"The Justice Ministry executed 14 Iraqis - terrorists and criminals - in Baghdad on Tuesday," a senior Justice Ministry official told Reuters on Wednesday. They included Abu Talha who headed an al Qaeda affiliate, Islamic State of Iraq, in the northern city of Mosul and the provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin, the official said on condition of anonymity.

A leading al-Qaeda Commander, of Saudi nationality and holding the post of Military Emir (Prince) of al-Qaeda in northern Iraq's city of Mosul, has been sentenced to death by the Central Iraqi Criminal Court, according to a statement from within the High Judicial Council on Wednesday. "The defendant, with the initials BA, who had occupied the post of the Military Emir (Prince) of the Right Side of Mosul in 2008, during the leadership of the former al-Qaeda Commander Abu-Musaab al-Zarqawi, was sentenced for execution by the High Judcial Criminal Court," the statement, as was received by Aswat al-Iraq news agency, stressed. The statement pointed out that the defendant had confessed to having contributed to the Falluja battle in west Iraq, during which he lost one of his legs and was sentenced for 15 years imprisonment; at the time he gave a false name, claiming to be an Iraqi and confessed to having carried out terrorist acts, aimed at deteriorating the security situation in the country.

A suicide car bomber killed at least nine people Wednesday near a hotel where lawmakers often gather in the Somali capital Mogadishu, police said. Police officer Hassan Ali told Reuters the attacker rammed his vehicle into a cafe by the Hotel Muna, which was also stormed by al Shabaab militants in August 2010 in an attack that killed more than 30 people. "So far we have carried nine dead civilians and 34 others injured. Up to now we have not seen casualties of any legislators. The death toll may rise," said Ali. Police and the spokesman for African Union troops in Somalia said initial reports showed that the attacker first opened fire on people sitting near the hotel before detonating the car.

The defendant also admitted that he and his co-conspirators raised money from the Somali-American community in Minnesota under false pretenses to pay for men in Minnesota to travel to Somalia to join al Shabaab. Specifically, the defendant and his co-conspirators claimed the money raised would be used for a local mosque or to help orphans in Somalia. In fact, the money collected was used to purchase airline tickets and to pay other expenses so men could travel from Minnesota to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. Further, Mahamud admittedly sent money via wire transfers to a co-conspirator in Somalia, knowing the money would be used to purchase weapons or otherwise support al-Shabaab.

The United States and its NATO partners will end their combat roles in Afghanistan in 2013 -- a year earlier than previously announced. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said that American troops will remain in the country through 2014, but only in a supporting role. This switch to training and advising Afghan forces will occur in mid- to late-2013, Panetta told reporters in Brussels.

Panetta surprised allies on Wednesday by suggesting the US combat mission in Afghanistan would end in 2013, the first time Washington had floated such a deadline.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he envisions two or three more years of combat operations in Afghanistan before the U.S. transitions to an advisory role, a mission likely to last years more. Pulling out combat forces in three years would ensure that the allied presence has transitioned to a training mission by the time British troops are due to withdraw in 2015. It would also meet Afghan President Hamid Karzai's goal of having his own army take responsibility for security by 2014.

The members met with President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai regarding the group's operations in the country. They agreed to gradually withdraw combat forces from the country with a completion date of 2014.

Mr. Gates sketched a process much like that in Iraq, where the U.S. formally ended combat operations this week, rebranding its forces as advisory brigades.

At least 13 people were killed when a U.S. drone launched three missile strikes in Orakzai region of Pakistan's northwest tribal belt on Wednesday, local media reported. According to the report by local TV channel Geo, the attack was launched in wee hours in the morning when a U.S. drone fired three missiles at a militants'hideout in Darand Shekhan area of upper Orakzai agency, a militancy-hit tribal area where Pakistan army has been battling local and foreign Taliban militants for the past four months. The report said that six foreigners were also among the killed militants and the dead bodies have been shifted to other areas of Orakzai after the drone attack.

At least 20 terrorists were killed as fighter jets pounded Taliban hideouts in Orakzai Agency on Wednesday, military sources said. The air strikes came a day after terrorists attacked a security checkpost in Jogi Heights in Mamozai region of Kurram Agency in which eight soldiers were killed. "Jets have targeted the hideouts of Taliban commander Mullah Toofan and commander Moheyuddin, ground intelligence reported at least 20 Taliban were killed in the blitz," military sources told Daily Times. Sources added that four compounds of the Taliban had been hit in the air strike. They added that some reports suggested that commander Moheyuddin could have been killed in the bombing. However, there was no independent confirmation of the commander's death. Considering the strategic location of the region, terrorists have been putting up stiff resistance to the military operation. This has also given the Taliban upper hand since they have cut off road links to Kurram Agency. Sources did not say how effective the operation was in weakening the terrorists so that ground troops could move in.

Current NATO strategy, agreed to at a summit in Lisbon in November 2010, calls for coalition forces to gradually shift to a training, advisory and assistance role with the Afghan military on the way to withdrawing all combat troops by the end of 2014. A Panetta spokesman traveling with the defense chief issued a statement Wednesday evening -- several hours after Panetta's original remarks -- saying that U.S. troops could still be involved in at least some combat operations , in partnership with Afghan forces, in 2014. U.S. and NATO forces, he said, would still be actively engaged in helping Afghan forces operate. Although the Afghan army has grown in size and capability, it is still dependent on the U.S. military for airpower, troop movement, supplies and medical aid.

It says that Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders. "Senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad," it said. It quotes a senior al Qaeda detainee as saying: "Pakistan knows everything. They control everything. I can't [expletive] on a tree in Kunar without them watching." "The Taliban are not Islam. The Taliban are Islamabad."

The Taliban in Afghanistan are being directly assisted by Pakistani security services, according to a secret Nato report seen by the BBC. The leaked report, derived from thousands of interrogations, claims the Taliban remain defiant and have wide support among the Afghan people. It alleges that Pakistan knows the locations of senior Taliban leaders. A BBC correspondent says the report is painful reading for international forces and the Afghan government. Pakistan has strenuously denied any links with the Taliban on previous occasions. "We have long been concerned about ties between elements of the ISI and some extremist networks," said US Pentagon spokesman Captain John Kirby, adding that the US Defence Department had not seen the report. 'Informational' The BBC's Quentin Sommerville in Kabul says the report - on the state of the Taliban - fully exposes for the first time the relationship between the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) and the Taliban. The report is based on material from 27,000 interrogations with more than 4,000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters and civilians. It notes: "Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly". It says that Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders. The report states: "As this document is derived directly from insurgents it should be considered informational and not necessarily analytical."

The soldiers eventually won their battle at OP Shal, securing the Kunar River Valley from infiltration, eliminating insurgent roadblocks and opening it to civilian and military traffic. But the Taliban's weeklong attack highlighted the many military problems facing Afghanistan, and it made clear that the outcome of the conflict remains far from certain. Throughout the intense fighting, the besieged defending force of 36 U.S. and Afghan army soldiers fought off multiple suicide bombers and at least four overrun attempts by between 400 and 500 heavily armed insurgents, who had been trucked in from Pakistan and who managed to advance to within 5 m of U.S. positions. Afterward, the soldiers said they confirmed 115 kills but estimated at least 200 deaths. "It was the most coordinated thing any of us had ever seen, but just the sheer number of forces they had massing on that position was ridiculous," Staff Sergeant Everett Bracey, of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 2-27 Infantry Battalion, told TIME. The attackers were reinforced and resupplied throughout the fight from bases and depots in the safe haven provided by Pakistan. "We saw 60 vehicles come out of Pakistan -- just drive in," said Staff Sergeant Anthony Fuentes, looking at a topographical map a few days after the battle. "This whole route, it goes all the way up into Pakistan. It's a two-hour trafficable route from the border." Added company commander Captain Michael Kolton: "It was Pashtuns and Arabs and Chechens and Punjabis -- everyone and their sister joined in on this one." The defenders of OP Shal also recognized that their attackers had been well trained. "They used the standard operating procedures that the U.S. Army uses," explained Fuentes. "We expected contact, but we didn't expect that. Their fire was so heavy and precise that to get up and look at their near sector, the joes just had to say, 'O.K., I'm just going to eat one in the face just to get up and see if somebody is moving on me.' And every time they lifted their head up, there was somebody there." Sitting in his squad bay at Combat Outpost Monti, Sergeant Brandon Goodell told TIME, "They are motivated, they are trained, and they are proficient." But what most surprised the Americans was the insurgents' determination to regain this strategic mountaintop commanding a 6-km section of road in the main Kunar River Valley. "They were relentless. They were all over us. I've never seen them come that hard at anybody," said Fuentes. The numbers, skill and determination of the insurgents repelled at OP Shal seem quite at odds with President Obama's suggestion that the Taliban's momentum has been broken.

Drones are not enough to contain this menace. But President Obama has done away with COIN, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine centered on building up allied local forces and good governance, for more limited counterterrorism measures such as drones and special forces raids. It apparently does not matter to the Obama administration that such tactics failed to stop al Qaeda's armies from previously controlling parts of Iraq and continuing to control territory elsewhere. Al Qaeda is hardly invincible. It has been greatly weakened, in some ways, during the past decade. But al Qaeda and its allies can only be strengthened by America's retreat from the lands of jihad. And they are not the only ones watching as President Obama takes his eye off the ball. Terror-sponsoring regimes like those in Iran and Pakistan have learned that there is no substantial price to be paid for spilling American blood. They've learned, too, that America's commitment to fight its enemies is severely constrained by domestic political considerations. The Obama administration lauds its counterterrorism partnerships with friendly governments. Allies, indeed, are invaluable. But the Arab Spring has introduced uncertainty into some of these relationships. In Egypt, a government dominated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood has replaced the regime of the friendly, if despicable, Hosni Mubarak. In Yemen, a duplicitous but sometimes helpful President Ali Abdullah Saleh has given way to chaos and a growing al Qaeda insurgency. In Libya, the gangster-terrorist Muammar Qaddafi, who also occasionally provided counterterrorism assistance, has fallen to a coalition that includes jihadists. We should not be sad to see the Mubaraks, Salehs, and Qaddafis go. But now that they are gone, we should be worried that the American government under President Obama will not seek to influence the course their nations take.

In the past, U.S. officials have worried that pushing Pakistan too hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabad more firmly into Beijing's embrace. But China's lukewarm response to Pakistan's recent overtures demonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its "all-weather friend" -- a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring to China. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties has been overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerably higher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decade and also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwise would likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorism activities. U.S. policymakers must recognise these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. China is increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing's cooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach to terrorism issues in Pakistan would help mitigate threats to both Washington and Beijing, since Islamabad's support for some terrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financial support for all Islamist terrorist groups.

Pakistan and China have long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defence relationship with Pakistan and views a strong partnership with Pakistan as a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India-Pakistan tension as advancing their own strategic interests, as such friction bogs India down in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi's ability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at the international level. Though Pakistan considers China a more reliable defense partner than the U.S., Islamabad should also recognise that China's support has its limits, especially during times of conflict and tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. When Pakistan sought Chinese assistance during its 1965 war with India, Beijing encouraged Islamabad to withdraw its forces from Indian territory. During the 1999 Indo-Pakistani border war in Kargil, Beijing privately supported U.S. calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the heights of Kargil on the Indian side of the Line of Control to defuse the crisis, and apparently communicated this stance to Pakistani leaders. The Chinese position during the Kargil episode helped spur a thaw in Indian-Chinese relations. During the 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani military crisis, China stayed neutral and counseled restraint on both sides, declaring that China was a "neighbor and friend of both countries.

Chinese officials are increasingly connecting the level of terrorist activity in Pakistan to instability in western China. One Chinese academic has noted in his writings that China has developed a more neutral position on the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir over the past decade in part because China believes that the dispute could have implications for ethnic-religious unrest in China, especially in Tibet or Xinjiang. In this context, the ascendance of Taliban forces in either Pakistan or Afghanistan is clearly not in China's interest. But rather than encouraging Islamabad to adopt a comprehensive approach toward countering terrorism, Chinese leaders have used their relationships with Pakistani military officials, and with the Islamist political parties, to persuade them to discourage attacks on Chinese interests. Before 9/11, for example, the Chinese reached agreements with the Taliban to prevent Uighur separatists from using Afghanistan as a training ground for militant activities.

China's concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan itself are not that extensive. China's economic commitment to Pakistan, for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan's economy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times of need. Pakistan's portrayal of its relationship with China features exaggeration of the economic dimension of the relationship. Pakistani media routinely report huge numbers for investment and financing with the People's Republic of China (PRC), numbers that cannot be verified by any independent source, including by the Chinese government or the Chinese companies supposedly involved. While Pakistani officials talk of a total of $25 billion in Chinese investment in Pakistan so far, the PRC's official figure of direct investment through 2010 is $1.83 billion.

Trade is not exaggerated by Pakistan or rendered unclear by Chinese secrecy. As with investment and (apparently) finance, though, it is relatively insubstantial. On Chinese figures, bilateral trade volume was below $9 billion in 2010 and grew slightly less quickly than the PRC's overall trade. The Philippines are similar to Pakistan in GDP and not as close politically with China. The Philippines mining sector is underdeveloped. Yet China's bilateral trade with the Philippines in 2010 was still three times larger than its trade with Pakistan, and grew faster. Not only is the trade relationship small, it is imbalanced. The PRC's 2010 surplus was $5.2 billion, tiny by Chinese standards, but huge in comparison to bilateral trade volume. If Beijing wanted to assist Islamabad for political reasons, it could artificially inflate imports from Pakistan, at least on a temporary basis. Cosmetic efforts along these lines are routinely made with the PRC's major economic partners, but Pakistan clearly does not qualify.

The creators of a jihadi comic strip called "Son of the Martyr" released a second comic, "The Fleeing Enemy," using the characters they established to contrast Islamic society with that of the West. The comic was posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum on January 24, 2012, and comes nearly four months after the first issue. The message posted with the first issue indicated that the creators were seeking a media foundation to publish the comics. In the message introducing the second comic, the creators named the "al-Wedha Islamic Foundation" as its publishing house and explained that the comic is a means to face Western "culturization" of Muslim boys and girls. In response to the comic, a fellow jihadist on Shumukh al-Islam commended the creators and advised they produce more comics but not focus on jihad alone. He added: "By Allah, the Jews and the disbelievers sneak their beliefs through such drawings that some might see as simple, but they are not simple at all. If they are read by a child, they will remain in his imagination...."