Over the Memorial Day weekend, the United Nations' IAEA Board of Governors released an update on their monitoring of Iran's nuclear program. David Albright and his colleagues at the Institute for Science and International Security have some great analysis of the report here.

Below is an abridged version of the IAEA's conclusions [emphasis mine]:

37. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

38. More specifically, Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran's nuclear programme and to resolving outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Iran also needs to implement the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

39. In addition, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of FEP and PFEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran's enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at PFEP, and its subsequent plan to use two cascades that will be interconnected, necessitated a new safeguards approach, which is now being implemented. In order to verify the chronology and original purpose of FFEP, Iran still needs to provide the Agency with access to relevant design documents and to companies involved in the design of the plant. Iran also needs to submit a complete DIQ for the facility. Iran has also announced that it has selected the venues for new nuclear sites and that construction of these sites is underway, but has not provided the Agency with the necessary relevant information and access in accordance with Iran's Safeguards Agreement.

40. Similarly, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and with heavy water related activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.