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      <title>Threat Matrix</title>
      <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/</link>
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      <copyright>Copyright 2010</copyright>
      <lastBuildDate>Sat, 20 Mar 2010 19:25:24 -0500</lastBuildDate>
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            <item>
         <title>Name that army</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<center><div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium">
<img src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/Swat-Shadow-Army-thumb.jpg" width="486" height="298" alt="" />
</td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium">  <p align="center" class="imagetext">At least one squad of the joint Taliban-al Qaeda Shadow Army operating in Swat. </td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center>

In a <a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7069205.ece"><em>London Times</em> article</a> on foreign fighters' influence in Pakistan's tribal areas, the author notes that the Punjabi and Arab fighters in the region are quite organized and efficient:

<blockquote>The Arabs, regarded by locals as good, quiet tenants, paying up to 20,000 rupees (£160) in rent per month, now reportedly move around chaperoned by another key group of international terrorists: the Punjabi Taleban fighters belonging to Kashmiri militant groups such as LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harakat-ul-Mujahidin.

“The Punjabis are very experienced in IEDs,” a tribal member said. “They and the other Kashmiri groups <strong>are like a regular army</strong>. [emphasis supplied]</blockquote>

That sounds <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php">very familiar</a>. And the following quote from the same article makes you wonder if it is such a good idea for the Pakistani military to demonize India and Israel as being behind the Taliban during pamphlet drops.

<blockquote>“The Arabs stay with them [the Punjabis] in the homes we have left behind. They trust them more than the local Taliban.”

However, not everyone is happy with their presence. “It’s because of them that the army has come to our land and destroyed our homes,” one local tribesman said. “Because of them our businesses are wrecked. Because of them we live as internal refugees.

“I’ve met ordinary people who say that they’d even welcome Israel or India if they helped us get rid of these Arabs and their friends.”</blockquote>]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/name_that_army.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/name_that_army.php</guid>
        
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Al Qaeda</category>
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Jaish-e-Mohammed</category>
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</category>
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Lashkar-e-Taiba</category>
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Pakistan</category>
        
         <pubDate>Sat, 20 Mar 2010 19:25:24 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Powell and Brzezinski on Iran&apos;s proto-nuclear capabilities</title>
         <description><![CDATA[During <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-19/powell-says-new-sanctions-on-iran-won-t-stop-nuclear-program.html">an interview</a> on Bloomberg Television’s “<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/tvradio/podcast/judy_woodruff.html">Conversations with Judy Woodruff</a>” due to air this weekend, former Secretary of State Colin Powell shared his thoughts on Iran's nuclear ambitions, saying:

<blockquote>The Iranians are determined to have a nuclear program... Notice I did not say a nuclear weapon. But they are determined to have a nuclear program, notwithstanding the last six or seven years of efforts on our part to keep them from having a nuclear program... I don’t see a set of sanctions coming along that would be so detrimental to the Iranians that they are going to stop that program, so ultimately, the solution has to be a negotiated one.</blockquote>

From the other side of the political aisle, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski <a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036789//vp/35927273#35927273">largely concurred</a> with General Powell's assessment, in an appearance on MSNBC's "<a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036789/">Morning Joe</a>":

<blockquote>We [the United States] have to operate in such a way, that, if necessary, we give a guarantee to all the countries in the region and we make it absolutely clear to Iran that if it seeks and acquires a nuclear weapon the United States will be committed to using weapons against it if it threatens anybody in the region. That's the system that has worked since the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons...[A nuclear Iran] may be inevitable, but it can be deterred.... </blockquote>

Both men agree that Iran is determined to reach a proto-nuclear capability, in which it has the potential to weaponize uranium but exercises restraint so as not demonize its position in the international community.  If this argument holds true, should the West look towards deterrence, containment, or preemption?  The answer to this question will determine the new strategic balance of the greater Middle East.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/powell_and_brezezinski_on_iran.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/powell_and_brezezinski_on_iran.php</guid>
        
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">iran</category>
        
         <pubDate>Fri, 19 Mar 2010 09:07:16 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Rafsanjani moves to the dark side</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<center>
<img alt="rafsanjani.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/rafsanjani.jpg" width="500" height="359" />
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Geneive Abdo <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/16/rafsanjani_makes_his_move?page=full">reports</a> in <em>Foreign Policy</em>  that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's fence-sitting days are over; he is officially an ally of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei:

<blockquote>In exchange for Rafsanjani's loyalty, the supreme leader appears to have given him power over a new bill that will establish a National Elections Commission to reform the electoral process. Not only is this issue at the heart of Iran's political crisis, but the commission would also determine the eligibility of individuals to stand as candidates in elections. And the Expediency Council, which monitors legislation and is responsible for any conflicts that might result over Iranian laws, will also decide the members who serve on the National Elections Commission.

This significant change in the elections process will greatly reduce the power of the Guardian Council, a body of six hard-line clerics and six jurists appointed by Khamenei. Historically, this Guardian Council has banned many reformist candidates from running in elections, thus ensuring conservative control even in the face of growing public discontent. The guardians were also charged with hearing complaints about election fraud and complaints from banned candidates contesting their exclusion. Now, the National Elections Commission will hold some of these responsibilities.

By bringing Rafsanjani back into the fold, Khamenei appears to be trying to reduce the power of the hard-liners, including some of those who sit on the Guardian Council. It is true that reforming Iran's electoral process is one step toward a less totalitarian regime. However, it is unlikely to pacify the millions of Iranians who consider themselves part of the opposition. If Khamenei had made this decision soon after the June election, its effects would have, perhaps, been different. But now, many in the opposition have far greater demands, including Ahmadinejad's resignation.</blockquote>

The question now arises: How will these political shifts affect the success of the Green Movement?  Will Rasfanjani's actions serve to deflate or energize the opposition? Only time will tell.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/rasfanjani_moves_to_the_dark_s.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/rasfanjani_moves_to_the_dark_s.php</guid>
        
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Iran</category>
        
         <pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 01:03:04 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Al Qaeda operative killed in Pakistan linked to Zarqawi</title>
         <description><![CDATA[While news reports have focused on the death of senior al Qaeda operative Sadam Hussein Al Hussami, who is also known as Ghazwan al Yemeni, at the hands of the US in the March 10 airstrike in North Waziristan, one of the three other al Qaeda operatives killed in the same attack was also a longtime al Qaeda fighter and trainer. Among those killed was Abu Jameelah al Kuwaiti Hamed al Aazimi, a Kuwaiti citizen and former government employee who is a three-decade veteran of jihad, according to <a href="http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0310/flashpointmiranshahmartyrs0310.pdf">the martyrdom statement written by Abu Abdulrahman al Qahtani and translated by <em>Global Terror Alert</em></a>. 

Aazimi was "our big brother; big in everything…old in age,"  according to Qahtani. Aazimi fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. After returning to Kuwait, he was employed as "an administrator in the Ministry of Religious Endowment, and he received a great salary...."

Later Aazimi fought against the US in Iraq, where he "accompanied al Zarqawi and remained with him for a period of time." At some point Aazimi was wounded, and he returned home to Kuwait, where he was arrested. After his release from jail, he joined al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, and eventually wound up in Miramshah in North Waziristan. 

According to the statement, Aazimi was "the expert on explosives and the arts of engagement." He fought "numerous engagements with the Americans and the apostates and he taught them great lessons at the Ancorada front, and their Humvees and tanks were a prey to his mines and their remains are still spread around those mountains." [Note: I have not been able to determine where the "Ancorada front" was.]

Aazimi passed along his training to younger al Qaeda terrorists, according to Qahtani. "The young men would gather so he can teach them how to use grenades and mines and trained them how to build the explosives... the love for this science filled his heart...."]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/al_qaeda_operative_killed_in_p.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/al_qaeda_operative_killed_in_p.php</guid>
        
        
         <pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2010 18:40:54 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>ACLU files lawsuit for information on US Predator program</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<center>
<img alt="mq-9-reaper-afghanistan.gif" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/mq-9-reaper-afghanistan.gif" width="400" height="127" />
</center>

The American Civil Liberties Union has followed up its <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/01/aclu_files_fioa_request_on_pre.php">Freedom of Information Act request that was filed in January</a> seeking information on the US Predator program. Today, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the the Defense Department, the State Department, and the Justice Department, demanding enforcement of its January request for information on the program. <a href="http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-seeks-information-predator-drone-program">The full press release release from the ACLU is below</a>:]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/aclu_files_lawsuit_for_informa.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/aclu_files_lawsuit_for_informa.php</guid>
        
        
         <pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 19:32:03 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Haqqani and Hekmatyar are &apos;absolutely salvageable&apos;?</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<div class="floatimgright">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium">
<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/jalaluddin-haqqani-and-nasrudin.php" onclick="window.open('http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/jalaluddin-haqqani-and-nasrudin.php','popup','width=230,height=184,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/jalaluddin-haqqani-and-nasrudin-thumb.jpg" width="100" height="80" alt="" /></a>
</td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium">  <p align="center" class="imagetext">Jalaluddin Haqqani with his son Nasrudin. Click to view.</td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center>

Robert Kaplan's <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/03/man-versus-afghanistan/7983/1/">overview of Afghanistan</a> in the April 2010 edition of <em>The Atlantic</em> makes some extremely controversial statements about reconciliation with the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. According to the article, top ISAF officers and advisers believe that the Taliban have become "kinder" and "gentler," while Jalaluddin Haqqani, the patriarch of the Haqqani Network, and Hekmatyar are considered “absolutely salvageable.” The full paragraph <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/03/man-versus-afghanistan/7983/5/">is on page five</a>:

<blockquote>A deal with the insurgents constitutes another part of a withdrawal strategy. While becoming more organizationally formidable since 9/11, the Taliban have also modified their behavior. Mullah Omar has sent out a directive banning beheadings and unauthorized kidnappings as well as other forms of violent and criminal activity, according to both Al-Jazeera and ISAF officials. “In a way, we’re seeing a kinder, gentler Taliban,” said both Commander Eggers and General Flynn. Moreover, in working with the tribes in the spirit of Churchill’s Malakand Field Force, Flynn, the intelligence chief, went so far as to suggest that the insurgent leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are both “absolutely salvageable.” “The HIG already have members in Karzai’s government, and it could evolve into a political party, even though Hekmatyar may be providing alQaeda leaders refuge in Kunar. Hekmatyar has reconcilable ambitions. As for the Haqqani network, I can tell you they are tired of fighting, but are not about to give up. They have lucrative business interests to protect: the road traffic from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Central Asia.” Lamb, the former SAS commander, added: “Haqqani and Hekmatyar are pragmatists tied to the probability of outcomes. With all the talk of Islamic ideology, this is the land of the deal.”</blockquote>

Let's leave the double-dealing and opportunistic Hekmatyar aside, as history has proven he's out for what's best for him. (By the way, how exactly does that make him reconcilable anyway, unless you believe that reconciliation is all about paying off an insurgent actor?). Also, Kaplan misrepresented the nature of HIG, as it is a splinter of the Hezb-i-Islami political party, which has already reconciled with the government.

The Haqqani Network is by far the most dangerous Taliban group in Afghanistan and is the most closely allied to al Qaeda. For all intents and purposes, the Haqqani Network is al Qaeda's Afghan branch. Siraj Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son, sits on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis.

So what would have happened if in 2007, at the beginning of the surge, top US military commanders had claimed that the top leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al Sunnah (or Ansar al Islam, depending on the month) were "absolutely salvageable?" Would such a statement have inspired confidence that the military understood the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, or that the Iraqi surge was on the right path to success? ]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/haqqani_and_hekmatyar_are_abso.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/haqqani_and_hekmatyar_are_abso.php</guid>
        
        
         <pubDate>Sun, 14 Mar 2010 11:08:29 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Taliban attempts to drive wedges between ISAF allies</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<img alt="voice-of-jihad.JPG" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/voice-of-jihad.JPG" width="550" height="104" />

The Taliban's info-machine has chosen to highlight some Coalition politics in its latest statement (Voice of Jihad <a href="http://124.217.251.48/~alemarah/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1319:australia-and-canada-take-a-rationale-decision-after-holland&catid=3:comments&Itemid=4">here</a>, PDF at Scribd.com <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/28338141/Can-Aus-Nld-Voj-English-141055utc-Mar-10">here</a>).  The Taliban say it's good to see the Canadians, Aussies, and Dutch do what the Afghan people 'really want':

<blockquote>After the dissolution of Dutch government following its parliament’s  hot discussion  over   the American war in Afghanistan, now Canada and Australia have  decided to respect   views of their people for unconditional withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan .... After the dissolution of the Dutch government over the mission in Afghanistan. ,  where the parliament was not ready to extend the military mission in  the country , now the Australian and Canadian public have mounted   pressure on their  rulers to  pay respect to the people’s demand for withdrawal of  troops from Afghanistan and notify America and NATO  of their decision ....</blockquote>

In addition to highlighting the departure of various Coalition members from Afghanistan as a general way to slip a wedge between allies, the Taliban make an even more specific reference to the strategy of divide-and-conquer:

<blockquote>... There are many examples which indicate America overtly and covertly works against the stance of other countries because of its arrogance. They hurl hurdles in their ways. He further says whenever, French, Canada and German succeed in winning the hearts and minds of Afghans in a given  area of Afghanistan through reconstruction work and other humantarisian (sic.) activities, the Americans heavily bombard that area; they torture the  residents and launch night raids  on their houses . Thus they intentionally  create resentments and wrath among the people .... The Coalition members  want to pull out of  the country one after another because they know,  the current war in Afghanistan is only  aimed at securing  interests of Americans and Britains while other countries are being  used  as fodder of the cannon ....</blockquote>

I don't think this will make said countries reconsider their decisions to leave.  Still, the inter-Coalition animus is not exactly zero - note <a href="http://www.facebook.com/posted.php?id=207730000664&share_id=338215238724&comments=1#s338215238724">this from a Facebook posting</a> by embed writer/blogger Michael Yon, who is currently in Afghanistan:

<blockquote>Task Force Kandahar, responsible for security of the bridge that was blown up on Monday, happens to be under Canadian command. This is causing friction. The Canadian government has clearly signaled that it will quit Afghanistan, yet a Canadian General is commanding US combat forces and resources -- all while allowing... a strategically important bridge to be blown up .... Our combat soldiers should not be commanded from a country that is quitting the fight .... With our next big offensive set for Kandahar, command should be with British and U.S. forces. Canada needs to step out of the way.</blockquote>

As for Yon, while he may be channeling what the troops say on the ground, this and other foreign bashing (like <a href="http://www.facebook.com/posted.php?id=207730000664&share_id=10150125557785245&comments=1#s10150125557785245">his work on the Spanish in Afghanistan</a>) don't help Coalition relations. His efforts have been ably rebutted by various other observers: an embed with CanWest News Service <a href="http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Military+rebuffs+blogger+call+Canadian+general+fired/2636068/story.html">here</a>, as well as a former Canadian OMLT trainer at the Flit blog <a href="http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_03_11.html#006685">here</a>, <a href="http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_03_12.html#006686">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_03_14.html#006687">here</a>. 

As for the Taliban, we'll have to see whether they continue to attempt to drive wedges into ISAF.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/taliban_statements_and_wedges_1.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/taliban_statements_and_wedges_1.php</guid>
        
        
         <pubDate>Sun, 14 Mar 2010 07:01:58 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Steven Cook: What the neocons got right on Iran</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/10266/">Steven Cook</a> of the Council on Foreign Relations has written an interesting piece in <em>Foreign Policy</em> titled "<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/11/what_the_neocons_got_right?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full">What the Neocons Got Right</a>."  Toward the end of the article, Cook argues that the neoconservative's worldview of the Iranian regime has largely proven correct.  Cook writes:

<blockquote>It's hard to sign up with the folks who seem all too willing to bomb Iran, but like Syria, the neoconservatives have a well-grounded view of the Iranian regime. George H.W. Bush tried engagement (remember "Goodwill begets goodwill" in his inaugural address?), so did Bill Clinton, and now Barack Obama has offered a hand to the clerical regime.

Yet all three presidents have very little to show for their efforts. Why? Did they not engage enough? Did Bush, Clinton, and Obama engage incorrectly? Unlikely. Rather, one needs to look at the ontology -- yes, ontology, the metaphysical nature -- of the Iranian regime. The Islamic Republic was founded in many ways on opposition to the West, and in particular, the United States. A good portion of Iran's revolutionary narrative identifies the United States' perfidy in undermining the aspirations and identity of the Iranian people. The litany of Tehran's complaints against Washington is long. This is precisely why the Iranian leadership cannot make a deal with the United States. To do so would undermine the reason for the revolution and the Iranian leadership's own reason for being. The neoconservatives seem to have innately understood -- perhaps for different reasons -- that the Iranians were quite unlikely to respond to U.S. overtures. This doesn't mean that engagement is bad everywhere, even when it comes to Iran. The Obama administration may have been too sanguine about its ability to sway Iran's leadership, but the policy does serve an important purpose. Engagement demonstrates that, unlike with the run-up to the Iraq war, Washington is willing to exhaust every possible avenue to resolve its differences with Tehran before taking more punitive steps such as sanctions or even military action. </blockquote>

For more commentary on the revolutionary nature of both Iran's recent history and its political structure, read <a href="http://www.randomhouse.com/author/results.pperl?authorid=36661">Robert Baer's</a> <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Devil-We-Know-Dealing-Superpower/dp/0307408647"><em>The Devil We Know</em></a>.  Baer does a succinct job of arguing that much of Iran's political success is rooted in its anti-imperial rhetoric. Nations that have suffered from colonialism are attracted to Iran's defiance in standing up against the West's perceived "oppression."   ]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/steven_cook_what_the_neocons_g.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/steven_cook_what_the_neocons_g.php</guid>
        
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Iran</category>
        
         <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2010 10:50:40 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Lashkar-e-Taiba: Bad company</title>
         <description>Below is a statement from Representative Gary Ackerman, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, which was delivered at the opening of a hearing on the the threat of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba. Rep. Ackerman notes LeT&apos;s global reach and aspirations, and questions the US support for Pakistan and the billions of dollars in aid sent to the country even as it continues to back the LeT. </description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/lashkaretaiba_bad_company.php</link>
         <guid>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/lashkaretaiba_bad_company.php</guid>
        
                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Pakistan</category>
        
         <pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 2010 23:41:54 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>How not to wage a counterinsurgency</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<center><div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium">
<img alt="Pak-Peshawar-lashkar.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/Pak-Peshawar-lashkar.jpg" width="466" height="200" />
</td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium">  <p align="center" class="imagetext">The Adezai lashkar, just a few miles outside Peshawar. Image from the <em>BBC</em>.</td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center> 

Two of the major reasons the Awakenings were so successful in Iraqi's Anbar province and beyond were: 1) the Awakening received support from the Iraqi government and the US, to include military backup in case of an attack; and 2) there was close and continuous coordination between local Awakening movements and a larger Awakening structure.

Pakistan has attempted to battle the Taliban using local tribal militias, but so far Pakistan's attempts to utilize local militias have been haphazard at best, and even treacherous in some cases. <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8537127.stm">The <em>BBC</em> reports</a> that in one town outside Peshawar, the provincial capital of the Northwest Frontier Province, there is little coordination between the government and local militia:

<blockquote>The villagers are funding the militia out of their own pockets. "We give clothes, shoes and food to the volunteers," said Dilawar Khan. "Machine guns, ammunition, cars, we provide the lot. We buy the fuel for the vehicles."

"It's 18 months since we started this war," said Mr Khan. "And until now we haven't had a minute's help from the government."

While the Pakistani government supports lashkars in principal, in practice the Adezai lashkar has had little or no help. Mr Khan says their next battle will be with the authorities - to get them to play their part.

"We are fighting this war for the sake of our motherland," he said, "to protect our village, our tribe and our religion. But we cannot handle it alone." </blockquote>

There is "Taliban-held territory on three sides," the leader of the Lashkar told the <em>BBC</em>.  Again, this is just outside the provincial capital, Peshawar, which is only 15 miles away.  Keep that in mind when you hear the Pakistani military state that the Taliban have been defeated in the tribal areas and the NWFP.

Farther north, in Bajaur, where the Pakistani military claimed it has defeated the Taliban, a lashkar is being supported by the government. The Salarzai tribe, which previously accused the military of targeting its leaders at the behest of the Taliban, is now rampaging through the region and is <a href="http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/?page=2010\03\09\story_9-3-2010_pg1_6">torching scores of homes said to be owned by the Taliban</a> - more than 144 at <a href="http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/?page=2010\03\10\story_10-3-2010_pg7_7">last count</a>.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/how_not_to_wage_a_counterinsur.php</link>
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         <pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2010 09:13:17 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Walt on how not to contain Iran</title>
         <description><![CDATA[Harvard professor and <em>Foreign Policy</em> blogger <a href="http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/stephen-walt">Stephen Walt</a> published an <a href="http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/05/how_not_to_contain_iran">interesting piece</a> last Friday raising objections to the containment argument for Iran.  Responding to an article in <em>Foreign Affairs</em> by Ray Takeyh and James M. Lindsay titled "<a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66032/james-m-lindsay-and-ray-takeyh/after-iran-gets-the-bomb">After Iran Gets the Bomb</a>" (a shorter version appeared as an <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/19/AR2010021904255.html">op-ed</a> in the <em>Washington Post</em>), Walt offers seven rebuttals to the containment argument proposed by Takeyh and Lindsay:

<blockquote>1) First, [Takeyh's and Lindsay's] depiction of a swaggering Iran armed with nuclear weapons grossly overstates Iran's actual capabilities. According to the IISS Military Balance, Iran's military budget in 2008 was around $9.5 billion dollars (less than 2 percent of U.S. defense outlays) and Iran's actual capabilities reflects this paltry investment.

2) Second, Lindsey and Takeyh misunderstand the sources of U.S. credibility. The United States has been actively engaged in Persian Gulf security for decades, because Persian Gulf oil is a vital U.S. national interest. That vital interest won't change no matter what happens in Iran, which is why our local allies can count on us to back them up. The reason is simple: it is in our own self-interest. 

3) Third, they overstate Iran's capacity to subvert or blackmail its neighbors. Iran's capacity to export its version of Islamic fundamentalism has declined steadily since the 1979 revolution (and it wasn't very great back then), and the regime is a far less attractive model today than it was under the more charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini. 

4) Fourth, fears that Iran will give weapons or technology to terrorists are even more far-fetched. One cannot rule out the possibility that Iran might share nuclear technology with a few other governments (much as Pakistan did), but there are good reasons to doubt it. Among other things, it is hard to believe that Iran would want to see more countries get nuclear weapons, especially in its own region.

5) Fifth, Lindsay and Takeyh's redlines are too vague and elastic. The United States is already committed to opposing conventional aggression in the Gulf region (unless we're the ones doing it, of course), and U.S. leaders have already made it clear that they will respond to blackmail or nuclear use as well. As Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge, the United State remains a powerful presence in the Gulf region today and will stay there long after the withdrawal from Iraq is completed. In short, the essential ingredients of containment are already in place. 

6) Sixth, a hair-trigger, forward-leaning approach to containment will give Iran an obvious incentive to acquire a deterrent of its own. No matter how much they hedge, Lindsay and Takeyh are announcing to the world that Iran's acquisition of a small nuclear capability at some point in the future would have significant positive effects on its regional position.

7) Seventh...Lindsay and Takeyh never consider the one approach that might actually have some small chance of heading off an Iranian bomb. That approach would be to take the threat of regime change and preventive war off the table and accept Iran's enrichment program-on the strict condition that it ratifies and implements all elements of the NPT Additional Protocol. At the same time, the United States would engage in serious and sincere discussions about a range of regional security matters, including a public U.S. guarantee to forego regime change.</blockquote> 

Professor Walt offers some interesting rebuttals.  This positive exchange between competent scholars who happen to disagree will only serve to promote a prudent foreign policy towards Iran.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/walt_on_how_not_to_contain_ira.php</link>
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                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Iran</category>
        
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2010 11:38:02 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Second strike targets FIA in Multan, frees jihadists</title>
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While much of the news from Pakistan focused on <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/suicide_bomber_kills_30.php">the suicide attack that leveled the Federal Investigation Agency building in Lahore</a>, a second strike against the FIA took place under the radar. <a href="http://www.geo.tv/3-8-2010/60670.htm">According to <em>Geo News</em></a>, an assault team freed three dangerous terrorists from a police prison in Multan. The prisoners, who were not named, were in the custody of the FIA:

<blockquote>Unknown assailants stormed a police station and managed to secure the release of three arrested terrorists from the police custody.

Three policemen on duty there were wounded, including an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), police said.

Sources privy to police said that three terrorists, who were under FIA custody, were shifted to Multan a few days ago for further interrogation.

The highly dangerous terrorists were kept in the Purana Alpa Police Station, which came under attack by the unknown gunmen today morning.

As a result of the gun-battle, three policemen were injured while attackers fled the scene after taking the arrested terrorists with them.

Police sources said that they were arrested from Lahore.</blockquote>]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/second_strike_targets_fia_in_m.php</link>
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         <pubDate>Mon, 08 Mar 2010 19:04:55 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Transcript of Adam Gadahn&apos;s &apos;A Call to Arms&apos;</title>
         <description><![CDATA[<center><div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium">
<img alt="gadahn-03072010.JPG" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/gadahn-03072010.JPG" width="550" height="302" />
</td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium">  <p align="center" class="imagetext">Adam Gadahn, al Qaeda's American spokesman, from "A Call to Arms," a videotape released in March 2010.</td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center>

Below is the full transcript of Adam Gadahn's latest tape, " A Call to Arms." Gadahn, al Qaeda's American-born spokesman, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/american_al_qaeda_sp.php">is thought to have been captured</a> in Karachi on March 7, but <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/is_adam_gadahn_in_pakistani_cu.php">there is much controversy over the reports</a>. 

<blockquote>I seek refuge in Allah from Satan the Accursed. In the Name of Allah, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful:

“O you who believe! Fight the unbelievers who are closest in proximity to you and let them find harshness in you; and know that Allah is with those who fear Him.” (9:123)
Muslim brothers everywhere, as-Salaamu ‘Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakaatuh [peace be upon you and the mercy of Allah and His blessings]. Wa B’ad:

The year 2009, the inaugural year of a new administration in Washington, ended in a truly miserable fashion for the Crusader West and its intelligence organs, who suffered a series of moral and material blows which culminated in the bloody deaths of at least 8 CIA operatives in a masterfully-planned and executed martyrdom operation inside their clandestine base in Afghanistan. This crushing blow came just a few days after the compromising of America’s supposedly airtight security in a valiant attempt by a heroic soldier of al-Qaida to bring down an American airliner over Detroit. But I would like here to take you back to an earlier event, one whose hero wasn’t a member of al-Qaida or any other Islamic group, but was in fact, a ranking officer of the United States Army, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who, this past autumn, opened fire on a group of American soldiers preparing to deploy to Afghanistan deep within the army’s largest domestic base, Fort Hood, Texas. According to official army figures, at least 13 Crusaders were killed and more than 30 wounded in this surprise attack. Major Nidal Malik Hasan himself was shot, wounded and captured, and has had charges filed against him in a Crusader military court of inquisition in preparation for a summary show trial whose outcome is not in question.

America may let the thugs of Blackwater off the hook, and may give the depraved guards of Abu Ghraib and the homicidal gang-rapists of al-Miqdadiyah slaps on the wrist, but it goes without saying that such concessions don’t extend to defiant Muslim heroes like Major Nidal Malik Hasan. The fact is, the heroic Fort Hood operation opens up a host of new opportunities for discussion of the hypocrisy, hubris and less-than-wholesome aspects of the Western Crusader culture which bestows peace prizes on war presidents and condemns Christmas messages from captured American soldiers as cruel, even as it continues to torture and humiliate the Muslims and other prisoners in its own custody. However, in the interest of brevity, I will leave such topics for another day in favor of shining further light on the nature and motivations of the man behind this historic and trend-setting operation, our Mujahid brother Nidal Malik Hasan – Nahsabuhu Min as-Saaliheen wa La Nuzakeehi Ala Allah: We consider him to be a righteous man and we don’t purify him before Allah.

The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan has shown us what one righteous Muslim with an assault rifle can do for his religion and brothers in faith, and has reminded us of how much pride and joy a single act of resistance and courage can instill in the hearts of Muslims everywhere. The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan, by the grace of Allah and with a single 30-minute battle, singlehandedly brought the morale of the American military and public to its lowest point in years. The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan, lightly armed but with a big heart, a strong will and a confident step, again brought into sharp focus the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of America, and again proved wrong those who claim America cannot be hit where it hurts. And most significantly, the Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan is a pioneer, a trailblazer and a role-model who has opened a door, lit a path and shown the way forward for every Muslim who finds himself among the unbelievers and yearns to discharge his duty to Allah and play a part in the defense of Islam and Muslims against the savage, heartless and bloody Zionist Crusader assault on our religion, sacred places and homelands.

Just as significant and just as deserving of contemplation and emulation as what the defiant Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan did is what he didn’t do. Courageous Brother Nidal didn’t give the orders of men priority over the orders of Allah, nor did he fear the wrath of men more than the wrath of Allah. Nahsabahu wa Allahu Haseebuh [We reckon him so and Allah is his Reckoner]. And defiant Brother Nidal didn’t make the youthful mistake he made in joining the American army an excuse for making the mistake of a lifetime and taking part in the fighting and killing of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq or anywhere else. This is why I believe that defiant Brother Nidal is the ideal role-model for every repentant Muslim in the armies of the unbelievers and apostate regimes who, like him, has come to the correct collusion that true Islam isn’t in a name or a set of rituals but in fact is in total submission and obedience to Allah and total disobedience to and disassociation from the unbelievers. When Brother Nidal was issued orders which conflicted with Islamic doctrine and values, he resisted them until the last bullet and thereby broke the mold of the mindlessly obedient soldier, a mold preferred and cultivated by the militaries of the world but totally rejected by Islam, which says loudly and clearly: La Ta’ata Li Makhlooqin Fi Ma’siyat al-Khaaliq – Obedience to a Created Being in Disobedience to the Creator is Impermissible. 

Not only did defiant Brother Nidal break free of the influence of the unbelievers he had grown up and worked with and served under,  he also broke free of the evil influence of the anti-Jihad, pro-Crusade Shaykhs and Muftis who attempt to legitimize the killing of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere using the flimsiest pretexts and excuses imaginable. Defiant Brother Nidal didn’t try to silence his conscience or justify obeying his commanders and remaining in the ranks of the unbelievers with those Shaykhs’ scandalous Fatwas which permit the impermissible, prohibit the obligatory and condone the murder of Muslims in the name of fighting terrorism, or in the name of protecting salary and position, or in the name of preserving the good reputation of American Muslims and dispelling any doubts about their patriotism and loyalty to America. Brother Nidal didn’t try to hide behind such ridiculous excuses because he knew that – however many famous signatures it might carry and whatever fancy title it might have – no Fatwa in this world can possibly justify breaking the clear, unambiguous and agreed-upon laws of the Shari’ah, like the law forbidding the killing of Muslims or the law ordering loyalty to the believers and disloyalty to the unbelievers, and he knew that on the day of Judgement, all the Ulama, Mullas, Muftis and Imams of this world put together would be incapable of saving him from divine retribution were he to have blindly followed their permissions and prohibitions in contravention of what he knew – in his heart of hearts and through honest research and careful study – to be Allah’s ruling and decree.

I believe that Brother Nidal realized that the insults, accusations, imprisonment, loneliness and other difficulties that one might face during or after one’s mission are insignificant when compared to the punishment Allah has threatened – in numerous places in the Quran and Hadeeth – for those who abandon compulsory Hijra and Jihad despite them having access to the necessary ways and means. But at the same time, I believe Brother Nidal realized that Islam neither calls for nor approves of hasty, reckless and poorly planned actions, and that’s why he acted with caution and took the necessary steps in order to avoid repeating the mistakes others have made in operational and procedural matters. For example, Brother Nidal didn’t – as far as we know – discuss his plans over government-monitored-and-controlled telephone and computer systems, nor did he confide his secrets to recent acquaintances – or even long-time acquaintances – whose professed loyalty to Islam and Muslims and apparent eagerness to defend their faith and brethren may or may not be as strong or as genuine as it appears. Brother Nidal wasn’t taken in by the provocateurs who infiltrate the Masjids and Muslim communities of America with hidden microphones in order to entrap Muslims eager to perform the duty of Jihad. And Brother Nidal didn’t unnecessarily raise his security profile or waste money better spent on the operation itself by traveling abroad to acquire skills and instructions which could easily be acquired at home, or indeed, deduced by using one’s own powers of logic and reasoning.

For example, the first thing many people often ask is: “What weapon should I use in my operation?” But the answer to this question – and it’s an important question – is not as difficult as it may seem. The Mujahid Brother Nidal Hasan used firearms in his assault on Fort Hood, but the fact is, today’s Mujahid is no longer limited to bullets and bombs when it comes to his choice of a weapon. As the blessed operations of September 11th showed, a little imagination and planning and a minimal budget can turn almost anything into a deadly, effective and convenient weapon which can take the enemy by surprise and deprive him of sleep for years on end.

Another important and often intimidating stage of preparation for any operation is the targeting phase. When the time came to pick his target, the Mujahid Brother Nidal chose carefully, looking for a target with which he was well acquainted, a target which was feasible and a target whose hitting would have a major impact on the enemy. In Brother Nidal’s case, these three important qualities came together in Fort Hood, but as you start to make your plans, you shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking that military bases are the only high-value targets in America and the West. On the contrary, there are countless other strategic places, institutions and installations which, by striking, the Muslim can do major damage to the Crusader West and further our global agenda and long-range strategic objectives.

We must look to further undermine the West’s already-struggling economies with carefully-timed-and-targeted attacks on symbols of capitalism which will again shake consumer confidence and stifle spending. We must keep in mind how even apparently unsuccessful attacks on Western mass transportation systems can bring major cities to a halt, cost the enemy billions and send his corporations into bankruptcy. We must erode our cowardly enemy’s will to fight by killing and capturing leading Crusaders and Zionists in government, industry and media who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk and are only interested in prosecuting their profitable wars as long as it’s other people who are in the line of fire and not them. We should look for targets which epitomize Western decadence, depravity, immorality and atheism, targets which the enemy and his mouthpieces will have trouble trying to pass off to the conservative Muslim majority as illegitimate targets full of innocent people. And finally, we mustn’t allow our lawless enemies to provoke us with their evil, sadistic and murderous crimes into crossing the boundaries laid down by Allah and His Prophet or doing anything which may have negative repercussions on the image of the Jihad and reputation of the Mujahideen.

We must always remember that our role models aren’t our enemies: our role models are the Prophet, His Companions and the righteous and God-fearing Mujahideen. We must always remember that we are different than the Zionists and Crusaders with whom we are locked in combat: We are not outlaws. We are not gangsters. We are not hypocrites. We are not barbarians. We are not opportunists and mercenaries. We are not enemies of freedom and civilization. We are not cowards who wage wars from behind the controls of pilotless aircraft. In other words, everything our enemies are, we are not, and everything we are, they are not.  We are people of courage, honor, decency, chivalry and ethics who selflessly sacrifice themselves for the noblest cause on earth, and that is why every Muslim and every Mujahid must continue to take the high road and protect the moral high ground which we have fought so long and hard to secure.

My dear brothers in Islam: with America and 25 of its NATO allies beginning to deploy a further 37,000 occupation troops to Afghanistan, and with armed American drones now violating Islamic airspace and terrorizing Muslim populaces from Miran Shah to Mogadishu, and with the American war president and his rabid British poodle plotting fresh aggression against the Yemen, and with the United States consolidating its cruel treatment of our brothers in Islam at new or newly expanded Muslim-only concentration camps in Illinois, Bagram and elsewhere, it is rapidly becoming clear that this already hot global battle is about to get even hotter.

This is a war which knows no international borders and no single battleground, and that’s why I am calling on every honest and vigilant Muslim in the countries of the Zionist-Crusader alliance in general and America, Britain and Israel in particular to prepare to play his due role in responding to and repelling the aggression of the enemies of Islam. This is the golden, once in a lifetime opportunity to reap the rewards of Jihad and martyrdom we have been waiting for, so unsheathe your sharpened sword and rush to take your rightful place among defiant champions of Islam like Mir Aimal Kansi, Muhammad Bouyeri, Nidal Malik Hasan and many others like them: “Men who have been true to their covenant with Allah; of them some have been martyred and some are still waiting; but they have never changed in the least.” (33:23)

My Muslim brother: Jihad is neither the personal property nor the exclusive responsibility of any single group, organization or individual. Instead, it is the personal duty of every able-bodied Muslim on the face of this earth, until the last Muslim captive is freed and the last piece of occupied Islamic land is recovered and until Muslims live in safety and security in the benevolent shadow of the Islamic state. Allah subhaanahu wa ta’ala has given you faculties of reason, judgement and choice within the guidelines of Islam, and it is for you – like your heroic Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan – to decide how, when and where you discharge this duty. But whatever you do, don’t wait for tomorrow to do what can be done today, and don’t wait for others to do what you can do yourself:“So fight (O Muhammad Sallallahu Alayhi Wa Sallam) in Allah's Cause – you are held responsible only for yourself – and rouse the believers. Allah will restrain the might of the unbelievers. And Allah is strongest in might and strongest in punishment.” (4:84)

Thank you for watching, and may Allah guide your steps. Wa as-Salaam ‘Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakaatuh.</blockquote>]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/transcript_of_adam_gadahns_a_c.php</link>
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                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Al Qaeda</category>
        
         <pubDate>Mon, 08 Mar 2010 02:48:44 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Is Adam Gadahn in Pakistani custody? Depends who you ask</title>
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Earlier today, reports from Pakistan indicated that American turncoat and traitor Adam Gadahn <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/american_al_qaeda_sp.php">was detained </a>in a Pashtun neighborhood in Karachi. Now, some news outlets are saying this is a case of mistaken identity, and that either a Taliban or an al Qaeda leader named Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al Adam was actually the one captured. 

So far, some of the media outlets in the “Gadahn’s captured” camp are:

• <em>McClatchy</em>:  <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/07/89968/pakistanis-say-theyve-arrested.html">Pakistan says it's arrested al Qaida's American mouthpiece</a>
• <em>The Associated Press</em>: <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100308/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan_al_qaida_arrest;_ylt=Arrs7z84OzHzUzRiIMoYbAxvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTJzZmtmYzhqBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTAwMzA4L2FzX3Bha2lzdGFuX2FsX3FhaWRhX2FycmVzdARjcG9zAzEEcG9zAzIEc2VjA3luX3RvcF9zdG9yeQRzbGsDb2ZmaWNlcnNwYWtp">Officers: Pakistan detains American-born al-Qaida</a>
• <em>Reuters</em>: <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6261SB20100308">Pakistanis "arrest American al Qaeda spokesman"</a>
• <em>Dawn</em>: <a href="http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/22-intelligence-agencies-arrested-al-qaeda-commander-abu-yahya-in-karachi-03-aj">Top Al Qaeda leader reported held in Karachi</a>
• <em>Geo News</em>: <a href="http://www.geo.tv/3-8-2010/60612.htm">Al-Qaeda most wanted Adam Yahiye Gadahn held in Karachi</a>
• <em>The Los Angeles Times</em>:  <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-al-qaeda-arrest8-2010mar08,0,2316889.story">Californian militant arrested?</a>

And some the media outlets in the “case of mistaken identity” camp are:

• <em>ABC News</em>: <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/american-al-qaeda-arested-gadahn-pakistan-official/story?id=10035076">Pakistan Arrests American Al Qaeda Member, Identity Not Confirmed</a>
• <em>CBS News</em>: <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/07/world/main6275953.shtml">Arrested al Qaeda Member May be American</a>
• <em>The Wall Street Journal</em>:  <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703936804575107173763978964.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_news">Taliban Leader Arrested in Pakistan</a>
• <em>The New York Times</em>: <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/asia/08qaeda.html?hp">Qaeda Operative Arrested in Pakistan</a>

So what camp does <em>The Long War Journal</em> fall under? Undecided. I’ve watched this bizarre version of the game of Where’s Waldo? play out in Pakistan far too long to accept any report as solid at first glance. Unless it’s an official confirmation from al Qaeda or the Taliban, or we're staring at a picture or video of a corpse, the initial reports have to be filed under ‘thought to have been killed/captured.’ 

In this case, you still have Pakistani intelligence officials telling the wire services Gadahn is indeed in custody. Even US officials are divided on the reports, but most are skeptical. It would be helpful if Pakistan released a photo and provided access to the suspect and DNA to the US to confirm or deny.]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/is_adam_gadahn_in_pakistani_cu.php</link>
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                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Al Qaeda</category>
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         <pubDate>Sun, 07 Mar 2010 23:20:44 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Iraq&apos;s election  day</title>
         <description><![CDATA[Heavy turnout is being reported in Iraq's parliamentary elections today, despite inevitable insurgent attempts to cow voters with violence. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html?pagewanted=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1268002859-OoMARvxKasrzuBGAZHhUoQ">The New York Times</a>:

<blockquote>Insurgents here vowed to disrupt the election, and the concerted wave of attacks — as many as 100 thunderous blasts in the capital alone starting just before the polls opened — did frighten voters away, but only initially. The shrugging response of voters could signal a fundamental weakening of the insurgency’s potency. 

At least 38 people were killed in Baghdad. But at the end of the day, turnout was reported to be higher than expected, and certainly higher than in the last parliamentary election in 2005, marred by a similar level of violence. </blockquote>

From a security perspective, no spectacular SVBIED attacks is the lede:

<blockquote>The extensive use of mortars and rockets suggested that a weakened insurgency had to shift tactics, perhaps because they were unable to maneuver cars or suicide bombers into the cities because of the intense security lockdown, with checkpoints erected every few hundred yards in some places. </blockquote>

From a political perspective, high turnout plus a nail-biter of an election are the stories of the day:

<blockquote>Despite a long delay, disputes over candidates’ qualifications, arrests, assassinations and finally an all-out assault by insurgents on Sunday morning, the election took place with only a few reports of irregularities. And by Sunday night, something rare was emerging in a region dominated by authoritarian governments: an election cliffhanger. 

Official results are not expected for days, but after the polls closed at 5 p.m., party leaders said two coalitions seem to have fared best: the one led by Prime Minister Nouri Kamal al Maliki, who has campaigned for a second time on improved security in Iraq, and another led by the former interim leader, Ayad Allawi, who has promised to overcome Iraq’s sectarian divides. </blockquote>

It's of course too early to tell, but if true, these not unexpected results strike me as ironic, given the way sectarian religious parties have continued to suck up so much of the media oxygen in the past few years. An Iraqi government that forces Maliki and Allawi to come to terms with each other is one the United States, the region, and especially Iraq can move forward with. Regardless of the pending outcome, three cheers for the brave men and women who stepped out to vote today. Good luck, Iraq! بالتوفيق]]></description>
         <link>http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/iraqi_election_day_1.php</link>
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                  <category domain="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag">Iraq</category>
        
         <pubDate>Sun, 07 Mar 2010 18:20:09 -0500</pubDate>
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