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10 years after 9/11: Lessons from the Philippines


The catastrophic attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 ripped off a veneer and exposed what was growing beneath the surface: al Qaeda's successful efforts to tap Muslim grievances around the world and infect disparate, home-grown groups with its global jihad. Al Qaeda has helped groups like Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia target the "Near Enemy" - their governments, and the "Far Enemy" - the United States.
         
Ten years after the event, it appears that 9/11 was the peak of al Qaeda's strength, when it reached from its caves in Afghanistan to destroy symbols of modernity, forcing governments around the world to change outdated paradigms of Cold War defense structures. Bin Laden's victory was short-lived: 9/11 was a strategic error for his forces because now they were exposed and vulnerable. In the next decade, they would never be that strong again.
 
Since 9/11, there has been no other al Qaeda attack on US soil or any other al Qaeda attack of a similar magnitude anywhere. Osama bin Laden is dead, and most of al-Qaeda's 'legacy leaders' have been killed and replaced. More than 40 plots have been foiled in the last decade, according to the Heritage Foundation. Some officials have declared all of this a "victory," but lessons from the Philippines show that the next defeat can come from the jaws of "victory."
 
In 1995, the architect of 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (known in intelligence circles as KSM), evaded arrest in the Philippines in what was then lauded as "the greatest counterterrorism victory." US and Filipino officials foiled "Bojinka," a plot for midair explosions on 11 US airplanes flying from Asia. If KSM's plot had succeeded, more people would have died in the planned "48 hours of terror" than in the Sept. 11 attacks.
 
The terrorist cell headed by KSM in the Philippines included his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993; Abdul Hakim Murad, perhaps the first commercial pilot recruited by al Qaeda; Wali Khan Amin Shah, who fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan; and bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.
 
KSM powered al Qaeda's drive as a learning organization, taking many of the cell's plots from that time, incorporating them into training at al Qaeda's camps, and resuscitating them through the years:

  • Shoe bombing:  First tested by Yousef in the Philippines, this technique resulted in a successful midair explosion on Philippine Airlines in 1994, and was later taught by KSM to his recruit, Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber, in 2001.
  • Cyanide: Discussions in the Philippines on the use of cyanide for terror attacks with the Abu Sayyaf would resurface again in the early 2000s in Great Britain.
  • Attacks on nuclear reactors: Plots discovered in the Philippines would resurface again in 2002.
  • Liquid bombs: This tactic was tested three times in the Philippines in 1994, including exploration of methods for getting bomb elements through airport security.  It would resurface again in 2006 during the London liquid bombs plot - a later version of Bojinka.

Finally, there was one plot so fantastic no one paid attention, neither law enforcement and intelligence agencies, nor journalists closely following terrorism. Murad, the pilot trained in the United States, told his Filipino interrogators about a suicide mission involving planes

[H]e will board any American commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger .... There will be no bomb or any explosive that he will use in its execution. It is simply a [suicide] mission that he is very much willing to execute. 

Among the targets he named: the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The interrogation report was from January 1995. Authorities in the Philippines have called it the blueprint for 9/11.
 
Six years after the pilot told authorities about the plans, the World Trade Center Towers were attacked again. What his nephew started in 1993, KSM finished in 2001. Jet fuel from two planes that slammed into the buildings weakened the structures at a molecular level, causing the towers to collapse hours after the impact. Nearly 3,000 people died that day, exactly 10 years ago.
 
The lesson from the Philippines in 1995 is simple: Don't underestimate the power of one person and one idea.
 
Aside from KSM, one other man escaped the 1995 dragnet: the Indonesian cleric Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali. He did exactly what KSM did for al Qaeda, except he did it for its Southeast Asian arm, Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI. Hambali built JI's network and became its operations chief, planning and carrying out the region's deadliest attacks, including the Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people.
 
The fierce reaction from law enforcement agencies around the world to the Sept. 11 attacks has affected al Qaeda and JI similarly: their centralized command structures have been hit hard, and their operational capabilities have been degraded. 
 
Still, the old networks remain and continue to spread al Qaeda's virulent ideology. Let's call it the jihadi virus. Smaller, more ad hoc and less professional cells carry out attacks without central coordination. These cells also continue to recruit, and they have caused the development of the networks to grow in a more haphazard pattern.
 
The central core of both al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have been weakened, but their ideology has sparked a movement. The networks have been degraded, but it is now more difficult for law enforcement to predict when and where the next attack will occur.  This can result in smaller, disparate attacks happening more frequently, as has been seen this year in Indonesia and the Philippines.
 
The danger is that these isolated cells and/or individuals may spontaneously regenerate some form of a network around them to carry out larger plots, something that occurred in Indonesia with the return of the Bali bomber, Dulmatin, and the discovery in 2010 of the Aceh training camps. 
 
All this shows that despite counterterrorism successes, it's hard to declare victory given the viral nature of al-Qaeda's ideology. All it takes are the right leaders to spark a regeneration that can allow the network to carry out larger-scale attacks. Remember the Philippines in 1995.


Maria Ressa is an Author-in-Residence at the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research and the author of Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia. She will be contributing to The Long War Journal on terrorism issues in Southeast Asia.



READER COMMENTS: "10 years after 9/11: Lessons from the Philippines"

Posted by CWolf at September 11, 2011 11:33 PM ET:

I remembered very well the months after Ramzi Yousaf was arrested in the Philippines. The US government insisted the Philippines buy and deploy very expensive metal detectors in the major airports or risk loosing landing rights to US borders.

So when 911 happened and when I realized that 911 plotters' weapons-of-choice were simple box cutters, I was stunned. The US FAA insisted to Philippine authorities that even box cutters weren't allowed.

Posted by Ben at September 12, 2011 1:32 AM ET:

The attack on the icons of America’s economic and military powers, twin towers and Pentagon, changed the world instantly. The change did not take place due to the terrorist attacks; the world was changed by the massive reaction and fury of the sole super power. Within a period of one month, an attack was launched on Afghanistan which toppled the government of Taliban but which caused the terrorists to be grateful. By the hindsight, it has now been revealed that this was what al Qaeda was asking for. It had successfully provoked the US to enter the land where two earlier super powers, Britain and USSR, had lost their pride and glory. After ten years, one trillion dollar and thousands of lives, al Qaeda is many times stronger and formidable. The US has gained nothing except for taking OBL, who was only a figurehead. The COO of al Qaeda is alive and kicking and so is his ideology of conquering the world. Read more at: http://pksecurity.blogspot.com/2011/09/decade-after-911-horrific-consequences.html

Posted by may ramos at September 12, 2011 2:05 AM ET:

september 11, 2011? please check first sentence. :)

Posted by Max at September 12, 2011 5:38 AM ET:

How can Maria claim that there have been no other Al-qaeda attacks on US soil since 9-11? What about the numerous attacks on recruitment centers, military bases, the fizzled attack on Times square not too many months ago, and most notably, the Al-qaeda inspired attack at Fort Hood, when the muslim murderer shouted "alihu akbar" before shooting dead a large number of service people? Most of these were admittedly not directly under Al-qaeda control/direction (as far as we know), but they were certainly inspired by Bin Laden and his global jihad, so what's the difference? Trying to split hairs in this way does a great disservice to the truth. And the Times Square fizzlebomb was directed by a subgroup that was closely allied to Al-qaeda, as admitted by the Obama administration, so what gives? Her statement is certainly false and misleading.

Posted by Gerald at September 12, 2011 9:36 AM ET:

So the Long War on Terror will consist of SF raids and Drone strikes. Best we start beefing up the Raptor fleet and build some more of those Stealth Helis.

Posted by namvet at September 12, 2011 10:02 AM ET:

Thank you Maria for reminding us of the Lernaean Hydra nature of Al-Qaeda. I look forward more of your articles.

Posted by joey at September 12, 2011 11:40 AM ET:

Thank you Maria for this piece. Interesting and much needed insight.

Posted by madashell59 at September 12, 2011 12:42 PM ET:

Ben;
To think the world changed due to the US reaction is out of place. Unless you are saying it stunned the world that the US deciding after being attacked numerous times decided to say enough is enough while everyone else just took it on the chin.
Now how about the Brits and the Russians being driven out of Afghanistan. Well the Brits conquered and then got to comfortable also that was before the ability to bring in support quickly. As for the Russians they were there to help a communist keep power and the US helped the Taliban defeat them. And look how nice those back stabbers (Taliban and others) have been.
Even within the Islamist Extremists it is all about money and power don't get fooled by the religious aspects.

Posted by Mr T at September 12, 2011 4:40 PM ET:


"After ten years, one trillion dollar and thousands of lives, al Qaeda is many times stronger and formidable."


Yeah, sure.

Posted by Dan at September 12, 2011 6:43 PM ET:

In my opinion Maria, I think your neglect to mention the strikes in Bali, Spain and London as similar in magnitude, highlights that body count is the bench mark for targeted operations. All of the above mentioned operations were a strategic success for AQ or their affiliates (and a loss for the West). I agree that we need to remain forever vigilant, with the next development phase for AQ. I fear the new head of the hydra is looking for benchmarks for strategic strike at the tactical level, along with the stated aims of WMD. Operations similar to Norway’s Anders Behring Breivik, or the Mumbai 2008 assaults could become the norm.

Posted by PacRim Jim at September 12, 2011 10:46 PM ET:

AQ has been extremely successful -- in spreading the U.S. military into the heart of Islam.
Unintended consequences are a bitch.

Posted by ennie at September 13, 2011 2:03 AM ET:

The distribution of the wealth all over the world is unfair, there still are other "AL Qaeda"s waiting for a chance to destroy the stabilization of people.

Posted by Neo at September 13, 2011 2:31 PM ET:

Ben is at least partially correct in his assertion that Al Qaeda intended to bring the United States into direct conflict with the Muslim world with the 9-11 attack. That much is supported in Al Qaeda literature. It must also be stated that Ben’s view is shared by much of the neo-pacifist left. It is by no means and uncommon view. Where the view fails, and I might add fails to be honest, is that it only accounts for part of Al Qaeda’s intent. Al Qaeda didn’t just create a circumstance in which the United States government could respond with war, it created a circumstance where the government must respond or lose legitimacy. Al Qaeda did for a time manage to capture the imagination of a Islamic public that was already antagonistic toward America. A United States military counter attack and occupation did reinforce that antagonism. That is the choice you make when you go to war. I have yet to see a “soft power” alternative that comes anywhere close to addressing the need to take down Al Qaeda’s supporting infrastructure and hunt down their leadership.

Quirky pacifist views aside, one of the primary purposes of governance is protection from malevolent attack. Every shred of evidence also supports that Al Qaeda would continue its attacks as long as their organization remained largely intact. To argue Al Qaeda would do otherwise is counterfactual. That left little choice but to reduce Al Qaeda and the associated Taliban government that hosted them. Lets be perfectly honest too, the primary mission of the Taliban government from the very onset, was to host training facilities for the global jihad. The political status of Afghanistan under the Taliban was that of an ideological warring state, set up with the expressed purpose of facilitating global jihad. The almost universal incompetence of the Taliban at governance was a big hindrance to the effectiveness of Afghanistan as a supporting state, but they did manage in the 90’s to train thousands of cadre for wars and acts of terrorism in over forty nations Across much of Northern Africa and much of Asia. Because of this, the 9-11 attack can never be viewed in isolation, but might be viewed as the grandest of thousands of attacks.

While the United States has been stalemated in Afghanistan in many respects, Al Qaeda and the Taliban haves been thoroughly unsuccessful as well during this time. They did take advantage of Pashtoon nationalism to reconstitute themselves in Pakistan and become a force that threaten both Afghanistan and Pakistan. They failed to topple the elected government of Pakistan and so far have failed to install a government that is solidly in support of their aims. They failed in outright rebellion against Pakistan. In this effort they could never rally the Punjabi populous like they had with the Pashtoon population. They still garner support from major portions of the Pakistani security and political apparatus, but that support is increasingly conditional. Their successes and failures in Afghanistan are enumerated in article so I won’t repeat. Their only substantial successes in the west, were the attacks in Spain and Britain, both of which were carried out some time ago. Al Qaeda still serves as inspiration for other Islamist insurgencies, and its extensive funding network still assists, but direct connections are under constant pressure which keeps them limited.

Where you will find Al Qaeda and the Pacifist-left in agreement, is that a shameful and crippling total withdrawal is the only “natural” long term outcome of the Afghan war. Under that thinking the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of Saigon in 1975 serve as models. While the American drawdown is worrisome, a sudden collapse is hardly a foregone conclusion. The collapse of the Soviet supported government took a further four years and early direct attempts by Pakistan to directly overthrow it flopped. It took the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and dissention within the Soviet supported Afghan government to finally unravel the government. For the Americans the fall of Saigon was also the product of special circumstance. The Nixon administration had been disgraced by Watergate, and Democratic center under the Johnson administration had earlier left in disgrace, leaving a caretaker executive under Ford and a hostile Democratic left in charge of both houses of congress. The United States in the mid 1970’s was also under the pressure of an economic slowdown precipitated by the Arab oil embargo. I would argue instead that such definitive collapses tend to be rare but spectacular exceptions rather than the rule.

Worst case would put a collapse scenario in the 2017-2021 range at the earliest. A collapse scenario would break up Afghanistan into a Pashtoon south and a non-Pashtoon north. By than much of the Pashtoon population would have been forced from the north by interethnic warfare. Much of the ensuing war would be local, and by than the Pakistani’s may not go much for the international jihad. Meanwhile much of the attention of the Muslim world has turned elsewhere to the Arab Spring and economic issues. Even five years ago Al Qaeda would have factored prominently in the Arab Spring. Now they are relegated as a bit player. Islamists and the Brotherhood are even somewhat at odds with Al Qaeda. They see Al Qaeda’s methods as unnecessarily bloody and too many of its victims innocent Muslims. Al Qaeda inspired states are also increasingly seen by much of the Muslim world as ungovernable and unlivable. You can’t just liquidate entire populations of Muslims, as Al Qaeda sponsored movements are currently doing, in the name of jihad against the west.

Posted by just a minute at September 14, 2011 3:43 PM ET:

I couldn't get past this line "tap Muslim grievances around the world". Like actual grievances are what causes Islamic pre-terrorist to join up for training. Or those who are in a position to cause harm to flip their switch and DO HARM spouting Allah Akbar as they go.

Life is full of grievances for every person ever born. It is not grievances that turn people into killers, it is believing the lie that killing will somehow make a wrong right. Those who kill in the name of religion are using religion as their justification but name injustice as there reasons. Being told and believing that your religion demands you kill those who don't believe as you do is the only thing that causes this problem we are facing today.

No matter what your circumstance or station in life, if you are hearing this lie, reading this lie, you are probably going to act on this lie. Satan has been pushing these words from the dawn of time and men are falling for the lie ever more as time marches on.

We need to fight this teaching at all cost and trying to justify it as caused by any real or imagined grievance is adding fuel to an already out of control wild fire. There is no excuse for killing in the name of religion, just evil.

Posted by Villiger at September 15, 2011 2:01 AM ET:

just a minute, thank you for articulating that. You speak the truth.

Posted by Infidel4LIFE at September 16, 2011 1:34 PM ET:

Wasn't there a laptop confiscated as well? This laptop was supposed to have had plans relating to 9/11 style attacks, and the Pinoy investgator passed this intel on to FBI, but they just couldn't "connect the dots?" the signs were all over the place, how couldn't our intel agencies NOT know? The laptop belonged to Yousef, there was a fire, the cops came and saw they were making explosives. Shame they didn't act on this intel.