The Baghdad Security Operation Order of Battle: May 7, 2007

The Baghdad Order Of Battle as of May 6, 2007. Click map to view.

By Bill Roggio, DJ Elliott and CJ Radin

The month of April was particularly hard on both U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces. As both forces push outward from larger, more secure bases, the casualties have increased. Iraqi Security Forces–both police and army–had over 300 KIA, while over 100 U.S. servicemen were killed in Iraq this past month. The numbers are likely to increase as the surge continues and Iraqi and Coalition guns train on al Qaeda’s havens in Diyala province sometime this summer. As al Qaeda continues to conduct its suicide campaign against civilians and Iraqi and Coalition security forces, there has been some tangible progress against the terror group and the Mahdi Army over the past week. Several high value al Qaeda targets were killed in a multi-day operation north of Baghdad, which included the participation of the Anbar Salvation Council. Also, an important tribe turned against al Qaeda in Anbar province.

Inside Baghdad, four of five U.S. combat brigades are now in place. The fifth combat brigade will be arriving in Iraq by the beginning of June. “We are about 80 percent of the way in the implementation of the troops that are flowing in as reinforcements,” said Rear Admiral Mark Fox, the Communications Division chief for Strategic Effects. An estimated 60 of the planned 72 Joint Security Stations and

Combat Outposts have now been established inside Baghdad’s neighborhoods, and three of the five U.S. combat brigades have joined Iraqi police and soldiers to man the stations. As a result, tips on insurgent activity are up and sectarian violence inside Baghdad has decreased by two-thirds, according to Brigadier General Perry Wiggins, the Deputy Director for regional operations within the Operations Directorate on the Joint Staff.

But al Qaeda still has weapons in its arsenal. “What we have seen [in Baghdad], though, in response has been an increase in the number of car bomb attacks, suicide vests and so forth,” said Rear Admiral Fox. “And what you’re seeing is an attempt to have these spectacular attacks, you know, on the council of representatives or taking down a bridge or something that grabs the headlines and in many ways, certainly in a lot of circles, will overshadow any of the less spectacular kind of progress that we may be making.”

As has been described in Multinational Forces Iraq press conferences, 80 percent of the violence in Iraq occurs in the region within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of Baghdad. This region consists of Baghdad itself plus the “Belt” around Baghdad: Diyala to the northeast, Salam Pak to the southeast, the “Fiya” towns of Northern Babil province to the south, and Abu Ghraib to the west.

Multinational Division Baghdad (MND-B), in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces, has been working to secure Baghdad. The Baghdad Security Operation has forced a large number of insurgents out of Baghdad proper and into the Belt region, which is now being used by insurgents to stage attacks into Baghdad, largely in the form of human artillery and roadside bombs. To secure this Belt, the Multinational Division Central (MND-C) has been set up. MND-C includes the 3rd Infantry Division headquarters and three brigades–the 2/10 Mountain, 4/25 Infantry, and the 3/3 Infantry. Eventually a fourth brigade–the 2/3 Infantry–and the 3rd CAB will join MND-C by early June. MND-C will work to secure the areas south of Baghdad that have long been a hotbed of insurgent activity–the Fiyas, Abu Ghraib, Salam Pak. Together with the existing and new units in Diyala, (3/1st Cavalry plus the newly added battalions from 3/2 Stryker, 3/82 Airborne and 3/25 Infantry), they will attempt to secure the entire Belt around Baghdad.

Outside of Baghdad, the fight against al Qaeda and Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army rages. Early last week, Iraqi forces believed they had killed both al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al Masri and Islamic State in Iraq leader Abu Omar al Baghdadi after fighting in Salahadin province just north of Baghdad. The Anbar Salvation Council, led by Shiekh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, the charismatic anti-al Qaeda tribesman from Ramadi, claimed to have killed al Masri after engaging al Qaeda in the town of Niyabi, just four miles west of Taji. This is significant, as the Anbar Salvation Council is now operating outside of its provincial boundaries, with the approval of Coalition forces and the Iraqi government, in order to work with friendly Sunni tribes in Salahadin and Diyala and facilitate the hunt for al Qaeda in Iraq fighters.

The Anbar Salvation Council, operating in conjunction with U.S. forces, captured 95 al Qaeda operatives and killed 15 others during the multi-day operation called Operation Rat Trap. Among those killed were Muharib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri, al Qaeda’s information minister, Sabah Hilal al-Shihawi, Latif’s religious advisor), and Abu Ammar al-Masri, an operative that was “facilitating insurgent activity and infrastructure support for al Qaeda in Iraq.”

The confusion over the death of Abu Omar al Baghdadi appears to be related to the transport of the body of Muharib Abdul Latif back to the Jubouri tribe in Baghdad. Iraqi Security Forces intercepted Latif at a checkpoint and identified him as al Baghdadi. The Iraqi government believes Latif and Baghdadi are the same person, while Multinational Forces Iraq is unsure of his identity.

The news of al Jubouri’s death comes as the Anbar Salvation Council scored a significant victory against al Qaeda in Iraq inside Anbar province. Sam Dagher of the Christian Science Monitor reported on how the Anbar Salvation Council turned the Albu Fahd tribe against al Qaeda. The Albu Fahd was one of the six original Anbari tribes to support al Qaeda and its Islamic State in Iraq. These six tribes are known in some military intelligence circles as the “Sinister Six.” The Albu Fahd [described as the Bu-Fahed] has now joined the Anbar Salvation Council and pledged to throw its weight behind the fight against al Qaeda.

“Winning over the Bu-Fahed tribe was a coup,” said Mr. Dagher, who covered the tribal meeting where the Albu Fahd moved into the camp of the Anbar Salvation Council. “It had been one of Al Qaeda’s staunchest supporters, and traces its lineage to the birthplace of the puritan form of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism in the Saudi Arabian province of Najd. It formally threw its lot behind Sheikh Abdel-Sattar Abu Risha.” the pickup of the Albu Fahd comes as the Anbar Salvation Council has made gains outside of its home province and is expanding into Diyala, Salahadin, and Baghdad.

In the city of Baqubah n the al Qaeda sanctuary of Diyala province, U.S. forces retook the Tahrir neighborhood after a week of heavy fighting. U.S. forces encountered fierce resistance from prepared al Qaeda traps and fighting positions. The 1920s Revolution Brigades, a Sunni insurgent group now aligned with the Anbar Salvation Council, fought pitched battles against al Qaeda in Baqubah efore being forced to withdrawal after running out of ammunition. The hand of the Anbar Salvation council is behind the fighting against al Qaeda in Diyala as well.

Al Qaeda is maintaining its nationwide suicide campaign against Iraqi civilians and police alike. On Friday, police stations in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Doura and Hay al-Amel were targeted, and five policemen killed and two wounded. On Saturday, nine police recruits were killed and 13 wounded after a suicide bomber detonated in a line outside an Iraqi Army base in Abu Ghraib. On Sunday, al Qaeda conducted a coordinated attack including a dual suicide car bombing, as well as a mortar and ground assault against a police station in Samarra. Twelve police were killed and eleven wounded. A car bomb killed 35 and wounded 80 civilians after terrorists detonated it near a market in the Shia dominated district of Bayaa on Sunday. Today, al Qaeda conducted a dual suicide car bomb attack in Ramadi, killing 20 and wounding scores more.

The Iraqi government and U.S. forces continue to whittle away Muqtada al Sadr’s power base inside Baghdad and in southern Iraq, as well as expose Iranian complicity with Sadr’s militia. On Friday, Iraqi Army troops clashed with Mahdi Army fighters in Najaf after a senior aide of Sadr refuse to stop at a checkpoint. During a raid in Sadr City on Friday, Coalition troops captured 16 “members of a secret cell terrorist network known for facilitating the transport of weapons and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq to Iran for terrorist training.” On Sunday, a raid in Sadr City against the same EFP cell resulted in the discovery of a “torture room,” the seizure of large weapons cache, and the death of up to ten terrorists after they engaged U.S. forces. On Friday, Coalition troops found a large cache of Iranian made weapons in Mahmudiyah, including “four improvised explosive devices, components for 25 additional IEDs, seven 107mm Iranian rockets and an 81mm Iranian mortar.”

In summary, the situation remains very fluid. U.S. forces are still executing the surge, the Iraqi Security Forces are still executing their own buildup and training additional forces, and the insurgents are still adjusting their tactics. As Gen. Petraeus has said, and which we should keep firmly in mind, we should not expect the effects to play out on the ground, nor should we start evaluating the result, until September.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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10 Comments

  • Dave says:

    In September we better see results or I fear time will expire.

  • tsquare says:

    This is a guess and only a guess 
    Petraeus wants 90 days with everything and everyone in place and with Al Qaeda and Sadr’s militia out of places to run to. 90 days to kill anybody who’s head pops up. He must figure that by the 90 day mark, ‘they’ will either be dead, gone, or in hiding so deep as to not be a problem.

  • tim says:

    It seems like “whittling away” at al Sadr and his Mahdi Army is all we can do at this stage.

    “There are a lot of people affiliated with [Mahdi Army], and if we made them all enemies, we’d be in trouble,” said Lt. Col. Steve Miska, 39, of Greenport, N.Y., who commands U.S. troops in northwest Baghdad.

    Interestingly, the US military is selective in how it confronts the militia, but I wonder if it is possible to go after some and not make enemies out of them all?
    A recount of a recent gunbattle between U.S. troops and Mahdi fighters may be something to worry about.

    During the two-hour fight, some Iraqi soldiers fought alongside Mahdi Army gunmen, according to the Iraqi officer in charge of security in the area.
    He spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for his life. But his account was corroborated by U.S. officials, who said some Iraqi soldiers took off their uniforms and tossed weapons to militiamen.

    Not a good sign.

  • DJ Elliott says:

    Tim
    Link please.

  • tim says:

    The above descriptions of raids/captures, and the following statements about how increasing casualties are expected this summer, make it seem like the enemy has become fairly well organized, supplied and entrenched.

    “All of us believe that in the next 90 days, you’ll probably see an increase in American casualties because we are taking the fight to the enemy,”

  • DJ Elliott says:

    Tim
    MG Lynch was saying the same thing about the enemy 18 months ago when he was MNF-I’s spokesman.
    This is nothing new.
    In war, you either adapt or die. Those that have not died, adapt…
    Still looking for your link to the previous comment. Just knowing the source tells me so much about credability…

  • Neo-andertal says:

    Great summation of what has been happening over there the last few weeks. I only wish this site had greater visibility, because I still don’t see anywhere that really brings this level of analysis of publicly available information about the conduct of the war. I still find it a little disturbing that this late in the day no major media source provides this sort of product. I frequently see fairly good stories in the written media, but little in the way of context or comprehensive analysis to go along with it.
    I have to contrast this with the compact little “bites”

  • Michael says:

    DJ,
    found the quote online, the first quotes by Tim are from Lauren Frayer/AP writer on Salon.com http://www.salon.com/wire/ap/archive.html?wire=D8OVORUO0.html
    I assume it shows reality of COIN ground operartions whereby you coopt forces and determine which battles to fight, which ones not and weed out good forces from the bad. It is a delicate operation, but I’m sure it also helps our forces in intel. If I were infantry, low rank, I’d probably not like it. Curious what you think. From an intel position it seems it might be beneficial.
    Winning friends and influencing Shia…

    In Kazimiyah, a densely packed neighborhood of wooden shops and cheap hotels for Shiite pilgrims, the Americans and their Iraqi partners have opted for militia help to protect the shimmering, blue-domed shrine.
    While U.S. soldiers continue to arrest individual Mahdi Army members in Kazimiyah and elsewhere, U.S. and Iraqi officers have not moved to break up the militia’s security network that protects the shrine.

    I think in some ways this gives pride to the locals protecting their turf. It also allows some interaction of forces. None of this appears easy.

  • DJ Elliott says:

    Michael
    Dividing the reconcilables from the irreconcilables is a stated goal of the GoI/MNF-I. Has been for a long time.
    With AP’s track record, I would require three independent sources to verify.
    Of note: Half of the IA in Kadhamiyah is Kurdish…

  • David M says:

    Trackbacked by The Thunder Run – Web Reconnaissance for 05/08/2007
    A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention.

Iraq

Islamic state

Syria

Aqap

Al shabaab

Boko Haram

Isis