While al Qaeda or other insurgent groups failed to take credit for the attacks, the strike bears the hallmark of al Qaeda – multiple bombs timed to detonate simultaneously and designed to inflict mass casualties. Al-Qaeda has stated its desire to murder Shiites in an effort to destroy the Iraqi government and foment a civil war. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, openly stated this goal. The only thing that has changed since Zarqawi's death and the rise of Abu Ayyub al-Masri is al Qaeda no longer takes credit for these mass suicide bombing on Iraqi citizens.

Al-Qaeda's terror campaign has forced a split between Iraqi Shia and Sunnis. Shiites who are angered by the violence are gravitating towards Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iranian backed cleric and leader of the Mahdi Army, which is responsible for running death squads in the Baghdad region and beyond.

Sunnis fear the death squads, and are turning toward insurgent groups or al Qaeda for protection. The Sunni insurgent leaders of groups such as the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq, who were interested in discussing reconciliation over the summer, have exposed themselves to al Qaeda, and several have been assassinated. And their members are less likely to lay down arms as the Shiite death squads are active. This serves the goals of both al Qaeda and Sadr. Al-Qaeda sabotages reconciliation and a democratic government, and Sadr's status as protector of the Shia community grows.

It is for these reasons that al Qaeda and Sadr must be addressed simultaneously. Coalition and Iraqi forces have a free hand to hunt al Qaeda and the Sunni Terrorist groups. Major General Bill Caldwell recently released a list of al Qaeda leaders and operatives killed or captured [PDF]. And Ansar a-Sunnah, an al Qaeda ally, And Ansar a-Sunnah, an al Qaeda ally, lost 11 emirs in western and norther Iraqi in mid-November.

But the Sadr problem is far more difficult. Sadr remains within the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and holds thirty seats in parliament and six of the ministries. U.S and Iraqi special forces have conducted numerous raids in Sadr City, targeting “criminals” and “death squads,” but have been handcuffed by the reluctance of the Maliki government to address Sadr head on.

Sadr has made some interesting and potentially damaging political moves of late. He threatened to withdraw from the government if Maliki met President Bush in Jordan. Maliki did meet Bush, after delaying the meeting one day. Sadr's block downgraded the threat of resignation to a boycott, which shows political weakness. Sadr also stated he was investigating the formation of an alliance with secularists, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and other groups. Sadr has twice threatened to withdraw support from Maliki. The U.S. has exerted enormous pressure on Maliki to deal with Sadr, and is supporting Maliki's request to accelerate the arming and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. At some point Maliki may recognize Sadr has become a liability.