(6)Al Qaeda's Shadow Army makes the news
Eight months after The Long War Journal broke the news on the existence of al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, the Associated Press picked up on the role the terror army plays in Afghanistan, and mentioned the Lashkar al Zil by name. In an article titled "Al-Qaida showing smaller presence in Afghanistan," the AP quoted Dr. Brian Glynn Williams' report at The Jamestown Foundation, titled "Death from the Skies: An Overview of the CIA's Drone Campaign in Pakistan - Part One" and published on Sept. 25, 2009. Dr. Williams identified the Lashkar al Zil by name, and also identified Khalid Habib as the former commander. These two facts were first reported by The Long War Journal but were not cited in the Jamestown report.
While it is certainly good to see al Qaeda's Shadow Army finally getting the press it deserves -- particularly as the debate over al Qaeda's involvement in Afghanistan is raging and will shape future policy -- it would be nice to see LWJ get proper credit for its contributions.
While most news organizations have fairly and properly cited LWJ reports (and these citations are in turn recognized in the "LWJ in the News" section on the front page), there has been a systematic problem with other analysts, organizations, and even academics using LWJ's research and analysis without attribution. For instance, this analysis by Dr. Chris Mason published at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute makes arguments identical to those provided here at LWJ on the very esoteric issue of the infighting between Mullah Nazir and the Uzbeks in 2007 and 2008 in South Waziristan. There is very little chance that two people could draw the exact same conclusions on this issue. Yet LWJ was not cited.
LWJ is a small shoestring operation that depends on recognition of its contributions and the support such recognition brings to stay afloat. A question for readers with knowledge of the publishing world: What do you think is the most effective way to ensure that LWJ is given proper credit, such as the credit given the New York Times or AFP (both of which are cited directly in Williams' report)? And how would you handle instances of inadequate citation, or worse?
Update:
Dr. Williams responded to an intrepid reader's email (thanks A Mac!), which was posted in the comments section. Many thanks to Dr. Williams for acknowledging and addressing the problem. Here is the reply:
"I have found the Long War Journal's study on Predator drones to be a gold mine of hitherto unreported information and found it be incredibly useful in writing my own article. I cited it in my original article but the editors at Jamestown Foundation removed my citation when it went to press. For this you have my sincerest apologies. I am writing up a more extensive version of the article and will certainly insist that your article gets credit there. Many thanks for your ground breaking work."
READER COMMENTS: "Al Qaeda's Shadow Army makes the news"
Posted by A Mackay at October 7, 2009 7:09 AM ET:
From: A Mackay
Date: October 7, 2009
To: sxxxxxxxt@hxxxxxl.com, bxxxxxxxs@uxxxxd.edu
Cc: Bill Roggio
Subject: Query about attributions of "Long War Journal" contributions
Dear Dr. Mason and Dr. Williams,
I am a reader of the web-log "Long War Journal," which offers news and analysis of events in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other areas of operation of Al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist organizations. In a post today, author Bill Roggio mentions a recent analysis by each of you. He suggests that citation of the Long War Journal as the primary source of certain key but obscure facts might have been appropriate for both pieces.
Roggio maintains a moderated Comments section for each entry; I have submitted a copy of this email under "Al Qaeda's Shadow Army makes the news" (October 7, 2009 12:06 AM). It can be accessed here.
I would be very grateful if you could review his blog post, and offer a response in that forum.
Posted by M at October 7, 2009 9:05 AM ET:
Keep up the good work Bill!
You should consider taking out a full page ad in the NY Times or USA Today. I doubt the NYT will give you the discount it gave MoveOn.org for its disgusting Petraeus smear campaign, but it's worth consideration.
Posted by A Mackay at October 7, 2009 10:35 AM ET:
Prof. Brian Glyn Williams emailed the following to me, and asked me to submit it here:
"I have found the Long War Journal's study on Predator drones to be a gold mine of hitherto unreported information and found it be incredibly useful in writing my own article. I cited it in my original article but the editors at Jamestown Foundation removed my citation when it went to press. For this you [Bill Roggio] have my sincerest apologies. I am writing up a more extensive version of the article and will certainly insist that your article gets credit there. Many thanks for your ground breaking work."
Posted by Neo at October 7, 2009 11:03 AM ET:
On the topic of "the shadow army"¯ and Al Qaeda's supporting cadre.
The thing that really amazes me is how many of the political advisors who make there living analyzing these things, still can't recognize Al Qaeda's "cadre"¯ organizational structure, when they see it. The cadre structure is nothing new. We've been dealing with adversaries that have been using roughly the same type of organizational structure in conflicts around the globe for almost a century now. This time instead of overlaying a cadre structure over nationalist regional and ethnic political rivalries, Al Qaeda chooses a more feudal tribal structure adapted to Afghanistan's cultural setting and history. It's still a modern cadre structure even with the cultural trappings.
The ideological core of Al Qaeda may indeed be small, but they have gathered to them a large accumulation of preexisting militant groups and remnants of groups to effectively serve as the larger operational core. Al Qaeda has evolved into a conglomeration of ideological co-travelers. Through these core groups they can disperse cadre tasked with support and monitor local Taliban. These might be tactical and arms specialists, bomb experts, political organizers and dealmakers, or ideological and religious cadre to keep the locals in line. By all evidence, the various Taliban elements still form an ideologically cohesive and effective political structure. The ideological movement has yet to show significant cracks.
I keep hearing the talking heads on TV speculating about regional independent Taliban organizations. Apparently, a lot of people have themselves convinced that the Taliban consists of local independent entities that are not ideologically and physically plugged into the Al Qaeda parent organization. The evidence so far is that local Taliban factions are still very much caught up in Al Qaeda's ideological movement. Local groups are still supported and tightly controlled by a small elite using and extensive network of supporting cadre.
Often in assessments, the whole ideological nature of the Taliban is often ignored or rejected. The cadre model gets pushed aside with preference given to tribal models. Much of this nonsense about independent Taliban organizations with local loyalties grows out of this belief that local ethnic and tribal bonds eventually override outside ideological influences. Let's face it, many academics feel more comfortable with models that emphasize local tribal loyalties and boundaries of ethnicity. Many people just don't want to deal with an aggressive ideological movement, so they downplay and ignore the ideological nature of the Taliban.
Rather than take the Taliban at face value, many analysts and would rather substitute lazy clichés about independent local warlords. Besides, cadre organizational models are considered too "cold war"¯ and intellectually passé, to be seriously applied to Afghanistan. Maybe after a century of fighting horrendous ideological wars, we would rather just stick out heads in the sand this time around.
Don't count on local tribal loyalties overriding anything in the short term. The Afghani people aren't so primitive or tribal that they can't import ideological movements. Evidence strongly suggests that the locals are quite aware of the international nature of the Islamist cause.
Posted by Render at October 8, 2009 8:42 AM ET:
Neo:
"Apparently, a lot of people have themselves convinced that the Taliban consists of local independent entities that are not ideologically and physically plugged into the Al Qaeda parent organization."
Absolutely, however, keep in mind that there are more then a few people who are intellectually wedded to that fraudulent narrative. For whatever reasons, (political, financial, lack of education on the subject), they have irrevocably bound themselves to the "independent stateless grass roots noble freedom fighter"¯ meme. Too let go of that meme now would be to invalidate all of the arguments, insults, and innuendo they've flung so carelessly about the place over the last eight years.
Of course, they've been invalidating all their other anti-war memes at a rapid rate since last November, so what's one more?
=
M: Full page NYSlimes ad, not a bad idea, assuming they'd accept it for publication. They wouldn't, at any price.
=
IZZAT
YOU,
R
Posted by Neo at October 9, 2009 11:38 AM ET:
Render said: "they have irrevocably bound themselves to the "independent stateless grass roots noble freedom fighter"¯ meme."¯
Not this time. The freedom fighter meme was applied to the Iraqi resistance in Anbar. Of course it fell apart when the locals started switching sides and directly reporting how Al Qaeda in Iraq had made their lives a living hell. It really sucks when your whole narrative implodes and the freedom fighters switch sides and start cooperating with the US Army.
The current meme is one of engagement, accommodation, elimination of misunderstanding, and negotiation. The motivations are different this time around. The Obama administration is full of highly educated people who strongly believe in reason over force. They didn't get their graduate and post-graduate degrees so we could violently grind out a dirty war with religious ideologs and extremists.
Such aspirations toward peace are all well and fine, if you actually have a little something to work with. Negotiating with entrenched ideologues who are disgusted at our very existence might present a special challenge. If the other side is only interested in concessions, than instead of real negotiation than in the end you are merely arranging a capitulation by small steps. At this point even finding someone willing to negotiate from the "local Taliban"¯ is completely hypothetical.
Also notice that there is no talk of political Islam or no use of the controversial term "Islamist"¯. You won't hear much talk about Wahhabis, or Deobandis, or Qutabists, or The Muslim Brotherhood. No talk of unmoving and entrenched extremists. No talk about enemies, or jihad, or madmen flying planes into skyscrapers. We'll talk about grievances and misunderstandings and how we have wronged them all. Call it all a "rhetorical disengagement"¯ if you like.
Perhaps this all would all be easier if we could dig up a pair of ruby slippers and chant "there's no place like home"¯ while tapping them together, than we can get ourselves directly back to the Kansas farm, without worrying ourselves about a middle game or the end game.