May 18, 2012 1:33 PM
By Bill Roggio

At the end of part one of the recently released autobiography of American jihadist Omar Hammami, he addresses a question about US airstrikes in Somalia and their effectiveness.

Hammami's response is interesting. He says the strikes have not had an effect on the fighting between Shabaab and the Somali government, and that it is what is on the ground that counts (he's basically saying you can't win a war via airpower alone). He also states that although the main purpose of the strikes is to cause a rift between "the global element of this Jihaad from the local element," the strikes are having the opposite effect.

Here is the question, and his answer:

32.1) Have they given America any advantage? Have the Mujahideen been able to effectively deal with this development? Are the drone strikes accurate, or do they occasionally result in civilian casualties? Please explain.

The drones haven't really changed anything on the ground as far as the basic power struggle between the TFG and the Mujaahidiin. The only aim of these attacks is to separate the global element of this Jihaad from the local element. They just want to kill off every white Muhaajir they can. It goes without saying that lots of collateral damage will only unite the people against the Americans, so they try to make our departure as unnoticeable to the populace as possible.

Like I said before, there have been lots of "cases" in the past few years, but the "accuracy" is only because of who's on the ground and not because of what is in the air.

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May 17, 2012 8:01 PM
By Bill Roggio

The Taliban executed a suicide assault on the governor's compound in the western Afghan province of Farah today. Six policemen, a civilian, and four members of the suicide assault team were killed during the attack, which lasted for more than two hours. From TOLONews:

Six Afghan police and one civilian were killed in an attack on the governor's compound in western Farah province on Thursday morning, local officials said.

Four men armed with explosives and automatic rifles stormed the compound around 10:30 am, breaking in after one of them detonated his explosives at the gate of the compound, provincial police chief Shamsul Rahman Zahid said.

The clash ended after nearly two hours with all four attackers dead, according to police spokesman in western Afghanistan Abdul Raouf Ahmadi.

A second bomber blew himself up inside the compound and the last two were killed during the clash with the Afghan security troops, Ahmadi told TOLOnews.

"The clash ended after nearly two hours as more security forces arrived and secured the compound," he said.

Provincial governor was at the compound, but he was not hurt in the attack, he added.

On their website, Voice of Jihad, the Taliban claimed credit for the attack. The Taliban said 13 Afghan security personnel were killed, named the four "martyrs," and claimed that two others involved in the attack had escaped:

According to details, the attack was carried out by 4 martyrdom seeking Mujahideen (Mahmood from Zabul, Rafeeq from Uruzgan and Ahmadullah and Abdus Salam both from Farah province) armed with RPGs, PK machine guns, rifles, hand grenades and explosives vests who initially killed the hireling troops stationed at the assembly area and then made their way to the governor office where they took up positions and engaged the enemy.

It is said that 13 hireling troops and government officials including the secretary of the provincial governor were killed in the ensuing fighting whereas nearly 40 other enemy personnel which includes the deputy provincial governor (Younus) were wounded. The 4 martyrdom seeking Mujahideen later embraced martyrdom (may Allah accept them) while another 2 involved in the successful operation managed to safely leave the area.

Another Taliban suicide attack in western Afghanistan took place on April 28 in Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz province. A suicide bomber detonated a cart packed with explosives, killing a US Marine and wounding others. The Taliban then opened fire on the US and Afghan troops from nearby buildings. See Ambush in Zaranj for more details on the attack.

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May 16, 2012 4:57 PM
By Bill Roggio

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Over the past two months, Tuareg rebels, backed by Islamist terror groups such as Ansar al Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, have seized control of northern Mali, including the cities of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao. During that same period there have been several reports that al Qaeda has moved to establish safe havens in the region. Yesterday, Magharebia published a must-read piece on how foreign jihadists have entered northern Mali to train and advise al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb fighters in Timbuktu. The mayor of Timbuktu is quoted as saying Pakistanis have indeed infiltrated his city. From Magharebia:

Timbuktu mayor Hallé Ousman confirmed the news during an exclusive telephone interview with Magharebia.

"There are actually many Pakistani nationals in Timbuktu, as well as others from many other nationalities, the mayor said. "I personally saw them today going around streets, neighbourhoods and markets. However, they haven't yet started actual communication and direct conversation with residents."

"As to their mission, it became clear to residents several weeks ago," Ousman added. "It is represented in training the new recruits who al-Qaeda and other armed groups in town are enlisting."

"The situation has become very dangerous," he concluded. "In Timbuktu, we refuse that our city be turned into a scene for the terrorist acts that foreign groups are engaged in, given that they threaten our stability and make our sons susceptible to deviation."

In addition to al Qaeda elements from Afghanistan and Pakistan, Boko Haram fighters from Nigeria are also said to have moved into northern Mali, which one analyst compared to Afghanistan and Pakistan:

Analyst Sid Ahmed Ould Tfeil explained that "the spread of foreign nationals and elements from several identities in areas controlled by al-Qaeda is one of the priorities for the terrorist group which considers itself to be above all ethnic and national considerations."

"It believes that wherever the necessary conditions and circumstances of jihad are available, it becomes a duty for jihadists to move to that place to provide support," he said.

"The condition of Timbuktu today is largely similar to that of Afghanistan and Pakistan which in the early 1990s were centres for attracting jihadists from around the world to raise al-Qaeda flag," Ould Tfeil added. "Northern Mali today is the next alternative for Afghanistan where the terrorists have suffered heavy losses before and after the killing of Bin Laden because of the role played by drones and international forces in countering terrorism there."

"A few days after the fall of northern Mali, Boko Haram elements came from Nigeria," he said.

"Now elements from Pakistan and Afghanistan are coming, and elements from Somalia's Shabaab al-Mujahideen may come within the next days," he predicted. "This is in addition to the Maghreb elements who are originally in the region."

Speigel noted days ago that a vast area in the Sahel has now fallen under terrorist control:

Overnight, the withdrawal of government authority in Mali has rendered ungovernable an area four times the size of France, spread across the Sahara Desert and the Sahel zone. Islamist groups now move nearly unchallenged across a territory that stretches from Tindouf in western Algeria to the border between Libya and Chad in the east, and into the northern part of Nigeria to the south. These groups move weapons and drugs, take hostages and plan attacks.

Northern Mali is but the latest al Qaeda haven to emerge over the past several years. It joins Yemen, Somali, the Egyptian Sinai, and Syria as the new fronts in The Long War.

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May 16, 2012 12:16 AM
By Bill Roggio

According to the International News Network, the Pakistani Taliban are selling a video of the Bannu jailbreak that freed 384 prisoners, including Adnan Rasheed, one of the would-be assassins of former President Pervez Musharraf [emphasis below is mine]:

Taliban have released the video of Bannu jail attack in which leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Hakeemullah Mehsud is briefing his fighters' squad.

Tape also contains messages of Adnan Rasheed who was allegedly involved in plotting the murder of former president Parvez Musharraf.

A 34 minutes video is being sold openly in various areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan in which Hakeemullah Mehsud is briefing his warrior's team through map containing different routes leading towards Bannu jail and also briefing the inside situation of the jail.

The video tape shows some 150 fighters including Hakeemullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman gathered at one place and form a strategy to assault the jail and attacked the jail with heavy weaponry without facing any hurdle from police side. Other scenes after the attack are also present in the tape having top militants who managed to escape from the jail.

Clearly the top leaders of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan can gather with 150 fighters to plot and execute operations without fear of attack, despite Pakistan's military offensives in the tribal areas and the US drones hovering over North and South Waziristan.

Additionally, it has been reported numerous times in the past that Hakeemullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman have been at odds with each other and even came to blows at the so-called "battle at the shura," where the two supposedly shot it out over who would succeed Baitullah Mehsud. The report was of course false, and was debunked when the two appeared together in a video.

The rumors that the top two Pakistani Taliban leaders remain at odds and ready to kill each other persist, and will continue to do so, despite the release of videos such as the one described above.

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May 15, 2012 11:38 AM
By Bill Roggio

The Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, a jihadist group that has claimed credit for three other suicide attacks in Syria, recently denied having produced a video attributed to Al Nusrah that claimed credit for the May 10 double suicide attack in Damascus. The video was released on YouTube two days after the May 10 bombings, which killed 55, and was subsequently reported in major media outlets as being attributed to Al Nusrah.

Al Nusrah's denial was issued on jihadists forums yesterday. An excerpt from the SITE Intelligence Group translation:

These agencies, websites and channels attributed this act to al-Nusra Front of the People of the Levant, may Allah grant it glory, basing it on a video clip that was published on YouTube. But, to show the truth and remove the falsehood, we say: That video and the statement included therein is made up and false on behalf of the Front, and anyone who follows the news knows that. We thought that we wouldn't need to deny this video, as it is full of mistakes ...

The statement went on to list the reasons why the YouTube video was false:

• The video was not issued by the "Al-Manara Al-Baydha' foundation," which Al Nusrah described as the "sole and exclusive one authorized to publish" its statements.
• The number of the statement is wrong.
• Al Nusrah does not issue videos in this format, and the voice "attributed to Sheikh al-Fatih [conqueror] Abu Muhammad al-Julani" was faked.
• The Al-Manara Al-Baydha' foundation does not publish videos.
• The video did not contain complete details of the attack.
• The video was not released through the established, official jihadist web forums.

LWJ did not report on the YouTube videotape claim, as was done in the three previous claims, as we were suspicious of the authenticity of the tape and how it was released. It has been clear that Al Nusrah uses the Al-Manara Al-Baydha' foundation to create the tapes, and relies on the established jihadist forums to distribute them.

Note that Al Nusrah did not deny responsibility for the attack, it only denied the validity of the videotape. Al Nusrah may yet claim credit for this attack.

An interesting question arises: If Al Nusrah did not produce the video, who did? Given that we don't yet know who carried out the bombings, we can only speculate as to why this video was created. Perhaps an Al Nusrah cell that carried out the attack jumped the gun and posted the video (if so, why get the release wrong and fake the voice of al Julani?) Or maybe a rival jihadist group, or even the Free Syrian Army, wants to pin the attack on Al Nusrah (but why)? Or was this the work of Syrian intelligence (conspiracy theories persist that Syrian intelligence is actually conducting these attacks to paint the rebels as jihadists)? Or perhaps a foreign intelligence service created the video to sow uncertainty in jihadist media circles?

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May 10, 2012 5:11 PM
By Thomas Joscelyn

It is easy to see why double agents are the source of inspiration for many spy novels and movies. The intrigue involved, including a potentially violent end to their spy games, gives writers low-hanging fruit to pluck. But art frequently mirrors real life when it comes to double agents. Especially infamous examples were found out during the Cold War - on both sides of the fight. And every secretive group on the planet, from intelligence agencies to terrorist organizations, must worry that double agents are among their ranks.

Al Qaeda has been especially paranoid about the use of double agents, as can be seen in the group's literature dealing with counterintelligence and operational security. Even before 9/11 the group would beat and torture any man the most senior terrorists suspected of being a spy posing as an eager recruit. In order to gain admittance to an al Qaeda safe house, terrorists needed someone in the organization to vouch for them if they were not already known to the house's inhabitants.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates have every reason to worry about real life double agents, as demonstrated by the recently foiled plot against American airliners. According to press accounts, a spy recruited by the Saudis infiltrated Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was so good at his job that AQAP recruited him for a suicide mission against an airliner using a new and improved bomb masquerading as underwear. This was an updated version of the bomb worn by an AQAP recruit on Christmas Day 2009.

But the double agent had no intention of doing AQAP's bidding. Instead, according to the New York Times, he "delivered both the innovative bomb designed for his aviation attack and inside information on the group's leaders, locations, methods and plans to the Central Intelligence Agency, Saudi intelligence and allied foreign intelligence agencies." As a result, Fahd al Quso, a long wanted al Qaeda operative implicated in the Oct. 12, 2000, USS Cole bombing was killed in a drone strike.

That the Saudis recruited a spy who burrowed his way deep into AQAP is not surprising. For years the Saudis have tried to do just that. The Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists is a perfect staging ground for such operations. A significant number of the program's graduates, including detainees formerly held at Guantanamo, have gone on to fill leadership positions in AQAP. According to the most recent figures made public by the Saudis, the recidivism rate for ex-Guantanamo detainees is 25 percent. (American sources say the true number is much higher.) But there is an opportunity for the Saudis to place a spy among the ranks of so many true recidivists.

In fact, the Saudis claim that a previous AQAP plot in late 2010 was broken up with the help of one such rehabilitated double agent. The Saudis say that AQAP's attempt to bomb two cargo planes was found out with the help of intelligence from Jaber al Fayfi - an ex-Gitmo detainee who joined AQAP after passing through the Saudi rehabilitation program. The timing of al Fayfi's role seemed a bit fishy at the time, as he left AQAP's ranks several weeks before the cargo bomb plot was disrupted.

We do not know who the more recent double agent is, or how the Saudis managed to recruit him. Nonetheless, the story of al Fayfi's putative spywork set a precedent for the recently neutralized bomb plot.

Which brings us to the most important question surrounding these events: Why was the double agent's existence leaked to the press?

It is possible that his cover was already blown after turning over the "innovative" bomb design and other sensitive details. If this is the case, it would substantially mitigate any damage done by having this spy's existence broadcast to the world.

Then again, why not try to keep AQAP guessing about its enemies' clandestine operations as long as we can? If his cover wasn't blown, then divulging his existence was a major operational mistake. It could potentially jeopardize future operations.

There is still much we do not know about this episode. We do know this: al Qaeda and its affiliates have every reason to worry about double agents. And that can only hamper their operations as they become more and more suspicious of new recruits volunteering to kill themselves. But blowing the double agent's cover can also improve AQAP's operational security, allowing the terrorists to learn more about their enemies' tradecraft.

Finally, the CIA has learned the hard way in the fight against terrorism that the good guys need to worry about double agents, too. One of the agency's biggest post-9/11 failures occurred when a Jordanian doctor told authorities that he could help them get Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's number two at the time. The doctor was, in reality, an al Qaeda double agent. He blew himself up at a base in Afghanistan in December 2009. He killed more CIA men and women in that one attack than any other attack in decades.

Double agents go both ways in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates. This latest round goes to the white hats -- except for the part about blowing the double agent's cover.

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May 10, 2012 2:25 PM
By Thomas Joscelyn

One of the chief beneficiaries of the Arab Spring thus far has been the Muslim Brotherhood, which has gained power in Egypt and elsewhere. This did not escape Osama bin Laden's attention prior to his demise. In one of the few documents released by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point last week, bin Laden comments on the Brotherhood and urges al Qaeda members to avoid confrontations with the group for the time being. Bin Laden sees the Brotherhood as a "half solution" that is migrating to the "true Islam," as defined by al Qaeda.

Here is the first key paragraph found in one of bin Laden's missives, dated April 26, 2011, the week prior to the terror master's death [emphasis added]:

Knowing that the movements calling for half solutions like the Brotherhood have witnessed a spread of the proper ideology among their membership in recent years, especially in the growing generations, and one of the Brotherhood members discussed that phenomenon in a lengthy question among the questions addressed to Sheikh Abu Muhammad; also it was mentioned in many of the media vehicles that there is a sizable direction within the Brotherhood that holds the Salafi doctrine, so the return of the Brotherhood and those like them to the true Islam is a matter of time, with the will of Allah. The more attention paid to explaining Islamic understanding, the sooner their return is, so preserving the Muslim movements today and adjusting their direction requires effort and attention, keeping in mind the necessity of being kindly to the sons of the nation who fell under misguidance for long decades.

"Sheikh Abu Muhammad" in the paragraph above is likely Ayman al Zawahiri, who answered a "lengthy question" about the Brotherhood in one of his online interviews. It is interesting to note bin Laden's comment about a "sizable direction within the Brotherhood that holds the Salafi doctrine" in light of how things have played out in Egypt. The Salafists there surprised many with the level of support they received from the populace.

Here is the second key paragraph found in the same letter from bin Laden [emphasis added]:

It would be nice to remind our brothers in the regions to be patient and deliberate, and warn them of entering into confrontations with the parties belonging to Islam, and it is probable that most of the areas will have governments established on the remnants of the previous governments, and most probable these governments will belong to the Islamic parties and groups, like the Brotherhood and the like, and our duty at this stage is to pay attention to the call among Muslims and win over supporters and spread the correct understanding, as the current conditions have brought on unprecedented opportunities and the coming of Islamic governments that follow the Salafi doctrine is a benefit to Islam. The more time that passes and the call increases, the more the supporters will be of the people, and the more widespread will be the correct understanding among the coming generations of Islamic groups.

Now, this is just one document. Unlike the analysts at the CTC, I won't jump to any conclusions based on this incredibly small sample. I wouldn't be surprised to learn that there are other documents in bin Laden's cache in which he stridently criticizes the Brotherhood.

Al Qaeda's public rhetoric has often been hostile to the Brotherhood. Al Qaeda sees the organization as a sellout because the Brothers are not willing to use violence at all costs and are willing to take part in democratic processes. (It is inaccurate to say, as many do, that the Brotherhood is entirely "nonviolent," because senior Brothers routinely endorse violence in the Palestinian-controlled territories and against Israel, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere.)

While it wouldn't be accurate to conflate al Qaeda and the Brotherhood, we should also not pretend that the two are entirely devoid of any common interests. Al Qaeda's intellectual roots are found in the Brotherhood, and many al Qaeda leaders were once members of the organization.

Osama bin Laden was reportedly instructed by Brothers at a young age and may have entered the global jihad through the Brotherhood's Syrian chapter. Ayman al Zawahiri was once a Brother, too, but decided that Hassan al Banna's organization was not violent enough for him. And here is just one more example, chosen from many: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was a member of the Brotherhood before graduating to al Qaeda. KSM's brothers were also in the Brotherhood; one of KSM's brothers was even a leader in the Kuwaiti chapter and financed KSM for years.

The disagreements between the Brotherhood and al Qaeda are largely tactical, not ideological or strategic. While the Egyptian Brotherhood decided that violence was a loser after being routinely quashed by Hosni Mubarak's regime, al Qaeda honchos like Ayman al Zawahiri decided to fight on.

Again, we shouldn't draw any firm or broad conclusions from this one document. We can guess that others may show antagonism between the two. But at least in this one case, bin Laden was willing to work with the Brotherhood in the near-term, judging that the Brothers would see things his way eventually. Many commentators in the West believe, however, that the opposite will result from the "Arab Spring."

Without delving too far into this complex matter, I'll leave this post with one simple observation. Shortly after Osama bin Laden was killed (just one week after penning the aforementioned letter), the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement referring to bin Laden as a "sheikh" and praising the "resistance" in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Sheikh" is, of course, an honorific title.

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May 8, 2012 11:43 PM
By Bill Roggio

Today Taliban fighters in Miramshah, the main town in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, distributed pamphlets proclaiming the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death, and vowed to wage jihad for the slain al Qaeda emir. From AFP:

Masked militants armed with assault rifles handed out copies of the pamphlet from pick-up vehicles in Miranshah, the main town of the tribal district that has become known as Pakistan's premier al Qaeda and Taliban hub.

"Let us pledge today that we will continue our jihad (holy war) and sacrifice our lives and property in the way of Allah like Sheikh Osama did," it said, unsigned and dated May 2, the anniversary of the Al-Qaeda leader's killing by US troops.

"Today, a year since Sheikh Osama bin Laden embraced martyrdom, the enemy America is repenting. It is facing defeat and Pakistan's future is also bleak,"it said.

We're never told which flavor of Taliban - the Haqqani Network, Hafiz Gul Bahadar's fighters, or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan - distributed the pamphlets. The reality is that it could be any of the three Taliban factions, as all three support and shelter al Qaeda in North Waziristan.

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May 7, 2012 2:39 PM
By Bill Roggio

According to The Associated Press, the Taliban captured two Pakistani soldiers in Miramshah in North Waziristan, beheaded them, and then displayed the heads on poles in the town. This occurred just one day after Taliban fighters ambushed and destroyed a Pakistani convoy near the town, killing nine soldiers. From the AP:

A Taliban commander said the military raided two houses in Miramshah on Sunday night, killing a militant commander and several of his colleagues. The militants seized two soldiers during the raids, beheaded them and hung their heads in different parts of Miramshah, said the commander.

The intelligence officials did not specify how the soldiers were seized, but confirmed that their heads were hanging from poles in Miramshah.

The officials and the Taliban commander spoke on condition of anonymity on Monday because they were not authorised to talk to the media.

If the past is any indicator, don't expect a major operation by the Pakistani military to deal with this problem. As we noted in February, the Pakistani Army has a garrison based in Miramshah, and yet the troops rarely venture off their base, as the Taliban run the show there.

For the past four years, the Pakistani military has resisted US pressure to launch an operation in North Waziristan, and instead has indicated it is interested only in keeping the peace agreements with the Haqqani Network and Hafiz Gul Bahadar intact. The Haqqanis and Bahadar are "good Taliban," and the Pakistani military has no desire to anger them, especially now that the US is rapidly drawing down in Afghanistan.

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May 6, 2012 5:41 PM
By Bill Roggio

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan killed nine Pakistani soldiers in an ambush in the Miramshah area of North Waziristan. From Reuters:

Army officials said the convoy was passing through Amin Picket, a security outpost on a hilltop outside Miranshah in North Waziristan, when "dozens" of militants attacked the troops.

"Militants hiding there opened fire at the soldiers with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG," a senior Pakistan army official told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

"Three gunship choppers were called in but the militants even fired rockets at the choppers."

Nine troops, including an officer were killed, and 12 more injured in the attack. The army official said the troops had retaliated and killed "a number of militants."

Tribesmen in Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan and a known hotbed of militants, including the Taliban, al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, said they saw army helicopter gunships pounding suspected militant positions in the town.

"As we were very close to the battlefield and could see from roofs of our houses, the security suffered heavy losses," said Razaullah Dawar, a local resident.

"Besides human losses, some of their heavy trucks and jeeps were burnt and were lying on the spot till evening."

The Reuters report notes that Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a powerful Taliban leader in North Waziristan who supports al Qaeda but is not a member of the Movement of Taliban in Pakistan, has denied responsibility for the attack:

"We have a peace accord with the government and condemn the killing of Pakistani soldiers in Waziristan. We will continue following the peace agreement with the government," he [Bahadar] said.

Bahadar shelters the Movement of Taliban in Pakistan, as does the Haqqani Network. Bahadar, the Haqqani Network, Mullah Nazir, and Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of Taliban in Pakistan, all belong to the Shura-e-Murakeba, an alliance that was formed in December 2011 with the support of al Qaeda.

The creation of the Shura-e-Murakeba was brokered by Abu Yahya al Libi, Ayman al Zawahiri's deputy; an al Qaeda leader known as Abdur Rehman Al Saudi; Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the Haqqani Network; and Mullah Mansour, a senior Taliban leader who operates in eastern Afghanistan.

The Shura-e-Murakeba had agreed to halt attacks against Pakistani security forces in North and South Waziristan, and instead focus on efforts against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. But the Taliban have attacked Pakistani troops in North Waziristan since the agreement was signed. Most recently, on March 24, four Pakistani soldiers and 12 Taliban fighters were killed in a clash in South Waziristan. And on March 23, the Taliban killed a Frontier Corps trooper and his 10-year-old son in a bombing at a base in North Waziristan.

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May 6, 2012 2:34 PM
By Bill Roggio

The Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant has claimed yet another suicide attack in Syria. The group released a statement on May 4 claiming credit for the April 20 suicide attack on Syrian forces at a restaurant in Hama. The Al Nusrah Front, which has been described as an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group in Syria, said the attack was designed to avenge a "brutal massacre" in the town of Al Latamnah near Hama. Below is an excerpt from the statement, which was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group:

The soldiers of the al-Nusra Front, may Allah grant it glory, knew about that, and the horses of jihad were issued the call...

The military regiment that carried out the massacre stayed between the village of M'ardas and the city of Tibat al-Imam, both of which are close to the city of Hama. They were in a two-floor restaurant called Qatrul Nada, and the number of elements there were about 350 criminals, while the rest of the forces were distributed around the restaurant. On Friday night, 20/4/2012, with grace from Allah the Almighty, an explosives-laden vehicle was prepared and it was driven by the heroic martyrdom-seeker Abu Bakr al-Hamawi, may Allah accept him - whose last words were: "The tyrant Bashar and his henchmen should know that this act will not pass without retaliation from the respectable ones...,"

The Al Nusrah Front has now claimed credit for three suicide attacks in Syria, including the April 27 suicide bombing in Damascus that killed 11 people and wounded 28 more, as well as the April 24 bombing outside the Iranian Cultural Consulate. For more information on the terror group, see LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front claims credit for suicide bombing in Damascus.

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May 6, 2012 11:09 AM
By Bill Roggio

ISAF reported today that an Afghan soldier has killed a Coalition solider in southern Afghanistan. The nationality of the slain solider has not been disclosed. The Afghan soldier was gunned down by ISAF troops shortly after. From the ISAF press release:

An individual wearing an Afghan National Army uniform turned his weapon against coalition service members in southern Afghanistan today, killing one service member.

The individual who opened fire was killed when coalition forces returned fire.

The incident is under investigation.

It is ISAF policy to defer casualty identification procedures to the relevant national authorities.

That makes for 20 ISAF soldiers killed by Afghan security personnel this year. (Note: Our previous count was 17, but it has been revised upward to 19 based on this report by The Associated Press on May 1. In at least one case, a soldier died from wounds suffered in the attack.)

These green on blue attacks, as they are called, have skyrocketed this year. An estimated 20 percent of the ISAF deaths this year have been the result of Afghan security forces attacking ISAF personnel. The last green on blue attack took place on April 26, when an Afghan commando killed a US Special Forces soldier in the south. Afghan forces have even killed two US advisers inside the Afghan Interior Ministry in Kabul.

The Associated Press report above mentioned that ISAF will not release data on the green on blue attacks that do not result in the death of ISAF personnel. This was first reported here at The Long War Journal on March 26, when we noted that ISAF refused to release data on non-fatal green on blue attacks and stated that the data is "classified."

With the US and NATO starting to rapidly withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, and relying on a strategy that embeds advisers with Afghan forces to make up for the shortfall in personnel, the issue of green on blue attacks will only become more prominent. The US military has become so concerned with the green on blue attacks that it has ordered units to designate "guardian angels" in each unit whose job is to provide security for troops working with Afghans.

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May 4, 2012 8:17 AM
By Bill Roggio

In the same letter Osama bin Laden wrote to his chief of staff, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, advising the relocation of fighters from Waziristan to Afghanistan, bin Laden also asked Atiyah to facilitate the establishment of a safe house in Peshawar for his son, Hamza. The letter is dated Oct. 21, 2010. Peshawar is the capital Pakistan's northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Bin Laden was concerned about security precautions for Hamza, who is a senior al Qaeda leader, as well as for his sons 'Uthman and Muhammad, and voiced distrust for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. From the letter, emphasis is mine:

In your letter, you talked about your relationship with Abu-Salman al-Baluchi. I know that he is good Mujahid and got detained in the past, but some of the Baluchi people that he knows work for the Pakistani intelligence. Therefore, I advise you to be careful and not talk to him about your news and secrets. Also, for that reason, my son Hamzah should not be at his place or anywhere near him.

Regarding my son Hamzah and his mother, I wish you take all the security precautions that were mentioned before in order to disrupt surveillance on him. He should move only when the clouds are heavy. Then, 'Um-Hamzah goes to the middle-man on my side. I asked him to make all the remaining arrangements. I also asked him to make sure that they read the letter before they go in order to alert them to some security precautions including not taking with them any of the things that they had in Iran, such as their suitcases. As for Hamzah, if you find my companion that we talked about, please send him to Peshawar and the surrounding area and ask him to arrange a house that can hold two families in addition to his family. He should stay there with Hamzah. If you did not find him yet, then please have a trusted Pakistani brother accompany him. Make sure to tell Hamzah that I am of the opinion that he needs to get out of Wasiristan if he is there, and he should not go there if he is not there. What I said regarding Hamzah applies to 'Uthman and Muhammad if they come from Iran.

Bin Laden obviously felt Peshawar was safe enough in October 2010 to hide one of his favorite sons there. Hamza has been discussed as being groomed as future emir for al Qaeda.

It is unclear if the safe house was actually established, and if it was, whether Hamza used it. With the release of only 17 documents from the vast cache of documents taken in the Abbottabad raid, it is impossible to know (I am told more than 10,000 document have been translated and that there are many, many more which have yet to be translated). Hamza's whereabouts are unknown; he is known to move in and out of both Iran and Afghanistan.

But we do know that al Qaeda is not afraid to place its top operatives in Pakistan's major cites. Many a senior al Qaeda leader has been killed or captured far from North and South Waziristan. Bin Laden himself was killed in Abbottabad; Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was captured in Rawalpindi; Abu Zubaydah was detained in Faisalabad; Khalid bin Attash was arrested in Karachi; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was busted in Gurjat; Younis al Mauritani and Abu Musab al Suri were arrested in Quetta; Abu Faraj al Libi was captured in Mardan; etc.

Also of note: The operative mentioned by bin Laden in the beginning of the excerpt above - Abu Salman al Baluchi - has not been previously mentioned in any open source material on al Qaeda and the Taliban. He obviously is a Baluch and very likely operates in Baluchistan province, where the Taliban wield a vast amount of influence and al Qaeda is known to operate. While bin Laden is advising Atiyah "to be careful and not talk to [al Baluchi] about your news and secrets" due to some of his associates' known ties with the ISI, bin Laden does not advise Atiyah to sever ties with him. It seems clear, at least based on this one document, that bin Laden advises Atiyah to continue to work with al Baluchi, who again is linked to the ISI through associates, but just not on issues related to bin Laden's family.

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May 3, 2012 8:50 PM
By LWJ Staff

While widespread media coverage has been given to recent Taliban attacks in Kabul - with some pundits overestimating and foolishly comparing the attacks to the Viet Cong's "Tet Offensive" in 1968 - Afghan intelligence officials have since April 13 quietly prevented three major terror plots intended to cause catastrophic levels of destruction and death in the capital city.

The Long War Journal previously covered the unprecedented interdiction of nearly 11 tons of homemade explosives by Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS) officials around April 13, and their foiling of a Taliban assassination plot on April 15 against Afghanistan's Second Vice President. At least three of the attackers arrested with the explosives on April 13 were Pakistani citizens; the remaining two were identified as Afghans with ties to a regional terror network known as the Qari Baryal Group.

Earlier today, the NDS announced that Afghan intelligence forces successfully intercepted and disarmed a truck carrying 1,000 kilograms - or approximately one ton - of unspecified explosives and arrested the driver, a Pakistani citizen from the "tribal parts of Pakistan," according to NDS spokesman Lutfullah Mashal.

Although NDS did not specify the intended target of today's intercepted truck-bomb, authorities captured the truck along the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in eastern Kabul, the same area where Taliban militants launched a multi-pronged suicide attack on May 2 against the Green Village camp, a housing complex in eastern Kabul that hosts a litany of foreign employees and contractors. The brazen early morning attack killed at least seven people and injured nearly two dozen, mostly civilians, and all five Taliban attackers were killed in the attack.

Today's prevention of what would have likely been a devastating terror attack in the capital city of over 6 million people is a testament to the increasing capabilities of Afghanistan's burgeoning intelligence agency. This is not to say that the NDS and Afghan security establishment are infallible, far from it, but the force is not completely incompetent or unreliable, either.

Today's news will likely not surprise astute Afghan observers or followers of the Long War Journal. Last year, the Long War Journal reported on a series of major terror plots that were broken up by the NDS [see list below]. These are significant developments that deserve attention, despite the wider media's tendency to only cover Taliban attacks, or as the shameless old press adage goes, "If it bleeds, it leads."

For additional coverage of NDS operations, see the following Threat Matrix and Long War Journal reports:

• NDS smashes Haqqani Network plots in Kabul, July 31, 2011

• Elite Afghan force destroys insurgent explosives cache, Aug. 22, 2011

• NDS dismantles Kabul Attack Network cell, Aug. 28, 2011

• Haqqani Network directed Kabul hotel assault by phone from Pakistan, Sept. 3, 2011.

• Afghan NDS continues crackdown on counterfeit uniforms, Sept. 5, 2011

• Afghan intelligence operations take on significant role, Sept. 21, 2011

• Afghan intelligence captures 3 members of northern assassination cell, Feb. 7 2012

• Afghan intelligence seizes 11 tons of explosives, thwarts additional terror plots, April 21, 2012

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May 2, 2012 10:12 PM
By Bill Roggio

Banner for the Al Nusrah Front, a jihadist group in Syria. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant released a statement on April 30 claiming credit for the April 24 bombing outside of the Iranian Cultural Consulate in Damascus, Syria. Below is an excerpt of the statement, which was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group. The Al Nusrah Front, a jihadist group in Syria, called the attack "a double special operation" as it targeted both Syrian security personnel and the Iranian Consulate:

One of the security battalions of the Al Nusra Front on Tuesday 4/24/2012 monitored an army vehicle belonging to the Nusayri [Alawhite] [Bashar] Assad regime and stuck an explosive device to it then pursued it until it arrived to a building known as the Iranian Cultural Consulate (the vanguard of the intelligence of the Shiite Iranian regime in every country)... And then it was detonated there in an operation that hit two targets at once, announcing by us that we are capable of reaching where we want ...

The Al Nusrah Front has now claimed credit for two suicide attacks in Syria, including the April 27 suicide bombing in Damascus that killed 11 people and wounded 28 more, and the bombing outside the Iranian Cultural Consulate. For more information on the terror group, see LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front claims credit for suicide bombing in Damascus.

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May 2, 2012 9:32 AM
By Thomas Joscelyn

Beginning tomorrow, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point is going to release hundreds of pages of documents from Osama bin Laden's files online. Given what has been reported thus far on the documents, they appear to undermine many claims that have been made about al Qaeda's operations and the depth of its alliances with other jihadist groups.

We will be reporting at Threat Matrix and Long War Journal on the documents, highlighting what we think are the key pieces of intelligence within them.

But we also wanted to note that, as we understand it, the CTC documents are not close to being the entire collection from bin Laden's compound. We think nearly the entire collection should be released online, while making as few exceptions as possible for truly operationally sensitive material. Let's see as many of the documents as possible.

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May 1, 2012 1:39 PM
By Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio

In the buildup to the one-year anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death, a lot of speculation has emerged on the state of al Qaeda. Most narratives state that al Qaeda's core, based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, has been defeated, and that its so-called loosely tied affiliates now wield most of the terror group's strength. We addressed this issue back in late January, in an article for The Weekly Standard titled Strategic Retreat, and our view is contrary to the conventional wisdom. The article reflects our views on the status of al Qaeda today.

In "Strategic Retreat," we argued that the Obama administration's strategy of pulling back from Afghanistan and switching to a counterterrorism-heavy mission worldwide does not adequately deal with the fact that al Qaeda and its allies still hold ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and North Africa.

We also stated that al Qaeda and the Taliban remain closely linked, and that conducting negotiations with the latter is a fool's errand (something we've noted numerous other times as well at The Long War Journal; see here, for instance). The recent Guardian report that bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar conferred over strategy in Afghanistan merely proves our point.

Al Qaeda has no doubt suffered a setback with the deaths of bin Laden, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, Ilyas Kashmiri, and other leaders over the past year, but the terror group has suffered similar losses over the past decade and regrouped.

Checking off names of top leaders and operatives who have been killed or captured, and then proclaiming the group dead, is the wrong way to decide whether al Qaeda remains a threat. The Bush administration used this same methodology and was ridiculed in the press for doing so. And measuring al Qaeda's strength or weakness solely by its ability to conduct attacks here in the US is another terrible way assess the status of al Qaeda. Using the same logic, al Qaeda posed no immediate threat to the US prior to Sept. 11, 2001. The reality is that al Qaeda is surviving and expanding into new territory. Al Qaeda is able to do so because its ideology has not been challenged effectively, and because the organization continues to enjoy safe havens and state support.

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May 1, 2012 12:09 PM
By Bill Roggio

Yesterday morning, I joined C-SPAN's Washington Journal to discuss the US's use of drones in military and counterterrorism operations abroad, as well as their usage by domestic law enforcement agencies. Interestingly enough, as I was making the argument that the US should openly discuss the program, President Obama's adviser for counterterrorism was defending the program in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. In my opinion, the opportunity to capitalize on explaining and defending this program to the US public and to the nations where the strikes occur has long since passed.

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May 1, 2012 11:38 AM
By Bill Roggio

Coalition and Afghan special operations forces have captured a Taliban leader who was involved in last month's assassination attempt against Haji Abdul "Koka" Wali, the chief of police for Musa Qala in Helmand province. Although the ISAF press release does not explicitly state it, Koka was the target of the April 10 suicide attack that is mentioned. From the ISAF press release:

An Afghan and coalition security force detained a Taliban leader and several subordinate insurgents during an operation in Washer district, Helmand province, today.

The leader was the senior Taliban insurgent in Kajaki district, responsible for roadside bombings, suicide attacks and other operations against Afghan and coalition security forces in Helmand province.

He was also one of the principle planners of the April 10 suicide attack against the district police headquarters building in Musa Qal'ah. In addition, the leader attempted to implement Taliban law on Afghan civilians and operated a Taliban prison.

Bill Ardolino discussed the assassination attempt here, and also interviewed Koka during his 2010 embed with the US Marines in Musa Qala.

The Taliban commander who was captured today also led Taliban forces in Kajaki, and given his usage of suicide attacks, is likely associated with the Mullah Dadullah front, a radical Taliban faction allied with al Qaeda.

For an excellent report on the situation in and around Kajaki, this New York Times report by Luke Mogelson from February is a must read. It explains the limitations to the 'surge' and reliance on Afghan security forces to hold these gains, and how areas of Helmand remain under Taliban control even after the surge of US troops there.

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May 1, 2012 11:37 AM
By Bill Roggio

In a raid today in Kunduz province, ISAF targeted yet another leader of the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. From the ISAF press release:

In Imam Sahib district, Kunduz province, an Afghan-led and coalition supported security force conducted an operation to detain an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader today. The leader plans and directs attacks against senior Afghan government officials, Afghan National Security Forces and coalition troops. Several insurgents were detained as a result of the operation.

The IMU continues to maintain a close working relationship with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network. The Pakistan-based terror group has integrated into the Taliban's shadow government in the north, and conducts operations with the Haqqani Network in the east. In addition, the IMU has been involved in several high-profile suicide attacks and assassinations in Kabul and in the north.

ISAF has stepped up its targeting of the IMU's leadership cadre over the past several months. Coalition and Afghan commandos have targeted top IMU leaders and associates in 16 raids in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Kunduz, Takhar, Logar, and Wardak provinces since Jan. 29. Nine of those raids took place in April and four occurred in March. In the course of those raids, special operations forces have killed the IMU's past two commanders for Afghanistan; the raids have also resulted in the capture of two senior facilitators and the death of another.

For more information on the IMU, see LWJ reports, IMU cleric urges Pakistanis to continue sheltering jihadis in Waziristan, and ISAF captures IMU facilitator in Wardak province.

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