Salim Hamdan, an admitted driver for Osama bin Laden, has been found guilty of supporting terrorism by a military jury at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although Hamdan was acquitted on the more serious charge of taking part in al Qaeda’s various terrorist conspiracies, including the Sept. 11 attacks, his conviction is an important milestone in the history of the US detention process. Hamdan’s trial was the first held at Gitmo since the facility opened nearly seven years ago.

According to The New York Times, the case against Hamdan was based largely “on his own descriptions of his role as a driver [for Osama bin Laden] collected in more than 40 interrogations, including some that lasted many days.” In fact, Hamdan never denied that he was a driver for bin Laden, the central allegation against him. According to the US government, Hamdan was not only a driver for bin Laden but also served as one of his bodyguards. A Sept. 16, 2004, summary of evidence memo produced for Hamdan’s first tribunal session at Gitmo alleges: “In addition to serving as driver, [Hamdan] served as a member of [Osama bin Laden’s] bodyguard detachment and armed himself with a weapon.”

The Long War Journal has identified at least 14 individuals, including Hamdan, who have been detained at Guantanamo Bay and charged by the US government with being a bodyguard or driver for Osama bin Laden. Eight of these individuals are, like Hamdan, native Yemenis. The remaining six include four Saudis, one Egyptian, and one Algerian. That many Yemenis were selected for this sensitive role is not surprising. Bin Laden has deep familial and tribal roots in Yemen, and he has often leveraged these ties to ensure that only the most dedicated recruits were in his immediate entourage. Indeed, bin Laden’s drivers and bodyguards were often required to swear bayat, or an oath of loyalty. While the documents have not specifically identified Hamdan and the 13 other detainees as members of the Black Guard, the specially trained bodyguards for al Qaeda’s senior leadership, their closeness to bin Laden suggests they were.

Hamdan’s defense attorneys reportedly argued that since Hamdan was only a low-level driver he was not important enough to find guilty of any material role in the al Qaeda terror network. In one sense, the military court’s decision validates their argument. The military jury ruled, in effect, that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Hamdan played any direct role in al Qaeda’s planning or execution of attacks. However, prosecutors argued that Hamdan’s role as a driver was not totally insignificant, since he and individuals like him were the ones that provided the security and transportation bin Laden needed to do his job. In this vein, the military jury evidently found the prosecution’s argument persuasive, finding Hamdan guilty of providing material support for al Qaeda’s operations.

In addition, the US government believes that Hamdan became privy to sensitive information in his role. According to the US government in its Sept. 16, 2004, summary of evidence memo:

“In the above roles [note: as Osama bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard], [Hamdan] gained substantial knowledge of al Qaeda operations and came in contact with a number of highly placed al Qaeda figures, such as Abu Hafs, Saif al Adel (al Qaeda Security Chief), and Abu Zubaydah.”

Abu Hafs al-Masri was al Qaeda’s military chief, one of the organization’s most prominent positions, until his demise in November 2001. Saif al Adel, who was trained by Hezbollah in the early 1990’s, reportedly replaced Abu Hafs in this role and is currently living in Iran under some loose form of house arrest. Abu Zubaydah is currently a detainee at Gitmo, and compiled an extensive terrorist dossier during his career, including participating in al Qaeda’s planned millennium attacks in Jordan and the U.S. Zubaydah was also in charge of selecting recruits to attend al Qaeda’s Khalden training camp in Afghanistan.

It is not known if Hamdan ever admitted to these ties during his many interrogations. But the government’s allegation should give pause to anyone who would suggest that Hamdan was an al Qaeda know-nothing. Certainly, there is no evidence that Hamdan was personally or directly responsible for any al Qaeda attack, but he was involved with those who were. And to the extent that he could inform interrogators of al Qaeda’s inner-workings, he may very well have been an important source of intelligence.

Thomas Joscelyn has joined The Long War Journal as a Senior Editor. He is directing a project that examines the unclassified intelligence gathered on current and former detainees at Guantanamo Bay.