Thousands attended Ansar al Sharia's gathering in 2012, some in Afghan military garb, waving swords and chanting slogans that included: "We are all children of Osama (bin Laden)."

Headlines trumpeted the 2004 Battle of Fallujah, when Marines defeated Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda fighters in brutal urban battle, but few reports noted that rebels soon returned and resumed their attacks. An embedded reporter at the time, Ardolino (associate editor of the Long War Journal) delivers a brilliant, detailed description of events in 2007, when Marines, tribal leaders, and local Iraqis worked together to again eject the insurgents--hopefully, this time, permanently. The author is wise to remind readers that al-Qaeda was never terribly popular in Iraq; it espoused a form of Islam considered violent and unfamiliar, "even by conservative Fallujan standards," and its success required vicious retaliation against uncooperative Iraqis. Even so, many refused to help the radical group, opting instead to side with American forces for a variety of personal and political reasons. Ardolino describes one Marine battalion near Fallujah that achieved remarkable success by enlisting the aid of an ambitious young sheikh nicknamed "Dark." Combining eye-witness accounts of political frustrations, the dangers of the "irrepressible and deadly creativity" of insurgents, and sympathetic portraits of the locals, Ardolino's is an outstanding account of the winding down of a resoundingly unpopular war.

Four foreign soldiers and a policeman were killed in the attack that occurred in the Mizan district of Zabul province, the deputy police chief, Col. Ghulam Gilani Farahi, told Pajhwok Afghan News. The provincial police chief and other security officials visited the scene to investigate the incident, Farahi said, adding that more details would be shared with the media after the investigation was completed. Meanwhile, the Taliban said four US soldiers were killed and several others wounded when a policeman loyal to the movement opened fire on them. Several policemen also suffered casualties when US troops returned fire, they added.

On May 1st, Afghan intelligence officials received reports that a complex attack was imminent in Farah Province. A truck with more than 3000 kg of explosives was being prepared for movement to a target area densely populated with civilians. As a frame of reference, the truck bomb used in the Oklahoma City terrorist attack had just over 2,200 kg of explosives - and that detonation killed nearly 200 people, injured more than 600, and damaged more than 300 buildings within a sixteen-block radius. Once the Taliban began moving the truck to its intended target, it was destroyed with a precision strike. Eight insurgents were killed, including two members of the cell that are also thought to have attacked the Farah courthouse complex in early April.

The attacks took place between 4 and 5 a.m. in Menaka and Gossi, near Gao - the first major town freed from the control of Islamist fighters during a French-led military intervention earlier this year. "The first attack targeted Nigerien soldiers in Menaka. A car bomb entered the (military) camp, but the soldiers ... destroyed the vehicle which exploded," Lieutenant Colonel Souleymane Maiga told Reuters. "At the same time in Gossi, three suicide bombers on foot attacked a checkpoint. Again the soldiers ... shot at them. The three bombers were killed," he said. Another suicide bomber was killed as he tried to enter the military camp in Gossi, Maiga said, adding that the injury to the Malian soldier was not serious.

These practices are being encouraged by the wave of preachers visiting Tunisia from the Gulf or the Middle East. Even though some of them have extremist views, these foreign imams often come to Tunisia with the blessing of the government or the Islamist party Ennahda, the party in power, which accommodate and welcome them.

"The secularists are still controlling the media, economy and administration," Ghannouchi warned the Salafists, according to Magharebia. "Therefore, controlling them would require more time." He advised the Salafists to "create television channels, radio stations, schools and universities" to increase their influence. Ghannouchi also warned that "the police and army's support for Islamists is not guaranteed, and controlling them would also require more time." He continued: "I tell our young Salafists to be patient.... Why hurry? Take your time to consolidate what you have gained." "The Islamists must fill the country with associations, establish Qur'anic schools everywhere, and invite religious preachers because people are still ignorant of Islam," Ghannouchi stated.

Illustrating their plight, FSA commanders say that entire units have gone over to al-Nusra while others have lost a quarter or more of their strength to them recently. "Fighters feel proud to join al-Nusra because that means power and influence," said Abu Ahmed, a former teacher from Deir Hafer who now commands an FSA brigade in the countryside near Aleppo. "Al-Nusra fighters rarely withdraw for shortage of ammunition or fighters and they leave their target only after liberating it," he added. "They compete to carry out martyrdom [suicide] operations." Abu Ahmed and others say the FSA has lost fighters to al-Nusra in Aleppo, Hama, Idlib and Deir al-Zor and the Damascus region. Ala'a al-Basha, commander of the Sayyida Aisha brigade, warned the FSA chief of staff, General Salim Idriss, about the issue last month. Basha said 3,000 FSA men have joined al-Nusra in the last few months, mainly because of a lack of weapons and ammunition. FSA fighters in the Banias area were threatening to leave because they did not have the firepower to stop the massacre in Bayda, he said. The FSA's Ahrar al-Shimal brigade joined al-Nusra en masse while the Sufiyan al-Thawri brigade in Idlib lost 65 of its fighters to al-Nusra a few months ago for lack of weapons. According to one estimate the FSA has lost a quarter of all its fighters. Al-Nusra has members serving undercover with FSA units so they can spot potential recruits, according to Abu Hassan of the FSA's al-Tawhid Lions brigade. Ideology is another powerful factor. "Fighters are heading to al-Nusra because of its Islamic doctrine, sincerity, good funding and advanced weapons," said Abu Islam of the FSA's al-Tawhid brigade in Aleppo. "My colleague who was fighting with the FSA's Ahrar Suriya asked me: 'I'm fighting with Ahrar Suriya brigade, but I want to know if I get killed in a battle, am I going to be considered as a martyr or not?' It did not take him long to quit FSA and join al-Nusra. He asked for a sniper rifle and got one immediately."

The Afghan government's hope that it could mobilise the Pakistani ulema's support for rejecting militancy not only remained unfulfilled, but what followed was the opposite. The very Pakistani ulema appointed by Islamabad to help Afghans in their peace efforts started disseminating their 'fatwa' of the permissibility of the strictest tactics of jihad in Afghanistan. And some found a keen audience in spreading their fatwa, thanks to the massive media interest.