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As Ethiopian forces continue to press their offensive in Somalia, Shabaab forces have relinquished control of a key southern city that has been under the terror group's control for three years.

Fighters from Shabaab, al Qaeda's affiliate in eastern Africa, today abandoned Baidoa, the provincial capital of Bay, as large numbers of Ethiopian troops backed by Somali forces advanced on the city from the west. Shabaab is also reported to have withdrawn from Bardere, which is southwest of Baidoa. A Shabaab spokesman confirmed that Shabaab withdrew from Baidoa but claimed the terror group would fight to retake it.

"Our fighters left town this morning without fighting. Now we are surrounding the town," Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab told Reuters. "Baidoa will be a cemetery for the Ethiopians."

Shabaab seized Baidoa in January 2009 after Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country. One month later, Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's emir, praised Shabaab for taking control of Baidoa. Prior to their withdrawal, Ethiopian forces had occupied much of southern and central Somalia after ousting the Islamic Courts Union from power in early 2007. And Baidoa had served as the capital of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, from 2006 until the Shabaab takeover in January 2009.

The recent loss of Baidoa has put Shabaab on the defensive. The terror group is being pressed by African Union and Ethiopian forces on three fronts. In addition to Ethiopia's advance from the west, Burundian and Ugandan forces have taken control of Mogadishu after Shabaab abandoned much of the city last summer, and are slowly pressing westward to Afgoye, a Shabaab stronghold just 15 miles outside of the capital.

In the south, Kenyan forces are slowly moving northward toward the Shabaab strongholds of Afmadow and the port city of Kismayo. Kenyan troops have been fighting in Somalia since mid-October, and have only advanced to about 40 miles inside the country.

Shabaab still controls other major towns and cities along the coast between Kismayo and Mogadishu, including Jilib, Baraawe, and Merca. Shabaab recently held parades and celebrations in many of these towns after announcing its official merger with al Qaeda on Feb. 9. One day later, Shabaab's affiliate in Kenya, the Muslim Youth Center, also said it has become "part of al Qaeda East Africa."

Despite Shabaab's recent setbacks in Somalia, US intelligence officials who follow the terror group closely said that even if it loses many of the cities and towns it currently controls, the group still will remain a threat and will be capable of retaking lost ground after the African Union forces leave.

"Shabaab has been in this situation before when it was part of the Islamic Courts back in 2007 up until when the group fractured in 2009," one official told The Long War Journal. "As soon as Ethiopian troops left, the TFG [Somalia's Transitional Federal Government] couldn't hold its ground."

The officials cited a lack of unity among Somali factions, corruption, poorly trained security forces, and sympathetic elements within the government as reasons to be pessimistic about the government's chances to hold the ground seized by the foreign forces. One official also said that Shabaab has staying power and is committed to the cause of jihad at all costs.

"Ultimately Shabaab is committed to its cause, and it won't give up easily," the official said. "To them, these setbacks are temporary. They'll switch from an active insurgency to a guerrilla campaign of terror attacks and assassinations when they need to, and they'll ride out the 'Christian occupiers' to take on the weak government," the official said, referring to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti, whose troops have been battling Shabaab.

Sinan Tekin, a Turkish national who was known as Emir Yunis and Abu Yunis Turki. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

A Turkish jihadist Internet forum announced the death of a military commander who was killed in the Waziristan tribal areas by Pakistani forces more than two years ago.

The Cihad forum eulogized Sinan Tekin, a Turkish national who was known as Emir Yunis and Abu Yunis Turki, in a statement that was released on Feb. 4 and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group. Yunis "set out to participate in jihad" in June 2005 "with help from a mujahid friend of his," the statement said.

"His jihadi life in Afghanistan began with military training," the statement continued. "He participated in operations with the group to which he was affiliated, and he increased his operations with his work. He improved himself and took part in many raids, and he became an expert in many heavy weapons and rocket launchers."

Yunis served under the command of Sheikh Abu Omar, and after time was named as the group's "military commander and as Abu Omar's deputy."

Yunis was killed on July 28, 2009 along with four other fighters, who were identified as Samil Aga, Yusuf, Cendel, and Salahuddin, as they were "passing through the ceasefire area," which is a reference to either North or South Waziristan. The Pakistani military has signed peace agreements with powerful Taliban groups led by Siraj Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan and by Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan.

Turkish jihadists affiliated with both al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network are known to fight in southeastern Afghanistan. On Nov. 30, 2011, Gazavat Media, a jihadist propaganda website that caters to Turkish jihadists belonging to the Taifatul Mansura, or the Victorious Sect, released a statement that announced the deaths of 21 "Turkish mujahideen affiliated with the Haqqani group," according to the SITE Intelligence Group.

In a separate statement released on Nov. 28, Gazavat Media said that another Turkish fighter was killed in a US Predator airstrike in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan.

"The mujahid of Turkish citizenship, who fought with the Haqqani group known as the Pakistani Taliban, was reported to have been affiliated with the group for the last three years," according to the Nov. 28 statement, which was translated by SITE. "The sources have reported that the Turkish citizen, M.E., who was martyred in a house hit by NATO drones, resided in Istanbul and was a registered resident of Gaziantep."

A number of al Qaeda-linked groups from outside Afghanistan and Pakistan flock to the region, and are known to fight alongside the Haqqani Network. Among those groups are the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and its offshoot, the Islamic Jihad Union; the Caucasus Mujahideen in Khorasan; Jund al Khilafah; and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.

The US Army recently announced the next round of unit deployments to Afghanistan. Five brigades and one army headquarters will deploy to Afghanistan between April and August 2012. While deployments are a regular part of normal troop rotations overseas, this deployment differs significantly from previous ones.

• These units will not be assigned to regular combat operations. Their mission is specifically to train and support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
• In the past, full brigades were deployed, each brigade consisting of about 3,500 troops. This time, less than 300 troops per brigade will be deployed; and the troops deploying will be only the brigade leaders, officers, and senior non-commissioned officers.
• The brigades will be configured to better assist the training and support mission. They will reorganize into small independent teams, each consisting of 18 personnel.
• Overall, five brigades plus an army HQ of officers and NCOs constitutes quite a large training contingent.

This announcement pertains to US Army units. It is likely that the US Marines, which also has combat troops in Afghanistan, will make a similar announcement.

The new Afghan strategy

This deployment plays an essential part in the new Afghan strategy. The strategy was described in detail in a previous Long War Journal article. In summary, the US plans to draw down its forces by 33,000 (from 100,000 to 67,000 troops) by the end of September 2012, thus ending the surge of US troops that started in late 2009. The goal is to have most US troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The US plans to end combat operations, however, by late 2013. By then, US forces will transition from the leading fighting force to a training and support force primarily supporting the ANSF. At the same time, the ANSF will take over the lead in combat operations, assuming the main role fighting the country's insurgency. The ANSF goal is to take responsibility for 50 percent of the Afghan population by the end of 2012 and all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Standing up the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

This strategy places a heavy load on the ANSF. Afghan forces will have to take over combat operations very quickly. The ANSF is still an immature force, however, and will need a great deal of training and support during the transition in order to be successful. A problem that has continued to plague efforts to develop the ANSF is the shortage of military trainers in Afghanistan. The deployment of a large number of US trainers this spring is intended to address this issue.

The organization of the US training teams is another important feature of the upcoming deployment. Until recently, the ANSF's primary developmental emphasis has been on growing its size. Training resources have been concentrated in centralized training camps where new ANSF units are recruited and trained. However, the growth of the ANSF will end in September when it reaches its end state goal of 352,000 troops. The training emphasis will then shift from the training camps to supporting the existing units deployed across the country. The large number of US training teams will be dispersed across the country, attaching to individual ANSF units in the field. There they can advise and support the ANSF units in ongoing combat operations.

Specialized US training units

Another interesting feature of this deployment is that two of the units are not regular combat brigades. They are specialized training units deploying overseas for the first time.

• 162nd Infantry Brigade. This training brigade specializes in training foreign security forces combat advisers. Based in Fort Polk, La., it trained the advisers within the combat brigades before they deployed overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan. Now for the first time, the brigade itself is deploying.
• 1st Army Headquarters. This is not a regular combat HQ. It is the headquarters for the army's readiness and training units within the US. Now also for the first time, it will be deploying overseas.

Note that this surge of US trainers to Afghanistan was facilitated by the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in late 2011. Before being reassigned to Afghanistan, several of the US brigades were either already deployed to Iraq or were planning to deploy there.

The US has already announced a drawdown of forces from Afghanistan. The surge of trainers is essential for "Part Two" of the Afghan strategy, standing up the ANSF. By the end of 2012, the US will have reduced its combat strength in the country by withdrawing a number of combat troops. At the same time, the intent is to enhance the capability of the ANSF by increasing the number of training and support troops.

A Taliban spokesman who identified himself as an "Authorized Correspondent by the Media Committee of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" said that the Taliban will not renounce al Qaeda and that the terror group operates under the command of the "Military Command of the Islamic Emirate."

The Taliban official, Abdullah al Wazir, made the statement yesterday in response to a posting at Shumukh al Islam, a jihadist Internet forum linked to al Qaeda. Wazir was replying to a question from a forum member who thought "that by agreeing to negotiations with the United States, the Afghan Taliban has taken the 'first step' to abandon al Qaeda," said the SITE Intelligence Group, which translated the statement.

"They [al Qaeda] are among the first groups and banners that pledged allegiance to the Emir of the Believers [Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban], and they operate in Afghanistan under the flag of the Islamic Emirate," Wazir said.

"They are an example of discipline and accuracy in the execution of missions and operations entrusted to them by the Military Command of the Islamic Emirate," Wazir continued, calling al Qaeda "lions in war."

Wazir said he was an "Authorized Correspondent by the Media Committee of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." SITE described Wazir as "the "Afghan Taliban's correspondent on jihadist forums."

A US intelligence official who follows the Taliban said that Wazir is a member of the Haqqani Network, the powerful Taliban sub-group that operates in eastern Afghanistan and in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Haqqanis are closely tied to al Qaeda; Siraj Haqqani, the network's operational commander, has a seat on al Qaeda's council, and he and five other members of the network have been added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their close ties to al Qaeda.

The Haqqanis routinely conduct join operations with al Qaeda in eastern Afghanistan, and provide shelter, support, and training facilities to leaders and operatives in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.

Last fall, Siraj released a training manual which included portions that praised al Qaeda and urged Haqqani Network members to support al Qaeda both locally and in its international operations.

Wazir's statement was made just two days after the Taliban released an interview with Zahibullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, by CNN. During the interview, Mujahid refused to renounce "international terrorism" or al Qaeda. Mujahid also insisted that as an initial "confidence building measure" the US must take steps including the "exchange of Guantanamo prisoners." The five Taliban detainees currently under discussion all have been instrumental in forging ties between the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The FBI has yet again employed a counterterrorism tactic that has proven extremely useful over the past few years in disrupting terror plots aimed at the United States. Amine el Khalifi, an illegal alien of Moroccan decent, was arrested today while wearing a suicide vest which he intended to detonate inside the US Capitol building in Washington DC. The attack would have been devastating were it not for the interception of his plot by undercover FBI agents, who posed as al Qaeda operatives and provided him with a non-functioning explosive vest.

"The complaint filed today alleges that Amine El Khalifi sought to blow himself up in the U.S. Capitol Building," US Attorney Neil MacBride said in a press release issued Department of Justice. "El Khalifi allegedly believed he was working with al Qaeda and devised the plot, the targets, and the methods on his own."

El Khalifi "became known to the JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force] because of his stated desire to carry out attacks in the US, specifically, the US Capitol building," James McJunkin, the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office said. "This arrest is the result of dedicated special agents, task force officers and intelligence analysts from the FBI and our partner law enforcement agencies that make up the JTTF."

Officials have been tight-lipped as to how el Khalifi raised suspicions, but the DOJ press release said that a confidential human source reported el Khalifi's intention to carry out an attack on US soil. It was during a meeting at an Alexandria, Va. home earlier this year that el Khalifi, along with other unidentified individuals, handled weapons and discussed his displeasure with the 'war on terror', which alarmed the confidential source who contacted law enforcement. It was after this report that the FBI began their investigation on el Khalifi.

He was then introduced by a man he knew as "Hussein" to another man named "Yusuf," both of whom el Khalifi believed to be al Qaeda members, but who in fact were undercover law enforcement officers. During meetings with the undercover agents, el Khalifi discussed various targets, eventually settling on a suicide mission against the Capitol building. On Jan. 15, el Khalifi expressed his willingness and competency in carrying out an attack by remotely detonating an explosive in a West Virginia quarry, then selected Feb. 17 as the day his operation would take place. Over the next few weeks, el Khalifi staked out his target and decided on a point of entry into the Capitol, where he would conduct his attack. Throughout this time, el Khalifi was closely monitored by law enforcement.

Today after first after praying at the Dar al-Hirjah mosque in Northern Virginia, el Khalifi set out to execute his plan. Holding an inoperable MAC-10 automatic weapon and wearing what he believed to be a suicide vest, he walked alone from a parking garage toward the US Capitol. Before he could exit the garage, he was taken into custody. El Khalifi had his first court appearance today at 4:15, where he is charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against a property that is owned and used by the United States. If convicted, he faces up to life in prison.

The US Treasury Department today designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) "for its support to terrorist groups as well as its central role in perpetrating human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran and its role in supporting the Syrian regime as it continues to commit human rights abuses against the people of Syria."

Al Qaeda and its affiliate, al Qaeda in Iraq, are among the terrorist groups supported by the MOIS, which is Iran's chief intelligence agency.

"Today we have designated the MOIS for abusing the basic human rights of Iranian citizens and exporting its vicious practices to support the Syrian regime's abhorrent crackdown on its own population," Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen explained in a press release. "In addition, we are designating the MOIS for its support to terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Iraq, Hizballah and HAMAS, again exposing the extent of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism as a matter of Iranian state policy."

The MOIS is assisting al Qaeda in a variety of ways. According to Treasury, the "MOIS has facilitated the movement of al Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports."

In addition, the MOIS has "provided money and weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)...and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives."

Previous designations tying Iran and al Qaeda

This is not the first time the Treasury Department has targeted the nexus between Iran and al Qaeda.

In July 2011, Treasury designated an al Qaeda leader known as Yasin al Suri along with five other terrorist operatives who use Iranian soil to move funds and recruits from Iran's neighboring Gulf countries to South Asia and elsewhere. Al Suri's network assists not only senior al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, but also al Qaeda in Iraq.

The Treasury Department said that al Suri's network operates as part of a "secret deal" between al Qaeda and the Iranian government. In December 2011, US authorities announced a $10 million reward for information leading to al Suri's capture.

Recent press reports indicate that the scrutiny placed on al Suri has led to his replacement as the head of al Qaeda's Iran franchise. The terrorist who has reportedly replaced him is a notorious al Qaeda financier named Mohsen al Fadhli. In addition to working with al Qaeda in Iraq and its deceased leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, al Fadhli is wanted for his involvement in al Qaeda's international terrorist plotting. Namely, al Fadhli helped finance the Oct. 6, 2002 attack on the French ship MV Limburg and has been tied to the Oct. 8, 2002 attack against US Marines stationed on Kuwait's Faylaka Island. One Marine was killed during the Faylaka Island shootout.

Also included in the July 2011 designation was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who commanded al Qaeda in northern Pakistan. Rahman was killed in a US drone strike in August 2011, the month after the Treasury Department's designation. According to press reports, he had been planning terrorist attacks in the West at the behest of Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda master who was killed in May 2011. With respect to Rahman, the Treasury Department noted that he "was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al Qaeda's emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials." Rahman received safe haven inside Iran after the Sept. 11 attacks.

In September 2011, the US State Department designated a Hamas operative who is tied to both Iran and al Qaeda. The terrorist, Muhammad Hisham Muhammad Isma'il Abu Ghazala, fought for Ansar al Islam. Abu Ghazala "plays an integral role in Hamas," the State Department said in a press release at the time. "He has links to Iran, the world's leading State Sponsor of Terrorism, and al Qaeda." Abu Ghazala is an improvised explosive device (IED) facilitator who has provided weapons to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations inside Iraq.

In January 2009, the Treasury Department designated four other al Qaeda members operating in Iran.

The January 2009 designation included Mustafa Hamid, the father-in-law of top al Qaeda operative Saif al Adel, and Saad bin Laden, one of Osama's sons.

Hamid was described as "a senior al Qaeda associate who served as a primary interlocutor between al Qaeda and the Government of Iran." During the 1990s, Hamid "reportedly negotiated a secret relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Iran, allowing many al Qaeda members safe transit through Iran to Afghanistan." Hamid also "passed communications between Osama bin Laden and the Government of Iran." In late 2001, Hamid negotiated with the Iranians to relocate al Qaeda families to Iranian soil. Saif al Adel, Hamid's son-in-law, was among them. Al Adel has been wanted since late 1998 for his involvement in al Qaeda's embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Saad bin Laden "facilitated the travel of Osama bin Laden's family members from Afghanistan to Iran" beginning in late 2001. He also "made key decisions for al Qaeda and was part of a small group of al Qaeda members that was involved in managing the terrorist organization from Iran."

Saad bin Laden relocated to northern Pakistan several years later and was reportedly killed in an airstrike. However, al Qaeda has never confirmed Saad's putative death.

The other two al Qaeda members included in the January 2009 designation were Muhammad Rab'a al Sayid Al Bahtiyti and Ali Saleh Husain.

Al Bahtiyti is a longtime member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda, and was reportedly involved in al Qaeda's 1995 bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. Ayman al Zawahiri, who is now al Qaeda's emir, tasked al Bahtiyti with moving members of Zawahiri's family to Iran after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Husain had long worked with top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah and was involved in shuttling al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to Iran following the fall of the Taliban's
regime.

All four of the al Qaeda members designated in January 2009 were placed under a loose form of "house arrest" by the Iranians in 2003, after al Qaeda's Iran network was tied to multiple terrorist attacks abroad, including the May 12, 2003 bombings in Riyadh.

However, Iran has continued to allow al Qaeda to operate on Iranian soil.

Unmanned US Predator or Reaper strike aircraft killed 19 "militants," including foreign fighters, in a pair of strikes in the Miramshah and Mir Ali areas of Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strikes broke a one-week-long lull in US attacks in the tribal areas.

In the first strike, the CIA-operated drones fired a pair of missiles at a compound used by "militants" in the village of Spalga near Miramshah, according to AFP. SAMAA reported that seven people were killed and seven more were wounded in the strike. The exact target of that strike has not been disclosed, and the identity of those killed is not known.

In the second strike, the drones fired missiles at a pickup truck that was traveling near the town of Mir Ali. A Pakistani intelligence official told AFP that 12 Uzbek fighters, likely from the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, were killed.

Senior terrorists are known to have sheltered in the village of Spalga in the past. The US has struck at targets in the village four other times since the end of 2009, according to data on the strikes that has been compiled by The Long War Journal.

Saleh al Somali, al Qaeda's operations chief, was killed in a US drone strike in Spalga on Dec. 9, 2009. Al Somali was a longtime al Qaeda operative who was present in Mogadishu during the infamous Black Hawk Down incident that resulted in the deaths of 19 US troops and hundreds of Somalis during an operation to detain a warlord in the capital in the fall of 1993.

Al Qaeda's external operations network has been a prime target of the covert US air campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas. The US has targeted al Qaeda and Taliban camps designated to train operatives holding foreign passports, while the leadership of the external operations branch has also been hit hard.

The Haqqani Network, a Taliban group that operates in North Waziristan as well as in eastern Afghanistan, administers the Miramshah area where today's first attack took place. Al Qaeda leaders and operatives, who are closely allied with the Haqqani Network, shelter in the area, as do other terror groups. Similarly, the Mir Ali area, about 25 kilometers east of Miramshah, is also used by a variety of terror groups for shelter and training. A local al Qaeda leader named Abu Kasha al Iraqi holds sway in the Mir Ali area.

US strikes in Pakistan in 2012

Today's strikes are the first in Pakistan's tribal areas in one week, and just the sixth and seventh this year. Six of the seven strikes this year have taken place in or around Miramshah in North Waziristan, a stronghold of the Haqqani Network.

The first strike this year took place on Jan. 11; it was the first by the US in Pakistan in 55 days. The previous strike took place on Nov. 16, 2011. The pause was the longest since the program was ramped up at the end of July 2008 [see LWJ report, US drone strikes in Pakistan on longest pause since 2008, from Dec. 19, 2011].

The program was put on hold from the end of November to the second week in January, following a clash between US forces and Pakistani Frontier Corps troops on the border of the Afghan province of Kunar and the Pakistani tribal area of Mohmand on Nov. 25-26. The US troops struck in Pakistan after taking mortar and machine gun fire on the Afghan side of the border from Pakistani troops. Twenty-four Pakistani Frontier Corps troops were killed.

The clash led to Pakistan's closure of the border crossings in Chaman and Khyber to NATO supply columns destined for Afghanistan; the supply lines remain closed to this day. In the aftermath of the Mohmand incident, Pakistan also threatened to shoot down US drones flying in Pakistani airspace, and ejected US drones and personnel from the Shamsi Airbase in Baluchistan.

US officials told The Long War Journal on Dec. 12, 2011 that the program had been put "on hold" due to tensions over the Mohmand incident, but that the drones would strike again if a high value terrorist target that could not be ignored was spotted.

The Jan. 11 strike killed Aslam Awan, a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's external operations network. Awan was a Pakistani citizen from Abbottabad, the same town where Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in a cross-border raid in May 2011. Awan is the most senior al Qaeda leader killed in a drone strike since mid-October, when Abu Miqdad al Masri, a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis who also was involved in al Qaeda's external operations, was killed. [For a list of senior terrorist leaders and operatives killed in drone strikes, see LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012.]

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was also rumored to have been killed in the Jan. 11 strike. His death has not been confirmed, however, and the Pakistani Taliban have denied he was killed.

The last strike took place on Feb. 8 in Miramshah's bazaar. Badr Mansoor, a senior Taliban and al Qaeda leader, was reported to have been killed in the strike. Mansoor ran training camps in the area and sent fighters to battle NATO and Afghan forces across the border, and linked up members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen with al Qaeda to fight in Afghanistan.

Despite the US airstrikes, al Qaeda operatives claim they are still capable of conducting training and operations in the area. Abu Zubaydah al Lubnani, a Lebanese member of al Qaeda who operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border, has said that while the drones have "delayed some operations or even stopped them," the terror group is still functioning in the region.

"I want here to confirm that Qaedat al-Jihad is still standing in Khorasan, solid and strong, despite what hit it, and it is still producing operations and it doesn't know the path of despair...," Lubnani said in statement that was recently released on jihadist forums. The statement was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Muhsin al Fadhli, who is said to be al Qaeda's new leader inside Iran.

A notorious Kuwaiti terrorist named Muhsin al Fadhli has reportedly taken over leadership of al Qaeda's network inside Iran. Sky News reports that al Fadhli assumed the top post in al Qaeda's Iran franchise after Yasin al Suri, who has headed the network for years, was placed under "protective custody" following his exposure by US authorities.

In July 2011, the US Treasury Department designated al Suri and several other al Qaeda operatives who use Iranian soil to move funds and recruits from Gulf countries to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Treasury Department said that this network operates as part of a "secret deal" between al Qaeda and the Iranian government. In December 2011, US authorities announced that they were offering a $10 million reward for information leading to al Suri's capture. [See LWJ reports, Treasury targets Iran's 'secret deal' with al Qaeda and US offers $10 million reward for Iran-based al Qaeda financier.]

It was this increased scrutiny, according to intelligence sources cited by Sky News, that led to al Suri's replacement.

Al Fadhli is an especially effective al Qaeda operative who was designated by the US Treasury Department in 2005. Al Fadhli "is considered an al Qaeda leader in the Gulf countries" and "fought alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan where he served as a bodyguard and second-in-command for an al Qaeda leader," the Treasury Department explained at the time. Al Fadhli "also fought against Russian forces in Chechnya, where he trained in the use of firearms, antiaircraft guns and explosives."

Al Fadhli has long been an elite member of al Qaeda. In early September 2001, Treasury explained, he "possibly received forewarning that US interests would be struck." The Sept. 11 operation was compartmentalized and only select members of the network received advance notice.

Among other nefarious activities, al Fadhli has been a key money man for al Qaeda. According to the Treasury Department's press release in 2005, al Fadhli's "support for terrorism extends to Iraq where he is believed to be providing support to fighters against US and multinational forces and is considered a major facilitator connected to the brutal terrorist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi."

Yasin al Suri, al Qaeda's leader in Iran who was reportedly placed under "protective custody."

Al Fadhli even "requested that tapes be made showing evidence of successful attacks in Iraq" so that he could "solidify the support of key financial backers sponsoring attacks."

Al Fadhli's dossier does not end there. Even before he assisted al Qaeda in Iraq's efforts, al Fadhli was involved in both the Oct. 6, 2002 attack on the French ship MV Limburg and the Oct. 8, 2002 attack against US Marines stationed on Kuwait's Faylaka Island. One Marine was killed during the Faylaka Island shootout.

An al Qaeda operative named Muhammad al Hamati called al Fadhli "in the wake of the attack on the MV LIMBURG, informing him that the first operation on the French oil tanker had been completed," according to the Treasury Department.

An al Qaeda cell responsible for the 2009 plot against Camp Arifjan, a US military installation in Kuwait, also had ties to al Fadhli. That cell was broken up by Kuwaiti authorities before it could launch an attack.

Al Fadhli was a leader of the so-called "Peninsula Lions Brigade," a group of more than three dozen terrorists responsible for the Faylaka Island attack and other plots. He was tried in 2005, in absentia, along with other members of the brigade. In fact, al Fadhli has been tried, acquitted, and retried by Kuwaiti courts on various terrorism charges multiple times.

At one point, al Fadhli was sentenced to 10 years of hard labor in prison. In a separate case, according to a leaked State Department cable written in June 2005, al Fadhli was charged with involvement in al Qaeda's October 2000 USS Cole bombing. That attack was carried out by the same network that bombed the MV Limburg, with help from al Fadhli, two years later.

Although al Fadhli has long been wanted for his al Qaeda role, it is unclear how many charges he was ultimately convicted of in Kuwait. One leaked State Department cable notes "the difficulties in prosecuting Kuwaiti terror financier Muhsin al Fadhli as an example of the dangers inherent in a lack of proper terror finance legislation" inside Kuwait.

Al Fadhli's presence in Iran has long been known. The Arab Times reported in 2009 that Kuwaiti officials were interrogating an al Qaeda recruiter known as "MS" for his involvement in "luring ... youths to fight Jihad against the foreign forces in Afghanistan." The man known as MS reportedly told officials he had met with al Fadhli "several times" and that al Fadhli "lives along the Iran-Afghanistan border."

In Kuwait, al Fadhli was closely tied to Sulaiman Abu Gaith, who served for a time as Osama bin Laden's spokesman. Abu Gaith received safe haven inside Iran after the Sept. 11 attacks, but was placed under a loose form of house arrest in 2003. In 2010, the Iranians reportedly freed Abu Gaith from his lax confinement and he may have made his way to Pakistan. [See LWJ report, Osama bin Laden's spokesman freed by Iran.]

Adel Radi Saker al Wahabi al Harbi, Muhsin al Fadhli's deputy.

Kuwaiti and US authorities are not the only ones interested in detaining al Fadhli. Saudi authorities have long targeted him as well. The man Sky News named as al Fadhli's deputy inside Iran, Adel Radi Saker al Wahabi al Harbi, is among Saudi Arabia's most wanted suspected terrorists.

No "specific" details of terrorist plotting

Sky News cited anonymous intelligence officials who believe a terrorist plot involving al Fadhli and al Qaeda's network in Iran may be afoot. Al Qaeda's emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, is reportedly interested in launching a mass casualty attack as retaliation for the killing of Osama bin Laden. However, the details of this putative plot are sketchy.

"We do know that an operation is under way. We assess that the most likely target is to be European. And the most obvious target in Europe for an attack that would attract a lot of attention would be the Olympic Games," a source told Sky News. Iran is reportedly providing training in explosives, safe haven, and funding for the operatives involved.

A secret intelligence memo shown to Sky News reads: "Against the background of intensive co-operation over recent months between Iran and al Qaeda - with a view to conducting a joint attack against Western targets overseas... Iran has significantly stepped up its investment, maintenance and improvement of operational and intelligence ties with the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan in recent months."

The memo adds that al Fadhli's deputy, al Harbi, "is considered an extremely dangerous field operative; he has fought in the Afghanistan and Pakistan theatres."

The intelligence sources cited by Sky News explained, however, that they lacked "specific" intelligence on al Qaeda's planning. It appears that the report is speculative when it comes to the details of the putative al Qaeda plot.

That said, Iran has provided safe haven to al Qaeda operatives known to be targeting the West. Members of an al Qaeda cell that was plotting Mumbai-style attacks on European cities are known to be currently living in Iran. [See LWJ report, Leaders of German al Qaeda cell living in Iran.]

Iran has provided assistance to al Qaeda in its operations before -- not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also elsewhere. As the 9/11 Commission and US courts have previously found, al Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were modeled after Iran's and Hezbollah's operations in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984. While living in Sudan in the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden approached Iran and Hezbollah, asking for their assistance in executing attacks similar to the 1983 bombing of the US Marine Barracks which had led to the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon.

Iran and Hezbollah agreed to help, providing training to al Qaeda operatives in camps in Lebanon and Iran. Among the trainees were al Qaeda members who would later plot the embassy bombings. [See LWJ report, DC court: Iran showed al Qaeda how to bomb embassies.]

Mullah Obaidullah Akhund. Photo from Voice of Jihad.

A former Taliban defense minister who was close to both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden has died in Pakistani custody, according to a statement released today by the Taliban.

Mullah Obaidullah Akhund "passed away in a Pakistani prison" on March 5, 2010, according to a statement released by the Taliban on their website, Voice of Jihad. Obaidullah served as the minister of defense from September 1996 until the Taliban were unseated by US forces in December 2001, and as the "deputy of [the] Islamic Emirate" from December 2001 until January 2007, when he was taken into Pakistani custody.

"The honorable Mujahid was detained by the government of Pakistan on the 3rd of January 2007 in the province of Balouchistan while on a visit after which his whereabouts were unknown for a long period of time until recently, when his family received word that two years from today, on March the 5th 2010, the mentioned person passed away from heart complications while being held in a prison in the city of Karachi," the Taliban statement said.

"To validate this distressing news, the family has attained trustworthy evidence which confirms his passing away however it is still not established if this distinguished personality of the Islamic Ummah and Afghanistan passed away due to heart complications or if he was martyred due to torture while being imprisoned," the statement continued.

The Taliban said it would "hold the International Red Cross responsible" for failing to get word to the family of his death for nearly two years.

While serving as Minister of Defense during Taliban rule of Afghanistan from 1996-2001, Obaidullah permitted al Qaeda to establish military camps where fighters were trained to battle the Northern Alliance as well as conduct terrorist operations outside Afghanistan.

One of the most infamous of these camps was Al Farouq, a military camp run by a Saudi named Abdul Quduz, where hundreds of al Qaeda operatives trained, including four of the Sept. 11 hijackers. Another notorious camp was Darunta, actually a network of four camps, which included one run by al Qaeda chemical weapons and explosive expert Abu Khabab al Masri and another run by the Blind Sheikh's son, Assadalah Abdul Rahman. Still another well-known terror camp was Khalden, a military camp run by al Qaeda leaders Ibn al Shaykh al Libi and Abu Zubaydah, where dozens of al Qaeda operatives received instruction, including three of the Sept. 11 hijackers. Rounding out the list of top al Qaeda training camps that were established in Afghanistan is Tarnak Farms, which also served as a home to Osama bin Laden.

After the fall of the Taliban regime, Obaidullah functioned as Mullah Omar's second in command, and directed military operations against Coalition and Afghan forces. He also served as a member of the Taliban's Shura Mujlis, or executive council. He was based in Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan, a known haven for Taliban leaders and fighters.

The Pakistani military detained Obaidullah in early 2007 while then-Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting the country. Sometime before November 2007, Obaidullah was released along with several other Afghan and Pakistani Taliban leaders in exchange for over 200 Pakistani soldiers who had been captured in August 2007 by South Waziristan Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud.

The Pakistani military reportedly re-arrested Obaidullah in early 2008 while he was fundraising for the Taliban in Baluchistan. US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that Obaidullah had not been imprisoned but was being held by the Pakistani military "in protective custody."

Click to view slide show of some of the Haqqani Network's top leaders. Pictured is a composite image of Siraj Haqqani.

Siraj Haqqani, the operational commander of the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network, and a member of a Taliban alliance that spans the tribal Pakistan's areas and eastern Afghanistan, has ordered the Taliban to abide by its peace agreement with the Pakistani military and cease its attacks on the security forces. Siraj's statement confirms what the Pakistani government has denied: the Taliban and Pakistan have entered into a peace deal.

Siraj issued the order under the aegis of the Shura-e-Murakeba, an alliance that was formed in January and consists of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which is led by Hakeemullah Mehsud and his deputy, Waliur Rehman Mehsud; Hafiz Gul Bahadar's group; Mullah Nazir's group; and the Haqqani Network. The Shura-e-Murakeba was formed with the aid of al Qaeda's top leaders.

The statement, which was distributed in the form of a pamphlet in North Waziristan, was obtained by The Associated Press.

"In North Waziristan, we are all in agreement with the Pakistani government, so we are all bound to honor this agreement and nobody is allowed to violate it," the pamphlet said. Siraj said that "anyone who violates the agreement 'will dealt with as a culprit,'" according to AP.

The Shura-e-Murakeba was officially formed in early January after months of negotiations between the various terror groups operating in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas, as well as with al Qaeda [see LWJ report, Al Qaeda brokers new anti-US Taliban alliance in Pakistan and Afghanistan]. The members of the Shura-e-Murakeba agreed to cease attacks against Pakistani security forces, refocus efforts against the US, and end kidnappings and other criminal activities in the tribal areas.

The formation of the Shura-e-Murakeba was brokered by senior al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al Libi; another senior al Qaeda leader known as Abdur Rehman al Saudi; Mullah Mansour, a top Taliban leader who operates in eastern Afghanistan; and Siraj. Mullah Omar, the overall leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is said to have dispatched Siraj and Mansour to help negotiate the agreement.

The Pakistani military and Interior Minister Rehman Malik have previously denied that Pakistan was in talks with the Taliban. In December 2011, Malik had said that the Taliban must lay down their weapons and end attacks in the country before any talks could proceed.

And in November 2011, the Pakistani military issued a press release that "strongly and categorically" denied it was conducting talks with the Taliban [see Threat Matrix report, Pakistani military denies role in talks with Taliban.]

"Strongly and categorically refuting media reports, a spokesperson of ISPR [the military's public affairs branch] said that Army is not undertaking any kind of negotiations with TTP [Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan] or its affiliated militant groups. Such reports are concocted, baseless and unfounded," the statement said. "Any contemplated negotiation/reconciliation process with militant groups has to be done by the Govt, the spokesperson concluded."

From 2004 to 2009, the Pakistani military and government signed numerous peace agreements with the Taliban in the tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, Arakzai, Kurram, and Khyber, as well as in settled districts in the northwest, including in Swat. The peace agreements gave the Taliban control over the territories, but stipulated that the Taliban must recognize the government, end attacks on security forces, and deny shelter to al Qaeda and other foreign terror groups. The Taliban have refused to abide by the terms of the agreements.

Abu Adam (a.k.a. Mounir Chouka), a German citizen who fights with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Photo from the SITE Intelligence Group.

A German citizen who serves as a leader in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and is linked to al Qaeda has urged jihadists to conduct attacks in Germany.

Mounir Chouka, who is also known as Abu Adam al Almani ("the German"), said that "jihad in Germany is only a matter of time," in a video released on jihadist web forums on Feb. 9 by Jundallah Studio, the propaganda arm of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The video, which supposedly was created on Dec. 13, 2011 in Waziristan, was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

In the video, Mounir claimed that Germany has publicly criticized the US while secretly supporting rendition of al Qaeda operatives to foreign governments for interrogations and "torture."

"It is in the interest of the Americans to have the German media display them as the big criminal, because the Germans can continue their secret work," he claimed.

Mounir claimed that the German government was deceiving its citizens on the scale of Nazi Germany's extermination of the Jews in World War II.

"After the fall of Hitler's regime, many, or rather, most of the German people, were shocked how that [the Holocaust] could happen in such a short period of time. It is a shock that is still visible until this day, and it is shown in the memorials erected for the Jews in every large city," he said.

He also accused the Germans of working with the Uzbek government to interrogate the "mujahideen."

"As the German mujahideen, along with their Uzbek brothers here in Afghanistan and Pakistan, raise high the flag of jihad, the Germans cooperate with the tyrannical dictators like Karimov in Uzbekistan and sit together at a table, and the German secret service interrogate the mujahideen of the IMU in Uzbek prisons and forget about human rights under the tyranny," he said.

Mounir then accused the Germans of aiding the US to kill Germans in drone strikes, and said the German Army is in Afghanistan to kill Muslims. He cited the Sept. 2008 airstrike in Kunduz that killed scores of Taliban fighters and civilians.

"Let me ask you something else: what would you do if someone followed the example of the military attack in Kunduz on 14 September 2008, and came to German soil and killed dozens of people? What would you do?! For us, Islam doesn't allow that. The question of jihad in Germany is only a matter of time."

He said that "the target is the German politicians and the executives who work for the Jews in the background. Allah willing, there must also be a series of attacks against the people also, because attacks in Germany are a type of revenge and reaction."

Mounir is not the first German citizen to use jihadist media outlets to issue propaganda threatening to carry out attacks in Germany. In 2009, Bekkay Harrach, who was also known as Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, warned that Germany would suffer an attack if Chancellor Angela Merkel was reelected. Harrach worked with both al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan along the Afghan-Pakistani border before he was killed while leading an assault on Bagram Air Base in 2010.

The Choukas, brothers in jihad

Mounir and his brother Yassin, also known as Abu Ibrahim, were added late last month to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists for serving as "fighters, recruiters, facilitators and propagandists for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," which in itself is on the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

The two brothers "carry out operations as members of the IMU along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border" and "are also senior members of Jundallah Media, the IMU's media production arm."

As senior leaders in Jundallah Media, the Chouka brothers have released numerous propaganda and martyrdom statements. According to State, Monir said the IMU was behind the deadly Oct. 29, 2011 suicide attack that targeted an armored bus in Kabul. Five Americans, a Canadian, eight ISAF civilian employees, three Afghan civilians, and a policeman were killed in the attack.

Mounir also said that the IMU was involved in the May 19, 2010 suicide assault on Bagram Air Base. One US soldier was killed in the attack. According to the IMU propaganda tape, the Bagram assault was launched "in coordination and cooperation with other jihadi groups," and the assault team included "Turks, Tajiks, Arabs, Pashtuns, and Afghans." Bekkay Harrach is thought to have been killed while leading the assault on Bagram. Harrach led a team of 20 fighters made up from the ranks of al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to a previous statement released by the IMU. The various terrorist groups carry out military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the aegis of the Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army [for more information, see LWJ report, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army'].

Abu Ibrahim al Almani, from an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan propaganda tape.

Yassin, Mounir's brother, has also released propaganda for the IMU. In February 2011, Yassin published a report that described his travels from Europe to Pakistan, which included a stop in Yemen and several meetings with Anwar al Awlaki, the wanted American-born terrorist who served as a senior ideologue and operational commander for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula before he was killed in a Predator strike.

In June 2011, Yassin announced the death of "Abdullah from Essen," a German citizen from Afghanistan who was known as Miqdad. The German was killed while fighting US forces in northern Afghanistan, according to Yassin.

One of the brothers was rumored to have been wounded in a US drone strike. In August 2011, the Victorious Sect, a terror group with ties to the IMU, issued a statement indicating that Mounir may have been wounded in a US Predator airstrike along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The report was never confirmed.

Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali, the leader of Shabaab's branch in Kenya, from a videotape released on Jan. 6. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The Muslim Youth Center, Shabaab's affiliate in Kenya, said it has become "part of al Qaeda East Africa." The statement was made just one day after al Qaeda and Shabaab formalized their longstanding relationship and announced their merger [see LWJ report, Shabaab formally joins al Qaeda].

The Muslim Youth Center (MYC) made the statement at their blog, MYC: Jihaad is Our Religion, in a post entitled, "Welcome to AQEA (al Qaeda East Africa)."

In the post, the MYC also praised Shabaab's official merger with al Qaeda, saying, "It was music to our ears to listen to our dear Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri (May Allah continue to preserve him for the global struggle) talk about the great union of the two organizations."

"Such a union is long over due and MYC members are pleased to be part of this great union that seeks to defeat the crusaders in Somalia and here in Kenya," the statement continued. "We pray Allah grants the mujahideen in Kenya to firmness and strength to set jihad alight here in Kenya."

The MYC said that the official name of the "union" between Shabaab, the MYC, and al Qaeda is al Qaeda East Africa.

"In the coming weeks and months, as part of this new union under the banner of AQEA (al Qaeda East Africa) we (MYC and al Shabaab) expect to achieve great things in defending our precious religion by defeating the crusaders," the MYC statement reads.

"It is not only groups like MYC that have committed and sacrificed themselves to join jihad in Somalia but now we have seen what union exists between all mujahideen around the world with the timely union with our brothers in al Qadea [sic]," the MYC said. "This union must be praised and supported for we in MYC are now part of al Qaeda East Africa."

Shabaab has sought to expand its operations outside of Somalia, and has courted Kenyan jihadists who have served as key support elements. On Jan. 10, Shabaab named Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali as its "Supreme Amiir," or leader, of its Kenyan branch.

East Africa Al Qaeda (EAAQ) or Al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA)

That the MYC would call this coalition "al Qaeda East Africa" or AQEA, for short, is not surprising. Al Qaeda has long maintained a presence in East Africa that has operated under this banner. And al Qaeda's East African operatives have been particularly adept when it comes to operating both alongside, and within, allied jihadist organizations. At least several senior Shabaab leaders have also doubled as AQEA operatives.

A leaked May 22, 2007 Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment of Abdul Malik Bajabu, who was arrested by Kenyan authorities in February 2007 and has been detained at Guantanamo since March 2007, describes the AQEA in detail. Once in custody, Bajabu allegedly "admitted personal involvement in the 28 November 2002 terrorist attack against the Kikambala Paradise Hotel" in Mombasa, Kenya. That operation was carried out by AQEA operatives.

JTF-GTMO analysts found that Bajabu "is a confirmed member of the East Africa al Qaeda (EAAQ) network, the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), and the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK)" and also "has ties to the al Ittihad al Islami (AIAI)."

"EAAQ is also referred to as Al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA)," the JTF-GTMO memo reads. From a counterterrorism perspective, the EAAQ/AQEA is defined as a "Priority 1A target due to its assessed association with the al Qaeda network."

The JTF-GTMO threat assessment continues: "Priority 1A targets are defined as terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests."

Bajabu worked closely with Fazul Mohammed, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Abu Talha al Sudani, Issa Osman Issa, and Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud -- all of whom have served as senior Shabaab leaders while at the same time being members of AQEA -- according to intelligence included in his JTF-GTMO file.

Members of this network were not only responsible for the 2002 terrorist attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, but also the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The 1998 bombings were al Qaeda's most devastating terrorist attack prior to Sept. 11, 2001. Fazul, Nabhan, and Sudani have all since been killed.

Deceased al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden retained a degree of control over the EAAQ/AQEA network, according to intelligence reports cited by JTF-GTMO. One EAAQ/AQEA operative stated that one of Fazul Mohammed's wives, Halim Fazul, "delivered a message from UBL when she traveled from Pakistan to Mogadishu in late December 2006."

Halima said that bin Laden "was angry with the EAAQ" and "wanted them to focus on carrying out terrorist operations and not to fight with the [Islamic Courts Union] or against the Mogadishu-based warlords." The EAAQ/AQEA network's "primary job was to carry out terrorist attacks," bin Laden reportedly explained.

A JTF-GTMO analyst noted that bin Laden's "instructions indicate communication with and an undetermined level of control over [Bajabu] and his [EAAQ/AQEA] associates."

Separately, "members of EAAQ wrote to the al Qaeda leadership informing them of Abu Talha's failure as a leader." The JTF-GTMO memo reads: "A reply was sent to the EAAQ members, in which [bin Laden] said that he would send a new leader."

Other leaked JTF-GTMO memos similarly include intelligence reports showing that the EAAQ/AQEA continued to report to senior al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. [See LWJ report, The Gitmo Files: Fazul Mohammed continued to seek bin Laden's direction.]

Abu Talha al Sudani was killed in 2007. In a September 2008 video, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan reached out to al Qaeda's top leadership to broker a merger between Shabaab and bin Laden's organization. Nabhan, who swore bayat to bin Laden and praised him in the video, was already a longstanding member of the EAAQ/AQEA network. Nabhan was killed in a US special operations raid in Somalia on Sept. 14, 2009.

A few months after Nabhan's death, in November 2009, bin Laden named Fazul Mohammed the EAAQ chieftain. Mukhtar Abu al Zubayr (a.k.a. Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed or Godane), the emir of Shabaab, attended the ceremony in which Fazul was sworn in as head of the EAAQ/AQEA. Fazul was also a senior Shabaab leader at the time. Fazul was subsequently killed, in June 2011.

Now, months after Fazul's death, the Muslim Youth Center has announced that it will fight "under the banner of AQEA (al Qaeda East Africa)" -- the same name used by al Qaeda's East Africa organization, which has long reported to al Qaeda's most senior leaders.

Some analysts predicted that al Qaeda would be weakened and would lose the support of its affiliates after the death of Osama bin Laden, as Zawahiri is perceived to be unpopular in many jihadist circles. All of al Qaeda's affiilates, however, including al Qaeda in Iraq, Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have sworn allegiance to Zawahiri. And a new branch that formed in Egypt's Sinai, Ansar al Jihad, also swore allegiance to Zawahiri and al Qaeda.

Furthermore, there have been no reports of major disagreements within the jihadist leadership or the rank and file over Zawahiri's succession to bin Laden's role as emir.

Shabaab and al Qaeda have announced their formal merger, according to a video disseminated online today and translated by the SITE Intelligence group. In the video, Mukhtar Abu al Zubayr (a.k.a. Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed or Godane), the emir and cofounder of Shabaab, pledges his organization's allegiance to al Qaeda, and Ayman al Zawahiri, the emir of al Qaeda, accepts.

"O our beloved Emir, on behalf of my brothers in al Shabaab al Mujahideen Movement, commanders and soldiers, I say: We give allegiance to you to follow the Book of Allah and the Sunnah [traditions] of His Messenger, to listen and obey in good and bad, to have altruism and not dispute with people in their fields except when we see clear unbelief that is proven in the revelation from Allah as much as we can," Zubayr says in his address to Zawahiri, according to SITE's translation.

"Lead us on the path of martyrdom and jihad, on the steps drawn by our martyred Imam Usama [bin Laden]," Zubayr adds.

In his portion of the video, Zawahiri claims that the "jihadi movement is growing...despite the fiercest Crusader campaign in history launched by the West against Muslims." Zawahiri continues: "Today, I have pleasing glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah that will please the believers and disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al Mujahideen Movement in Somalia to Qaedat al Jihad, to support the jihadi unity against the Zio[nist]-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers who let the invading Crusader forces enter their countries."

The announcement is hardly surprising. Al Qaeda and Shabaab have long been closely linked. And Shabaab's leaders have repeatedly proclaimed their allegiance to al Qaeda.

During an interview in December 2011, Zubayr highlighted the role al Qaeda has played in Somalia since the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. In 2010, according to an account published by Reuters, Zubayr signed a statement saying that Shabaab had "agreed to join the international jihad of al Qaeda."

Al Qaeda has praised Shabaab and its predecessor, the Islamic Courts Union, for years prior to accepting Shabaab into the fold. And for years al Qaeda has helped produce propaganda for the Islamic Courts and Shabaab, and has addressed the group in its own propaganda tapes. Osama bin Laden endorsed the Islamic Courts during a speech back in 2006.

"We will continue, God willing, to fight you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan until we waste all your money and kill your men and you will return to your country in defeat as we defeated you before in Somalia," bin Laden said. Al Qaeda leaders Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al Libi have also directly addressed Shabaab and voiced their support for the terror group's activities.

During the summer of 2008, Shabaab sought to formally join al Qaeda. By the end of that year, al Qaeda had indicated that it had all but formally accepted Shabaab as its official affiliate in East Africa.

In September of 2008, Shabaab formally reached out to al Qaeda's senior leadership in an effort to better integrate with the network and its strategic nodes across Africa and the Middle East. The effort came in the form of a 24-minute video that featured Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan, a dual-hatted al Qaeda and Shabaab leader.

In the tape, Nabhan declared an oath of bayat (loyalty) on behalf of Shabaab to bin Laden and al Qaeda and encouraged fighters to train in Shabaab-run camps and participate in the fight against the transitional federal government, Ethiopian forces, and African Union peacekeepers. A public response to Shabaab's declaration came two months later, on Nov. 19, 2008, when al Qaeda operations chief Ayman al-Zawahiri acknowledged the group in a propaganda video by calling them "my brothers, the lions of Islam in Somalia."

"[R]ejoice in victory and conquest," Zawahiri said, in an official transcript acquired by The Long War Journal, "and hold tightly to the truth for which you have given your lives, and don't put down your weapons before the Mujahid state of Islam and Tawheed [oneness with god] has been set up in Somalia."

Despite the close ties between the two terror groups, al Qaeda's senior leadership "instructed Shabaab to maintain a low profile on al Qaeda links," a senior US intelligence official who closely follows al Qaeda and Shabaab in East Africa told The Long War Journal in August 2010. The official, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject, said the information was passed between the top leadership of both groups.

"Al Qaeda has accepted Shabaab into the fold, and any additional statements would only serve to draw international scrutiny," the intelligence official said.

Longstanding organizational ties

Despite abundant evidence that Shabaab has long been a part of al Qaeda's international network, some analysts have claimed the two groups lack organizational or operational ties. Of course, al Qaeda does not publish an organizational chart for public consumption. But the depth of operational ties between the two can best be seen in the biographies of the men who have led Shabaab:

Aden Hashi Ayro was, along with Zubayr, a co-founder of Shabaab and its military commander until he was killed in an American airstrike in 2008. Ayro was a senior al Qaeda operative in East Africa. Shabaab's official biography of Ayro, released after his death, said that "he fought under the supervision of al Qaeda, and with its logistical support and expertise."

Fazul Mohammed was a dual-hatted al Qaeda and Shabaab operative until he was killed in June 2011. In November 2009, Osama bin Laden named Fazul the head of East Africa Al Qaeda (EAAQ). Zubayr, the emir of Shabaab, attended the ceremony in which Fazul was named to this leadership position. Fazul continued to seek Osama bin Laden's direction even while the al Qaeda master was in hiding in Pakistan, according to a leaked Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) memo. Fazul was long wanted by US authorities for his role in al Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. Prior to assuming a leadership position within Shabaab, Fazul was the intelligence chief for the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which spawned Shabaab. Fazul served as an al Qaeda operative inside Somalia since the early 1990s and reportedly fought in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.

Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was killed in a US airstrike in September 2009, was also a dual-hatted Shabaab and al Qaeda commander. Like Fazul, Nabhan was also wanted for his role in al Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks in Kenya. Nabhan was tasked with training foreign recruits for Shabaab, including at least some of the young recruits Shabaab attracted from the US. In a video recorded in July 2008, Nabhan praised Osama bin Laden as "the courageous commander and my honorable leader." The Shabaab cell that carried out the July 11 double suicide attack in Kampala, Uganda, killing 74 people, was named the Saleh Ali Nabhan Brigade, which indicates the importance of Nabhan and al Qaeda to Shabaab.

Abu Talha al Sudani, who was killed in 2007, was a senior al Qaeda leader in East Africa. Like Fazul and Nabhan, he was wanted in connection with the 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks. Sudani was reportedly "close" to the aforementioned Ayro. In fact, Nabhan announced Sudani's death in an online video that also discussed the 2008 airstrike that killed Ayro.

Mukhtar Robow (a.k.a Abu Mansur) is a senior Shabaab leader and spokesman. Like other Shabaab leaders, Robow received his terrorist training in Afghanistan. Robow also does not hide his allegiance to al Qaeda. In August 2008, according to the Los Angeles Times, Robow admitted: "We are negotiating how we can unite into one [with al Qaeda]. We will take our orders from Sheik Osama bin Laden because we are his students." Robow continued: "Al Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia. Most of our leaders were trained in Al Qaeda camps. We get our tactics and guidelines from them. Many have spent time with Osama bin Laden."

Issa Osman Issa was sanctioned, along with Zubayr and Robow, by the US Treasury Department in November 2008. Leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo documents reference intelligence reports tying Issa to both al Qaeda and Shabaab. In one such memo, Issa is described as "a mobile commander for al Shabaab forces." Issa reportedly took part in al Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was co-leader of the Islamic Courts Union. In early 2009, he founded Hizbul Islam, a coalition of four Somali Islamic groups. Although the two organizations cooperated in attacks against their common enemies, Hizbul Islam became a rival of Shabaab after the two unsuccessfully attempted to merge forces. The two clashed in southern Somalia, including in Kismayo. Hizbul Islam was weakened by infighting, however, and Sheikh Aweys eventually merged the group with Shabaab. Aweys is now a Shabaab commander.

Aweys is a longtime ally of al Qaeda and was trained in al Qaeda's pre-9/11 Afghan camps. He was reportedly involved in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. In November 2001, the US State Department added Aweys to its list of Specially Designated Terrorists. Aweys has long advocated suicide attacks, including the use of children as suicide bombers. According to a leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo file, Sheikh Aweys "sponsored" Saleh Ali Nabhan in Mogadishu after Nabhan fled there following al Qaeda's Nov. 28, 2002 terrorist attacks in Kenya.

Sheikh Hassan Turki was a leader in Al Ittihad al Islami (AIAI) and then the Islamic Courts Union before forming his own organization, the Ras Kamboni Brigade. Sheikh Turki originally merged the Ras Kamboni Brigade into Sheikh Aweys' Hizbul Islam, but later broke from Aweys' group to join Shabaab in early 2010.

Zubayr, Shabaab's emir, and Sheikh Turki released a joint statement announcing the merger. The statement read: "We have agreed to join the international jihad of al Qaeda .... We have also agreed to unite al Shabaab and Kamboni mujahideen to liberate the Eastern and Horn of Africa community who are under the feet of minority Christians." Sheikh Turki operates terrorist training camps in southern Somalia and has trained suicide bombers close to the Kenyan border.

Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud is, according to the United Nations, a Shabaab "military commander" and "one of approximately ten members on al Shabaab's leadership council as of late 2008." The UN notes that Mahamoud and "an associate were in charge of the 10 June 2009 mortar attack against the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu." A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) file notes that a current Gitmo detainee, Abdul Malik Bajabu, has admitted to having "a close relationship" with Mahamoud. The same file describes Mahamoud as an "EAAQ member." Mahamoud "planned to assassinate the Somali Prime Minister and conduct unspecified suicide attacks," the JTF-GTMO file adds.

Abdul Malik Bajabu is currently held at Guantanamo. A JTF-GTMO threat assessment summarizing the intelligence on his activities alleges that he was a member of East Africa Al Qaeda (EAAQ) and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and also "has ties to the al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)." Bajabu has allegedly "admitted that he participated in the planning and execution" of the Nov. 28, 2002 attacks on the Kikambala Paradise Hotel and an Israeli airliner in Kenya. Several of the dual-hatted al Qaeda and Shabaab leaders on this list were involved in that attack.

The details of Bajabu's career alleged in the threat assessment show a high degree of
coordination between al Qaeda members and Shabaab leaders. The file cites intelligence reports that say Bajabu operated out of Mogadishu and conspired with Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Fazul Mohammed, Issa Osman Issa, and Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud, as well as with other terrorists working for al Qaeda, Shabaab, and the ICU. The JTF-GTMO threat assessment also alleges that a member of a group called the "London Boys" was a "close associate" of Bajabu's. The "London Boys" allegedly received terrorist training under Fazul Mohammed and may have been recruited by al Qaeda to be sleeper agents for future attacks in the West.

Ibrahim al Afghani was reportedly killed in a Predator strike in late June 2011. Afghani previously served as Shabaab's regional governor of the Kismayo administration. The Somalia Monitoring Group, in a March 2010 report, said Afghani is one of the group's top leaders. Afghani was listed after Zubayr, Shabaab's emir. Afghani received his nom de guerre because he fought in Afghanistan for years. A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment dated Aug. 6, 2007 describes Afghani as "an al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) military commander known for his religious knowledge as well as loyalty and support for al Qaeda and the Taliban and for his continuing links to Afghanistan." The file continues: "[Afghani] was one of the first founders of al Qaeda affiliated AIAI cells and one of the instigators of terrorist attacks in Somaliland."

Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was indicted by the US Department of Justice in 2011 "on charges of providing material support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)." The DOJ alleges that Warsame "received explosives and other military-type training from AQAP," "worked to broker a weapons deal with AQAP on behalf of al Shabaab," and provided explosives training. Multiple press reports have pointed to collusion between Shabaab and AQAP. For instance, the Washington Post reported in late June 2011 that two Shabaab leaders targeted in a US missile strike had "direct ties" to deceased AQAP cleric Anwar al Awlaki.

Abu Mansour al Amriki is a US citizen whose real name is Omar Hammami. He converted to Islam and traveled to Somalia in 2006. Once in Somalia, he quickly rose through the ranks, and now serves as a military commander, recruiter, financier, and propagandist. Amriki appears in several Shabaab propaganda tapes. The US has added Amriki to its list of specially designated global terrorists for his ties to both al Qaeda and Shabaab.

Bilal al Berjawi was a British citizen "of Lebanese origin" who was known as Abu Hafsa. Berjawi was second-in-command to slain al Qaeda leader Fazul Mohammed and fought in Somali for years before he was killed in a US Predator airstrike in southern Somalia in January 2012.

Shaykh Muhammad Abu Fa'id is a Saudi citizen who serves as a top financier and a "manager" for Shabaab. He is also known as Sheikh Fua'd Mohamed Khalaf.

Abu Sulayman Al Banadiri is a Somali of Yemeni descent. He serves as a top adviser to Zubayr, and trained in an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan.

Abu Musa Mombasa is a Pakistani citizen who serves as Shabaab's chief of security and training.

Mahmud Mujajir is a Sudanese citizen who serves as Shabaab's chief of recruitment for suicide bombers.

A senior Taliban and Qaeda commander said to have been killed in the latest US drone strike in North Waziristan played a key role in funneling fighters from a radical Pakistani jihadist group to al Qaeda camps.

Pakistani and US intelligence officials believe that Badr Mansoor was among four terrorists killed in last night's Predator airstrike in Miramshah, the main town in the Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. Four "militants" were reported killed in the strike. Mansoor's death has not been confirmed.

Mansoor is known to run terrorist camps in North Waziristan that are used to train fighters to wage jihad in Afghanistan. He is also said to be the mastermind of the May 2010 suicide assault on an Ahmadi mosque in Lahore that killed scores of Pakistanis, as well as several attacks in Karachi.

Mansoor was the "de facto leader of al Qaeda in Pakistan," a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. A US intelligence official described Mansoor as "al Qaeda's go-between with Pakistan's umbrella Taliban movement and a member of al Qaeda's leadership shura [council] in Pakistan."

"Badar Mansoor had moved between the militant groups of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda where he became a key figure," according to a report in the BBC.

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is a Pakistani terror group with thousands of members that operates primarily in the Indian state of Kashmir. It is closely allied with al Qaeda, and is known to have sent its fighters to other theaters of jihad, such as Chechnya, Bosnia, and Somalia. Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil, the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen, was an original signatory to Osama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa that declared war on the West. He also was close to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks on the US. Khalil lives openly in Islamabad and enjoys the support of the Pakistani military.

Two US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal confirmed that Mansoor uses his ties to both the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan to recruit from their ranks, train them, and place them into al Qaeda.

"Mansoor funneled Pakistani jihadists from HuM and TTP [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan] into the ranks of al Qaeda," one official said. "He didn't just recruit low level-jihadists, but also convinced more experienced commanders to fill positions in al Qaeda."

Another US intelligence official said that Mansoor is part of the "deep bench" of commanders who are culled from the plethora of Pakistani and Central Asian jihadist groups operating in Pakistan to fill vacant leadership positions in al Qaeda.

"Al Qaeda is taking advantage of decades of networking in Pakistan, not just in the tribal areas, but in Pakistan proper, to develop a deep bench of leaders and foot soldiers who can be brought into the organization when there are vacancies," the second official told The Long War Journal. "Badr Mansoor and Aslam Awan are perfect examples of how al Qaeda takes advantage of this relationship."

Before he was killed in the Jan. 11 drone strike in Miramshah, North Waziristan, Awan was a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's external operations network. Awan was a Pakistani citizen from Abbottabad, the same town where Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in a cross-border raid in May 2011.

The second US intelligence official said that the US's strategy to defeat al Qaeda with limited drone strikes is flawed as the program only focuses on "a narrow slice of al Qaeda's network in Pakistan."

"The targeted strikes in North and South Waziristan only hit al Qaeda's vanguard, the ones who are at the front lines, in select camps in a small area of Pakistan" the official told The Long War Journal. "But al Qaeda has camps elsewhere in Pakistan, and also relies on the camps operated by allied jihadi groups. Its [al Qaeda's] network in Pakistan is expansive, and it leverages the deep ties with the Pakistani jihadist groups that have been built over years. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen is but one such group. And Pakistan has no interest in dismantling this terrorist infrastructure."

For more information on al Qaeda's network in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the limits of drone strikes, see LWJ reports, Analysis: Al Qaeda is the tip of the jihadist spear, US airstrikes alone cannot defeat al Qaeda, and Analysis: Al Qaeda martyrdom tape shows nature and extent of terror group's reach in Afghanistan.

Unmanned US drones struck in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan for the second time in 24 hours, killing four "militants," including a senior Taliban leader linked to al Qaeda.

The Predators or the more heavily armed Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan today, according to AFP and Geo News.

Pakistani intelligence officials said that Badr Mansoor, a Taliban commander with close ties to al Qaeda, was killed in the strike. Mansoor rain training camps in the area and sent fighters to battle NATO and Afghan forces across the border, according to AFP. One Pakistani official told AFP that Mansoor was al Qaeda's chief in Pakistan. A US intelligence official said he was a member of al Qaeda's leadership council for Pakistan.

The Haqqani Network, a Taliban group that operates in North Waziristan as well as in eastern Afghanistan, administers the area where today's attack took place. Al Qaeda leaders and operatives, who are closely allied with the Haqqani Network, shelter in the area, as do other terror groups.

The strike is the second in 24 hours. Earlier today, the CIA-operated drones killed 10 Haqqani Network and Central Asian fighters in an attack on a compound in the village of Tappi, just outside of Miramshah.

The US has carried out five strikes in North Waziristan since Jan. 11. All five strikes took place in and around Miramshah. The Jan. 11 strike was the first in 55 days. The program was put on hold following a clash between US forces and Pakistani Frontier Corps troops on the border of the Afghan province of Kunar and the Pakistani tribal area of Mohmand on Nov. 25-26. The US troops struck in Pakistan after taking mortar and machine gun fire on the Afghan side of the border from Pakistani troops. Twenty-four Pakistani Frontier Corps troops were killed. The pause was the longest since the program was ramped up at the end of July 2008 [see LWJ report, US drone strikes in Pakistan on longest pause since 2008].

The Jan. 11 strike killed Aslam Awan, a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's external operations network. Awan was a Pakistani citizen from Abbottabad, the same town where Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in a cross-border raid in May 2011. Awan is the most senior al Qaeda leader killed in a drone strike since mid-October, when Abu Miqdad al Masri, a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis who also was involved in al Qaeda's external operations, was killed. [For a list of senior terrorist leaders and operatives killed in drone strikes, see LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012.]

Abu Zubaydah al Lubnani, a Lebanese al Qaeda operative who operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border, has said that while the drones have "delayed some operations or even stopped them," the terror group is still functioning in the region.

"I want here to confirm that Qaedat al-Jihad is still standing in Khorasan, solid and strong, despite what hit it, and it is still producing operations and it doesn't know the path of despair...," Lubnani said in statement that was recently released on jihadist forums. The statement was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.