(2)Wikileaks, Afghanistan, & Pakistan on NPR
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Earlier today I spent an hour with NPR's Marty Moss-Coane at the WHYY studio in Philadelphia. Lawrence Korb also joined the conversation.
We discussed the Wikileaks documents, the impact on national security, and the danger to US troops and to Afghans who have cooperated. Interestingly enough, Marty and I agreed that the release of documents is indeed a danger to Afghans and Coalition forces, while Lawrence disagreed. We also discussed Pakistan's role in the Afghan insurgency and negotiations with the Taliban.
READER COMMENTS: "Wikileaks, Afghanistan, & Pakistan on NPR"
Posted by ArneFufkin at August 2, 2010 4:42 PM ET:
Lawrence Korb is wrong about everything.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-Iw0AxZkho&feature=channel
Posted by Neo at August 3, 2010 9:55 AM ET:
ArneFufkin
It's not a Lawrence Korb problem. He just repeats the prevailing academic appraisal of the situation at any given time. The prevailing academic appraisal often gets a few things right but mostly gets it wrong. The central problem is the academic community has a very strong activist core and much of the debate is very politically charged and biased. You get a lot of gross preconceived notions and filtering so that conclusions fit agendas.
Among the gross preconceived notions included in the NPR discussions, was the notion of a "golden hour of opportunity" right after the Initial success of the US and Northern Alliance in pushing Al Qaeda and the Taliban across the border in retreat. It contends that we had a golden opportunity to wipe out Al Qaeda at this point, but failed because attention was diverted toward Iraq. I will grant them that Iraq was an enormous complicating factor, and as a general rule you should never start a second war when you already have one to tend to.
The problem with the notion of a "golden hour" is that it completely ignores the prevailing conditions within Pakistan. One of the first reactions counter to the US invasion came in the form of large gains for conservative religious parties in the Pakistani parliamentary election in the fall of 2002. This was followed by a successful Pashtoon insurrection within Pakistan's Northwest Territories. Much of the Pakistani populous was initially sympathetic to the insurrection including much of the lower ranks within the Pakistani military establishment. The plunge in popularity of Pervez Musharraf was directly related to his cooperation with the US. My point is, everything is in place for a successful comeback for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since most of this was happening across the border in Pakistan, increased US interference would not have been at all welcome. The US could have increased security within Afghanistan but the Taliban wouldn't really start to project across the border for another few years anyway.
The ironic part is a big push by the US directed at Pakistan during the "golden hour" could easily have antagonized the Pakistani's to the breaking point. We need to remember that the United States played a prominent role in setting up a presidential election which led to a second government sympathetic to US interests. Had the US pressed the Pakistani's further about the situation in Western Pakistan it quite likely would have created an open political backlash, rather than stop a Taliban resurgence. What eventually soured the Pakistani population to the Taliban was indiscriminant brutality. That process took time to play out though.