New Bajaur peace deal identical to failed 2007 agreement

Faqir-Mohammed.JPG

Faqir Mohammed. Click image to view slideshow of Taliban leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Pakistani government and one of the three major tribes in the Bajaur tribal agency have signed a 28-point peace agreement to end the Taliban insurgency in the tribal area. The agreement mirrors a deal reached in 2007 that failed to quell the Taliban insurgency and helped the group solidify control in Bajaur.

The peace agreement was signed by tribal elders from the Mamond and three sub-tribes, and representatives of the provincial government of the Northwest Frontier Province. The agreement was signed just weeks after the Pakistani military claimed the Taliban were defeated in Bajaur. The military said the eight-month-long operation in Bajaur had resulted in the expulsion of the Taliban and forced them to come to terms.

The agreement calls for the Taliban to end fighting, lay down weapons, and surrender its senior leaders, including Faqir Mohammed, who would later be pardoned. The tribes are obligated to stop al Qaeda from sheltering in the region, close training camps, and halt cross-border movements by the Taliban and al Qaeda. The main points of the deal are:

• All Taliban groups are to be abolished.

• Taliban members are to surrender to their tribes, who will ensure they will not continue fighting.

• The tribes would surrender Bajaur Taliban leader Faqir Mohammad, his spokesman Muslim Khan, and three other leaders to the government, which would then pardon them and allow them “to live peacefully if they promised not to fight government forces.”

• The Taliban fighters are to lay down their weapons.

• The Taliban must end attacks on government forces and installations.

• No parallel governments are to be established.

• The Taliban must recognize and abide by the writ of the government.

• No “foreign elements” would be allowed to shelter in the tribal areas. Tribesmen may not rent homes or compounds to foreigners.

• The Bajaur tribal areas cannot be used “for sabotage activities.”

• The Taliban cannot establish training camps.

• The tribes must prevent all cross-border movement into Pakistan.

• The tribes must not allow the Taliban to engage in “interference with the affairs of other countries.”

• Security forces and government officials have the right to move in the region and may retaliate if attacked.

• Security forces and the government will not tolerate anti-government propaganda.

• All Islamic seminaries must be registered with the government.

• Security would be provided to foreign contractors.

In the past, Mamond tribal leaders have promised to stop supporting the Taliban, but the tribe is known to have close ties with the group as well as with al Qaeda. The tribe has dug its feet in over the past year, resisting government calls to end support for the Taliban.

The current agreement is nearly identical to an agreement proposed in October of 2006 and signed in March 2007. The Taliban used the 2007 agreement to consolidate its power and establish a parallel government that meted out punishments under sharia, or Islamic law; collected taxes; recruited and trained fighters; and established terror training camps.

During that time, Bajaur became a command and control center for al Qaeda operations in eastern Afghanistan. Ayman al Zawahiri is known to have sheltered in Bajaur under the care of Faqir Mohammed. At a pro-al Qaeda rally in October 2006, the Bajaur tribes called Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden “heroes of the Muslim world” and vowed to fight the West. A US airstrike in Bajaur in January 2006 targeted a safe house thought to be sheltering Zawahiri and several other senior al Qaeda commanders.

Faqir is also the second in command of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the group founded by South Waziristan leader Baitullah Mehsud.

The terms of the Bajaur peace agreement are compiled from reports from Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Daily Times, and The Nation.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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10 Comments

  • Bill,
    How much credence will you give to this theory?
    1. The Saudi Govt and Al Qaeda (AQ) have become mortal enemies. And Saudi wants Pakistan to stop giving AQ sanctuary.
    2. For AQ – the battle within Pakistan, is essentially an existential battle. If it loses, AQ is gone for ever – it has no more YEMENs to turn to.
    3. Hence taking control of Taliban (the mindless foot soldiers of Islam) becomes important. In the past both the Pakistan Army and AQ have used Taliban to their advantage.
    4. With peace deals Pak Army is trying to win over a few factions of Taliban, after all Taliban was created by Pak Army.
    5. However, AQ is winning the control of Taliban battle, essentially since it is ideologically better placed than pakistan Army.
    6. The issue is further complicated as many senior and junior members of Pakistan Army are close to the jehadi ideology of Taliban and have openly supported them and are averse to fighting them.
    Hence, if the above points are true, where do you see this going?

  • David M says:

    The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 03/12/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.

  • Mestik says:

    Such peace deals are important so as not to disturb lives of the civilians. Now army can concentrate on other areas to the south of peshawar, since it already claims controlling all the roads in Bajaur.

  • bard207 says:

    Mestik

    Such peace deals are important so as not to disturb lives of the civilians. Now army can concentrate on
    other areas to the south of peshawar, since it already claims controlling all the roads in Bajaur.
    If the Army – Government is in control, then why are they making peace deals?
    If the Army – Government is in control, then they should be able to dictate terms and the agreement does not illustrate that.
    This part from the article does not indicate that the Army is in control.

    • The tribes would surrender Bajaur Taliban leader Faqir Mohammad, his spokesman Muslim Khan, and
    three other leaders to the government, which would then pardon them and allow them “to live peacefully if they promised not to fight government forces.”
    Why are they intending to grant pardons to those who led an insurrection against the country of Pakistan?
    ——————————————————-

    Now army can concentrate on
    other areas to the south of peshawar, since it already claims controlling all the roads in Bajaur.
    Controlling the roads is one thing, but the control needs to be extended beyond 10 feet from the road.
    ———————————————————-

    Such peace deals are important so as not to disturb lives of the civilians.

    By leaving the Taliban present in the Bajaur Agency, they will likely to disturb the lives of the civilians, so your premise is likely to fail.

  • bard207 says:

    Mestik
    I am still waiting for your response.

  • Mestik says:

    When government controls roads(only checkposts and not a foot beyond) still means logistics of militants is cut. And it will be just a matter of time before taliban go out of supplies, also arresting them at checkpoints for interrogation.
    Now what i feel is that the whole north of Peshawar is nullified.

  • bard207 says:

    Between what they raid from NATO supply lines and Pakistani Army Facilities, the Taliban don’t need a significant supply network.
    To arrest theTaliban at various road checkpoints suggets more Pakistani troops and a more active policy than what I have read about from various sources.

  • Bangash Khan says:

    The US did deals with Muqtada Sadr in Iraq and Sunni tribes in order to fight alqaeda. What is wrong with Pakistan doing the same ?

  • Bill Roggio says:

    The Sunni tribes by and large were the ‘nationalist’ insurgents, the US never cut deals with the elements that shared al Qaeda’s philosophy.
    In case you weren’t aware, the US and Iraqi government pounded the Mahdi Army during 2007 & 2008. The US & Iraq recognized that dealing with the Mahdi Army/Sadr was a mistake. Would that Paksitan catch on about the Taliban….

  • Bangash Khan says:

    @Bill Roggio
    The cause of lower violence is US alliance with the tribes, surge of troops in militant-infested areas, and a ceasefire agreement with Muqtada Al-Sadr.
    The Pakistani approach is to pound the Taliban in Bajaur, then sign a peace agreement with the tribes and remnants of militants that puts obligations on both of them. Sounds quite similar to what US did in Iraq.

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