Pakistani claims of high Taliban casualties ‘wildly exaggerated’ – US officials

US military and intelligence officials are expressing skepticism about Pakistani claims of high Taliban casualties as the fighting spreads in the volatile northwest.

The Pakistani military’s daily reports of hundreds of Taliban fighters killed in the districts of Swat, Shangla, Dir, and Buner are “wildly exaggerated,” a senior US intelligence official who is closely watching the operations in Pakistan told The Long War Journal.

Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, claimed that more than 700 Taliban fighters were killed in the last four days in Swat alone, Dawn reported. But a US intelligence official described Malik’s claim as “fantastic.”

“Malik’s numbers are even more fantastic than those given by the Pakistani military, which has claimed more than 300 Taliban fighters were killed since late last week,” a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal. “Clearly they [the Pakistani security establishment] want us to believe they’re having fantastic success against the Taliban.”

“The numbers issued by the military are wildly exaggerated,” a military intelligence official said, noting that the military is over-relying on air and artillery strikes instead of engaging the Taliban. “This is like a bad movie we’ve all seen before. The Pakistani military levels large areas, claims success, and thinks we’ll be conned into believing it if they pump up the Taliban body counts.”

The military said more than 15,000 troops, including units from the paramilitary Frontier Corps, are engaged against an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 Taliban fighters in Swat. Malik’s numbers would indicate that the Taliban have suffered 10 percent killed and likely another 20 to 30 percent wounded.

The status of the fight in Swat casts doubt on the Pakistani military’s claims on Taliban casualties. “The Taliban are still holding firm in Swat, the military has largely been kept at bay,” a US military officer said. “If they’ve suffered such high casualties, I wouldn’t expect this.”

Meanwhile, the military continues its heay-handed approach to counterinsurgency in the northwest. Multiple reports from the region indicate the Army is shelling villages indiscriminately without allowing civilians to flee the area and with little or no intelligence on the Taliban presence in the region.

As the fighting continues in Swat and neighboring Dir and Buner, the Taliban have expanded their operations into the tribal areas and in neighboring districts. Large Taliban forces, operating at the company and battalion level, have conducted attacks on military bases and convoys in Mohmand and South Waziristan, and have been interdicting military convoys in Mardan and Malakand.

“The military’s engagements in Mohmand and South Waziristan have been defensive in nature,” the military officer said. “They’re responding to Taliban attacks, not taking the fight to them.”

The Taliban attacks outside of the Swat theater continue. Today, a Taliban suicide bomber killed 13 Pakistanis after ramming a car packed with explosives into a Frontier Corps checkpoint in Darra Adam Khel.

Update on fighting in northwestern Pakistan:

Shangla

The largest single incident of Taliban casualties was reported yesterday when the military claimed it killed between 140 and 150 Taliban fighters after pounding the Banai Baba region in Shangla, a district adjacent to Swat, and taking two mountains known as point 2245 and point 2266. A Taliban training camp and base in Banai Baba was hammered with air and artillery strikes, and most of the casualties were reported there.

The military stated that only one soldier was killed and that much of Shangla has been cleared of the Taliban. Previously, the military had asserted that only a small Taliban force of 30 to 40 fighters had entered Shangla.

Swat

The military claimed an estimated 110 Taliban fighters were killed in Swat over the past two days. Yet the Taliban remain in control of Mingora, where security forces holed up in a school remain under siege.

The Taliban also remain in control of the towns of Kabal, Matta, Kanju, Venaibaba, Namal, Qambar, Fizagath, Tiligram, and Chamtalai. The town of Peochar, Taliban headquarters in Swat, is also under Taliban control. All of these areas have been hit with artillery and air strikes over the past several days. The military appears to be hesitant to close with the Taliban on the ground, US military intelligence officials said.

The Pakistani military also claimed it is targeting the Taliban’s senior leadership in Swat, The News reported. But other than the brother of Ibn Amim, the leader of al Qaeda’s Shadow Army brigade operating in Swat and Buner, no senior commanders have been killed or captured.

More than 100 police, Frontier Corps, and regular Army troops are still in Taliban custody.

Dir

The military has also claimed that the Taliban have suffered heavy casualties in Dir. On May 8, the military claimed 73 Taliban fighters were killed during fighting in the district. The Taliban still remain in control of Chakdara, a strategic town that serves as the gateway to Dir and Swat.

The Taliban destroyed a headquarters of the Dir Levies, a paramilitary police force, in Chakdara late last week. The military claimed it is advancing in Dir, but the Taliban denied this and claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on security forces.

The operation In Dir has been underway for more than two weeks now. The military initially announced that Dir was secured just one day after the operation began.

Buner

The military claimed it has advanced in Buner, where operations are in their third week. At the onset of the fight, security forces secured the main town of Daggar in an air assault by the commandos of the Special Service Group, but Daggar is still said to be under siege as the Taliban control the main roads leading to the town. The military is still conducting artillery strikes in Daggar, which is said to have been abandoned by Buneris.

The towns of Sultanwas and Pir Baba are still under Taliban control, and the military is trying to advance along the road to Pir Baba. The Special Service Group has been used to air assault the hills between Daggar and Pir Baba, while security forces claimed to have secured the ridges around Sultanwas. Heavy fighting has been reported as the military again has relied on artillery, air, and helicopter strikes to dislodge the Taliban.

Malakand

The Taliban continue to interdict security forces in Malakand in an attempt to slow the deployment of forces in Dir and Swat. The Taliban attacked a series of Levies checkpoints in the town of Palai. One Levies officer was killed and three others were captured. The Taliban “retained control of Palai area for about 14 hours and blocked the roads linking the town to Mardan and Dargai,” Daily Times reported.

Mohmand

In Mohmand, a large Taliban force of an estimated 200 fighters (company strength) attacked military outposts in Ambar a few days ago. The military claimed 26 Taliban were killed and another 14 were wounded after troops repelled the assault. But the Taliban claimed 20 soldiers were killed and another six were taken prisoner.

Earlier this month, the Taliban overran a Frontier Corps outpost. On March 1, the military had claimed the Taliban were defeated in Mohmand.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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50 Comments

  • AMac says:

    Re: ‘like a bad movie we’ve all seen before’–the Pakistani military seem to be acting in a remake of “The Chinese Civil War,” diligently playing the part of the Western-organized and equipped Kuomintang armies.
    The screenwriter was Mao Zedong.
    I don’t recall that working out so well, the first time around.

  • Marlin says:

    The Pakistani Army seems to be promising house-to-house fighting in Mingora shortly. It will be interesting to see if they actually follow through.

    Officials revealed on Sunday that elite commando troops had been dropped into parts of Mingora, the regional capital, to undertake advance combat, even as the army lifted a curfew to allow thousands of civilians to flee.
    […]
    “We have prepared for house-to-house fighting but if the militants leave Mingora, then we will avoid it,” said Maj Gen Athar Abbas, the army’s chief spokesman.
    He said that the security forces were heading from two directions towards Mingora and both forces would link up before assailing the city in force.

    Daily Telegraph: Pakistan army ready for house-house combat with Taliban

  • Neo says:

    “Once again, no signs that the Pak military is serious about this, because if they were, they would rely on ground combat and plan for a long-term commitment.”

  • asad says:

    You guys are predicting doom gloom again, may be the army is softening enemy postions before an all out assualt.

  • dude40000 says:

    Guerrilla wars tend to be long fights, likely to be won by the more committed side. My take is that the only way in which the Pakistan army can defeat the Taliban is by fighting with them for at least a decade if not many decades. Look around any region of the world and any motivated insurgency has carried itself for decades.
    Anyone who thinks that this war will be over in weeks or months or even years is living in a fool’s paradise. The disheartening thing is that Pakistan army believes that bulldozing and bombing entire civilian areas in a few weeks/months will be enough to quell this. Don’t they teach history to Army Generals in Pakistan?

  • AMac says:

    asad wrote,
    “maybe the army is softening enemy positions before an all out assault.”
    asad,
    It doesn’t make any sense to talk about softening noncombatant positions. And it’s trivially easy for Taliban guerillas (or ‘infantry,’ perhaps) to let off some AK47s and RPGs from a farmyard and then scoot, leaving any hapless civilians cowering in the basement to receive the Army’s incoming rounds.
    Do you have any sense that Army units deal with this undoubtedly-common situation via some tactical doctrine, COIN or otherwise? If so, any evidence that the troops are following its directives?

  • asad says:

    Noboday has evidence of anything. Only info we have is what we read on the internet. All we know is that fight is going on and some army/talib have died and I am sure troops did not die sitting in jets.
    Also 3rd of the population is livining in tents.

  • Bill Roggio says:

    What we do have, asad, is a 7-year history of Pakistani military activity in the FATA/NWFP that has resulted in the consistent yielding of ground to the Taliban after military spokesmen making grandiose statements. From what I can tell, nothing has changed. Here’s hoping I’m wrong.

  • Robert says:

    Nobody has evidence of anything. For all we know there may be no fighting at all. Even that we know from the internet.
    Whose confirmed the death of military personnel or Taliban?

  • Robert says:

    Who has confirmed

  • Max says:

    Sounds like Baghdad Bob is back in business with a new job as Interior Minister of Pakistan.

  • Mark Buehner says:

    Its a good rule of thumb to divide casualty counts by 3 if you aren’t counting them personally. In this case i’d divide by 10 and still be skeptical.
    Pakistan just isn’t the picture the US has in its mind and our leaders and media is portraying. This is as much a Pashtun/Punjabi struggle as anything else. The Pashtuns are a fraction of the population of the Punjabi and the Punjabi control the military- the idea of the Taliban rushing out of the mountains to dominate 100 million Punjabis on the plains is just ludicrous, which explains why the Pakistanis and particularly the military don’t seem overly worried.
    Pakistan is secure, insofar as the bulk of the nation including Islamabad and the nuclear infrastructure. The Pashtun areas have always been a problem, and Pakistan knows full well that sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers into the Pashtun mountains wont accomplish anything but carnage. The military isn’t going to risk dulling its blade on a fools errand without a clear objective. THAT could end up causing internal strife that is an actual threat to the social order in the bulk of the nation.

  • aewn says:

    “THAT could end up causing internal strife that is an actual threat to the social order in the bulk of the nation.”
    So there we have it. Pak army can’t fight Taliban all out, cause it means civil war. In effect, Pakistan doesn’t have the capacity nor will to control the NWFP and FATA.
    It might be insane to think that the Taleban can dominate the 100 mill Pakistanis on the southern plains, but they sure as heck can make Pak a very troubled state and a failed state in all but name if they want too). The army needs to realize the severity of this threat.
    Remember that in history everything is possible. It is just a matter of how many unlikely events must happen first. Pakistan isn’t looking good. It beats me how the Pak army can be so sure of victory and so calm with the Taliban when you look at the last 7 years.

  • Mat says:

    “The Pashtuns are a fraction of the population of the Punjabi and the Punjabi control the military- the idea of the Taliban rushing out of the mountains to dominate 100 million Punjabis on the plains is just ludicrous, which explains why the Pakistanis and particularly the military don’t seem overly worried.”
    Unfortunately Mark, history has given many examples of a large population being dominated by a smaller one. The great changes in history have not been by the masses, but by small groups of individuals who have imposed their worldview on others.
    Recent examples of this include the Bolsheviks and the Nazis, which started out as very small groups and who came about to dominate the respective countries of Russia (Soviet Union) and Germany (Third Reich).
    Don’t assume that just because they’re outnumbered that the Taliban can never win. If they’re committed and ruthless enough, there is an even chance that they could pull it off (something that would be a disaster for the rest of the world).
    The question is not about numbers. The question is about the will of one group to impose their view on others. So far, I’ve seen nothing serious going on in the anti-Taliban camp. As Mr. Roggio has pointed out many times, I don’t see any difference with what the Pakistani army is doing now and what they’ve done over the last couple of years.

  • Spooky says:

    “Pakistan just isn’t the picture the US has in its mind and our leaders and media is portraying. This is as much a Pashtun/Punjabi struggle as anything else. The Pashtuns are a fraction of the population of the Punjabi and the Punjabi control the military- the idea of the Taliban rushing out of the mountains to dominate 100 million Punjabis on the plains is just ludicrous, which explains why the Pakistanis and particularly the military don’t seem overly worried.”
    Are Pakistanis insane? Do they not remember from whom they acheioved independance? 10,000 white boys ruled how many million Indians again? 100 million or so?
    Well I agree with the notion that Pakistan can’t go full out without risking civil war since the Pashtuns make up the biggest ethnic group within the military after the Punjabis and any break of the chain of command breaks Pakistan.
    But also one has to take into account that the Pakistani military has never won a war. First thing they’ll say to that is that they fought India to stalemate, which is also untrue. Each time the UN called for a ceasefire, India was always the one with momentum (and territory captured) on its side.
    So with everything taken into account, only thing they can do is keep their spoof of a nation together for a little while longer.
    My big worry comes from Kiyani however. He’s got a relatively good head on his shoulders, but he’s retiring next year, along with a dozen other officers who entered the Pakistani Amy around the same time, which was in 1971 (for Kiyani) or so. I don’t know how many officers will be left from the Zulifqar years to take the place of the retiring officers. If there are some, they too will likely retire within five years of their appointment. After that, the only officers left would be those who entered the military from the Zia years onward, and once they have control, God only knows what will happen.

  • tbrucia says:

    If the Pushtun areas are placed de facto under a new government, you’re talking about 15 percent of Pakistan’s population (and about 25 million people, or about the population of Afghanistan, or Taiwan, or North Korea). The total Pushtun population (across national boundaries) is about 42 million people…. If Pakistan proves unable to extend control 24/7/365 over the Pushtuns, there are other minorities ready to secede also: Sind and Baluchistan…. The Taliban doesn’t need to take on the Punjabis — simply push them out of ‘Pushtunistan’.

  • AMac says:

    Mark,
    You make good points, but I’m not sure they are fully persuasive.
    The Taliban have their core ethnic base among Pashtuns, but that’s the beginning of the discussion, not its end. In Afghanistan, this was a movement that drew on religious and ethical standards to develop solutions to societal problems (the post-Russian occupation civil war). It seems likely that the Pakistani Taliban, too, draws its inspiration from traditional and conservative interpretations of Sunni practices.
    There are plenty of non-Pashtun Muslims in the Punjab and elsewhere in Pakistan who subscribe to the beliefs of the Taliban and its allies. For example, I recall the Red Mosque occupation as being seen as a religious/political event, not a tribal one.
    Also recall the alliance between the Taliban and (non-Pashtun) al Qaeda, both its leadership and its military. True for pre-2001 Afghanistan, and true in Pakistan today.
    To the extent the Taliban are a threat to the state of Pakistan, it is not because a few thousand armed Pashtun tribesmen will swarm a nation of 100 million and defeat its armed forces in pitched battle.
    It is because the Taliban movement generates sympathy and financial and political support among many influential sectors of Pakistani society. Pashtuns in the armed forces, and Pakistanis yearning for a return to the pure Islam of days-gone-by, and patriots wishing to strike a blow for the liberation of Kashmir, and Baluchs desiring a weaker central state, and militarists desiring strategic depth for a future tussle with India, and the Islamist core of the ISI… Such a set of forces could be formidable.
    In 1979, a cobbled-together coalition overthrew the Shah in Iran. Only in the chaotic aftermath did the Ayatollah Khomeni’s allies definitively take over control of the state’s apparatus and develop a monopoly on force.

  • Neo says:

    Tbrucia,
    One doesn’t have to speculate about what the Taliban plans. They have openly their plans from the very beginning. They have at no point ever promised the Pashtuns a nation state. Their goal is to create a Central Asian Caliphate, a religious theocracy. Forget about Pashtunistan.
    They recognize two groups, those that join their version of Islam and those that they will overcome. They have no problem with capitalizing on ethnic rivalries but it is merely a means to an end.
    I don’t have to make any of this up. These groups have clearly stated their objectives and repeatedly justified their methods.

  • Neo says:

    openly (stated)

  • Midnight says:

    For the obvious reasons I have nothing to say about the comments, the report is accurate but old news. Think about this however, the numbers have been that wrong for years now.

  • Neo says:

    Personal accounts of the exodus out of Swat.
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8044150.stm

  • Zalmay says:

    The 700 figure is clearly exaggerated, but one would hope there was similar scrutiny with NATO and US causality counts of taliban dead which are also never confirmed by any independent party. I have yet to read of many fire fights in Afghanistan which have left less then 10 talibs dead according to official statements, and yet the proof is in the pudding and the taliban have only grown stronger.
    Also, good going on firing your general. Hopefully the new guy does better.
    Neo, despite the supposedly superior COIN tactics, in the end it took massive amount of bribery to change things around a little in Iraq. There is no magic answer to defeat an insurgency, certainly not an afghan/pashtun insurgency.

  • Minnor says:

    These Human rights organisations start highlighting civilian troubles during a war. Civilians who supported taliban in past deserve refugee situation, also are those who did not oppose.
    They are attacking the base of Taliban base.

  • Raj Kumar says:

    There is no magic answer to defeat an insurgency, certainly not an afghan/pashtun insurgency.
    Zalmay,
    Care to tell me how the Indians defeated the insurgency in their bit of Kashmir?
    Their is a magic answer to defeating insurgency which is to be very focused in takeing out the key enemy personnel and not do things like indestriminate artillery fire or bombing by jet planes. All you are doing right now is creating additional recruits for the Taleban and nothing more. What do you think a teenage boy who has just been forced out of his home into a refugee camp is going to do? If it was me I would sign up at the nearest Taliban recruting office.
    The Pakistani Government has so let this thing get out of hand that it is no longer a Insurgency but a full blown civil war between Pashtun’s and the plain’s Punjabi.

  • bard207 says:

    Zalmay
    When are General Kiyani (COAS) and General Pasha (ISI) going to get fired since the Taliban – TTP have definitely spread throughout Pakistan since they were appointed to their positions?

  • Zalmay says:

    Raj Kumar, are you saying the insurgency is dead in Kashmir (a traditionally docile people)? Is the maoist insurgency dead too? The overblown insistence that American training in COIN tactics is the deciding factor in beating an insurgency is misleading. The American advantage comes through use of frequent air strikes. Not exactly a people pleasing tactic.
    bard207, Kiyani and Pasha lack political will and national consensus and are/were afraid of civil war. They also know of how Pakhtuns will consume any army and spit it out like stale chewing gum. Is that the same limitation being faced by American generals?

  • bard207 says:

    Zalmay
    Is that the same limitationl being faced by American generals?l
    It was felt that the U.S. had a General with a conventional warfare background when the need was for Leadership that was used to to dealing with unconventional foes like the Taliban.
    The new Leadership has different backgrounds from the previous General.
    Also, Musharraf and the Pakistani military didn’t take care of business in recent years like they kept promising the U.S. The Peace Deals gave time and space for the Taliban to base and regenerate in the safety of Pakistan.
    Finally, if a situation was happening inside the U.S. like it is happening inside Pakistan, there would be a significantly higher level of concern & action shown by the American Leadership than what is being shown by the Pakistani Leadership (Military & Government) in handling their own situation.
    You are comparing the intensity and degree of activity shown by the U.S. in a country (Afghanistan) the other side of the world from the U.S. to the passivity & acceptance to the severe violence and surrender of control to rebels – militants inside your own country (Pakistan). That comparison fails and if people in Pakistan are unable to realize the differences between the two situations, then Good Luck because Pakistan is going to need quite a bit of it.
    ————————————————————–
    Kiyani and Pasha lack political will and national consensus and are/were afraid of civill war. They also know of how Pakhtuns willl consume any army and spit it out like stalel chewing gum.
    If that is the majority opinion on the way things are going to go with the militants, then proceed to the Conclusion instead of making excuses and asking for aid money that won’t be spent on things that might have a chance of saving Pakistan.
    Let the various groups (Balochistan, Sindh, Pathans – Pakthuns etc) go their separate ways if they like since the current Pakistani National Leadership (Army & Government) shows minimal desire to both protect its citizens and aid in their development.
    The remaining part of Pakistan (the Punjab) will become landlocked, but why should any other country care when they (Punjabis) ignored the problems in other parts of Pakistan for decades and that includes Bangladesh – East Pakistan.

  • Rhyno327 says:

    The P-stani’s are playing us like a fiddle..they just want the US to keep pumping money to them. In turn, they are building 2 new nuclear reactors-with OUR money. Are we feeling stupid yet? This whole conflict is going to end badly. With a catastrophe of some kind. P-stan has thier share of apocalyptic islamists too.

  • Wana88 says:

    Some observations on the situation in FATA/NWFP that was deliberately stoked by various Pak state entities to attain more $ from the US:
    1)Pakistan has never come close to being a failing or failed state. Sure, eventually it may accelerate down this path but not yet.
    2) Pakistan has a professional standing military whose bloody record against its own –Muslim– citizens is well known within the country. The arguments offered by Islamabad to the West ring hollow: its reluctance to leverage the army against its own people has nothing to do with humanity or concern for its citizens. All one has to do is ask the Baluchis whose insurgency against the state began in the early ’70s and ZA Bhutto (the elected PM) let the Punjabi led military run loose in Baluchistan to brutally put down the rebellion by killing 1000s of the most downtrodden citizens of the most exploited region of the country. BTW, this insurgency still continues like a smoldering fire notwithstanding the effectiveness of brute force by the Pak military. Bugti’s assassination by the military under Musharaff notwithstanding his hideout in the wilds of Baluchistan and amongst his loyal tribal elements only serves to confirm how violently “efficient” this military is when it chooses to be. Don’t forget what this military did to the unarmed citizenry in East Pakistan when they wanted to secede. They were able to break free and form Bangladesh thanks to Indian intervention to stop the slaughter of East Pakistanis at the hands of West Pakistanis. All Muslims by the way. In short, the Pak Army has its tentacles everywhere and can act when it suits their interests.
    3) The so-called rogue elements (LeT, TTP, AQAM etc) all have linkages to the ISI and beyond, & the military. They would not last without the support/logistics/training by elements within the army.
    4)The nukes are the least of our worries for now. The army also has a very firm control over the delivery mechanisms as well as the devices.
    5)While the Paks are quick to blame the US for their problems, there is enough blame to go around within this state: an autocratic “democratic” system of feudals (many of whom still have slaves/serfs/indentured peasants), their sycophants, namazis: all corrupt to the core. Zardari vs Nawaz Sharif. Both corrupt to such a degree (millions of $) that is just unbelievable in a state where the per capita income is maybe $300 a year. Zardari has fewer allies and as a Shia is at a long term disadvantage; while Wahhabi lover Sharif has been in bed with the Saudis (the financiers of global wahhabism aka salafi-jihadi jihad bin saif wa jihad bin hijra (far more effective than by saif).
    6) As long as the troublesome/country bumpkin Pushtuns are dying, it was an ideal situation to milk for all it was worth. The Pakistani babu/fauji all want the gravy train from d.c. to continue. Exaggeration of the internal situation and throw in cries of “the sky is falling, please help us we’re a nuke state”

  • Neo says:

    Zalmay,
    I see you have introduced a number of blatant misconceptions.
    “The overblown insistence that American training in COIN tactics is the deciding factor in beating an insurgency is misleading. The American advantage comes through use of frequent air strikes. Not exactly a people pleasing tactic.”

  • Neo says:

    In addition, I should probably clarify that clearing operations in Fallujah were done for the most part by ground forces. Once again, air power is used in conjunction to ground action once a target has been identified and engaged. Even in Fallujah, US forces did not use area bombing to soften up targets. That being said, the fighting in Fallujah was extensive with Al Qaeda using a lot of high explosives and US forces using high caliber ordinance to pierce through buildings.

  • Dean says:

    Is there a map of the Swat valley that shows all the villages mentioned in the article?

  • tbrucia says:

    Dean: Intermittently useful is Google Earth (in some areas offering high resolution and in others low resolution). Under ‘Geographic Web’ enable ‘Panoramio’, and ‘Wikipedia’ options! The high resolution lets you see individual buildings and trees (in orchards)! Don’t bother with ‘Street Views’;-)

  • Neo says:

    Zalmay
    “Neo, despite the supposedly superior COIN tactics, in the end it took massive amount of bribery to change things around a little in Iraq. There is no magic answer to defeat an insurgency, certainly not an afghan/pashtun insurgency.”

  • K-Khan says:

    I think the Taliban are thinking ahead of the so called allies of war against terror; for a long time they have started to disrupt and destroy the supply line of allied forces but I don’t know why Taliban are still in a position to get as much as they want the supplies coz they have the money of drugs?
    This is not only money; there are some external hidden hands supporting Taliban in the area.
    In the past Mujahedeen/Taliban were then strategic assets against USSR for some agencies and now they are fighting back with their masters.
    Despite all of this speculations; very soon they will be exposed and defeated very badly

  • Neo says:

    By the way, Zalmay. One last thing.
    I do not suggest that the Pakistani army try COIN tactics in SWAT at this point. My suggestion was to use superior numbers of infantry in standard clearing operations. I also suggested that they be careful to consolidate their position south of Swat before risking the operation.
    Unlike many others here I don’t think it is too late for the Pakistani Army. That very much depends on their willingness to fight. I very much doubt they can switch into high gear after sitting on the Indian frontier for the better part of sixty years. There is going to be a huge amount of rust to be knocked off to make the Pakistani army effective, and this process is going to be painful. Being asked to fight your own countrymen is also quite a shock, even when those fellow countrymen have become a danger to the rest of the nation. I am glad they decided to use the regular army in Swat. At least that provides some mechanism to eventually turn things around.

  • Peter says:

    Zalmay says, [i]”Raj Kumar, are you saying the insurgency is dead in Kashmir (a traditionally docile people)?”[/i].
    You seem to suggest that the locals in Kashmir suddenly rose up in 1989. Well, some other thing also happened in 1989 in the region.
    Russia withdrew from Afghanistan and a large number of fighters suddenly became available only to be used by some one.
    If you fight for 10 years and then there is no “work” all of a sudden you end up being used for violent purposes. Fighting is such an adrenaline intensive act and it is hard to turn a decade long fighter into a senile.

  • Neo says:

    Latest reports from Dawn.
    http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/12-security-forces-claim-gains-in-dir-malakand–bi-10
    What I wouldn’t do for some decent maps of the area (from this century). I must admit I have only a vague idea where half of these places are and no idea where the other half are.

  • Geographer says:

    For maps I would recommend (for now) http://www.wikimapia.org

  • Neo says:

    Anyone have any ideas of the location of Peochar. Dawn article says 65 kilometers NW of Mingora which I think is too far. ‘Dir Town’ in northern Dir is 65 km NW.
    There is a Puchyar marked on Wikimapia at 35° 0’16.34″N, 72°13’49.34″E This is 28km NW of Mingora. It is way up on a mountain side.
    Can anyone confirm the location?

  • David M says:

    The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 05/12/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.

  • Geographer says:

    Reports have indicated that Peochar, as Fazlullah’s home village, is North West of Mingora. Considering how English transliterations of Pakistani names can vary (e.g Sind, Sindh) I believe neo has the correct location.

  • Mark Buehner says:

    “To the extent the Taliban are a threat to the state of Pakistan, it is not because a few thousand armed Pashtun tribesmen will swarm a nation of 100 million and defeat its armed forces in pitched battle.”
    “It is because the Taliban movement generates sympathy and financial and political support among many influential sectors of Pakistani society. Pashtuns in the armed forces, and Pakistanis yearning for a return to the pure Islam of days-gone-by, and patriots wishing to strike a blow for the liberation of Kashmir, and Baluchs desiring a weaker central state, and militarists desiring strategic depth for a future tussle with India, and the Islamist core of the ISI… Such a set of forces could be formidable.”
    Precisely Amac. Which is my point- Pakistan’s government and more-to-whit its military are arguing that trying to route the Taliban out of the tribal areas is MORE likely to set that series of events in motion. If Talibanization is a threat now, it will be a certainty if the army frays or even is stalemated.
    The army is like a hole card and the Pakistanis are loath to put it into play, because once its out the threat is gone. The Taliban ruling Pashtunistan isnt nearly as big a threat as the army being bogged down in a guerilla nightmare and possibly fraying apart along ethnic lines, which endangers the security of the nation to the core. The Taliban can work on flipping Punjabis and other tribes til they are blue in the face but I think there is little danger of the Punjabi Talibanizing, for all kinds of social, political, economic, and historical reasons. Elements may but they are less of a threat than the army bogging down indefinately in the mountains… which is probably the BEST case scenario realistically.

  • Sure says:

    “Don’t forget what this military did to the unarmed citizenry in East Pakistan when they wanted to secede. They were able to break free and form Bangladesh thanks to Indian intervention to stop the slaughter of East Pakistanis at the hands of West Pakistanis. All Muslims by the way. In short, the Pak Army has its tentacles everywhere and can act when it suits their interests.”
    WRONG. The Pakistani army deliberately targeted Hindu civilians in East Bengal, read Kennedy’s report on the matter. Over 3 million dead, at least 2/3rds Hindu, in a place with at the time less than 20% Hindu population.
    Genocide.
    Pakistan is getting what it deserves.

  • Vern says:

    To Sure,
    Sorry, read Kissinger’s report, now declassified, as well as both Indian and Pakistani military unit reports as well as refugee reports. Most of the killing was done by Muslim West Pakistani soldiers (Punjabis) who were primarily killing Muslim Bengalis. I’m sure the Pakistani soldiers didn’t discriminate too finally and killed some resident Hindus as well as others; I’m even certain the few East Pakistani paramilitary units killed a few Hindus along with a few Bnegali Muslims, but most of the killing by Muslims was perpetrated on Muslims.
    Check your history.
    Of course, there is a long history of Muslims willingly killing other Muslims, starting in, oh, the seventh century (see the fight between Muawiyya and Ali for one). If the Punjabi Muslims of the Pakistani Army state they are hesitant to kill the Muslim Pushtuns, then what reason can they possible give for being so eager and willing to kill Muslim Balochis or Muslim Baltis (Shi’a, of course) or Muslim Mohajirs in Karachi.
    Me thinks they doth protest too much.
    Must be another reason.
    Vern

  • Sure says:

    “Sorry, read Kissinger’s report, now declassified, as well as both Indian and Pakistani military unit reports as well as refugee reports. Most of the killing was done by Muslim West Pakistani soldiers (Punjabis) who were primarily killing Muslim Bengalis. I’m sure the Pakistani soldiers didn’t discriminate too finally and killed some resident Hindus as well as others; I’m even certain the few East Pakistani paramilitary units killed a few Hindus along with a few Bnegali Muslims, but most of the killing by Muslims was perpetrated on Muslims.
    Check your history.”
    Actually, you must have misread Kissinger’s declassified reports, because it also specifically mentions the targeting of Hindus. This was a well-known aspect of the genocide there, as mentioned in many news outlets of the time (the reason given was that the Punjabis were trying to woo Muslims in East Pakistan by gaining the possessions and property from the dead or displaced Hindus) – for instance, the marking of Hindu homes to better identify the targets. Take a close look at the census figures of the East Bengal pre and post war and you will see a significant drop in the percentage of Hindus – there was a reason for that.
    Nice try Vern. Anyways, justice is coming to Pakistan. Enjoy it.

  • Sure says:

    To follow up
    http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/45604.htm
    “The Consulate General in Dacca reported on May 14 that it had received numerous reports that the Pakistani army was systematically searching out Hindus and killing them. (Telegram 1722 from Dacca; ibid., POL 23-9 PAK)”
    “Mr. Johnson: Eighty percent of the refugees are Hindus. (Ambassador) Farland raised this with Yahya and got an emotional reaction. He denied the Hindus were being persecuted but said he would look into it.”
    “Having said that, he felt that on the merits it is wrong to resume military assistance as long as the killing continues in East Pakistan. Dacca is reasonably quiet, although only half the normal inhabitants are there. The Pakistani army is now concentrating on the Hindu population. At first the refugees crossing into India were in the same proportion of Hindu and Muslim as in the whole East Pakistani population. Now, 90% are Hindus.”
    “. I went on to note that the flow of refugees continued and that this flow is symptomatic of the serious situation in East Pakistan. I pointed out that the Embassy continued to receive reports of Hindu villages being attacked by the army, that fear is pervasive, and that until this situation changes the refugees will continue to cross over into India. And I reiterated the USG’s concern that at some point the Hindu exodus, if not checked, could lead to a military clash with India. I said that the continued massive flow of refugees remains the most explosive aspect of the East Pakistan situation. Observing that the USG had urged restraint on the GOI, I said that nevertheless a heavy responsibility still rests on Pakistan. Realistically speaking, I observed that one could hardly expect the flow to cease until the level of military activity by the army is reduced and repressive measures against the local population, especially the Hindus, was ended.”
    “a population still largely cowed and fearful of Army action: people are hesitant to return to work in government and private offices and factories. The Hindu population has suffered strong persecution, and many have fled the country. The total number of refugees in India is now over four million.”
    “In the context of briefing Nixon in advance of his meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, Keating painted a grim picture of the situation in East Pakistan. He suggested that Nixon could put pressure on Pakistan to stop what he described as genocide in East Pakistan by withholding economic assistance. Keating pointed to the flood of five million refugees into India and said that the problem was growing at a rate of 150,000 a day. The strain on India was tremendous, and Keating said that the situation was further inflamed by what he described as a deliberate policy by Pakistan to drive out or kill the Hindus in East Pakistan.”
    initially in these documents we see a certain hesitancy to describe the situation for what it was, likely due to the nature of war and the difficulty obtaining accurate initial reports. later, it became clear to all the Pakistani intentions towards the Hindus of East Bengal.

  • Sure says:

    might as well post some more
    http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/45599.htm
    Mr. Sisco: There were two factors in the use of force against the Hindus: (1) the fact that the primitive Punjabi peasants really took it out on the Hindus, and (2) the basic Pakistan policy of getting rid of the Hindus
    “A further operational problem was that of equity in distribution of relief supplies. Williams said that one of our observers had reported that relief in cyclone disaster area was being refused to Hindus”

  • Vern says:

    To Sure,
    First, I will apologize. I went back and did more research and you are, at the very least, partially or greatly correct. The Pakistani (West) Army did specifically target Hindus, who they labeled “Biharis.” They felt the problem with the “weak” Muslim Bengalis was pollution of the culture by Hinduism.
    Of the Bengali population pre-1971, approximately 10 million were Hindu Biharis. The Pakistani Army and its paramilitary East Pakistani rakazars forced 7 million of them to leave East Bengal to India as refugees, along with approximately 3 million Muslim Bengalis. Of the remaining 3 million, an estimated 1.5 to 2 milliion were butchered by the Muslim Pakistani Army and cohorts. A further 1 to 1.5 million Muslim Bengalis were also slaughtered.
    Bottom line: of the pre-war 10 million Hindus, approximately 8.5 million+ were “eliminated” from Muslim East Bengal. That is genocide, by any measure.
    So, you are correct, it was a Hindu targeted genocide. However, the first targets of the Pakistanis were not Hindus but the intellectuals and the Bengali officer class of the Army, as well as Muslim Bengali leadership cadres in the East Pakistan government. Only after these tens of thousands were first rounded up and eliminated did the genral targeting of Hindus, and those who defended them, get under way.
    The most shameful thing is that the US president openly accepted the Pakistan excuses that a mere 36,000 had died, information certainly contradicted by the very State Dept cables you mention.
    Best source, aside from the cavles, was a March 2008 article by Nitin Pai, describes the genocide and the political events surrounding it.
    Amazing thing is that if the Paksitani government hadn’t responded so poorly to Cyclone Bhota, none of it might have happened, at least, not for several more years. In the end, was just another example of the drive to cleanse Dar al-Islam by eliminating the Harbis.
    Now, please relax, you own the topic, no need to get all frothy. Don’t want you to get a stroke or something.
    My point remains, Pakistani Muslims have little hesitation in killing Muslims, be they Bengali, Pushtun, Balochi, Mohajir or Balti.
    Vern

  • Vern says:

    Meant “razakar,” not rakazar.
    Vern

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