READER COMMENTS: "The Future of the Iraq Strategy"

Posted by Bill Roggio at November 9, 2006 2:00 PM ET:

A preemptive warning: This isn't the place to discuss the evils of the political parties or the conduct of the parties during the election. Keep the comments focused on how the political shift will affect policy, without the political venom, and all will be well. Political attacks will be deleted without warning.

Posted by Nicholas at November 9, 2006 5:42 PM ET:

Polls of voters found a strong majority - about six in 10 - disapproved of the war in Iraq.

I imagine most Americans would get their information about what's happening in Iraq from the MSM. Therefore I would word that sentence thus:

Polls of voters found a strong majority - about six in 10 - disapproved of the media portrayal of the war in Iraq.

I suppose nobody really has a full picture of what's going on over there, but I very much doubt that those polled had any objective sources of information on which to make such a determination. Obviously, that is irrelevant in terms of how they vote. But I think it's worth realizing just how much power the media has. By controlling perceptions, they are effectively able to hamstring the government.

Make up your own mind about what biases the MSM may have—but there's no doubt in mine, just as there's no doubt that perceptions play a huge role in the political pressure which may well end up causing a serious fumble in Iraq policy.

As for whether and how conduct of the war will be affected, at this stage I think it's anybody's guess. Very little could change. My greatest worry outside of the new SecDef is that critical spending bills are going to be hard to pass, however some creative veto-ing and deal-making could smooth that out. On the other hand, this Gates fellow's history is a bit of a worry, but maybe he'll do a good job. I hope he's very smart and principled. One would hope only the most capable candidatate would even be considered.

I hope this comment is sufficiently neutral for Mr. Roggio... I certainly don't have a dog in this race, unless you count civilization in general.

Posted by Anand at November 9, 2006 5:55 PM ET:

Bill,

Good post. Is it okay to start a discussion thread here about the ISF and the situation in Iraq rather than the new shift in US policy on Iraq? If not, please feel free to delete this e-mail.

DJ and anyone else,

I am very surprised to hear that Babil province is in danger of being lost. Even with the death of the former head of Babil Swat, I thought that Babil's state government was further along than the large majority of provincial governments. I further thought that Babil was going to assume provincial control, and that Babil Swat's 800 man force and 8th IA [Iraqi Army] division were going to assume full security responsibility within less than 6 months--despite the slight stretch of Sunni Arabs in northern Babil. What's gone wrong in Babil?

How sectarian (infiltrated by Badr and Mahdi) is the 8th IA division? When will it be able to assume full actual responsibility for its AO (versus just being filled in green on the map), so that the few remaining US (and MNF) combat battalions can be redeployed North where they are badly needed. Part of this question depends on how Sadr handles extreme elements within Mahdi, as well as incorporates mainstream Mahdi into the ISF (appears to be a major objective of his).

The report is correct that the situation has badly deteriorated in Diyala province. In my opinion, the 5th IA division is the second most disappointing IA division after 10th IA division measured in terms of actual performance relative to expectations. Didn't the 5th IA division receive equipment ahead of the 4th IA, and perform far worse on the field than 4th IA. (4th stood its ground and made slight progress in Salahaddin province while 5th IA allowed a sharp deterioration in Diyala.) Even the 1st IA division, in the heart of Al Anbar, has avoided a sharp spike in violence in its AO.

Does anyone know how much US military support 4th IA division requires to keep a lid on Salahaddin province?

Anand

Posted by Glenmore at November 9, 2006 7:05 PM ET:

A majority of American voters disapproved of how the war in Iraq was being prosecuted. Most of those wanted the US out, now or soon, and to Hell with the Iraqis, they had their chance. But a lot wanted the US to increase their effort, not decrease or stay the same.
'Stay the same' is always a losing proposition in any discussion; it's the fulcrum of the see-saw, a singularity. ALL other possible answers are lumped together in opposition. Only when one of those answers is implemented will we truly know how it stacks up against all the remaining others plus the former status quo.

Posted by andrew at November 9, 2006 7:37 PM ET:

I would have sworn that Robert Gates was nominated for Sec Def.

Posted by Nicholas at November 9, 2006 7:56 PM ET:

"Everybody sees that it isn't working."

The thing is—how do you know that? We know counterinsurgency wars often take a long time to successfully prosecute (the shorter ones are ~6 years, some take 10 or longer). Often it isn't obvious you're winning until the other side collapses. In some senses it's a contest to see who has the most patience.

So isn't declaring it futile a bit premature?

Posted by the nailgun at November 9, 2006 8:04 PM ET:

Lisa - I think patience and perspective is the big problem. A lot of wars in this and previous decades went very well, very quickly but they didn't really require territory to be held and occupied. Yet I think GWI etc has become the benchmark for all wars in the minds of the general populace and MSM.
The only thing I can see that would greatly disappoint me in how the war is being run is if it became clear we could have successfully built up, trained and overseen a far larger ISF far faster. I don't hear any experts like Bill suggesting that is the case so I'd say patience is what is required and more edication of the general population of what is actually required to win a counter insurgency as opposed to what journalists think.
We also now have to live with the added complication of how the Iraqi Govt responds. Looking from the outside looking in it seems Al Maliki is going soft on Al Sadr. I really hope that this is perception and not reality.

Posted by Bill Roggio at November 9, 2006 8:06 PM ET:

Anand, Nicholas, The discussion is just fine, no complaints here.

Lisa: General Batiste wants to INCREASE the number of US troops in Iraq to win, not draw down. The media only reported his criticisms, and not his support for the mission and desire to send in more troops.

The average life of an insurgency is around 9 years. We're 3 1/2 years into this.

Posted by Bill Roggio at November 9, 2006 8:12 PM ET:

nailgun,

(If I misinterpretted your post, my apologies beforehand.) I did a series of posts on the Iraqi development of the Iraqi Army last summer,and said one of our mistakes was our original plan to create the Army on a national guard model designed to defend the country from outside threats was a mistake. We turned that around in the summer of 2004 (Gen. Petreaus did a remarkable job in my opinion), so the current Army is really only 2 years old. I fully agree, patience is needed.

One of my interests in going back to Iraq is to see how the 7th Divison has developed in Anbar. That was the greenest formation in the military at the time.

Posted by Dudley Smith at November 9, 2006 9:01 PM ET:

Bill, you are spot-on about the way the media treats Batiste. They always show his criticism of Rumsfeld, but then cut him off or don't report the rest of his message, which is that we need to get this country thinking like it is WWII with everyone hunkered down for a long fight and significantly more troops on the front lines.

I'm probably incredibly naive to hope for this, but IMO the Democrats could do themselves a huge favor by getting serious on Iraq now that they are in power. Increasing funding for the war, increasing troop levels, any public display of hawkishness would pay huge dividends to boosting the reputation of their single biggest weakness (national security) if Iraq settles down over the next few years. They could sell themselves as the "difference makers" for the favorable result and rehabilitate their overall image as a national party. I fear, however, that they will see these elections (falsely) as a mandate for the anti-war message of the extremists in the party, and simply use it as a chance to score cheap political points by accelerating failure in Iraq and tarnishing Bush's legacy.

I'd be happy to be wrong about Pelosi and Reid in this regard, even if it meant the Dems gaining long term party advantage.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 9, 2006 9:01 PM ET:

Anand:

What's gone wrong in Babil?

- The problem with 8th IAD is that it only has nine line Battalions to cover four Provinces. Most is in Diwaniyah and Wasit beating up on Mahdi Army. Babil got the short end and we have to help.
Note: 8th IAD is under Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) Control.
----

Diyala province.

- 5th IAD only graduated its third Bde two months ago. Its support elements were formed in August. Lack of equipment delayed their formation. Much of 3-5 Bdes vehicles are salvage from the boneyards in their AO. 10 Line Bns with in-training MTR/BDU/Engr elements to deal with the spillover from Baghdad.

- 4th IAD has 13 Line Bns in three Bdes and fully independent BSU, MTR and a RSU also on line in its AO. Vehicles (HMMWVs and OTOKAR APCs) were provided to 4th prior to 5th.
Note: 4th IAD is under Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) Control. Training of Strategic Infrastructure Bns/Bdes is a colateral duty of 4th IAD.
--------

Does anyone know how much US military support 4th IA division requires to keep a lid on Salahaddin province?

- 2.5 US Bdes in 4th IAD AOR (Salahdin, Kirkuk, Salamaniyah).

Posted by Nicholas at November 9, 2006 9:17 PM ET:

Lisa: There are clearly sufficient numbers of US military personnel (active duty and reserve) to increase the number in Iraq —plus you could ask your allies to contribute more too. However, obviously the more are in country at any time, the less time they get between combat deployments, meaning they wear out faster and it's likely to negatively impact morale. It may mean equipment shortages, or more maintenance, or equipment wearing out and breaking more often, etc.

In short I think it's possible but I'm not sure if it's desirable for any long period. I think what could be done is, say, double the number of troops for 3 months and undertake some major operations, then drop back to the current level again. The trick would be to pick the best time to strike. That approach could pay dividends. It would still place strain on the people and equipment but at least it would be limited in scope. If that's the plan, one would want to pull in soldiers who have already had one or two combat deployments to bolster the numbers, to reduce the amount of time it takes for the larger force to become combat effective (because they will not be there for long enough to learn the ropes if they don't already have experience).

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 9, 2006 9:22 PM ET:

Nicholas

Time to do it is this month.
Left-seat/right-seat for 4th ID and 1st Cav.
Extend 4th ID and 2BCT-1 AD (plus any rotating Marines).

Waiting will not help.

Other option is to kick the can down the road and use the forming IA "Moble Strategic Reserve" to do it. Graduation live-fire exercises for those three Divisions...

Posted by Enigma at November 9, 2006 10:04 PM ET:

The issue isn't Maliki so much as it is the UIA. I think we tend to overlook the fact that neither the Shias, Sunnis, nor Kurds are monolithic entities. There is as much jockeying for position and power within these groups as there is amongst them. The violence we're seeing in Iraq is more than just Sunni vs Shia and Kurd.

I don't expect much change in the conduct of the war, beyond what would have occurred if the Republicans had retained control. I don't think the Democrats will have much choice but to tacitly support Bush in Iraq. Anything they proactively do, either positive or negative, would probably be too costly politically. Bush and the Congress may squabble over the details, but I think the war will continue to be funded as it has been, at least for the next couple of years. What I expect to see is more of a political battle here at home over perceptions: who gets credit for victory, or blame for defeat.

Posted by Nicholas at November 9, 2006 10:22 PM ET:

DJ Elliot: I can't think of any reason to disagree with you. I can only imagine there's some kind of political stuff going on which I don't understand. If I were in charge I would grab an extra bunch of troops, send them in to clean out the militias in Baghdad in one big push, and simultaneously sweep Ramadi. It would be somewhat costly in terms of casualties and I doubt that would fix all the problems but it would surely go a long way and has to be better than a war of attrition. (Then again the bad guys seem to be taking pretty heavy attrition at the moment, but I think it's not enough). We're all wondering why something like this is not happening and what Enigma said may have something to do with it.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 9, 2006 11:26 PM ET:

Carrot and stick.

The forming MSR Divisions will give PM Maliki a stick after we are gone.

I suspect they are trying to determine the fallout/reconciliation effects of executing Saddam while rehiring Baathests.

Judging how much stick will be required while seperating out as many as possible with carrots...

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 10, 2006 2:35 AM ET:

"If I am correct, my goodness, HOW MUCH POWER did the Dems just get?"

- They got the power of the purse.
They got the budget of the US Government.
President can veto but, he cannot change what is put in front of him.
He can only say yes or no to it.

- Congress does not order troops.
They are not in the chain-of-command.
They do control the funds to feed and arm them.
That sounds more like a promise to arm the ISF in return for them getting more agressive so as to justify reducing our forces.
(Same thing that was already ongoing.)
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2006/Iraq_06-69.pdf

Nothing happens til the new Congress sets in Jan 2007 and the Dems figure out a plan. They are very splintered.

Posted by Anand at November 10, 2006 3:48 AM ET:

DJ,

Doesn't 8th Division have 4 brigades in the lead with 3 combat battalions each, or a total of 12 at end state plus one non-combat support battalion or Motorized Transport Regiment (MTR) to control 5 provinces. When do the remaining 3 combat battalions take control of their battlespace? 1st Brigade controls An Najaf and Al Qadisiyah (whose capital is Diwaniyah). 2nd Brigade controls Karbala and a sliver of North Babil. 3rd Brigade controls Wasit (where they are banging Mahdi), while 4th Brigade controls Southern Babil. If 12 combat battalions are not enough for Wasit/Diwaniyah/An Najaf/Karbala/Babil, IGFC (Iraqi Ground Force Command) should overstaff these battalion above the now standard 825, perhaps by adding an additional combat company each.

Regarding Babil, isn't the 800 man Babil Swat one of the best ISF units in Iraq? Many articles I have read describe Babil's local and state police are non-sectarian, non-partisan and a notch above any non-Kurdish state in Iraq

If I understood you right, 4th Division has 5 combat battalions in its 1st brigade that controls Salahaddin province and a sliver of North Tamin, 4 combat battalions in its 2nd brigade that controls Tamin and a sliver of South Salahaddin, 3 combat battalions in its 3rd Brigade that controls Sulaymaniyah [refitted PUK peshmerga] plus one MTR for a total of 13 battalions. Of course the 7 battalion infrastructure brigade is on top of this.

2.5 US brigades helping 4th IA's 1st and 2nd Brigade hold down Salahaddin and Tamin is not a sustainable situation over the medium term . . . especially with US public and congressional opinion what it is. MNF-I needs to start helping IA beef up its presence in Salahaddin so that the MNF-I can reduce its footprint to one or maybe two combat battalions by the end of 2007.

5th IA division has 3 brigades with 3, 3 and 3 combat battalions respectively, plus an MTR for a total of 10 battalions. That should be enough for 1.5 to 2 million people (or less than a third the size of Bagdad), when combined with the border security force and State (& local) police [which appear to have major problems].

Everyone,

It seems to me that 13 division HQs, 42 brigade HQs (eleven 3 brigade divisions, two 4 brigade divisions [DJ, if there are three 4 brigade divisions the total number of brigade HQs in the IA becomes 43] and one special forces brigade = 11*3 + 2*4 + 1 = 42) and 126 combat battalions in the IA, plus 28 battalions in the National Police and 28,000 in the border security force are not enough to allow the number of US combat brigades in Iraq to drop to one or two-excluding advisors, trainers, Airforce, navy, logistics, search and rescue, medical-in 2 years. This seems to be the Bidon/Dems/American public consensus at the moment.

And since the Iraqi's do not have the money to increase their defense budget further--thanks the financial drain from fuel subsidies, Sadr's 5 ministries [other party ministries are probably as inefficient and corrupt to be fair], and the war time logistics for the ISF's existing force structure-US tax payers are going to have to pay for it. Unfortunately most of the $38 billion appropriated by Congress for Iraqi aid has already been spent. In addition to this, we should dramatically increase the number of US advisors embedded in the ISF . . . this will require tearing apart many US brigades because advisor teams are very commissioned and non-commissioned officer heavy.

We should plan to transfer all security responsibility (not just battlespace drawn on a map) in every Iraqi province except Al Anbar to the ISF within 18 months, and reduce the number of US combat brigades in Iraq (excluding Al Anbar) to no more than one or two within 2 years. I think that Biden, McCain, Lugar, Obama and Hillary would support such a policy (not sure about Hagel).

We should not flood Iraq with US combat forces for a brief period of time and then pull them out. Rather we should follow COIN and establish heavily patrolled pockets of safety and gradually over 5-10 years expand the arch of stability outward to include all of Iraq.

We should also encourage Iran to train and equip a large part of Iraq's security forces under US supervision.

I think that the biggest mistake in Iraq by President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld was not to seriously start training and equipping the ISF until June, 2004. Even now, the advisor/training program doesn't have nearly enough officers and Sergeants in it, and much of the ISF's equipment is substandard.

Does anyone have any thoughts on all this?

Posted by ajacksonian at November 10, 2006 4:36 AM ET:

I did a quick run-down on part of a talk-fest Mr. Gates was part of at the Leon Panetta Institute that covered a wide array of issues ( http://ajacksonian.blogspot.com/2006/11/gates-review-from-2005-gabfest-secdef.html )

His outlook is strongly at variance with the purported plans of the ISG and to be seen as his 'own man' he will have to distance himself from them because he does have a GOAL for when to leave Iraq and *not* a timetable, and I think that it is not at all out of line with what people want to see:

Robert Gates: I think an Iraqi government secure enough to invite us to leave we can count as a victory. My concern is that we have so little patience. We're so accustomed to watching television and we get irritated if it's a two-part series.

[laughter]

And we haven't wrapped it up by 9:00. Yesterday marked the end of World War II, sixty years ago. There are still American troops in Germany. We've had troops in Korea for over 50 years. The British have had troops in Cyprus for 40 years. I hope we're not in Iraq for those lengths of times, but if you want to change history, you have to be prepared to stay as long as it takes to do the job.

[applause]

We all hope that it will be quick. That in a year or two the -- this government in Iraq will be secure enough that they will be able to invite us to leave and we can do so, leaving behind us a government that can survive and that will be very different from what preceded it.

Iraq is one of the oldest countries in the world, that in its thousands of years of history never known democracy.

We're irritated because the Russians haven't figured out democracy in 15 years. There are still all these problems going on in Russia, a country that in its thousand years of history has never known democracy.

We're still working on it after 300 years.

So I guess part of my concern is that there are too many in Americans in public life and in the media who want to know when it's over, who want to have a deadline for when we'll be out of there so we can write finish to this whole thing.

Well, for better or for worse, we have cast our lot and we need to stay there as long as necessary to get the job done. And it's been a long time in a lot of places. We hope it won't be nearly that long in Iraq. But I think it would be a disservice to the young men and women who have given their lives and been casualties in Iraq to leave prematurely and have everything go back to being the way it was.
That is NOT cut and run, nor is it *stay over the horizon* and intervene, nor is it call in Syria and Iran who want, as James Baker III states 'a stable Iraq'. I may disagree with him on some other areas in his responses and do so, but, by and large, the man supports democracy, understands long fights, puts things into context, plays an audience and, personally, I think would be a great interviewee more than able to hold off an 'attack interviewer'. His experiences in Beirut give him first hand knowledge that going after terrorists on their 'home turf' is difficult. He did not like losing one operative and then his Chief of Station there in the search for the missing operative.

He must divorce himself from Baker and the Bush Rolodex syndrome that implies the Elder is running things from retirement. Time will tell on that, but he has put out positions that will be very difficult to walk away from or repudiate. To uphold them he must do what HE thinks is right FOR the President and the Armed Forces and no one else. He will need to talk of his Reagan era involvement in things, but after reading what he said, I am less worried about that, by and large.

Posted by Tom Grey - Liberty Dad at November 10, 2006 5:33 AM ET:

In Rumsfeld's Kansas speech he says:
In the past, U.S. efforts to train foreign security forces have been burdened by outdated regulations. In Afghanistan, for instance, building up the Afghan Army was unnecessarily and harmfully delayed because there was no such category in the U.S. federal budget at the time. The painful delays in training the Afghan and Iraqi police forces were a result of the fact that the Department of Defense was prohibited from doing the training.

Why haven't I heard of this legal problem before, Bill? Yes, perhaps I missed it -- but more training of the locals was always important, and even a "big deal"� with NATO, and whether they would train in country or not.

Dem Bush-hate noise drowned out reasonable constructive criticism on the DoD training plans for Iraqis.

One "new direction"� in Iraq -- the US trains, the Iraqis fight (or flee). What should also happen: a freeze on military promotions for those officers who have NOT had training assignments.

In any case, lots more training, less active fighting. Which I think is much better for lower US casualties, but worse for higher Iraqi deaths, than Batiste's more troops now.

It's too late for more troops.

A big PR problem is that we are fighting a Limited War (not WW II Total War). In a Limited War, the loser, and only the loser, has the power to decide when to stop fighting. Only the loser can make and keep a "timetable". The winners keep fighting until the losers decide to lose. In the US-USSR cold war; in Vietnam; in Somalia. It's also the Israeli-Palestinian problem. This asymetrical aspect of loser power is underdiscussed -- the Reps need to get Dems on board for winning, and ready to keep fighting until the loser anti-democracy forces decide to stop fighting.

I was for the Reps hanging on, but I already see a big silver lining in the Dems gaining power -- because they will be stuck with responsibility and accountability. Whatever happens now will be partly the Dem responsibility; Iraq has become Rep AND Dem America's war, not just a Rep war. And I even think it's great.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 10, 2006 6:31 AM ET:

Anand:

8th IAD (Wasit/Babil/Najaf/Karbala/Qadidayah)
- BSU and MTR fully up (first ones to stand up)
- Engr Bn still forming
- 1st Bde: 2 Bns (Najaf/Diwnayah)
- 2nd Bde: 2 Bns (Hilliah/Obidai)
- 3rd Bde: 3 Bns (Kut/Suwayra)
- 4th Bde: 2 Bns (Hindiniyah/Iskandariyah)

9 total combat Battalions.
That is part of what the announced expansion is about, standardizing the Bdes at 3 Bns each.
-----

"Regarding Babil, isn't the 800 man Babil Swat one of the best ISF units in Iraq?"

- Yes. But they need the backup and it just does not exist at this time.
----

70 percent of 4th IAD is refitted Peshmerga
4th IAD
MTR and BSU fully up.
(RSU for 4th/5th is in Kirkuk and was the second to go operational)
Engr Bn forming.
- 1st Bde: 5 Bns (Samarra/Tikrit/Tarmiyah)
- 2nd Bde: 5 Bns (Kirkuk/Tuz/Bayji/Hawijah)
- 3rd Bde: 3 Bns (Sulamaniyah/Chamchamal/Raniyah)
----

I expect a reduction of US Bns outside of Baghdad/Ramadi and a consolidation of MND-N and MNF-W into one command in Feb.
----

5th IAD
BSU and MTR were only formed in Aug. Not even trained as a unit since they only got their vehicles in Aug. Not expected to be operational in 5th IAD until next summer. Engr Bn has not been organized yet.
- 1st Bde: 3 Bns (Mandali/Julula)
- 2nd Bde: 4 Bns (Sadiyah/Tamin/Tahrir)
- 3rd Bde: 3 Bns (Muqdadiyah)
10 Bns

Note: 4th IAD traines the SIBs. 14 SIBs organized into 3 Bdes are in 4th/5th IAD AORs.
Both 4th and 5th IADs have DBE Bdes of 3 Bns each on the borders.
----

- 42 Bdes includes the 1st SOF Bde.
Current in lead is 6/10, 30/36 and 91/112.
- Current IA count is 112 Bns
+ 2 SOF
+ 1 Marine.
They do not count 1st SOF Bde and the Marine Bn in their totals since they are not assigned to or transitioning to IGFC.
- Marine Bn is Navy subordinate under JFC.
- SOF Bde is under JFC.

I expect the three SOF Bns to be subordinated to the three MSRs to provide CT raid capability throughout. Use other IA Bns in the outer cordon role thus increasing available raiding teams six-fold. (Capable Bns; such as 1-4, 2-4, 4-6 or 5-6 Bde's AAslt trained Inf Bns.)

- 4th INP Bde just finished QLII. What is left of 8th (maybe 30%) is due to go thru this training next. Only 27 Bns are on the OOB. ERU disappeared in May and was probably folded into the Divs. Now the Div's HQs have been eliminated. If any of the INP Bns are truely combat effective before summer, I will be ammazed.

- 12 Bdes of Border Police (38 Bns).

- With the organization of the three MSR Divisions, the IA would take over the QRF function. I still see 1 US Division plus the Advisors and air.

- Some of the IA formations no longer have Advisors. Only 3000 Advisors are in-country now. Expect that to grow to 4-5,000. Also watch those drop off the troop count. Embassy personnel do not count and MAAG/ODCs are AmEmb personnel in most countries.

- Baring further trouble all except Baghdad, Ramadi and Basrah will be handed off by end-summer. Those are the problem areas and the problems in Babil, Diyala and Saladin are just spillover from Baghdad.
----

"We should also encourage Iran to train and equip a large part of Iraq's security forces..."

- Riiiiight. They already do. It is called the Mahdi Army. Iran considers itself at an undeclared state of war with US and has acted accordingly since 1979. Most of my deployments to the ME was because of Iran. Thank you but, NO THANKS.
----

- The delay and training them for external vice internal fight is an acknowledged error.

- Advisors are increasing. IA already does 95% of its own training. Only the Engr and other technical sides still require NATO Training Group assistance.

- Equipment is good enough for dealing with insergency and T72s/BMPs are compareable to Iran/Syria's equipment. The OTOKARs, DZIK3s and Cougars are good enough for Turkish, Polish and US use. Additional equipment they are getting is not sub-standard.
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2006/Iraq_06-69.pdf

What they need to deal with the Iranian/Syrian threat is Mortars, Artillery, air defense and Air. What they have is good enough for the COIN role.

- At this point, the IA Cos are getting their 60mm mortar sections.
- Next will be the IA Bn's 81mm mortar Btrys.
- (After this current expansion is over in Aug) Their will: Start adding the 120mm Mortar Bns and in 2008 the Artl Bdes. Fighter/Strike and Air defense to be done in FY2008 budget.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 10, 2006 6:48 AM ET:

"Fighter/Strike and Air defense to be done in FY2008 budget."

Correction: Start in FY 2008 Budget.

Posted by Anand at November 10, 2006 1:26 PM ET:

DJ,

BSU = Blood Supply Unit? At end state, both 4th and 8th IAD (Iraqi Army Division) will have 2 non-combat support battalions each (1 MTR [Motorized Transport Regiment] + 1 Engineering Battalion) in addition to their BSU and Division (Head Quarters) HQs company?
At end state:
4th IAD will have 13 combat battalions + 2 support battalions for a total of 15 battalions. [Some of these battalions will probably be transferred to the newly formed IAD headquarters.]
8th IAD will have 9 combat battalions + 2 support battalions for a total of 11 battalions.
Do the 14 SIBs (Strategic Infrastructure Battalions)have an standard strenght of 825 [= 750*1.1] each? Are they expected to be fully operational within 9 months?
Are "DBE Bdes" Border Police?

(Capable Bns; such as 1-4, 2-4, 4-6 or 5-6 Bde's AAslt trained Inf Bns.) refer to the 1st and 2nd Brigades of 4th IAD, and the 4th and 5th Brigades of 6th IAD>

In addition to the various Iraqi governments, Rumsfeld and Bush need to be blamed for not insisting that the Iraqi National Police (INP)be trained by MNF-I until 2005. I am amazed that the ERU and two division HQs have been folded up. I guess part of the problem is that the INP are rough, slightly aggressive with civilian populations (prone to torture at the extreme), and disproportionately from Shia militias that are viewed as "not neutral"� by many Sunni Arabs. It looks like it will take 18 months to get the INP fully up to speed (including logistics).

To set timelines on all this, by 1.1.08 are these reasonable targets for the ISF:
- more than 120 combat battalions in IA in the lead under the control of their operational company HQs and controlling battlespace
- 10 existing IAD HQs, all their subordinate brigade HQs, and more than 96% of their combat battalions fully operational and in the lead under IGFC,
- 3 new Division and 5 brigade HQs in the lead, but not yet fully operational . . . may or may not be under IGFC yet. Fully online with logistics enablers by mid 2008.
- All but two RSU's and other support battalions not assigned to division or brigade HQs fully operational and under IGFC or JFC.
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th IA divisions being in the lead and independent with respect to logistics.
- 9th IAD having 3 brigades fully operational, a 4th brigade being fully operational by spring 2008. 9th IADs own logistics and support should be mostly online, with 9th IAD fully operational by mid 2008.
- 2 INP division HQs, and 8 out of 9 brigade HQs in the lead, controlling more than 21 of their combat battalions. INP and logistics enablers not fully online until mid 2008.
- 28,000 Border patrol fully operational.
- SIBs, including 3 Brigade HQs and 14 battalions fully online.
- local police in the lead and IPC (Iraq Provincial Control) in every state except Baghdad, Al Anbar, Al Basrah and Maysayan,

I think that the Dems, American public and Iraqi public will insist that US troop strength drop below 10,000 by 2010. The ISF need to be strengthened to allow this to happen.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 10, 2006 8:33 PM ET:

Anand:

- BSU = Base Support Unit (read Logistics Battalion)

I expect for the IA to standardize 10x Divs to:
- DivTroops: STB, MTR, BSU and Engr Bn.
- 3x Bdes: BSTB, LtInf Bn (AAslt), 2x MotInf Bns (DZIK3/OTOKAR equipped) and (Forming after Aug2007) 1 Mortar Bn.
- (Forming after Aug2007) Artl Bde: BSTB, 3-4x FA Bns and BSB.

- STB=Special Troops Battalion (Div HQ unit):
HHC, HSC, MI Co, MP Co, Scout/SF Co, Sec Co, Sig Co & ?.
- BSTB=Brigade Special Troops Batalion:
HHC, HSC, MP Co, Scout/SF Co (I&R) & Sec Co.
----

4th IAD: I expect heavy recruiting from them for MSR Divs.
----

- SIBs are standard 750 personnel but, Technical and truck mounted.
Think of them as Static Security Battalions.
- 4x SIBs plus BSTB to the SI Bde.
- 8x SI Bdes identified to date.
(Except 7th Bde which has 6x Bns; probably doing the training of new SIBs; Training center is Bayji.)
- 3400 per 2mo training cycle: 400 in BSTB (vice IA 277) because they have firefighting, engr and repair personnel in an ESU Company.
- They are the replacements for the FPS.
- Expect more SI Bdes to be trained and for (at minimum) 6 Bdes FMC by Sep.

Are "DBE Bdes" Border Police?
- Department of Border Enforcement.
----

"...refer to the 1st and 2nd Brigades of 4th IAD, and the 4th and 5th Brigades of 6th IAD"

- All four of those Bdes have commanded and controlled AAslt operations. Each of those Bdes have 2-3 AAslt experienced LtInf Bns.
I have Identified 28 AAslt trained Bns (incl 2 in 1st SOF).

- Entire IP/INP/DBE was delayed because State had the lead for MoI functions and dropped the ball. Guess they couldn't get away from their dinner parties long enough to work.
- DoD got MoI dropped on it in May2005 and could not get MoI to allow embeds until Apr2006. The more they learn, the less they are happy with the IP/INP. DBE is comming along.
----

To set timelines on all this, by 1.1.08 are these reasonable targets for the ISF:
1. more than 120 combat battalions in IA in the lead under the control of their operational company HQs and controlling battlespace
- Yes. Possibly more.

2. 10 existing IAD HQs, all their subordinate brigade HQs, and more than 96% of their combat battalions fully operational and in the lead under IGFC,
- No. 10 is the goal for March2007. 13 is the target for end-2007. Remember that with all of these experienced staffs for cadre, it will be easier to add and train forces.

3. 3 new Division and 5 brigade HQs in the lead, but not yet fully operational . . . may or may not be under IGFC yet. Fully online with logistics enablers by mid 2008.
- Again, Cadre. Big delay will be equipment delivery. The order for 756 Cougars (ILAV) extends into 2008 (18 Bns worth). If the option to go to 1050 (25 Bns worth) is exercised (and I expect this) then end-2009.

4. All but two RSU's and other support battalions not assigned to division or brigade HQs fully operational and under IGFC or JFC.
- Nat Depot and two are already operational.
expect all five by then.

5. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th IA divisions being in the lead and independent with respect to logistics.
- 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th are already in lead.
- 1st, 4th, 6th and 8th alrady have their BSU and MTRs.
- 6th has officially stood up its Engrs this week and 1st is well along. Training of Engr Cos is 10/year. Loooonnngggg pole.

6. 9th IAD having 3 brigades fully operational, a 4th brigade being fully operational by spring 2008. 9th IADs own logistics and support should be mostly online, with 9th IAD fully operational by mid 2008.
- Probable. They might split the Bdes between the MSR Divs for heavy QRF function vice keeping it as the only heavy Mech formation. 3x ArmCav Bdes at 1/per MSR Div. Based at Taji, Tallil and Al Asad.

7. 2 INP division HQs, and 8 out of 9 brigade HQs in the lead, controlling more than 21 of their combat battalions. INP and logistics enablers not fully online until mid 2008.
- Neither INP Div Hqs or logistics enablers exist at this time.
- The Bdes are being controlled directly from MoI.
- Just getting thru phase II of Quicklook training (re-bluing and purging) will take until Aug2007. Forming the support will be long.
- If half of the INP Bdes are FMC by 2008, I will be surprised.
- 4 of the INP Bdes are to be stationed away from Baghdad as regional QRFs. Expect them to use IA RSUs as bases of operations due to lack of effective supply.

8. 28,000 Border patrol fully operational.
- Yes. Supply issues is the big problem. MoI just does not understand logistics.

9. SIBs, including 3 Brigade HQs and 14 battalions fully online.
- More. Those numbers were for 4th and 5th IAD AORs only...

10. local police in the lead and IPC (Iraq Provincial Control) in every state except Baghdad, Al Anbar, Al Basrah and Maysayan,
- Actually, the Anbar IPs are doing surprisingly well (except Ramadi) dispite the support problems from MoI.
- Maysan is on th adgenda to turn over. The fighting was not the defeat for IA that the press claimed.
----

I expect US to be at 25-50,000 by end-2007.
Mostly Air and Advisors with a Div providing security (and 2 more of prepositioned equip) to keep the Irainians from doing anything stupid. Advisors under AmEmb MAAG vice troop count.

The Iraqis do not have a real Air Force.
They have a fixed and rotary wing Air Group of recon and transport.
That is the long pole.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 11, 2006 2:30 PM ET:

FYI-

Support Units TO/E:

- Base Support Unit (BSU):
HHC, HSC, Maint Co, Med Co, Sec Co (BDU) & Trans Co.

- Engineer (Engr):
HHC, HSC, Sec Co, Aslt Boat Co, EOD Co & (1 initialy) 2-3 Engr Cos.

- Motor Transport Rgt (MTR):
HHC, HSC, Maint Co, Sec Co & 4x Trans Co.

- Bde Support Bn (BSB):
HHC, HSC, Maint Co, Med Co, Sec Co & Trans Co.

BSTB's TO/E:

- 1st SOF Bde:
HHC, HSC, I&R Co & Dev&Trng Detatchment.

- 9th Div's Bdes:
HHC, HSC, MI Co, MP Co, Sec Co & Scout/SF (Recon) Co.

- Inf Div's Bdes:
HHC, HSC, MP Co, Scout/SF Co & Sec Co.

- Strategic Infrastructure Bdes:
HHC, HSC, Scout/SF (I&R) Co, Sec Co & ESU Co (firefighting/engr/repair).

- IA Div STB:
HHC, HSC, MI Co, MP Co, Scout/SF Co, Sec Co & Sig Co.

- Support Company (HSC):
Maintenance, Medical, Supply and Transport Platoons.

Posted by Anand at November 11, 2006 3:33 PM ET:

Thanks for the info DJ.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 12, 2006 12:58 AM ET:

One other note:

12,000 to overman combat Bns at 110 percent means 120,000 is total personnel of Combat Bns prior to the announced additions.
750 personnel is the standard Bn barracks built for IA by GRD.
= 160 Battalions.

112 IA + 2 SOF + 10 Engr Bns = 124

That leaves 36 for the SIBs or nine Bdes.

I have only a rough accounting of 34 SIBs formed into 8 Bdes.
9th SI Bde may still be forming.
7th Bde (Bayji) is two Bns over normal and they may be there for field training pending 9th formation.
Bayji is the center for SIB training.

Posted by Anand at November 13, 2006 2:02 AM ET:

DJ,

Check out this article on 5th IAD:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/world/middleeast/12diyala.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ei=5094&en=bde484053c8ca363&hp&ex=1163307600&partner=homepage
This is why I consider 5th IAD the second most disappointing division in the IA after the 10th IAD.

I didn't know that Engineering Battalions are considered combat battalions. From what you told me, training only 10 Engineering Companies a year looks to be another Rumsfeld error in not devoting enough resources to training and equipping the ISF. They were right to focus first on combat forces in 2003-2005, but to only train 10 engineering companies in 2006 is a bit much.

Just to verify, they are not overmanning any of the 9 MTRs, 9th IAD non-combat support battalions, or RSUs? Are there any noncombat support battalions in the IA not assigned to division HQs other than the RSUs?

Will the 34 SI battalions be manned at 825 = 750*1.1? If so, 34 or 36 SI battalions amount to about 28,000 to 29,000 IA troops. By contrast the Iraqi facilities protection force is manned at abou 74,000. Will the Iraqi facility force remain at a lower troop strenght?

You wrote: "- 1st, 4th, 6th and 8th alrady have their BSU and MTRs." Are all these BSU's fully operational and under the control of their division HQ's? For the 9 (now 10) Infantry IADs, will the BSU be battalion sized but categorized as a company?

4 BSUs are level 1 or level 2. How many BSUs are level 3 and level 4? (3rd IAD, 2nd IAD and 5th IAD are level 3 I guess?)

Isn't 1st IAD MTR still not fully operation and under the control of the 1st IAD HQs.

I guess that only 4th, 8th and 6th currently have level 1 battalions since only they can independently sustain them. When do you expect to start seeing many level 1 battalions?

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 13, 2006 6:42 AM ET:

Anand

Check out this article on 5th IAD:

- Command problem.
Why do you think we didn't provide equipment to that Div until last.
Keeping them on a leash.
MTR only finaly started to stand up in Aug. Iraqi MOD needs to fire that General.
----

They were right to focus first on combat forces in 2003-2005, but to only train 10 engineering companies in 2006 is a bit much.

- Focus was on EOD units.
There are EOD dets thrughout IA but, other than the organized Companies, I have not seen the size standardized.
- Support functions and Engrs did not start training until Aug2005. After initial Infantry Bns planned were formed. Then they added to the Infantry count. Competing resources between new Infantry and the longer-pole of training Engr troops.
- 10 Engr Cos, 10 EOD Cos and new forming Assault Boat Companies (All Engr functions in Army). Also the Bn HHC/HSCs.
- Engineers are a specialty rate and require much more training than line grunts.
Trained as infantry, usually get some field experience, then selected and trained in building everything from slit-trenches to bridges, bunkers and airbases while being shot at.
Also cross trained with EOD.
And require considerable specialized equipment.
(Tell a Seabee, in person, that they are not combat troops. Just do not expect to have teeth afterwards...)
----

- 110% manning for Combat units only. 100% for support units. Subtract the 25% leave rate and you have actual manning. Current IA manning is 85% (61% overall with leave factored in).
----

Are there any noncombat support battalions in the IA not assigned to division HQs other than the RSUs?
- 1 SOF (AAslt) Bde BSB
- National Depot-Taji
- Regional Support Unit-Nasiriyah
- Regional Support Unit-Numaniyah
- Regional Support Unit-Al Kasik
- Regional Support Unit-Kirkuk
- Regional Support Unit-Habbaniyah
- Kirkush Military Training Center (KMTC):
1 Trng Bn-Kirkush
2 Trng Bn-Kirkush
- An Numaniyah Military Training Center (NMTC):
3 Trng Bn-An Numaniyah
- Taji Military Training Center (TMTC):
Taji Basic Trng School
Taji Intel Trng School
Taji Comms Trng School
1 Engr Trng Bn
Iraqi Army Supply Support Institute (16 schools)
- K1 Regional Military Training Center-Kirkuk
- Habbaniyah Regional Military Training Center-Habbaniyah
- Tallil Regional Military Training Center-Nasariyah
- Al Kindi Regional Military Training Center-Mosul
- Tikrit Regional Military Training Center-Tikrit
- Ar Rustimiyah Military Training Academy-Ar Rustimiyah
- Qalachwalan Military Training Academy-Qalachwalan
- Zahko Military Training Academy-Zahko (1 year School/~600 enrolled reported Nov06/grad in spring)

All Iraqi training is transitioning to full Iraqi control...
-----

Will the 34 SI battalions be manned at 825 = 750*1.1? If so, 34 or 36 SI battalions amount to about 28,000 to 29,000 IA troops. By contrast the Iraqi facilities protection force is manned at abou 74,000. Will the Iraqi facility force remain at a lower troop strenght?

- Training of SIBs is at 3400/7wks or one Bde every 7 weeks.
This program only started Aug2005 with a train-the-trainers program for the 4th IAD personnel assigned to train these formations.
First group graduated to field operations Dec2005.
I estimate it is a five year program of replacing the corrupt 144,000 rent-a-cop FPS (27 seperate Ministries) and establishing an IA reserve.
Started with Ministry of Oil and has expanded into Electricity and Water so far...
----

Are all these BSU's fully operational and under the control of their division HQ's? For the 9 (now 10) Infantry IADs, will the BSU be battalion sized but categorized as a company?

- You are confusing the HSCs with the BSUs.
BSUs have always been classified as Bns.
(Unit does not equate to Company in US Military terms.
Unit is used as a reference for smaller than Bde/RCT.
E.G.: A USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is an Inf Bn plus armor/artl/support and a composite 20 bird air squadron.
That does not include the USN taxicab/firesupport/Air Defense service support...)
- The HSCs that each Bn of any type has is the support companies that you are thinking of.
- The BSUs are trained and go operational in parallel with their partnered MTRs.
----

4 BSUs are level 1 or level 2. How many BSUs are level 3 and level 4? (3rd IAD, 2nd IAD and 5th IAD are level 3 I guess?)
- C1/C2: 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th.
- C3: 3rd, 9th, 10th.
- C4: 2nd, 5th, 7th.
- Not yet formed: 11, 12, 13 (actual Div Design unk).
All Divisions have BSUs.
Difference is the linkage and other support.
9th has a Div Maint Bn and BSBs for each Bde.
----

Isn't 1st IAD MTR still not fully operation and under the control of the 1st IAD HQs.

- They are the next to graduate.
Followed by 3rd then 10th.
I keep looking for the cerimony for 1st MTR since their independent field exercise last month.
----

When do you expect to start seeing many level 1 battalions?

- Not before summer.
First they need to man the force to a level that allows C1.
Then they have the diversion of key experienced personnel as cadre for the new formations.
18,000+12,000+18,700= 48,700 divide by 5k/mo.
End-July.
Then let them steady down with the new personnel.

- Good news is that the new units will train up to C2 faster since they will have experienced cadres.

- Bad news is that the current batch of support units were planned to be FMC by summer and now they will have to cadre out to form three more DivTroops sets.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 13, 2006 6:53 AM ET:

Note:
I expect that they plan to further recruit the Bns to 1,000 each after they get thru this expansion/replacement cycle in Aug.
That would allow for full manning and 25% leave factor.
For now they are forming new formations and ensuring the combat Bns are above 80% with the leave factor. (110%-25%=82.5%)

Posted by Anand at November 13, 2006 2:05 PM ET:

FMC is an Acronym for operational I think. What does it stand for?

At end state, it looks like the IA will have 13 BSUs, 12 MTRs, and 13 Engineering battalions assigned to their respective division HQs (assuming that two of the mobile strategic reserve divisions are not armored.)

Nineva province is a relative success story in Iraq. I suspect that 2nd and 3rd IADs will be in the lead in less than 3 months, and under the IGFC in less than 6 months, with full ISF security responsibility and IPC in 9 months for Nineva. Once the 2nd IAD MTR and BSU are fully operational, hopefully US "combat" troops should be able to leave Nineva, and At Tamin shortly thereafter provided Kirkuk doesn't explode after the referendum. I am surprised that second IAD's MTR and BSU haven't been a higher priority despite 2nd IAD's strong performance on the field. Bagdad/Kurdish politics?

I agree with you that Iraq will increase combat battalion strenght to 1000.

At 1000 troops per combat battalion, do you think that 112 combat battalions, 3 Special force battalions, 13 engineering battalion and 34-36 SI battalions are enough to secure all of Iraq without any US combat troops? Unless the MOI improves dramatically . . . I hope so but am skeptical.

I think that the US government should immediately announce a plan to dramatically increase the number of US advisors in Iraq (and tear apart some US divisions to do it since advisors are so officer and experienced NCO heavy), and request Congress to appropriate $50 billion in additional economic and military grants for Iraq. (since the US presence in Iraq costs $8 billion a month, this will have a high return on investment if it allows US troops to leave one year early) Bush and the Democratic Congress should offer this to Iraq (as the carrot) if they agree to massive reforms and very difficult compromises. The stick has to be the full withdrawal of American troops and support for Iraq. This is the only leverage we have left, and it may or may not work. But unless the Iraqi civil war diminishes somewhat before November 2008, the American electorate will demand the cessation of all US support to Iraq.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 13, 2006 4:32 PM ET:

Anand

FMC - Fully Mission Capable.

- Do not forget the 9th Mech's Maintenance Bn.

"...Bagdad/Kurdish politics?"
- Exactly. I suspect consolidation and reductions when MND-N and MNF-W merge (prob Feb). Big problem with handover in north is the oil law has not passed yet.

- 123 (vice 112) combat battalions, 3 Special force battalions, 13 engineering battalions, 1 Marine Bn and 36+ SI battalions.
- MoI on line 38 DBE Bns.
- MoI not so sure 27 INP Bns

"...are enough to secure all of Iraq without any US combat troops?"
- No. No Air, Air Defense, Artl. You have to worry about the Persians trying to reclaim their historical provinces...
- It is enough to hand off most functions and consolidate into Tallil, Al Asad and Taji with Advisors (MAAG), Air and 1 Div for Base security and QRF. 25-50,000 total pers. Simular to what we have in Korea. Half what we have in Europe.

- Advisors are already being trained and expanded. Iraqis have their own trainers for all but some of the more technical items. The military schools are handing over.

"request Congress to appropriate $50 billion in additional economic and military grants for Iraq."
- Out of this congress? Riiiigghhtt...

Posted by Anand at November 13, 2006 4:46 PM ET:

"request Congress to appropriate $50 billion in additional economic and military grants for Iraq."
- Out of this congress? Riiiigghhtt...

Ha Ha Ha. I would have loved to hear this out loud. No, just call it "reparations for our illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq" and the 30 most liberal democrats in the house will vote for it. Simultaneously say that this is the only way to stop Al Qaida to set up a base of operations in Al Andbar and stop a future 9/11 on American soil, and 30 of the 45 blue dog democrats in the house will vote for it.

The problem will be in the Senate. ;-)

Posted by Anand at November 14, 2006 10:19 AM ET:

Note the new press release:

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7240&Itemid=18

MNF - Baghdad (includes Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf and Babil) now has 2 IA divisions (6th and 9th IADs, not including the part of 8th IAD that controls Karbala, Najaf and Babil), 10 brigades (5 in 6th IAD, 3 in 9th IAD, 2 in 8th IAD) and 25 battalions in the lead.

I haven't seen any press release about the 3rd brigade of 9th IAD going into the lead, but by inference this appears to have happened since Karbala/Najaf/Babil have two 8th IAD brigades between them.

It looks like 2 brigades in 8th IAD, 2 brigades in 9th IAD, and 2 brigades in 6th IAD have 2 battalions each in the lead. 1 Brigade in 9th IAD and 2 brigades in 6th IAD have 3 battalions in the lead, while 1 Brigade in 6th IAD has 4 battalions in the lead.

I think that 6th IAD goes under IGFC in December, and 9th IAD, 1st IAD, 2nd IAD, 3 IAD go under IGFC by March 2007.

10th, 5th and 7th IAD goes under IGFC by July, 2007 (I know that 10th is suppose to go under by March, 2007 and 5th by April currently but they aren't doing that great. Bill will soon let us know how 7th is doing--I am hopeful.)

All 37 current IAD brigades (including the Special Forces Brigade) in the lead by October, 2007. [Officially there are 30 IAD brigades in the lead now, but I am skeptical that all of them are really in the lead.] 5 new IA Brigades in the lead by February 2008, and all 13 IADs under IGFC by July 2008. All Border police, Iraqi National police, Strategic Infrastructure and IA combat battalions should be in the lead by March 2009, with logistics for MOI online and all units FMC by March 2010.

These are my guesses, hope they are online sooner.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 14, 2006 10:28 AM ET:

http://www.dvidshub.net/pub_show.php?id=1557
Pg8 - 5th MTR turned over to 5th IAD.

- This is in direct contridiction to a brief in early Aug (3-4BCT) which indicated they were still getting their vehicles. Hard to train without equipment.
- I suspect that 3rd MTR (or elements of) was redesignated and transfered to 5th IAD.

However this happened, I expect 5th IAD to hand off to IGFC within the month...

Posted by Anand at November 14, 2006 12:24 PM ET:

It looks like the NY Times article on Sunday about 5th IAD coming under the IGFC in April 2007 is wrong.

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 14, 2006 10:36 PM ET:

Anand:

I haven't seen any press release about the 3rd brigade of 9th IAD going into the lead, but by inference this appears to have happened since Karbala/Najaf/Babil have two 8th IAD brigades between them.

- Officers for the 3-9th were chosen in April.
The training of the Bns after they were formed was as attachments to 1-9, 2-9 and 3-6 Bdes during this summer.
The cadre of 3-9 was all drawn from experienced personnel in 1-9, 2-9 and 9th DivTroops.
Fast stand-ups are possible when you have experienced personnel for cadre.

- Keep this factor in mind when you track the new forming formations...
-----

I think that 6th IAD goes under IGFC in December, and 9th IAD, 1st IAD, 2nd IAD, 3 IAD go under IGFC by March 2007.

- 1st, 5th, 6th and 9th are all potential hand overs to IGFC by end-year.
My bet is 1st/5th before 6th/9th.
Baghdad needs more settling down and has major sections not turned over to IA.
1st and 5th own their entire AORs...
-----

10th, 5th and 7th IAD goes under IGFC by July, 2007 (I know that 10th is suppose to go under by March, 2007 and 5th by April currently but they aren't doing that great. Bill will soon let us know how 7th is doing--I am hopeful.)

- 7th is the youngest of the current crop.
All 10 IAD's Logistics was to be operational by summer. That is the last component.
I see it as 2nd/3rd prior to 7th/10th.
I may be wrong on 10th but, see it needing some housecleaning...
----

All 37 current IAD brigades (including the Special Forces Brigade) in the lead by October, 2007. [Officially there are 30 IAD brigades in the lead now, but I am skeptical that all of them are really in the lead.] 5 new IA Brigades in the lead by February 2008, and all 13 IADs under IGFC by July 2008. All Border police, Iraqi National police, Strategic Infrastructure and IA combat battalions should be in the lead by March 2009, with logistics for MOI online and all units FMC by March 2010.

- CADRE. They have experienced personnel to draw cadre from that they did not have previously. I see 37 Bdes in-lead by Jun but,
that will be impacted by need to draw cadre out.
Time-line to bring the new formations on-line will be compressed due to the experience level available.
Think six-months from formation and do not be surprised if the 4-9 Bde forms at the end of the month.
I expect them to use 40% of the 10k currently in Bootcamp to form new formations and the rest to provide the individual replacements.
Hypothetical schedual:

- Start either with this graduation (end-Nov) or next (end-Jan) and split the trainese between individual replacements and new formations (starting with 4-9 Bde)...

- If they start with end-Nov class then it could look like this:
- 4-9 Bde, 3x Bns, 3rd SOF Bn:
(~3,300 and ~6,700 replacements)
- Bde, 2x Bns, 11 Div HQ, 11 BSU, 11 MTR:
(~3,800 and ~6,200 replacements)
- Bde, 2x Bns, 11 Engr Bn, 12 Div HQ, 12 BSU:
(~3,800 and ~6,200 replacements)
- Bde, 2x Bns, 12 Engr Bn, 12 MTR, 13 Div HQ:
(~3,800 and ~6,200 replacements)
- Bde, 2x Bns, 13 MTR, 13 BSU, 13 Engr Bn:
(~4,000 and ~6,000 replacements)

- Reason I am sudgesting this is that it would spread the impact and minimise the disruption of active forces as well as accelerating the introduction of more forces.
That and they have already announced an additional Bde in 9th Div and an additional Bn of SOF. (Already in works?)

Posted by Anand at November 15, 2006 3:14 PM ET:

DJ,

Your speculations on ISF force training appear probable.

Just because all the heavy equipment for 9th IAD, 3rd Brigade is not in doesn't mean that they cannot be in the lead and contribute significantly to urban security.

I am still concerned that even after all 1st and 7th, IAD are at full strenght they will not be able to handle Al Anbar without major back-up. I think that 1st and 7th IAD battalions should be massively overstrenght (1100-1200) so that our combat brigades can pull out. (Advisors/logistics/Air support/Medivac will be needed for a while.)

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 16, 2006 4:32 AM ET:

Anand

Al Asad is in Anbar and I expect the MSR Divs to be at Taji, Tallil and Al Asad.

That means that there would be three Division with 10 Bdes in Anbar vice the current 2 with 7 understrength Bdes. And one would be moble.

Adding to the Bns to further man them would be good but, 110% is all that can be done by Aug.
10K/8Wks for new junjis unless they can expand training and equipment purchases...

Posted by Anand at November 16, 2006 10:04 PM ET:

DJ,

Interesting. I agree with you on one new (three brigade) MSR divisions going to Anbar. That would imply that two MSRs (1st IAD--4 Brigades) and the new MSR (3 Brigades) would be based in Al Anbar.

Why do they declare that the 1st IAD controls its entire planned AOR when it has four understrenght brigades?

One new (three brigade) division is going to Baghdad. I think it gets one of 6th IAD's brigades.

One more division is probably being created in the North, and it will inherit one of 2nd IA's brigades. This new division will probably control part of Salahadin and Ninevah province.

There have been very few briefings (by Iraqi based commanders) and little information made public over the last few weeks. Might it be related to the Gates transition?

Anand

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 17, 2006 7:00 AM ET:

Anand

Interesting. I agree with you on one new (three brigade) MSR divisions going to Anbar. That would imply that two MSRs (1st IAD--4 Brigades) and the new MSR (3 Brigades) would be based in Al Anbar.

- Replace 1st IAD with one of the new forming (static) Divs to free it up. Motorize it with some of the 756 Cougars being purchased. Based at Al Asad.
- 9th remains based at Taji and the 4th Bde may be a wheeled Mech formation since I am seeing no new tracked purchases/proposals.
- New Div based at Tallil to cover the south. Also probably motorized. Each of the Divs retain a Bde AOR around home base and use non-deployed elements to control it.
- 756 Cougars is 18x vehicle Bns (42 each is 3x 14 vehicle Cos). Contracted delivery rate is 1 Bns worth per month (~44).
- Plus 15 HMMWVs per Bn and some Bns entirely HMMWV mounted (lt Inf/Cav).
----

Why do they declare that the 1st IAD controls its entire planned AOR when it has four understrenght brigades?

- Look how small that AOR is compared to all other Div AORs except 6th and 9th.
- Baghdad's population in 6th's case and a Div planned for MSR in 9th's case are why they have such small areas.
- 1st has such a small area because it is undermanned and was planned to be MSR (Iraqi Intervention Force).
- The other IA Divs are covering the same amount of area with 1-2 brigades (population Dependent).
Note: They are increasing their ability to cover the AOR with more vehicles.
----

One new (three brigade) division is going to Baghdad. I think it gets one of 6th IAD's brigades.

- Makes sense. 6th IAD is controling only four of its five Bdes. 9th has OPCON of 2-6 (Tigers) Bde.
- The split is the Tigris River. 9th IAD controls North and East of the river and 6th south and west.
- Adding a Div HQ and a Bde to Baghdad will free up 9th for independent operations by providing 2x 3 Bde strength Divisions for Baghdad proper while 9th retains AOR around its Base at Taji.
- If there is a problem then the 9th can augment again. That is what MSRs do. 10 total Bdes of IA in Baghdad province vice current 8.
- (Plus the 5 INP Bdes. Eventially they will be on line. 4 INP Bdes are to be in the provinces. Probably based in key problem areas (Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk and Amarah/Kut).
----

One more division is probably being created in the North, and it will inherit one of 2nd IA's brigades. This new division will probably control part of Salahadin and Ninevah province.

- My bet is 1-2, 2-4 and 3-4 Bde AORs will become a Division AOR.
1-4, 2-4, 1-6 and 4-6 Bdes are 5x line Bns each.
Part of what I see is that the Bdes are standardizing at 3 line Bns each.
Spliting those Bdes and adding a Bn to fill out the new Bde makes sense.
- 4th IAD would then own Arbil, Sulamaniayah and Kirkuk (Tammin).
- 2nd IAD retains Dohuk and Eastern Ninawa.
- New Division (part of 2-4 and split 1-4) gets Saladdin and probably part of Diyala.
- Keep in mind they also have 3 SI Bdes (1 Forming/training) in 4th AOR, 2 in 8th and 1 each in 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th. C2 is an issue in 4th, 6th and 8th AORs because they have too many Bdes.
- Not so sure where the split will be in the south.
I tend to keep 1-10, 2-10 and 4-10 together looking at LOCs and RSU location.
3-10 becomes part of Tallil MSR.
Not sure of split in 8th
Add to binary Bdes of current 8th and 10th (3 Bns each).

Thought:
- One way that 9th could be expanded without additional tracked purchases would be to convert 2nd Tank Bde to Mech and operate as 4x (understrength in Tanks) Mech Bdes.
- Or by adding wheeled Mech or by forming airmoble Bde.
- I am looking for any data I can get on the composition of the forming 4-9 Bde.
----

There have been very few briefings (by Iraqi based commanders) and little information made public over the last few weeks. Might it be related to the Gates transition?

- Probably. Also the Congressional hearings. That time again. The testimony is the spoken part of qtrly report to congress. Expect the unclas portion to be released end-Nov.
- This is the first time in over a year that there has been a two week period without a brief from Iraq. RCT7 is briefing in two hours and we will see what is going on in his chunk of Anbar...

Posted by DJ Elliott at November 17, 2006 10:31 AM ET:

Correction RCT5.

- After hearing his brief, I have the following comments:
1. 1st IAD is under 50% manning.
2. 1st IAD is good enough for the Col to refer to them as "Marines" without even thinking about it. He thinks they are getting good.
3. Recruiting of sunnis for IA is still a problem.
4. While violence is down in Fallujah, locals do not trust Maliki Govt.
5. Future will not be decided by US or Iranians; will be decided by Iraqis.
6. 15th MEU is not going to Fallujah. (I expected it to be headed to Ramadi.)
7. He has expanded the MiTTs in his area out of hide.
8. The Col is over identifying with the locals.

Posted by Anand at November 17, 2006 4:24 PM ET:

Thanks for the info DJ. Lets transfer this discussion to Bill's new Iraq article thread.