 laboratories. Although interdiction is a step in the right direction, not nearly enough is being done to target the essential precursor chemicals smuggled into Afghanistan that augment the capabilities of drug refinement workshops. While 90 tons of precursor chemicals sounds like a lot, consider that Afghanistan annually uses nearly 14,500 tons of such chemicals to refine opium into a usable substance. Last year, less than 68 tons of precursor chemicals were interdicted. This year, during my travels north of Kabul in late June, I saw dozens of heavy transport trucks carrying shipments of precursor chemicals likely to have been acetic anhydride, the key ingredient used to refine opium into morphine base and heroin. The trucks traveled on main thoroughfares, and their drivers made no effort to conceal their illicit cargo. Political protection for these types of convoys is said to be traceable to the highest levels of the Afghan government. In areas controlled by insurgents such as the Taliban, commanders are providing the necessary protection for drug shipments and precursor chemicals under the guise of “transit-taxes,” earning insurgents well over $75 million annually in protection fees. Afghanistan’s narcotics industry continues to erode security and stability initiatives, entrenches corruption deep within the Afghan central government, and feeds a growing generation of heroin addicts across South Asia. Meanwhile, diseases like HIV/AIDS continue to spread at unprecedented rates due to the increase in intravenous drug use, a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s narco-problem will not simply go away by itself. In order to even begin to turn the tide against this robust and entrenched industry, corruption must be fought and security established, long enough to allow for meaningful agricultural assistance; the core infrastructure must be developed, such as creating cold-storage depots and improving roadways; and micro-financing must be made available for farmers. In addition, it will be essential to target the nexus between drug producers and traffickers, on the one hand, and government officials and insurgent commanders on the other. Unless Afghanistan's narcotics problem is properly addressed, the country will be consumed by its own corruption, bad governance, and a thriving insurgency fueled by narco-profits and criminality. Fort Hood shooter has ties to radical US imam
November 9, 2009 9:48 PM ET
By Bill Roggio ![]() Even as the FBI continues to investigate if Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Malik Hasan has links to al Qaeda, investigators are rushing to declare that he "acted alone and without outside direction," the Associated Press reported. Over at The Weekly Standard, Thomas Joscelyn takes a hard look at Anwar al Awlaki, the radical cleric who is linked to three of the 9/11 hijackers and who has fled the country to reside in Yemen, where he still preaches jihad. Now, the AP reports that Hasan has been in direct contact, via email, with Awlaki: In late 2008, officials said, a separate investigation revealed Hasan's communications with another individual they declined to identify. Separately, another U.S.official said the person Hasan was communicating with was Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical imam overseas who has come under scrutiny for possible links to terror groups. All of the officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the case on the record. And it gets more interesting. Alwaki praised Hasan's actions on his blog: Nidal Hassan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn’t exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges. Here is what we know about Hasan so far: • Hasan attended the Dar al Hijrah mosque in Great Falls, Va., in 2001 at the same time as two of the 9/11 hijackers. Iraq: The raveling*
November 8, 2009 1:19 PM ET
By Bill Ardolino Iraq's parliament has approved a long-delayed law governing national elections scheduled to be held next January, officials have said. While the underlying dispute over Kirkuk has not been resolved by the law's passage, the agreement includes this crucial positive detail: The election law provides for an open candidate list, allowing voters to cast their ballot for an individual rather than a party. It also sets aside five seats in parliament for minorities. It was vital to permit open candidate lists in order to maintain Iraq's popular trend towards nationalism, elevate truly qualified leaders, and break sectarian party strangleholds on government ministries. Notably, open list elections were supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and opposed by some of the major Kurdish and Shia Arab parties, the latter of which are often portrayed in the media as running Iraq at Iran's behest. The open source news reports are typically light on detail, but this looks to be a milestone essential to Iraq's potential stability and political progress. * The title is of course a light poke at Thomas Ricks' "Iraq, the Unraveling" series of blog posts, which I believe focus on negative aspects of Iraq without due consideration of what is working, when it works. Today it looks as if something important worked. More troubling information emerges on Fort Hood shooter
November 7, 2009 8:18 PM ET
By Bill Roggio While some news outlets entertain the ridiculous notion that Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Malik Hasan was the victim of "vicarious traumatization," more evidence emerges that indicates Hasan was radicalized. The Telegraph reported that Hasan attended the same Virgina mosque as three of the 9/11 bombers, while NPR said he casually espoused his religious views to colleagues in the course of his work as a medical professional. Hasan, the sole suspect in the massacre of 13 fellow US soldiers in Texas, attended the controversial Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Great Falls, Virginia, in 2001 at the same time as two of the September 11 terrorists, The Sunday Telegraph has learnt. His mother's funeral was held there in May that year. NPR: But he seemed almost belligerent about being Muslim, and he gave a lecture one day that really freaked a lot of doctors out. |





