4 Threat Matrix: Haqqani and Hekmatyar are 'absolutely salvageable'?

Written by Bill Roggio on March 14, 2010 11:08 AM to 4 Threat Matrix

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/03/haqqani_and_hekmatyar_are_abso.php

Robert Kaplan's overview of Afghanistan in the April 2010 edition of The Atlantic makes some extremely controversial statements about reconciliation with the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. According to the article, top ISAF officers and advisers believe that the Taliban have become "kinder" and "gentler," while Jalaluddin Haqqani, the patriarch of the Haqqani Network, and Hekmatyar are considered "absolutely salvageable." The full paragraph is on page five:

A deal with the insurgents constitutes another part of a withdrawal strategy. While becoming more organizationally formidable since 9/11, the Taliban have also modified their behavior. Mullah Omar has sent out a directive banning beheadings and unauthorized kidnappings as well as other forms of violent and criminal activity, according to both Al-Jazeera and ISAF officials. "In a way, we're seeing a kinder, gentler Taliban," said both Commander Eggers and General Flynn. Moreover, in working with the tribes in the spirit of Churchill's Malakand Field Force, Flynn, the intelligence chief, went so far as to suggest that the insurgent leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are both "absolutely salvageable." "The HIG already have members in Karzai's government, and it could evolve into a political party, even though Hekmatyar may be providing alQaeda leaders refuge in Kunar. Hekmatyar has reconcilable ambitions. As for the Haqqani network, I can tell you they are tired of fighting, but are not about to give up. They have lucrative business interests to protect: the road traffic from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Central Asia." Lamb, the former SAS commander, added: "Haqqani and Hekmatyar are pragmatists tied to the probability of outcomes. With all the talk of Islamic ideology, this is the land of the deal."

Let's leave the double-dealing and opportunistic Hekmatyar aside, as history has proven he's out for what's best for him. (By the way, how exactly does that make him reconcilable anyway, unless you believe that reconciliation is all about paying off an insurgent actor?). Also, Kaplan misrepresented the nature of HIG, as it is a splinter of the Hezb-i-Islami political party, which has already reconciled with the government.

The Haqqani Network is by far the most dangerous Taliban group in Afghanistan and is the most closely allied to al Qaeda. For all intents and purposes, the Haqqani Network is al Qaeda's Afghan branch. Siraj Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son, sits on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis.

So what would have happened if in 2007, at the beginning of the surge, top US military commanders had claimed that the top leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al Sunnah (or Ansar al Islam, depending on the month) were "absolutely salvageable?" Would such a statement have inspired confidence that the military understood the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, or that the Iraqi surge was on the right path to success?