On March 1, a loitering munition struck the Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Akrotiri. Cypriot officials, followed by their Lebanese counterparts, accused Hezbollah of responsibility. The group’s leadership has threatened to target Cyprus in the past if it facilitated a war effort against the interests of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. However, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) agents operating from Lebanon could have also carried out the attack.

The day before an attack on the US Embassy on March 7, the Coordination Committee of the Iraqi Resistance had issued a statement warning that continued strikes on Beirut’s Dahiyeh area would elicit attacks against embassies and oil companies in the region. The ultimatum follows repeated Israeli strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure and personnel in Beirut’s southern suburbs after Hezbollah entered the war on March 2.

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem addressed Hezbollah’s latest war with Israel on Monday night, insisting that his group had fire rockets at Israel in defense of Lebanon, preempting a premeditated “war of extermination.” Qassem insisted that Hezbollah would not surrender its arms and vowed to continue fighting until achieving either victory in battle or martyrdom.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between February 23 and March 1, 2026. Israeli activities last week, the last days of which coincided with the onset of the joint US-Israeli operation against the Islamic Republic of Iran, were concentrated on policing activities but included airstrikes on Hezbollah’s assets deeper into Lebanon.

The US State Department ordered the departure of all non-emergency government personnel from the US Embassy in Beirut, along with their family members. Many media outlets tied this to rising US regional tensions with Iran. A Lebanese media outlet suggested it was in response to threats to the embassy from Hezbollah.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between February 16 and February 22, 2026. Israeli activities last week were relatively more intense than in preceding weeks and included attacks on Hezbollah assets deep inside Lebanon, some of which the group reportedly intended to use against Israel in the event of a US conflict with Iran.

Earlier this week, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Jood SARL, a gold exchange recently established in Lebanon, declaring it a front for the US-sanctioned Hezbollah financial institution Al Qard al Hassan (AQAH). For years, AQAH has acted as Hezbollah’s shadow bank, using its legal status as a charitable institution to elude banking regulations, oversight, and compliance. However, based on corporate records, it appears that Treasury did not designate some of Jood SARL’s shareholders and managers.

Naim Qassem marked the 33rd anniversary of the Mahdi Schools System with a defiant speech that said Iran was divinely promised a momentous victory over the United States and Israel. He also stressed that Hezbollah would not disarm, and its patient path of choosing even death over surrender would guarantee Lebanon’s eventual victory over Israel.

Lebanese media reports claim that Hezbollah sought to smuggle weapons from the remnants of its arsenal in Syria to Dahiyeh in Lebanon. The weapons, transported in two vehicles, were detected by suspicious Lebanese authorities. However, the reports claim that Hezbollah temporarily detained a Lebanese officer and only handed over the vehicles for inspection after emptying them of their cargo.

Hezbollah has yet to deploy operatives to protect the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regime from ongoing protests. However, the group has stated that it will not remain neutral if the United States or Israel attack the Tehran regime and threaten its existence. Hezbollah also claims the current Iranian authorities actually enjoy widespread domestic support and that calls for regime change are being instigated by Washington and Jerusalem.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between January 19 and January 25, 2026. Israeli operations last week targeted Hezbollah assets and personnel both north and south of the Litani River.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently assassinated a Hezbollah local liaison officer in south Lebanon and has now explained the alleged function of these operatives during the group’s regeneration efforts, including how they cultivate relationships with Lebanese civilians.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between January 12 and January 18, 2026. Israeli activities were largely concentrated north of the Litani River, with mainly policing activities occurring south of the waterway.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between January 5 and January 11. Israel Defense Forces activities included strikes on Hezbollah assets and personnel, including targets involved in the group’s regeneration efforts south of the Litani River after the Lebanese Armed Forces had certified taking control of the area.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between December 22 and December 28, 2025. Israeli activities this week included strikes on Hezbollah assets and personnel north and south of the Litani River, reaching as far as Hermel, and killing an alleged Lebanese Armed Forces-Hezbollah dual operative.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between December 15 and December 21, 2025. Israeli activities this week included strikes on Hezbollah assets and personnel north and south of the Litani River, reaching as far as Baalbek and Hermel.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between December 8 and December 14, 2025. Israeli activities were more intense than in the preceding weeks and included a resumption of targeted killings.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between December 1 and December 7, 2025. Israeli activities were less intense than usual last week; while they targeted and destroyed alleged Hezbollah infrastructure, they, unusually, resulted in zero casualties.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between November 24 and November 30, 2025. Israeli activities were less intense than usual last week and, irregularly, resulted in zero casualties.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between November 17 and November 23, 2025. These activities involved targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets. The week witnessed a significant escalation by Israel against Hezbollah, including the targeted assassination of its chief of staff, Haitham Ali Tabatabai, for his ongoing oversight of the group’s regeneration efforts.

An Israeli airstrike on an apartment building in Beirut’s southern suburbs killed senior Hezbollah figure Haytham Ali Tabatabai, along with four other members of the group. The strike is the most high-profile action taken against Hezbollah since the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel began last November.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between November 10 and November 16, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Israel continued operations in Lebanon between October 27 and November 2, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Israel continued operations in Lebanon between October 20 and October 26, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Israel continued military operations in Lebanon between October 13 and October 19, 2025. These activities included targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts and strikes on its assets.

Hezbollah hosted a gathering for its Mahdi Scouts in Beirut that the group claimed drew 75,000 attendees. The event was meant to commemorate the Scouts’ 40th anniversary and one year since Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s death, while also demonstrating Hezbollah’s continued popularity among Lebanese Shiites.
