Coalition and Afghan troops beat back a complex Haqqani Network assault on two bases in eastern Afghanistan today, killing more than 20 fighters and a senior commander during and after the attack. Two Haqqani Network fighters breached the perimeter of one of the bases before being killed.
The Haqqani Network “simultaneously launched” coordinated attacks on Forward Operating Base Salerno and Forward Operation Base Chapman in the early morning today, the International Security Assistance Force stated in a press release. An unknown number of fighters attacked the bases at 4 a.m. with mortars, rockets-propelled grenades, and small arms fire. The Haqqani Network fighters were wearing US military uniforms during the attack.
The combined Coalition and Afghan force killed 13 Haqqani Network fighters at FOB Salerno, four of whom were wearing suicide vests, and six more at FOB Chapman, ISAF stated. Five others were detained. Afghan police also discovered a car bomb, seven suicide vests, and two recoilless rifles that may have been intended for use in the attack.
Two of the Haqqani Network fighters were killed after breaching the perimeter at Salerno. “Coalition forces had the two insurgents under surveillance and when they cut the fence, a quick reaction force was dispatched to the location where they were killed immediately,” ISAF stated.
ISAF air weapons teams later killed a Haqqani Network facilitator known as Mudasir and two other fighters as they fled the scene of the attack. Mudasir, who is also known as Qari Ishaq, was described by ISAF as “a Haqqani Network facilitator for improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers.” He “had direct ties to Haqqani Network senior leadership based in Pakistan and was a teacher at a madrassa known to facilitate suicide bombers.”
Today’s assault on FOBs Salerno and Chapman constitute the latest Taliban assault on major Coalition bases throughout Afghanistan since late spring.
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
Haqqani Network a main target of Coalition and Afghan forces
Over the past few months, Coalition and Afghan forces have been conducting special operations raids targeting the Haqqani Network and al Qaeda operatives and camps in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika on a near-daily basis. In the past several days, three Haqqani Network fighters were killed and a commander and several fighters were detained during raids in Paktia, Paktika, and Khost.
In mid-June, Afghan and Coalition forces killed “a large number” of Haqqani Network and foreign fighters during a major clash in the Jani Khel district in Paktia, and another 38 as they crossed the provincial border into Musa Khel in Khost. “Arabs, Uzbeks, Turks, and Chechens” were among those killed in the fight in Jani Khel in Paktia.
On Aug. 12, Afghan and Coalition forces killed more than 20 Haqqani Network fighters and detained several more during a raid in the district of Zadran in Paktia. ISAF described the district of Zadran as a “known Haqqani Network safe haven” which is “used to stage attacks into Kabul and the Khost-Gardez pass.”
Al Qaeda maintains a strong presence in eastern Afghanistan, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal. In Khost, the presence of al Qaeda and allied groups’ cells has been detected in the districts of Besmil, Khost, Mandozai, Nader Shahkot, Sabari, Shamul, Spera, and Terayzai; or eight of Khost’s 12 districts.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Frequently, al Qaeda operatives serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. In addition, al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
Background on the Haqqani Network
The Haqqani Network has extensive links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and its relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has allowed the network to survive and thrive in its fortress stronghold of North Waziristan. The Haqqanis control large swaths of the tribal area and run a parallel administration with courts, recruiting centers, tax offices, and security forces. They have established multiple training camps and safe houses used by al Qaeda leaders and operatives, as well as by Taliban foot soldiers preparing to fight in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network has been implicated in some of the biggest terror attacks in the Afghan capital city of Kabul, including the January 2008 suicide assault on the Serena hotel, the February 2009 assault on Afghan ministries, and the July 2008 and October 2009 suicide attacks against the Indian embassy. American intelligence agencies confronted the Pakistani government with evidence, including communications intercepts, which proved the ISI’s direct involvement in the 2008 Indian embassy bombing. [See LWJ report “Pakistan’s Jihad” and Threat Matrix report “Pakistan backs Afghan Taliban” for additional information on the ISI’s complicity in attacks in Afghanistan and the region.]
The Haqqani Network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin. Jalaluddin is thought to be ill and is considered the patriarch of the network. Siraj runs the daily operations and is the group’s military commander.
Siraj is one of the most wanted Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the Afghan-Pakistan region. The US military has described Siraj as the primary threat to security in eastern Afghanistan. He is the mastermind of the most deadly attacks inside Afghanistan, including suicide assaults in Kabul, and he is the senior military commander in eastern Afghanistan. He is the leader of the Taliban’s Miramshah Regional Military Shura, one of the Afghan Taliban’s four regional commands [see LWJ report, “The Afghan Taliban’s top leaders“].
Siraj is considered dangerous not only for his ties with the Afghan Taliban, but also because of his connections with al Qaeda’s central leadership, which extend all the way to Osama bin Laden. Siraj is a member of al Qaeda’s Shura Majlis, or top council, US intelligence sources told The Long War Journal. In a tape released in April 2010, Siraj admitted that cooperation between the Taliban and al Qaeda “is at the highest limits.” On March 25, 2009, the US Department of State put out a $5 million bounty for information leading to the capture of Siraj.
The US Treasury recently added Nasiruddin Haqqani, Siraj’s brother, to the list of specially designated global terrorists. Nasiruddin is a key financier and emissary for the Haqqani Network. According to the Treasury, Nasiruddin has traveled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2004-2009 to carry out fundraising for the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.
Despite Siraj’s ties with al Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network’s use of suicide attacks, some top US military commanders have stated that Jalaluddin Haqqani, his father, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, another supporter of al Qaeda, are “absolutely salvageable” and ripe for negotiations.
“The HIG already have members in Karzai’s government, and it could evolve into a political party, even though Hekmatyar may be providing al Qaeda leaders refuge in Kunar,” Major General Michael Flynn, the top military intelligence official in Afghanistan, told The Atlantic in April 2010. “Hekmatyar has reconcilable ambitions. As for the Haqqani network, I can tell you they are tired of fighting, but are not about to give up. They have lucrative business interests to protect: the road traffic from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Central Asia.”
Sir Graeme Lamb, a senior adviser to General McChrystal, echoed Flynn’s view on Hekmatyar and Haqqani, and discounted the groups’ close ties to al Qaeda.
“Haqqani and Hekmatyar are pragmatists tied to the probability of outcomes,” Lamb also told The Atlantic. “With all the talk of Islamic ideology, this is the land of the deal.”
A Haqqani Network leader known as Zakim Shah serves as the shadow governor of Khost province. Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces are the main strongholds of the Haqqani Network in eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network also has a presence in the provinces of Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Zabul, and Kabul.
The Haqqani forces in Paktika province are commanded by Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a senior lieutenant to Sirajuddin Haqqani. A US military intelligence official told The Long War Journal that Sangeen also commands forces outside of Paktika and that he has become one of the most dangerous operational commanders in eastern Afghanistan.
Last summer, Sangeen took credit for the kidnapping of a US soldier who apparently stepped away from his post at a combat outpost in Paktika on June 30, 2009. US forces in eastern Afghanistan launched a massive manhunt for the soldier, but failed to find him. The soldier is believed to be held across the border in Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
US and Afghan forces hit the Haqqani Network hard in the summer of 2009 during a series of raids in Khost, Paktika, Paktia, Logar, and Zabul. Major battles were fought in mountainous regions as the joint forces assaulted strongly-defended Haqqani Network “fortresses.” The raids failed to dislodge the Haqqani Network from the provinces.
The Haqqani Network has also been heavily targeted by the CIA in the covert air campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Siraj has been the target of multiple Predator strikes. His brother, Mohammed, who served as a military commander, was killed in a February 2010 strike in North Waziristan.
• ISAF, Afghan forces repel attack at two bases, ISAF press release
• Precision air strike conducted after attack, ISAF press release
• Security force detains insurgents in Paktiya, ISAF press release
• Capture of Taliban commander in Paktiya confirmed, ISAF press release
• Taliban IED facilitator targeted in Afghan, coalition operation, ISAF press release
• Several insurgents detained in Khost, ISAF press release
• 20 Haqqani Network fighters killed in raids in eastern Afghanistan, The Long War Journal
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Crap–glad everyone at Salerno & Chapman were heads up. What military uniforms were they wearing Bill? US or Afghan?
“The Haqqani Network fighters were wearing US military uniforms during the attack.”
There have been inflamed accounts of ‘US military — in uniform — attacking pro-government civilians in night raids in the NY Times.
The obvious use of false-flag uniforms coupled to the style of the attack aroused no curiosity.
It is a fact: ISAF do not raid settled villages at night. Period.
Night raids are performed in the field against Talibs packing heat and on patrol.
At night such tactics are the only way the ISAF can be assured that they are not targeting civilians — which is totally taboo.
When the ISAF enters a village it is with the Afghans in the lead. The reasons are obvious: we’re there to support the government. Normally such knock and talks involve no fighting. There is no need for ISAF other than as an overwatch element.
How the Haqqani Network fighter act to procure the US military uniforms?
These are tactics straight from the ISI playbook, long-applied against the Indian army in Kashmir. It won’t be long before decapitated heads of our personnel make their rounds in Pakistani mosques to rally the faithful; fallen Indian soldiers were regularly meted this treatment (see Owen Bennett Jones’ book). Of course, at that time, we didn’t care since they were only Indians being attacked by our faithful ally.
Man, they sure fixed their “poor morale” awfully quickly…
The uniforms are readily available in many of the FATA arms markets.
They’re also ridiculously easy to steal from the supply convoys moving through Pakistan. So are weapons and vehicles in transit.
Nice job Bill! very good info.
As a former captain in US special ops, I knew the enemy would eventually start using USA uniforms.
The 18 months I spent in that country, I never wore a uniform,however, according to what old friends have told me, the conventional troops are wearing regular uniforms,which opens up all kind of possibilities for the terrorists.
A side note: I was in the country in 2001 and 2002,spent little time around Khost or Kabul, mostly in the villages located within the large area called Tora Bora.
May God bless the troops.
for years they were stealing our gear going to and coming from theater in pakistan. when we got back several of our containers were emptied of our gear and filled with bricks.
Pakistan is full of floods.How was it possible for two American uniformed Chechens or talibs to break the outer preimeter ?From the rreport it looks like a major attack with 4 suicide bombers amongst the killed.
Do you suggest any improvement in perimeter security after this assault with American uniforms?
If the perimeter was allowed to be broken on purpose then it may have been a good thing.
We don’t want to kill too many top people in the Haqqani organization. After all, he’ll be Prime Mininster in 2012.