The US attacked al Qaeda and Taliban targets in the Datta Khel area, a known terrorist command and control hub in Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Unmanned Predators or the heavily armed Reapers fired six missiles today at a compound and a vehicle in the Sunzalai village in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan, Dawn reported. Six “militants” were reported killed and five more were wounded, while four Predators continued to circle over the scene of the attack, Pakistani intelligence officials stated.
The target of the strike is not known, and no senior Taliban or al Qaeda leaders were reported killed.
The Datta Khel area is administered by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan. Bahadar provides shelter to top al Qaeda leaders as well as terrorists from numerous Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups.
Datta Khel is an al Qaeda stronghold
Datta Khel serves as a command and control center for al Qaeda’s top leaders. Several of al Qaeda’s top commanders, including Mustafa Abu Yazid, the chief financial official and commander in Afghanistan, and Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of al Qaeda’s military, have been killed in Predator strikes in Datta Khel in the last year. [For more information on al Qaeda’s presence in Datta Khel, see LWJ report, Latest US Predator strike kills 5 in al Qaeda hub in North Waziristan.]
The US has pounded the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan this year; 24 of this year’s 88 strikes, or 27 percent, have hit targets in Datta Khel.
Today’s strike takes place as the US is seeking to disrupt a plot by al Qaeda modeled after the Mumbai terror assault. Al Qaeda operatives have been planning to carry out a terror assault targeting several major European cities. The plot is said to have been ordered by Osama bin Laden.
The US has been pounding targets in the Datta Khel, Miramshah, and Mir Ali areas of North Waziristan in an effort to kill members involved in the European plot. Al Qaeda and allied terror groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and a number of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups host or share camps in the region.
Despite the known presence of al Qaeda and other foreign groups in North Waziristan, and requests by the US that action be taken against these groups, the Pakistani military has indicated that it has no plans to take on Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Haqqani Network, and Mullah Nazir. Regardless of their support for al Qaeda and other terror groups, the Haqqanis, Bahadar, and Nazir are considered “good Taliban” by the Pakistani military establishment as they do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan.
The Pakistani government claims it is conducting “surgical” strikes against terror groups in North Waziristan, and said more than 34,000 troops are operating in the tribal agency. But there is no evidence to back up the Pakistani government’s claim it is hitting those terror groups in covert raids.
The Predator strikes, by the numbers
The pace of the strikes since the beginning of September is unprecedented since the US began the air campaign in Pakistan in 2004. The 21 strikes in September is a record number, and with 13 strikes already in October, the US appears to be prepared to match last month’s pace. The previous high was 11 strikes in January 2010, after the Taliban and al Qaeda executed a successful suicide attack at Combat Outpost Chapman that targeted CIA personnel who were active in gathering intelligence for the Predator campaign in Pakistan. In the bombing at COP Chapman, seven CIA officials and a Jordanian intelligence officer were killed.
The US has carried out 88 attacks inside Pakistan this year, which is more than double the number of strikes in Pakistan just two years ago. The US exceeded last year’s strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram in late August. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan. [For up-to-date charts on the US air campaign in Pakistan, see LWJ Special Report, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 – 2010.]
All but nine of this year’s 88 strikes have taken place in North Waziristan. Of the nine strikes that have occurred outside of North Waziristan, seven took place in South Waziristan, one occurred in Khyber, and one took place in Kurram.
The US campaign in northwestern Pakistan has targeted top al Qaeda leaders, al Qaeda’s external operations network, and Taliban leaders and fighters who threaten both the Afghan and Pakistani states as well as support al Qaeda’s external operations. [For a list of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in the US air campaign in Pakistan, see LWJ Special Report, Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 – 2010.]
8 Comments
Interesting, 6 missiles with a few birds flying over head during the aftermath.
*sniff sniff* smells like we are after a HVT here.
Is this the area that latest “news” is referring to that Bin Laden is living “comfortably” in a house (versus the popular perception that he is living in a cave somewhere)?
Here is a theory for why the finger being pointed at Pakistan for sheltering Osama and AZ is being publicized more right now:
Laying the public relations for even more drone strikes, possibly in Karachi or Quetta or other towns outside the “tribal” and non government controlled areas. I hope this is the case and that there is intel on the locations, and that public relations are starting to blunt the reaction to collateral casualties.
To Lab: No. The latest belief is that our AQ/Talib friends have taken refuge in a nice condo in a Pak city somewhere….safely among civilian (shields) and where its’ more difficult to send a missle. But who needs a missile? Hee hee hee….
Jose
Drone strikes are not going to be expanded into the cities of Quetta and especially-not Karachi. If anything, the increaed volume about OBL/AZ is happening now because Kayani and Co. are coming to town for the Strategic Dialogue. In the same news cycle as the OBL/AZ story, reports also surfaced that the U.S. was adding the finishing touches on multi-year military aid to Pakistan.
The last confirmed location for UBL (from a photograph) was in Chittral — he was photographed there. There are also reports of him being in Kurram. Both further to the north of NW but in the FATA
I commented out the “threat model” for UBL and AZ security before. They’re only security is obscurity. Not being found is what they have to do. Once found they are toast. They could have the whole of 313 Brigade they’re and they know the US is going to kill or capture everyone of them if they found the location.
They are with very small entourages that don’t attract attention: a cook, a drivers/butler and perhaps a couple of bodyguards. One vehicles worth at most. Lots of body guards won’t help when a US battalion arrives outside the door.
They’re aware of UAV and sat reconnaissance so they won’t move very much but they will move occasionally just in case old information about their location gets out. Moving too often also burns out safe houses that they probably can’t reuse.
They know about SIGINT so they won’t use sat phones, cell phones or any other high tech equipment at their secure location. All communication with the outside world is via couriers that are trusted and drop into a network of people to pass on the message.
So they are staying in a location where they can’t easily be found. This means remote, inaccessible, and easy to identify any strangers hanging around. If they are found they can notice that they’re being watched before the US arrive in large numbers (they will arrive in large numbers). It doesn’t have to be a cave but a remote location.
This means UBL and AZ are almost certainly in different locations so a single strike won’t catch both of them.
They aren’t in a big Pakistani city: too difficult to escape, too easy to be noticed by someone else and difficult to notice observation of their location. I suspect they learnt their lesson from KSM and RbaS in Karachi. I’m sure they felt hidden there but once they were traced (using SIGINT) they were easily captured.
They aren’t relying on their Pakistani hosts either: they are potentially too untrustworthy (they helped capture KSM and were in no position to stop it). If the chips are down and it’s “the end of Pakistan” (or even the end of graft heading to offshore accounts from diverted US money of some Pakistani politician) Pakistani could and would give them up. UBL and AZ can’t rely on the Pakistani’s good will. That’s too big a risk. They can’t rely on a lot of Pakistani’s either (just a trusted few) the reward money (and relocation to the USA) is too attractive. They have to keep themselves secret.
All of this puts them somewhere in FATA where all strangers are suspected and the tribes know who the strangers are. Chittral and Kurram are both excellent with high mountain ranges and poor connectivity for 6 months of the year. If things get really bad they can try to head back in the Afghanistan (but that’s very risky). Or perhaps get smuggled out of Pakistani (by sea?) to Yemen or Somalia. Both risky but perhaps useful for a latch ditch move should the Pakistanis give up on AQ for strategic depth.
I’m sure UBL and AZ (and perhaps their friends in the ISI) have though this true and come to the same conclusions. Their most important job is to stay alive and not captured and to do that they have to not be discovered. That means keeping out of locations where the CIA can more easily find them.
Two other locations I wouldn’t rule out:
Balochistan: big, plenty of support, off the UAV attack list right now. But more accessible than FATA but with a better sea escape route.
Iran: I think this is less likely. UBL had to put his faith in the Iranians which is not something he is going to do. Mostly dependent on the Iranians being willing to take the risk of harboring their enemies enemy (and their enemy too). I can see them doing this with other AQ members (as they seem to have done) but the downside risk of the US finding out about UBL or AZ in Iran then getting taking indirect and direct action against the Iranians might be just too big for a non-nuclear Iran. Even a nuclear Iran might wonder about doing this.
The ideal zone for OBL, IF he’s above room temperature, is the Afghan-Baluchistan-Iranian conjunction.
Like classic medieval king-warriors, OBL would stay WAY away from the battle zone. Only an extremely select few would know is true location. His fantastic height is a problem — burkas don’t work for him.
Since his Black Guard/Watch has a growing contingent in Yemen — and he’s a Yemeni by clan and blood — don’t be shocked if he magically pops up there.
His medical problems demand that he not get too far off the beaten path. I can’t see where Chitral really works for him. The terrain is so nasty that everyone is forced to use the passes/choke points. If I were OBL, I’d be paranoid about any constrictive terrain that lent itself to American guile.
What ever pics released to the kafirs must always leave breadcrumbs away from the truth. All war is deception, as Mohammed was prone to say.
The real hunt should be on for Zawahiri. We know he’s still actively calling the shots. I suspect OBL’s existence is at this point a fabrication. All that is required is an audio impersonator. The lousy quality of AQ press releases is going to frustrate any CIA voice analysis. GIGO.