After cordoning off the Sarai neighborhood of Tal Afar, U.S. troops are waiting for residents to leave before executing the assault. The residents are refusing to leave. Ethnic Sunni Turkmens make up the majority of those living in the Sarai neighborhood, and they fear reprisals from the Shiite minority if they follow the proscribed evacuation route, which takes them south through the Shiite neighborhoods. U.S. troops are negotiating with the residents.

United Press International's Pam Hess has some excellent background information on Tal Afar, including the mosaic of tribal and ethnic relationships in the city; "Tall' Afar is home to 82 different tribes. Each with up to 12 sub-tribes. Tribes are comprised of both Sunnis and Shi'a, as the two groups intermarry regularly." While the tribal, religious and ethnic makeup of the neighborhoods and cities in Iraq can seem daunting, positive results in formerly violent areas such as Sadr City in Baghdad shows that success can be had.

She also highlights the deftness of Lt. Col. Christopher Hickey in dealing with the local tribal politics and culture. This knowledge is a crucial element in fighting a successful counterinsurgency campaign. LTC Dickey, the Sabre Squadron commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, has skillfully engaged the tribes and ethnic groups of Tal Afar.

Hickey and his troopers have only been coming to this Sunni section of Tall 'Afar for the last two months; it took them that long to negotiate a way into the neighborhood, which is believed to be home to a number of the town's insurgents. Protected by tanks and Bradley armored vehicles, Hickey could have muscled his way in. But the military's secret weapon in Iraq is men like Hickey -- officers who take the lay of the land and figure out how to pursue their mission by means other than overwhelming force.

LTC Hickey is not unique to Iraq. Michael Yon has documented LTC Kurilla’s grasp of Iraqi culture and his skill at fighting the insurgency in Mosul (LTC Kurilla has been wounded in action and is now stateside). Grim has pointed pointed out the efforts of Captain Leggett, USMC, and Army Staff Sergeant Dale Horn. The list goes on. These men and others like them are able warriors and diplomats, well suited to conduct insurgency warfare despite their training in Cold War tactics.

If the residents of the Saria neighborhood cannot be convinced to leave the impending combat zone, and the Coalition decides to conduct the assault, the fighting will be bloody indeed. Al Qaeda is notorious for using civilians as human shields and fighting from homes with civilians present to increase the propaganda value and destroy the image of the U.S. military and government.

While the assault on Fallujah last fall has been portrayed by many antiwar activists and elements of the foreign and domestic media as an abuse of U.S. power, the residents of Tal Afar (and no doubt elsewhere in Iraq) fear an assault of this nature, thus proving that direct force still has its place in modern war.

"To Fallujah" has now become a verb for Iraqis, Hickey explained later, synonymous with the violent leveling of a recalcitrant city. In mid July, in fact, Baghdad ominously announced that there would be a "solution" to the Tall 'Afar "problem" within 10 days. Three dozen men from Tall 'Afar and Mosul went to Baghdad to meet with the government to circumvent "a Fallujah."

Ms. Hess also confirms that the operations in Tal Afar are indeed part of a ‘clear and hold’ mission. The troops of the 3rd ACR will not be abandoning Tal Afar to the predations of al Qaeda and the insurgency, but stay to restore and maintain order in a strategic city along one of al Qaeda’s main ratlines from Syria. It now appears that Phase II of the Anbar Campaign is in effect.