February 2, 2012 6:00 PM
By Bill Roggio

According to Xinhua, which cites local Pakistani news channels, US drones struck yesterday in Pakistan's Arakzai tribal agency, killing 13 "militants," including six "foreigners":

At least 13 people were killed when a U.S. drone launched three missile strikes in Orakzai region of Pakistan's northwest tribal belt on Wednesday, local media reported.

According to the report by local TV channel Geo, the attack was launched in wee hours in the morning when a U.S. drone fired three missiles at a militants'hideout in Darand Shekhan area of upper Orakzai agency, a militancy-hit tribal area where Pakistan army has been battling local and foreign Taliban militants for the past four months.

The report said that six foreigners were also among the killed militants and the dead bodies have been shifted to other areas of Orakzai after the drone attack.

This was picked up by some small news outlets, such as Khyber News. But none of the major Pakistani news outlets, or the wire services, have reported on an Arakzai strike. Local Pakistani officials, who are often quick to claim drone strikes have taken place (and who have been accurate in the past on said strikes), denied that drones struck in Arakzai.

Pakistani news outlets instead have said that Pakistani Air Force jets targeted Taliban hideouts in Arakzai. Here is a report from Daily Times:

At least 20 terrorists were killed as fighter jets pounded Taliban hideouts in Orakzai Agency on Wednesday, military sources said. The air strikes came a day after terrorists attacked a security checkpost in Jogi Heights in Mamozai region of Kurram Agency in which eight soldiers were killed. "Jets have targeted the hideouts of Taliban commander Mullah Toofan and commander Moheyuddin, ground intelligence reported at least 20 Taliban were killed in the blitz," military sources told Daily Times. Sources added that four compounds of the Taliban had been hit in the air strike. They added that some reports suggested that commander Moheyuddin could have been killed in the bombing. However, there was no independent confirmation of the commander's death. Considering the strategic location of the region, terrorists have been putting up stiff resistance to the military operation. This has also given the Taliban upper hand since they have cut off road links to Kurram Agency. Sources did not say how effective the operation was in weakening the terrorists so that ground troops could move in.

It certainly is possible that US drones conducted an attack in Arakzai yesterday and the major media outlets missed it, but it is unlikely. Of the 305 strikes that have taken place since 2004, only one hit a target in Arakzai, and just 11 others hit targets outside of North and South Waziristan. A strike in Arakzai would be hard for the media to miss.

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February 1, 2012 10:37 PM
By CJ Radin

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the US would end combat operations in Afghanistan in mid-to-late 2013, more than one year earlier than the previously announced date of the end of 2014. After ending their combat operations, the US forces would transition to a training and advising role, with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) taking over the lead combat role. The ANSF currently number 305,000 police and army troops, and are slated to grow to 352, 000 by September 2012.

According to the Washington Post:

Current NATO strategy, agreed to at a summit in Lisbon in November 2010, calls for coalition forces to gradually shift to a training, advisory and assistance role with the Afghan military on the way to withdrawing all combat troops by the end of 2014.

A Panetta spokesman traveling with the defense chief issued a statement Wednesday evening -- several hours after Panetta's original remarks -- saying that U.S. troops could still be involved in at least some combat operations , in partnership with Afghan forces, in 2014.

U.S. and NATO forces, he said, would still be actively engaged in helping Afghan forces operate. Although the Afghan army has grown in size and capability, it is still dependent on the U.S. military for airpower, troop movement, supplies and medical aid.

Secretary Panetta also said that no decision has been made on how many US troops will remain in Afghanistan once combat operations end. The previously announced plan called for a reduction from the current level of 90,000 US troops to 67,000 by October 2012 and a steady drawdown after that with most US troops out by the end of 2014.

Today's announcement comes on the heels of an announcement by the French that they will withdraw their forces from Afghanistan by 2013.

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February 1, 2012 4:50 PM
By Bill Roggio

Here is another interesting excerpt from the shocking! BBC article about the classified NATO report on Pakistan's support of the Afghan Taliban:

It says that Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders.

"Senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad," it said.

It quotes a senior al Qaeda detainee as saying: "Pakistan knows everything. They control everything. I can't [expletive] on a tree in Kunar without them watching."

"The Taliban are not Islam. The Taliban are Islamabad."

First, an unnamed son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the family patriarch, has been reported in the past in the Pakistani press to be living in Rawalpindi, near General Headquarters.

Second, the statement from the "senior al Qaeda detainee" is interesting, as it implies that the ISI (the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Pakistan's notorious military intelligence service) is quite aware of al Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan. Again, this should come as no shock. See this report by Thomas Joscelyn on the ISI's links with Haji Wali Mohammed, detailing the ISI's support of al Qaeda's "primary financial manager," and this report on Sabar Lal Melma, for some specific examples of the ISI's support for al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Third, while the identity of the "senior al Qaeda detainee" is not given, we may be able to guess who he is. As far as I can tell, only one senior al Qaeda leader has been captured recently in Kunar province: Abu Ikhlas al Masri. The rest of the senior al Qaeda leaders targeted in Kunar have been killed, according to ISAF's own press releases (most in airstrikes, not during raids designed to capture). It is also certainly possible that ISAF has captured another senior al Qaeda leader in Kunar and hasn't reported it.

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January 31, 2012 9:58 PM
By Bill Roggio

We retired the prestigious Captain Louis Renault Award last year after Osama bin Laden was killed at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. We felt that nothing could top the shock value of that. Osama bin Laden, living for years just a stone's throw from Pakistan's top military academy, far from the tribal areas, and the US couldn't tell Pakistani officials the raid on his compound was coming because US officials didn't trust them - what could have been more shocking.

We've wanted to roll out the award several times since then but stifled the urge. But now comes this report, from the BBC, on a leaked NATO document that - wait for it - says that Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban and shelters its leaders. Who would have seen this one coming? We truly and sincerely are shocked, shocked! that Pakistan would do such a thing. Below is a long excerpt from the BBC report:

The Taliban in Afghanistan are being directly assisted by Pakistani security services, according to a secret Nato report seen by the BBC.

The leaked report, derived from thousands of interrogations, claims the Taliban remain defiant and have wide support among the Afghan people.

It alleges that Pakistan knows the locations of senior Taliban leaders.

A BBC correspondent says the report is painful reading for international forces and the Afghan government.

Pakistan has strenuously denied any links with the Taliban on previous occasions.

"We have long been concerned about ties between elements of the ISI and some extremist networks," said US Pentagon spokesman Captain John Kirby, adding that the US Defence Department had not seen the report.

'Informational'
The BBC's Quentin Sommerville in Kabul says the report - on the state of the Taliban - fully exposes for the first time the relationship between the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) and the Taliban.

The report is based on material from 27,000 interrogations with more than 4,000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters and civilians.

It notes: "Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly". It says that Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders.

The report states: "As this document is derived directly from insurgents it should be considered informational and not necessarily analytical."

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January 31, 2012 1:51 PM
By Bill Roggio

TIME reports on a clash in Kunar province, Afghanistan in late October 2011 between US and Afghan forces on one side, and the Taliban and their allies on the other. The Taliban attempted to overrun a platoon manning an observation post (OP) in the Kunar River Valley. An estimated 500 Taliban and allied fighters, including "Arabs and Chechens and Punjabis" - clearly the Lashkar al Zil, the military formation made up of al Qaeda and allied jihadist groups in the region - massed from Pakistan and assaulted the platoon of US and Afghan forces (numbering 23). From TIME:

The soldiers eventually won their battle at OP Shal, securing the Kunar River Valley from infiltration, eliminating insurgent roadblocks and opening it to civilian and military traffic. But the Taliban's weeklong attack highlighted the many military problems facing Afghanistan, and it made clear that the outcome of the conflict remains far from certain.

Throughout the intense fighting, the besieged defending force of 36 U.S. and Afghan army soldiers fought off multiple suicide bombers and at least four overrun attempts by between 400 and 500 heavily armed insurgents, who had been trucked in from Pakistan and who managed to advance to within 5 m of U.S. positions. Afterward, the soldiers said they confirmed 115 kills but estimated at least 200 deaths. "It was the most coordinated thing any of us had ever seen, but just the sheer number of forces they had massing on that position was ridiculous," Staff Sergeant Everett Bracey, of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 2-27 Infantry Battalion, told TIME.

The attackers were reinforced and resupplied throughout the fight from bases and depots in the safe haven provided by Pakistan. "We saw 60 vehicles come out of Pakistan -- just drive in," said Staff Sergeant Anthony Fuentes, looking at a topographical map a few days after the battle. "This whole route, it goes all the way up into Pakistan. It's a two-hour trafficable route from the border." Added company commander Captain Michael Kolton: "It was Pashtuns and Arabs and Chechens and Punjabis -- everyone and their sister joined in on this one."

The defenders of OP Shal also recognized that their attackers had been well trained. "They used the standard operating procedures that the U.S. Army uses," explained Fuentes. "We expected contact, but we didn't expect that. Their fire was so heavy and precise that to get up and look at their near sector, the joes just had to say, 'O.K., I'm just going to eat one in the face just to get up and see if somebody is moving on me.' And every time they lifted their head up, there was somebody there."

Sitting in his squad bay at Combat Outpost Monti, Sergeant Brandon Goodell told TIME, "They are motivated, they are trained, and they are proficient." But what most surprised the Americans was the insurgents' determination to regain this strategic mountaintop commanding a 6-km section of road in the main Kunar River Valley. "They were relentless. They were all over us. I've never seen them come that hard at anybody," said Fuentes. The numbers, skill and determination of the insurgents repelled at OP Shal seem quite at odds with President Obama's suggestion that the Taliban's momentum has been broken.

Over the past several years, the Lashkar al Zil has conducted similar assaults against US combat outposts in Kunar, Nuristan, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. US forces have repelled the assaults.

The Taliban still control large areas of Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province, as well as areas in Pakistan's tribal agencies of Mohmand and Bajaur. The Pakistani military routinely claims the Taliban have been defeated in these two tribal agencies, but the massed assault launched from Pakistan (among others) shows that such claims are far from the truth.

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January 28, 2012 12:10 PM
By The LWJ Editors

Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio have published an article at The Weekly Standard discussing the Obama administration's strategy for dealing with al Qaeda and allied terrorist groups. After years of back-and-forth between the administration and elements of the military establishment over the strategy to deal with the terrorist threat, the proponents of a counterterrorism-based approach to dealing with al Qaeda and allied groups have won the fight. Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts to uproot the jihadist insurgencies raging in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia have given way to drone strikes, limited special operations raids, and cooperation with local and often unreliable governments.

The Obama administration's growing preference for counterterrorism over counterinsurgency operations is a topic that Thomas and Bill discussed in detail with respect to Afghanistan in October 2009, in Al Qaeda is the Tip of the Jihadist Spear.

The recent article at The Weekly Standard is titled "Strategic Retreat." A short excerpt is below, but read the whole thing.

Drones are not enough to contain this menace. But President Obama has done away with COIN, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine centered on building up allied local forces and good governance, for more limited counterterrorism measures such as drones and special forces raids. It apparently does not matter to the Obama administration that such tactics failed to stop al Qaeda's armies from previously controlling parts of Iraq and continuing to control territory elsewhere.

Al Qaeda is hardly invincible. It has been greatly weakened, in some ways, during the past decade. But al Qaeda and its allies can only be strengthened by America's retreat from the lands of jihad. And they are not the only ones watching as President Obama takes his eye off the ball. Terror-sponsoring regimes like those in Iran and Pakistan have learned that there is no substantial price to be paid for spilling American blood. They've learned, too, that America's commitment to fight its enemies is severely constrained by domestic political considerations.

The Obama administration lauds its counterterrorism partnerships with friendly governments. Allies, indeed, are invaluable. But the Arab Spring has introduced uncertainty into some of these relationships. In Egypt, a government dominated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood has replaced the regime of the friendly, if despicable, Hosni Mubarak. In Yemen, a duplicitous but sometimes helpful President Ali Abdullah Saleh has given way to chaos and a growing al Qaeda insurgency. In Libya, the gangster-terrorist Muammar Qaddafi, who also occasionally provided counterterrorism assistance, has fallen to a coalition that includes jihadists. We should not be sad to see the Mubaraks, Salehs, and Qaddafis go. But now that they are gone, we should be worried that the American government under President Obama will not seek to influence the course their nations take.

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January 27, 2012 6:30 PM
By CJ Radin

Reuters recently featured an extensive analysis of the Pakistan-China alliance. With US-Pakistan relations deteriorating, Pakistan has attempted to 'replace' the US by improving relations with China, calling it Pakistan's "all-weather friend." Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, argue that there are in fact significant limits to the Pakistan-China relationship which have implications for US policy makers.

In the past, U.S. officials have worried that pushing Pakistan too hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabad more firmly into Beijing's embrace. But China's lukewarm response to Pakistan's recent overtures demonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its "all-weather friend" -- a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring to China. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties has been overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerably higher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decade and also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwise would likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorism activities.

U.S. policymakers must recognise these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. China is increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing's cooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach to terrorism issues in Pakistan would help mitigate threats to both Washington and Beijing, since Islamabad's support for some terrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financial support for all Islamist terrorist groups.

What interests do the Pakistanis and the Chinese share? And how extensive are they?

Security

Pakistan and China both share an interest in India as an adversary. Pakistan has a political interest in featuring India as an adversary. China has an interest in limiting India's international influence and also in creating a strategic dilemma for India's military. Nonetheless, it is not in China's interest to support an actual India-Pakistan war.

Pakistan and China have long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defence relationship with Pakistan and views a strong partnership with Pakistan as a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India-Pakistan tension as advancing their own strategic interests, as such friction bogs India down in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi's ability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at the international level.

Though Pakistan considers China a more reliable defense partner than the U.S., Islamabad should also recognise that China's support has its limits, especially during times of conflict and tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. When Pakistan sought Chinese assistance during its 1965 war with India, Beijing encouraged Islamabad to withdraw its forces from Indian territory.

During the 1999 Indo-Pakistani border war in Kargil, Beijing privately supported U.S. calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the heights of Kargil on the Indian side of the Line of Control to defuse the crisis, and apparently communicated this stance to Pakistani leaders. The Chinese position during the Kargil episode helped spur a thaw in Indian-Chinese relations. During the 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani military crisis, China stayed neutral and counseled restraint on both sides, declaring that China was a "neighbor and friend of both countries.

Counterterrorism

China has more in common with the US in fighting terrorism than with Pakistan's promotion of terrorism.

Chinese officials are increasingly connecting the level of terrorist activity in Pakistan to instability in western China. One Chinese academic has noted in his writings that China has developed a more neutral position on the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir over the past decade in part because China believes that the dispute could have implications for ethnic-religious unrest in China, especially in Tibet or Xinjiang.

In this context, the ascendance of Taliban forces in either Pakistan or Afghanistan is clearly not in China's interest. But rather than encouraging Islamabad to adopt a comprehensive approach toward countering terrorism, Chinese leaders have used their relationships with Pakistani military officials, and with the Islamist political parties, to persuade them to discourage attacks on Chinese interests. Before 9/11, for example, the Chinese reached agreements with the Taliban to prevent Uighur separatists from using Afghanistan as a training ground for militant activities.

Economic cooperation

Because of Pakistan's poor economy, China has little to gain from expanding economic cooperation with its southern neighbor.

China's concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan itself are not that extensive. China's economic commitment to Pakistan, for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan's economy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times of need.

Pakistan's portrayal of its relationship with China features exaggeration of the economic dimension of the relationship. Pakistani media routinely report huge numbers for investment and financing with the People's Republic of China (PRC), numbers that cannot be verified by any independent source, including by the Chinese government or the Chinese companies supposedly involved. While Pakistani officials talk of a total of $25 billion in Chinese investment in Pakistan so far, the PRC's official figure of direct investment through 2010 is $1.83 billion.

Trade

Again, due to Pakistan's poor economy, China has little to gain.

Trade is not exaggerated by Pakistan or rendered unclear by Chinese secrecy. As with investment and (apparently) finance, though, it is relatively insubstantial. On Chinese figures, bilateral trade volume was below $9 billion in 2010 and grew slightly less quickly than the PRC's overall trade. The Philippines are similar to Pakistan in GDP and not as close politically with China. The Philippines mining sector is underdeveloped. Yet China's bilateral trade with the Philippines in 2010 was still three times larger than its trade with Pakistan, and grew faster.

Not only is the trade relationship small, it is imbalanced. The PRC's 2010 surplus was $5.2 billion, tiny by Chinese standards, but huge in comparison to bilateral trade volume. If Beijing wanted to assist Islamabad for political reasons, it could artificially inflate imports from Pakistan, at least on a temporary basis. Cosmetic efforts along these lines are routinely made with the PRC's major economic partners, but Pakistan clearly does not qualify.

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January 26, 2012 6:35 PM
By Wes Bruer

American officials are acknowledging a terror plot in Algeria that aimed to attack US or European ships in the Mediterranean. The plot, which was similar to that of the bombings in Yemen of the USS Cole in 2000 and the Limburg oil tanker in 2002, included ramming explosives-filled boats into Western-flagged ships, but was interrupted by Algerian authorities in the early planning stages.

ABC reported that US officials had been aware of the plot before the Algerian daily newspaper, Echorouk, broke the story, but hinted that Algerian authorities had foiled the plot without the help of the US government.

Three terror cell members were arrested after arousing suspicions among Algerian authorities when they visited jihadist websites at a local Internet cafe. Although no specific US ship was identified as a target, according to US authorities, Echorouk reported that the plotters had already purchased a boat to carry out the attack.

When asked if the US had played any role in uncovering the plot, a US counterterrorism official gave ABC a vague response, saying, "We know that al Qaeda and their sympathizers continue to plot against the US and our allies [and] as such, we are in touch with a number of foreign governments on issues pertaining to counterterrorism."

Authorities believe the plot was directed by the Algerian-based terror franchise known as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group, which had earlier called itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), was officially welcomed into the al Qaeda fold by then second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri in a Sept. 11, 2006 video.

In recent years, AQIM has tried to make headlines to keep pace with other affiliates such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the ever-growing al Qaeda-aligned Somali insurgency, Shabaab. Although most of AQIM's attacks are aimed at Algerian government and military targets, the group has recently begun to rely on kidnapping European tourists as a means to further fund its desire to conduct attacks globally.

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January 26, 2012 10:11 AM
By Bill Ardolino

An al Qaeda supporter has opted once again to use art to promote jihad against the West, thereby violating the Salafist jihadist or Wahhabist proscriptions against art endorsed by ... al Qaeda. Via the SITE Intelligence group:

The creators of a jihadi comic strip called "Son of the Martyr" released a second comic, "The Fleeing Enemy," using the characters they established to contrast Islamic society with that of the West. The comic was posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum on January 24, 2012, and comes nearly four months after the first issue. The message posted with the first issue indicated that the creators were seeking a media foundation to publish the comics. In the message introducing the second comic, the creators named the "al-Wedha Islamic Foundation" as its publishing house and explained that the comic is a means to face Western "culturization" of Muslim boys and girls.

In response to the comic, a fellow jihadist on Shumukh al-Islam commended the creators and advised they produce more comics but not focus on jihad alone. He added: "By Allah, the Jews and the disbelievers sneak their beliefs through such drawings that some might see as simple, but they are not simple at all. If they are read by a child, they will remain in his imagination...."

As a reminder, artwork, especially drawing the human form and "other living objects," is prohibited in many unadulterated interpretations of Islam. (As are music, dance, loud laughter, and many other basic human activities, according to the logic of the takfiris).

The use of cartoons on an al Qaeda-associated Internet forum illustrates how individuals can be enamored of the trappings of armed jihad, while at the same time lacking in understanding of the particular theology behind the jihadist movement they have embraced. Casual support of strict Islamist and radical jihadist political goals is easy; actually living under their authority - and the brutally enforced, austere standards that can come with it - is hard.

This helps explain a paradox in some quarters of the Muslim world. Although some opinion polls may show casual support for the vague political aims (though not the means) and general Islamic identification of strict conservative and radical groups, many of those movements wear out their welcome once they obtain any real authority (i.e., Algeria, Iraq's Anbar province, and large portions of Afghanistan). Narrow, harshly-enforced theology conflicts with both modernism and regional cultural standards, such as tribal codes ... or the basic permission to create artwork that depicts living beings.

Thus, an al Qaeda cartoonist is both ignorant and hypocritical. And beyond his violation of religious precepts, he is protesting "Western 'culturization' of Muslim boys and girls," in a medium that is itself a symptom of 'Western ... culturization.' Irony abounds.

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January 25, 2012 8:38 PM
By CJ Radin

The escalating confrontation over Iran's nuclear arms program is having a telling effect on Iran's economy. One stark manifestation of this is described in today's New York Times:

Facing a wave of panic selling by Iranians worried that international sanctions and inflation are destroying the value of the rial, Iran's president reversed himself on Wednesday and allowed bank interest rates to rise sharply in an effort to stop a slide that has depressed the currency to a relentless string of record lows.

More from Reuters:

Iran increased bank interest rates on Wednesday and indicated it would further restrict sales of foreign currency, hoping to halt a spiraling currency crisis after new Western sanctions accelerated a dash for dollars by Iranians worried about their economic future.

By the way, the central bank knows there is more than one reason to hold foreign currency.

The central bank also told Iranians they should only buy dollars if they are traveling and not hoard them to guard against economic uncertainty.

And as a matter of fact, a number of Iranians are doing just that ... traveling. One of our contacts in Iraq said in a recent e-mail:

[A]lready I've seen hundreds of well off Iranian families renting apartments in southern Iraq and moving their families there in case of trouble in Iran. Other countries in the gulf like the UAE and Kuwait have placed visa restrictions against Iranians due to the influx of people trying to flee potential trouble.

Previously Iranians would come to Iraq for a one week visit. Now we have some Iranians coming and bringing a lot of luggage with them and settling down for a longer stint. Of course, not everyone in Iran can afford to do this. The richer Iranians tend to go to Dubai / Kuwait. The poorer ones to Syria / Iraq. But with the troubles in Syria, Iraq has become one of the few exit points for Iranians now.

The number of Iranians staying [in Iraq] is still a trickle compared to what would be the numbers if things really kicked off, but it has been already noticed locally that some Iranians are staying now rather than just visiting.

Update. January 27th, from the Iraqi province of Wassit which borders Iran:

Thousands of Iranians poured into the Zurbatia border (crossing) with the province to buy US dollars from Iraqi merchants, a Wassit Province official said today.

The source told Aswat al-Iraq that the buying campaign came after the deterioration of the Iranian currency.

The source added that the Central Bank of Iraq witnessed greater purchasing demand on the US dollar during the last two days, following the sanctions imposed against the Iranian government.

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January 25, 2012 10:04 AM
By Bill Roggio

Reuters reported that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has left the town of Rada'a in the central province of Baydah after negotiating with tribesmen to ensure that key AQAP prisoners would be released and that sharia, or Islamic law, would be imposed in the town. AQAP, under the command of Tariq al Dhabab, the brother-in-law of Anwar al Awlaki, took control of Rada'a more than a week ago after hundreds of fighters stormed the town. From Reuters:

Dhahab had demanded the release of several prisoners including his brother Nabil, as well as the formation of a council to run the town under Islamic law, but previous efforts to broker the militant group's withdrawal fell through.

"According to the deal which is due to be implemented on Wednesday, the leader of the group must withdraw his followers from the town and move to... a rural area located far from the town until the al Qaeda operatives are freed from the central security prison," said tribal leader Ahmed al-Kalz, who took part in the talks, late on Tuesday.

Dahab was handed the sons of two senior tribesmen as surety against the release of 15 militants held by intelligence services, Kalz said, adding that the council set up to rule Rada'a would follow the laws of Yemen.

What you now have in Yemen is a situation that is analogous to northwestern Pakistan from 2004-2009, when the Pakistani Taliban seized control of significant territory in the tribal areas and even in the settled districts of what was then the Northwest Frontier Province. The Pakistani government's response was to negotiate a series of peace agreements with the Taliban after the military had been fought to a standstill. The government always claimed, however, that the negotiations with the Taliban were held with tribal leaders.

Today, AQAP controls vast areas of southern Yemen, including Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan province. The Yemeni government has fought AQAP in Zinjibar but has ceded control to AQAP in other cities and towns (Azzan, Al Koud, Ja'ar, Shaqra, and Rawdah).

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January 25, 2012 9:43 AM
By Bill Roggio

US Navy SEALs from SEAL Team Six conducted a successful nighttime raid in Somalia to free an American woman and a Danish man being held by kidnappers in Somalia. From the BBC:

Two foreign aid workers kidnapped in Somalia three months ago have been freed in a rare US military raid.

US officials have confirmed that elite US Navy Seals were dropped into Somalia to carry out the overnight operation which resulted in a shoot-out.

The two hostages were freed uninjured, although nine of their captors are said to have been killed. No casualties have been reported among US forces.

The hostages - a US woman and a Danish man - were seized on 25 October.

BBC Security correspondent Frank Gardner says Wednesday's rescue is the highest profile US action in Somalia since it pulled its forces out of the country in 1994.

I'd disagree with the BBC correspondent that this is the "highest profile US action in Somalia" since 1994. There are three other times when US personnel are known to have taken direct action in Somalia in the past five years. First, US forces (CIA and special operations forces) are known to have engaged the Islamic Courts Union several times in late 2006 and early 2007 when the Ethiopians invaded Somalia in December 2006.

Second, a US Navy warship and US personnel targeted al Qaeda leader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in June 2007 off the coast of Somalia's semi-autonomous region of Puntland. After the USS Chafee opened fire on their speedboats, 35 Islamic Courts fighters were killed.

Third, US special operations forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in September 2009 during a daring helicopter raid in the southern Somali town of Barawe. Nabhan's body was recovered during the raid.

Additionally, US conventional aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (the Predator and Reaper drones) as well as sea-launched cruise missiles have been used to target Islamic Courts and Shabaab targets since 2006. The Long War Journal counts nine such incidents, including the two mentioned above. Just last weekend, the US killed Bilal al Berjawi, a senior al Qaeda and Shabaab commander, in a Predator strike south of Mogadishu.

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January 23, 2012 3:04 PM
By Bill Roggio

Yesterday the Guardian provided a clue on how Bilal al Berjawi, the al Qaeda commander who was killed in a US drone strike on Jan. 21, may have been tracked:

The 27-year-old's wife is understood to have given birth to a child in a London hospital a few hours before the missile strike, prompting suspicions among relatives that his location had been pinpointed as a result of a telephone conversation between the couple.

If true, it would be interesting to know if the Brits helped in gathering the signals intelligence. Additionally, the report has a few more details on Berjawi:

Berjawi grew up in west London, travelling to Somalia around three years ago. There were unconfirmed reports that he had been injured in a drone attack last June, after which his wife was said to have returned to the UK.

He was stripped of his British citizenship under the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act using powers the Home Office has been deploying with increasing frequency since the last election.

Berjawi is understood to have sought to appeal against the order, but lawyers representing his family were unable to take instructions from him amid concerns that any telephone contact could precipitate a drone attack.

The Guardian goes on to say that family members claimed he is innocent and was not involved with al Qaeda. But our sources are 100 percent certain that Berjawi was a senior leader in both al Qaeda and Shabaab.

"We've been looking for him for some time now," a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal yesterday. The official would not comment on how Berjawi was traced, however.

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January 20, 2012 8:38 AM
By Bill Roggio

Less than a day after an Afghan soldier shot and killed four French troops in Kapisa, France has suspended its training mission with Afghan troops and has threatened to end its mission in Afghanistan if the issue is not properly addressed. From AFP:

"The French army is alongside its allies but we cannot accept that a single one of our soldiers be wounded or killed by our allies, it's unacceptable," Sarkozy said, dispatching Defence Minister Gerard Longuet to Afghanistan.

Longuet and army chief of staff Admiral Edouard Guillaud will establish the circumstances of Friday's shooting in which an Afghan soldier shot dead four French troops and wounded 16 before being arrested.

"Between now and then all training, joint combat operations by the French army are suspended," Sarkozy said.

"If security conditions are not clearly established, then the question of an early return of the French army will be asked."

"We will have to take a difficult decision in the coming days. But I must assume my responsibilities before the French people and before our soldiers," Sarkozy said.

Today The New York Times published an excellent article on high incidences of Afghan troops killing their NATO counterparts. It has been clear to me for some time that the number of killings of NATO troops by Afghan personnel has been inordinately high.

But the most troubling fallout has been the mounting number of Westerners killed by their Afghan allies, events that have been routinely dismissed by American and NATO officials as isolated episodes that are the work of disturbed individual soldiers or Taliban infiltrators, and not indicative of a larger pattern. The unusually blunt report, which was prepared for a subordinate American command in eastern Afghanistan, takes a decidedly different view.

"Lethal altercations are clearly not rare or isolated; they reflect a rapidly growing systemic homicide threat (a magnitude of which may be unprecedented between 'allies' in modern military history)," it said. Official NATO pronouncements to the contrary "seem disingenuous, if not profoundly intellectually dishonest," said the report, and it played down the role of Taliban infiltrators in the killings.

The coalition refused to comment on the classified report. But "incidents in the recent past where Afghan soldiers have wounded or killed I.S.A.F. members are isolated cases and are not occurring on a routine basis," said Lt. Col. Jimmie E. Cummings Jr. of the Army, a spokesman for the American-led International Security Assistance Force. "We train and are partnered with Afghan personnel every day and we are not seeing any issues or concerns with our relationships."

The numbers appear to tell a different story. Although NATO does not release a complete tally of its forces' deaths at the hands of Afghan soldiers and the police, the classified report and coalition news releases indicate that Afghan forces have attacked American and allied service members nearly three dozen times since 2007.

Two members of the French Foreign Legion and one American soldier were killed in separate episodes in the past month, according to statements by NATO. The classified report found that between May 2007 and May 2011, when it was completed, at least 58 Western service members were killed in 26 separate attacks by Afghan soldiers and the police nationwide. Most of those attacks have occurred since October 2009. This toll represented 6 percent of all hostile coalition deaths during that period, the report said.

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January 18, 2012 3:17 AM
By Bill Roggio

Hakeemullah Mehsud (left), the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, is photographed with Waliur Rehman, the leader of the Taliban in South Waziristan (right), during a meeting with the media in Sararogha in South Waziristan in 2009. AP photo.

Pakistani officials are being far more cautious this time around when discussing the possibility that Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was killed in a Jan. 12 drone strike in North Waziristan. Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who in the past has reported Hakeemullah's death with certainty, said he needs more evidence. From Voice of America:

Rehman Malik told reporters in Islamabad Monday that unless he has "DNA evidence" or confirmation from his own "independent sources," he will not say Mehsud is dead.

It seems Malik has finally decided to take LWJ's advice and is looking for better confirmation.

This report, from Central Asia Online, quotes a Taliban spokesman, who said that Hakeemullah was not at the scene of Jan. 12 strike:

A spokesperson for the TTP [Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan], Asimullah Asim Mehsud, however, denied the death of his commander.

"Hakeemullah was even not present on the scene where the drone hit two vehicles, killing eight Central Asian militants," he said.

Sailab Mehsud, a tribal journalist from South Waziristan Agency, told Central Asia Online that he had spoken to residents of the Dattakhel area where the aerial attack occurred, who said Hakeemullah was present when the missile strike took place. However, they had no knowledge of his death, he said.

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January 17, 2012 12:37 PM
By Wes Bruer

The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, has denied the deportation of Abu Qatada (a.k.a. Omar Othman) to Jordan, in the Court's first ruling that extradition of a suspect would violate his or her right to a fair trial. Qatada, a Jordanian national, arrived in the UK in 1993 after successfully applying for asylum following his detention in Jordan where he claimed he was tortured while in custody. Qatada is considered to be al Qaeda's ambassador to the United Kingdom.

In 1994, UK officials recognized him as a refugee, and he was permitted to stay until June 1998. Awaiting his application for indefinite status, Qatada was detained in October 2002 under the country's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act. In August 2005, Qatada was made aware that authorities planned to deport him back to Jordan.

While living in the UK, Qatada was convicted in absentia for his role in two alleged terrorist plots in 1999 and 2000. Jordanian authorities contend that Qatada incited his followers in Jordan to carry out bombings. In the current proceeding, Qatada made the successful case that his extradition to Jordan would result in a lengthy pretrial detention where he may be subject to torture and a "grossly unfair trial based on evidence obtained by the torture of his co-defendants."

Despite the UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission's assurance that Qatada would not be tortured because of agreements negotiated by authorities in the UK and Jordan, and the House of Lords upholding the Commission's findings, the European Court of Human Rights still believed that Qatada faced a considerable risk of torture at the hands of Jordanian authorities.

In light of Qatada's previous claims of torture, coupled with UN and human rights organizations' testimony that the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) routinely uses torture and ill-treatment against high-profile terror suspects, such as Abu Qatada, the court was tasked with determining whether the agreements set forth by the UK and Jordan were sufficient to ensure he would not be maltreated.

Assurances were said to have been given at the highest levels of government, including the Jordanian King and senior GID officials, that Qatada would not be tortured, so as to avoid straining the historically strong relations between the two countries. But European Court officials were not convinced that evidence obtained through the torture of co-defendants might not plague Qatada's chance at a fair trial.

Qatada is currently detained at Long Lartin prison in Worcestershire, England, where he can now apply to be released on bail within days.

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January 16, 2012 8:03 AM
By Matt Dupee

Just in case you missed it, yesterday the Afghan Taliban made a "proclamation of the Islamic Emirate's victory," issuing a typical, oddly-written diatribe published on their website, Voice of Jihad. As usual, the nearly-700-word briefer poorly argues that the Taliban movement is not only a "military power" but also "a well-organized political power." In short, the statement claims that the Taliban movement is:

- not dependent upon the external assistance of foreign governments (i.e., Pakistan);
- widely supported by the Afghan population and the global Islamic community (ummah);
- militarily victorious despite the 10-year effort by the US and NATO in Afghanistan to crush the Taliban;
- unified and organized, and;
- the only viable and logical alternative to the current Afghan regime.

These themes are common among most official Taliban communiqués, and do not constitute the most notable part of the statement. That distinction goes to the explanation given for settling on Qatar as the site of the Taliban's de facto political office:

The choice of Qatar for the inauguration of formal office shows the political deliberation of the Islamic Emirate. If this initiative had been taken in some neighboring country, it would have been another chance of every day propaganda for Karzai administration. If the office was inaugurated in Saudi Arabia, someone else would have suspected it because of the close bilateral relations of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And finally Turkey could not have been considered an ideal place for the sovereignty and prestige of this office because of its membership of the NATO alliance.

But Qatar having balance relations with all sides and a prestigious status in the Islamic world is the most appropriate place for this kind of office.

It is interesting that in choosing the location for an office, the Taliban rejected Turkey for its membership in NATO; decided against Pakistan (described as "some neighboring country") because it would have given Afghan opposition blocs more reasons to thwart the Karzai regime's ongoing peace efforts ("everyday propaganda for the Karzai administration"); and nixed Saudi Arabia because of its historic links with Pakistan and the Taliban regime (the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan were the only three states to every officially recognize the Taliban government between 1996-2001).

The National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA), a newly formed opposition bloc to the Karzai regime that consists of many influential former United Islamic Front commanders, cautiously stated they would support the peace talks but warned that Afghan parties must also be part of the talks. This comes as a delegation of NCA officials met with US representatives in Berlin last week, where they initially urged that serious consideration be given to federalizing the boundaries of Afghanistan and decentralizing the government.

Although not affiliated with the NCA, Haji Mohammad Muhaqeq, one of the most influential Hazara leaders, demanded that Afghanistan's ethnic minorities be included in the talks. And in contrast to the Taliban's description of Qatar as "having balance[d] relations with all sides and [its] prestigious status in the Islamic world," Muhaqeq termed Qatar as mustamera-e-Amrika, essentially a "colony of the US."

While half-heartedly supporting the ongoing efforts to establish a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban, the NCA and other powerful players in Afghanistan's virulent political landscape are more than skeptical of the Taliban's intentions as well as the suspect role of Qatar in US-Taliban negotiations.

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January 13, 2012 4:23 AM
By Bill Roggio

The US Embassy in Bangkok issued an "Emergency Message to US Citizens" that warned of "Possible Terrorist Threat." The statement was released on the embassy's website:

This message alerts U.S. citizens in Thailand that foreign terrorists may be currently looking to conduct attacks against tourist areas in Bangkok in the near future. U.S. citizens are urged to exercise caution when visiting public areas where large groups of Western tourists gather in Bangkok.

U.S. citizens are encouraged to maintain a heightened awareness when out in public; be alert for unattended packages/bags in public/crowded places and report any suspicious behavior to the nearest law enforcement personnel. We also encourage you to keep a low profile in public areas, particularly areas frequented by foreign tourists.

The statement did not indicate who might carry out the attack. Thailand has been plagued by a brutal Islamist insurgency in its southern provinces. The shadowy Islamist groups are seeking to break away from Thailand, and have received support from Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaeda's affiliate in Southeast Asia.

Jemaah Islamiyah is known to have a network in Thailand. Hambali, the Jemaah Islamiyah operations chief who was close to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was captured in the city of Ayutthaya in 2003. He was thought to have been plotting attacks in Bangkok.

Update:

The threat appears to have originated from Hezbollah. One person has been arrested, according to the BBC:

Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung said one man was being held over possible immigration offences.

The situation was now under control, he said, and urged people not to worry.

"Following concern raised by the Israeli embassy about a possible attack by a group of Lebanese terrorists in Bangkok, Thai police officials had been co-ordinating with Israeli officials since before the New Year," Reuters news agency quoted Mr Yoobamrung as saying.

He told the Associated Press news agency police had been tracking the two men and called one in for questioning.

"Technically the two men have not committed any crimes under the Thai law, so we could only use the immigration law to keep this one suspect in custody," he said.

An official at the defence ministry told Reuters that Israel had contacted them on 22 December with information that two or three suspects could be planning an attack in Thailand, but that those individuals had left the country. A second warning came on 8 January, he said.

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January 12, 2012 12:42 PM
By CJ Radin

On Jan. 5, the Obama administration released its Defense Strategic Guidance document. It provides the administration's view of the current security environment, the priorities for future US military missions, and guiding principles for organizing the US armed forces. (Note: It does not contain specific recommendations for the US military organization. Those will be released in early February.)

The security environment

Al Qaeda is much less of a threat
In the administration's view, the death of Osama bin Laden and many other senior leaders means that al Qaeda has been severely degraded. Terrorism by al Qaeda and other associated groups now constitutes a much-reduced threat. What continues to exist has diffused away from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region to other areas around the globe, including Somalia, Yemen, and the Maghreb. Consequently, Afghanistan as a major theater of operations is no longer a high priority, and other areas are of greater concern. As a result, US resources will be drawn down from Afghanistan and redistributed to meet the new threats.

Asia-Pacific will become more important
The Asia region, the arc through East, Southeast, and South Asia, will become much more important both strategically and economically. The central concern is China, which is expected to emerge as a regional power with the potential to affect the economy and security of the US. Europe will become less of a security concern. Cooperation with European countries will continue, but US military priority there will be lowered. The focus for the US conventional military will shift from Europe to Asia.

Military missions

Although the US military will need capabilities for many different missions, the priority will be placed on organizing the military for the following subset:

• Counterterrorism and irregular warfare
• Deterring and defeating aggression by conventional military forces
• Maintaining a nuclear deterrent
• Defending the homeland

Counterterrorism and irregular warfare
While the battle against terrorism is still important, it will not be fought as a major war with the US in the leading role. It will be prosecuted with more limited means, such as Special Operations Forces actions, drone strikes, and law enforcement activities. For counterinsurgency operations, the US military will no longer be organized to lead large-scale, long-term operations like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, the military will be sized and organized for smaller-scale missions. In the ideal scenario, the US would be in a supporting role, assisting local forces. This would be done in conjunction with allies who would provide additional support to the local forces.

As previously announced, the US will to continue to draw down operations in Afghanistan. The US troop level will be reduced from today's 90,000 troops to 67,000 by September 2012, and the level will likely continue to decline to perhaps 15,000 trainers and advisors by the end 2014. At the same time, counterterrorism operations may be initiated in the other areas. As described above, they will be more limited in scope, involve more non-military means, and be conducted in cooperation with allies and partners.

Aggression by conventional military forces
US conventional military forces will be sized to be able to simultaneously fight one major war while fighting a smaller-scale, short-term, or diversionary war somewhere else. The strategic goal is to have the capacity to deter "opportunistic attack." In other words, if the US becomes engaged in a major military operation, the US will also deter opponents in another region from exploiting the opportunity, by having sufficient forces to deny the objective or impose unacceptable costs. If the US were fighting a major conventional land war in Korea, for example, the US would still have sufficient forces available to repel an attacker's attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Given the emphasis on Asia Pacific generally and China specifically, it is likely the US will move the bulk of its conventional military forces to the Asia Pacific region, with smaller contingents elsewhere.

Note that this strategic defense guidance is particularly vague. One can imagine a large number of permutations of possible conflicts that each require a different military size and organization.

Nuclear deterrent
According to the document, "it is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force." The administration's policy will likely be to continue to reduce the US nuclear stockpile, in line with the "New START" Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiated and ratified with Russia, with negotiations for further reductions possible.

Military structure: guiding principles

Cost-effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness will become a central issue in planning US forces and operations. The US will use "innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."

Reversibility and regenerative ability
The administration concedes that the future is highly uncertain. The US cannot definitively say any capability will not be needed. However, the US also cannot afford to maintain robust capabilities in all areas. Therefore, US forces will retain capabilities in a broad range of areas, but some capabilities will be reduced to a reserve force level and structure with the assumption that they can be rebuilt if needed in the future. (The specific capabilities affected have not yet been identified.)

This strategy is essentially a tradeoff between cost versus deployment readiness. Generally, it is cheaper to maintain a reserve force than a ready one. But a reserve force cannot be immediately deployed; time and additional resources are needed to rebuild a reserve into a deployable capability.

Partners and allies
Missions in the future will attempt to include partners and/or allies in some way. "Building partnership capacity will be important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership." The document cites India as one such example: "The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region."

The tradeoff here is between cost and flexibility. While this "burden sharing" cuts the cost, it also constrains US operations to areas where we have a readily available partner. This partnership scenario cannot always be assumed to exist, however, which means the tradeoff creates significant burdens and risks for US strategic options.

Commentary: forward to the past

In many ways, this strategic defense guidance document charts a return to the US defense strategy of the 1990s, the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 era. At that time, the size and budget for the US military were reduced. The military was being reorganized for smaller-scale operations, with larger operations dependent on the mobilization of reserve forces. A nuclear arms reduction treaty was being negotiated with Russia. China was the up and coming threat. And fighting terrorism was a law enforcement issue, not a war.

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January 12, 2012 9:31 AM
By Bill Roggio

ISAF special operations forces captured a Haqqani Network facilitator who aids others conducting attacks in the northwestern province of Faryab. From the ISAF press release:

In Pul-e Alam district, Logar province, an Afghan led and coalition supported security force captured a Haqqani network facilitator during an operation today. The facilitator acquired explosives and weapons for insurgent attacks in Faryab province. Two additional suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.

While the Haqqani Network is traditionally considered to be constrained to operatiing in the southeastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost, the al Qaeda-linked group has increasingly expanded its area of operations in northern and southern Afghanistan over the past several years. The Kabul Attack Network, the alliance of Taliban and terror groups that directs attacks in the capital, is co-led by a Haqqani Network commander, and many attacks there are attributed to Haqqani forces. Haqqani Network operatives have been captured or targeted in Kunduz as well as in the far-flung northern province of Badakhshan.

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