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The ANA. Click map to view. |
The June 2008 updates to the Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle are now available at the ANSF OOB homepage. The significant changes to the Order of Battle that occurred since January are summarized below.
Afghan National Army (ANA) & Organizational goals:
The strength of the ANA stands at approximately 60,000 out of a goal of 80,000. In February 2008, the organizational goals for the ANA were updated. The new plan is complete the fielding of the following units by September 2009:
• 80,000 troops
• Five corps HQ
• 15 brigade HQ including:
o 13 light infantry brigade HQ
o One armored brigade HQ
o One commando brigade HQ
o One support brigade HQ
• 78 battalions including approximately:
o 40 infantry battalion
o Six commando battalion
o Two armored/mech battalion
o 15 combat support battalion
o 15 combat service support battalion
Given Afghanistan’s limited resources, the plan is designed to create a force that Afghanistan can maintain in the long run. New ANA units continue to be trained and deployed.
Corps deployment:
All five corps HQs are operational.
• Since early 2008, 201st Corps has redeployed its brigades. 1st , 2nd, and 3rd Brigades each now own their own AORs in eastern Afghanistan.
• By Spring 2008, 201st and 203rd Corps will receive two new brigades. It is likely each corps will receive one new brigade resulting in each corps having four brigades.
• 205th Corps has expanded to four brigades with one brigade each in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabol provinces.
• 207th Corps has started training a second brigade that will be based in Farah province. It will be operational by Spring 2009.
• No further expansion of 209th Corps is expected.
Brigade deployment:
Twelve of 15 combat brigade HQs are deployed:
• There are 11 light infantry brigades. Two more light infantry brigades will deploy by Spring 2008.
• There is one armored brigade, 3rd Brigade/201st Corps, based in Jalalabad. But, it is being trained and utilized as infantry due to a lack of the required heavy equipment. It is unclear when this situation will change.
• The status of the commando brigade HQ is unknown.
Battalion deployment:
Fifty-two of 78 battalions are deployed:
• 36 infantry battalions have been deployed.
• Four of six commando battalions have deployed. The last two are expected to deploy by September 2008.
• Two2 heavy battalions have been trained and deployed as infantry due to the lack of heavy equipment.
• Each of 15 brigades is to have a combat support battalion. These battalions, however, are still in a very early state of development. Ultimately, they will include an armored reconnaissance company, an engineer company, and an artillery battery. Artillery capability is being implemented first and this activity is only just starting. Several brigades are in the processes of training an artillery section (three guns). It will likely be September 2009 before all combat support battalions are formed, equipped, trained, and deployed.
• Six infantry and two combat service support battalions have yet to deploy. These will fill out the two remaining infantry brigades that are schedule to deploy by Spring 2008.
Equipment:
A major effort is underway to convert the ANA from Russian-designed small arms (AK47 assault rifles, RPK PKM machine guns) to US-designed small arms (M16/M4 rifles, M249, M240B machine guns). The first to convert were the commando battalions and 1st Brigade of 205th Corps.
The ANA is standardizing on D30 122mm guns as its primary artillery pieces. The ANA is starting to receive up-armored HUMVEEs.
Afghan National Air Corps (ANAC)
A new eight-year plan for the development of the ANAC has been announced. Over the next four years, development will focus on air transport capability, first on MEDIVAC using helicopters flying from Kabul and Kandahar, followed by operational transport capability using C27 cargo planes. Close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability will follow, becoming operational by 2015.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
The strength of the ANP stands at 76,000 with a goal of 82,000. There remains significant training and equipment shortfalls.
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
The ANP began developing the ANCOP in 2006 . With selective recruiting and a long 16-week training program, the ANCOP is a high-end SWAT unit. The ANCOP was originally envisioned as forces distributed around the country, but it has been retasked and is now being extensively used to support the “Focused District Development” training program for the Afghan Uniform Police. There are currently 10 ANCOP battalions.
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)
By far, the most important development in the ANP has been the implementation of a major new training plan. This plan consists of additional training resources and two new training programs.
Improvement in resources came from the temporary deployment of 2,300 Marine trainers and an additional 200 trainers from other NATO countries. In the long run, however, training resources are still about 50 percent under requirement.
The new training programs consists of the “Individual Training” program and the “Focused District Development” program:
• Individual Training: 15 training centers have been set up throughout Afghanistan to provide new recruits eight weeks of basic training.
• Focused District Training program: This program is targeted at the 40,000 AUP that are already in the field but have not been adequately trained. In this program, eight districts are a time are selected, the most critical districts first. The AUP are removed from their districts and sent for eight weeks of collective training. While they are gone, they are replaced by an ANCOP unit. The program started in January 2008. The plan is to complete the training of the 52 most critical districts in 2008 and all 414 districts and urban precincts in Afghanistan by the end of 2011.
Summary
Overall, significant progress has been made. Development in 2007-2008 is occurring at a much faster pace than in 2002-2006. ANSF is now leading fights, wining battles, and becoming a respected institution.
It is hoped that the ANSF will be able to take over security for Afghanistan around 2011 allowing ISAF to start reducing its forces. Yet, there is still a long way to go.
12 Comments
“ANSF is now leading fights, wining battles, and becoming a respected institution.”
Great report CJ,
Fantastic job of providing a clear picture of
what is going on.
Why is there such a disconnect on
reporting out of this region? As apposed to reports that say we are losing.
The development of Afgan Army combat air assets has been non-existent. How can the AFA effectively fight such an insurgency in this rugged region without that? Sounds like we are going to be there a looooong time!
Will we be there a long time? In some form, definitely yes. It will be “a looooong time” before ANA has developed 100% of the capablity to be 100% independent with 0% support from any outside source. But then, that goal in the short or medium term is not and never has been realistic. On the other hand, ANA performing most combat and support operations with ISAF performing a minority (the difficult ones that take a long time to develop capability, which includes CAS) is realistic and achieveable in the medium term. This has already happened in sections of the eastern region where the 201st and 203rd corps(which are the most developed) are leading operations.
Actually, the Afghan Air Corps just completed its first successful mission earlier this month. People need to keep in mind that this country has come a LONG way and has a LONG way to go. They deserve credit for getting as far as they have with the half-assed commitment the world has provided. Also keep in mind that western time and Afghan time are two different worlds. If you let alack of serious patience get in the way, Afghanistan has no chance at all.
Sounds great. My question is: how is such a poor, discrepit country like Afghanistan going to maintain their armed forces for the long run? Will the West have to continue subsidizing them forever, or do they have the resources to support themselves financially?
Max:
This is exactly why the ANSF is structured the way it is: so it can maintain itself in the long run without subsides. The army is almost all light infantry in pickups or humvees. Few armored vehicles. The artillery is cheap D30 122mm howitzers and mortars. There are no plans for high performance jets or guided muntitions or UAVs or land warrior or….
Also the ANSF is (as is Afghanistan as a whole) 70-80% illiterate. Couldnt operate or maintain a lot of complex equipment even if it had them.
This is also why the ANSF is going to be fairly small.
Afghanistan is 30m people and ANSF is planned to be 162,000.
Compare that to Iraq which is 27 m people and the ISF is 550,000 and still growing.
Couldn’t agree with you more cjr. The only worry I have is how well the (arguably) poorest country in the world can sustain even this modest force. Especially when you have people talking about giving them western helicopters and aircraft, Leopard tanks and western style C2. I mean, small arms and Humvees are one thing but I just get the feeling that, at least in this case, if it aint broke, don’t fix it.
By the way, was there any truth to the whole Leopard 1 tank deal anyway or was that just some pipe dream?
There was talk of Greece donating like 13 Leopards last year but nothing has become of it so far. Helos are Russian designed Mi17. Transport aircraft is C-27 which is a simple aircraft(think of it as a half sized C-130)
There is going to be few armored units. The current plan is 2 heavy battalion out of ~50 combat battalions. But even these 2 battalions are still being trained and used as light infantry because there isnt even enough equipment to fill out 2 battalions. Also in the plan is a armored recon company for each combat support battalion, but I havent seen any of these operating yet. I’m guessing these will be uparmored humvees insteaded of armored vehicles.
That said, Afghanistan should be able to maintain a light force. With little heavy equipment, soldier pay becomes the biggest expense, and Afghan soldiers dont cost much.
Why is there no reference to this document?
It gives a much more considerate picture than your aricle suggests. For example there is stated that only less than 2% of ANA are realy combat ready, another 36% is heavily dependet on foreign support for the conduct of their operations.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf
MLK
This document was release last Wedensday, too late to incorporate this into this update.
I dont understand what you mean by “combat ready”. That term is not used in the report and therefore is not defined. Also, “heavily dependent on foreign support” is not defined. See page 22 for “capablity milestones” which is what is defined.
Hello
I am not only referring to the article above but to the whole website. I thought this document would be of great interest to the readers of this site, as it gives a picture of the ASF not only in terms of numbers and organization but in capabilities too.
As far as I am concerned it is much more interessting than hearing on another expendable insurgent leader captured or killed every day.