Soldiers from Company A, 64th Brigade Support Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division set concrete barriers in place in the surroundings of the southern portion of the Sadr City district of Baghdad May 3. (US Army photo/Specialist Joseph Rivera Rebolledo)

The battle for Sadr City continues as US and Iraqi forces continue to erect the concrete security barrier on Qods Street, the main thoroughfare that divides the southern third of Sadr City from the northern portion. US Special Operations Forces teams have entered the fray, and the specialized teams are fighting inside the Mahdi Army bastion for the second day in a row.

Twenty-three Mahdi Army fighters have been killed by US and Iraqi troops since the afternoon of May 8. US Special Operations teams operating inside Sadr City killed nine Mahdi Army fighters as they attacked Iraqi and US forces building the concrete barrier on Qods Street. The team also directed an airstrike that killed two more Mahdi Army fighters. Yesterday, US Special Forces killed two Mahdi Army fighters inside Sadr City.

US soldiers killed 12 more Mahdi Army fighters inside Sadr City from May 8-9. US troops used unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, Abrams tanks, and small-arms fire in response to Mahdi Army attacks inside Sadr City. Mahdi Army fighters continue attempt to disrupt the building of the barrier. The US military said the construction should be completed in two weeks. Inside the secured area in southern Sadr City, the Iraqi Army is providing medical, humanitarian, and construction aid to civilians.

The US military has described the barrier as a "magnet" for Mahdi Army attacks as they seek to stop the construction effort. A total of 562 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25, according to numbers compiled by The Long War Journal.

Operations continue in the South

The Iraqi military continues to apply pressure on the Mahdi Army and the Sadrist movement in Basrah and the South.

More than 70 percent of Basrah has been cleared, Multinational Forces Iraq reported. Iraqi police arrested 45 "wanted persons" and three "suspects" in Basrah on May 8. A Mahdi Army rocket attack killed two civilian contractors and wounded four civilians and four Coalition soldiers at a forward operating base outside the city the same day.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

Less than 24 hours after a spokesman for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense announced the capture of Abu Ayyub al Masri, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, the US military denied al Masri has been captured. "Neither coalition forces nor Iraqi security forces detained or killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri,” Major Peggy Kageleiry, spokeswoman for Multinational Division North, told The Associated Press. “This guy had a similar name." Al Masri was reported to have been captured in Mosul.

The report of al Masri’s capture was cause by a case of mistake identity, said Mohammed al Askari, the spokesman for the Ministry of Defense. “We called the commander of Ninewa operations 10 times and every time he insisted it was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir [a pseudonym for al Masri] because when they caught him, they asked him whether his name was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and he said yes," al-Askari told AP. The Ninewa operations commander "insisted that it was him, how can we deny him then."

This is the third time the Iraqi security forces claimed al Masri was either killed or captured since 2007. The spokesman for the Interior Ministry claimed al Masri was killed in a major clash between al Qaeda forces and the Awakening and police forces near the city of Balad. Al Masri was not captured, but Abu Abdullah al Majamaia, an aide to al Masri who also is believed to lead his security detail, was.

In May 2007, Sunni tribes reported al Masri was killed in a battle near Taji, just north of Baghdad. Iraq’s Ministry of Interior claimed its forces saw his body. Just days later, the Ministry of Interior said Abu Omar al Baghdadi. The supposed leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, was reported killed in another battle in the town of Dhuluiya in Salahadin province. US forces confirmed Muharib Abdul Latif al Jubouri, al Qaeda in Iraq's senior minister of information was killed, but neither al Masri nor Baghdadi were killed.

Al Qaeda regrouping in Mosul

The report of al Masri’s capture in Mosul highlights the importance of the northern city to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership is attempting to regroup in Mosul. Al Qaeda in Iraq's last major ratline into Syria spans westward from Mosul into Tal Afar and the crossing point at Sinjar. The terror group is waging a brutal campaign to prevent the Iraqi Army and US forces from securing the province.

US and Iraqi forces have killed several key al Qaeda leaders in Mosul over the past several months. Fourteen of the top 30 al Qaeda operatives who have been killed or captured in the past three months were al Qaeda leaders in Mosul, including three al Qaeda leaders from Saudi Arabia.

Al Masri also has family ties in Mosul. In September 2007, Coalition forces captured Ali Fayyad Abuyd Ali in the northern city. Fayyad was a senior adviser to the terror group's leaders, including al Masri. He also is al Masri’s father-in-law.

Background on al Masri’s rise to power and his Islamic State of Iraq

Al Masri entered Iraq in 2002 prior to the US invasion and established what is believed to be the first terror cell inside Baghdad. He is an experienced bomb maker, and built car bombs and trained other al Qaeda operatives in the techniques.

He was appointed the leader of the terror group in the summer of 2006 after US forces killed Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the infamous leader and founder of al Qaeda in Iraq. He quickly worked to undo the failures of Zarqawi, and attempted to unite the disparate Sunni insurgent groups and the Sunni tribes in the Sunni-dominated province. Zawahiri urged Zarqawi to "Iraqify the insurgency," but was ignored.

A close confidant of Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second in command, al Masri was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group that folded into al Qaeda under Zawahiri’s leadership. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is a core element of al Qaeda and includes many former members of the Egyptian military.

Al Masri is officially listed as the minister of defense for the Islamic State of Iraq, according to a press release put out by the terror group in April 2007. But over the summer of 2007, it became known the Islamic State of Iraq was the invention of al Masri, who serves as the emir, or leader, of the group. Abu Omar al Baghdadi is actually a fictional character played by an Iraqi actor named Abu Abdullah al Naima. This information was revealed after the capture of Abu Muhammad al Mashadani, the former minister of information for the Islamic State of Iraq. Recently, an Iraqi police leader in Hadithah claimed Baghdadi was actually a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s army.

Al Qaeda established the Islamic State of Iraq in October of 2006 to put an Iraqi face on al Qaeda's operations in Iraq and unite the Sunni disparate elements of the insurgency. Al Qaeda claimed the Islamic State of Iraq comprises “Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahadin, Ninewa, and ... other parts of the governorate of Babel.” The declaration of the Sunni Islamic State of Iraq followed the creation of the "Mutayibeen Coalition," which included six Anbar tribes, as well as three smaller insurgent groups. In mid-April 2007, Baghdadi named the ministers of the cabinet of the rump Islamic State of Iraq.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri, from a video found in 2006.. Click to view.

The Iraqi military claimed Abu Ayyub al Masri, al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader, has been captured in the northern city of Mosul in Ninewa province. The US military has not confirmed the report of al Masri’s capture. Al Masri's capture would provide a potential intelligence boon on al Qaeda's network in Iraq and its connections to the international organization.

Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al Askari said al Masri’s capture was “confirmed to him by the Iraqi commander of the province,” The Associated Press reported. The person believed to be al Masri has been transferred to US custody for identification, according to Askari. Iraqi troops arrested the man believed to be al Masri while he was sleeping in a safe house. Iraqi troops received intelligence from a captured operative, and the man admitted to being al Masri. The capture was also announced on Iraqiya Television, the state-run TV network, AP reported.

The Iraqi government has a history of announcing the capture of senior al Qaeda leaders, only to have to retract the statements. The Iraqi government had made several claims of wounding, killing and capturing both al Masri and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the fictitious leader of al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq, several times during 2007. The reports turned out to be false or cases of mistaken identity.

Al Qaeda in Mosul

Al Qaeda’s senior leadership is thought to be attempting to regroup in Mosul. US and Iraqi forces have killed several key al Qaeda leaders in Mosul over the past several months. Fourteen of the top 30 al Qaeda operatives who have been killed or captured in the past three months were al Qaeda leaders in Mosul, including three al Qaeda leaders from Saudi Arabia.

Al Masri also has family ties in Mosul. In September 2007, Coalition forces captured Ali Fayyad Abuyd Ali in the northern city. Fayyad, a senior adviser to the terror group's leaders, including al Masri, is the al Qaeda in Iraq leader's father in law

Al Qaeda in Iraq's last major ratline into Syria spans westward from Mosul into Tal Afar and the crossing point at Sinjar. The terror group is waging a brutal campaign to prevent the Iraqi Army and US forces from securing the province.

A map of al Qaeda's vision of the Islamic State of Iraq, taken from an al Qaeda video.

Background on al Masri’s rise to power and his Islamic State of Iraq

Al Masri entered Iraq in 2002 prior to the US invasion and established what is believed to be the first terror cell inside Baghdad. He is an experienced bomb maker, and built car bombs and trained other al Qaeda operatives in the techniques.

He was appointed the leader of the terror group in the summer of 2006 after US forces killed Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the infamous leader and founder of al Qaeda in Iraq. He quickly worked to undo the failures of Zarqawi, and attempted to unite the disparate Sunni insurgent groups and the Sunni tribes in the Sunni-dominated province. Zawahiri urged Zarqawi to "Iraqify the insurgency," but was ignored.

A close confidant of Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second in command, al Masri was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group that folded into al Qaeda under Zawahiri’s leadership. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is a core element of al Qaeda and includes many former members of the Egyptian military.

Al Masri is officially listed as the minister of defense for the Islamic State of Iraq, according to a press release put out by the terror group in April 2007. But over the summer of 2007, it became known the Islamic State of Iraq was the invention of al Masri, who serves as the emir, or leader, of the group. Abu Omar al Baghdadi is actually a fictional character played by an Iraqi actor named Abu Abdullah al Naima. This information was revealed after the capture of Abu Muhammad al Mashadani, the former minister of information for the Islamic State of Iraq. Recently, an Iraqi police leader in Hadithah claimed Baghdadi was actually a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s army.

Al Qaeda established the Islamic State of Iraq in October of 2006 to put an Iraqi face on al Qaeda's operations in Iraq and unite the Sunni disparate elements of the insurgency. Al Qaeda claimed the Islamic State of Iraq comprises “Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Ninawa, and ... other parts of the governorate of Babel.” The declaration of the Sunni Islamic State of Iraq followed the creation of the "Mutayibeen Coalition," which included six Anbar tribes, as well as three smaller insurgent groups. In mid-April 2007, Baghdadi named the ministers of the cabinet of the rump Islamic State of Iraq.

Soldiers from Company A, 64th Brigade Support Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division set concrete barriers in place in the surroundings of the southern portion of the Sadr City district of Baghdad May 3. (US Army photo/Specialist Joseph Rivera Rebolledo)

US and Iraqi forces have reported heavy fighting during multiple engagements in Sadr City and the surrounding districts. Nineteen Mahdi Army fighters have been killed and nine were captured during clashes and raids in Baghdad.

US and Iraqi troops and US air weapons teams killed 17 Mahdi Army fighters during a series of engagements in the Baghdad districts of Sadr City, New Baghdad, Adhamiyah, Kadhamiyah, and the Taji Qada northwest of Baghdad.

Many of the Mahdi Army fighters were killed as they attacked barrier emplacement teams and planted roadside bombs in Sadr City on the night of May 7 and the morning of May 8. US Special Forces units killed an additional two Mahdi Army fighters as the US teams were providing security for engineers "making safety infrastructure improvements in Sadr City."

The US and Iraqi military have been constructing concrete barriers around the southern third of Sadr City to cut off the Mahdi Army from the area and provide security and humanitarian assistance. The US military has described the barrier as a "magnet" for Mahdi Army attacks as they seek to stop the construction effort.

A total of 539 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25, according to numbers compiled by The Long War Journal.

Map of Baghdad neighborhoods. Click to view.

US and Iraqi troops also captured nine Mahdi Army fighters during raids and operations in Baghdad. Iraqi Special Operations Forces captured seven Special Groups operatives, the Iranian-backed elements that are a subset of the Mahdi Army, during a targeted raid inside Sadr City. The Iraqi special forces teams went after a cell behind the importation and use of the deadly explosively formed penetrator roadside bombs against US forces as well as the firing of mortars and rockets into the International Zone.

The Special Groups cell was also using mosques as weapons caches, prisons, and command and control centers for their operations. "Some of the reported uses of mosques by these Special Groups criminals include: as headquarters for operations, as holding facilities for their kidnapping victims, as interrogation places for captured Sons of Iraq, and as launching points for their attacks against Iraqi and Coalition forces," Multinational forces Iraq reported.

US soldiers captured "a suspected criminal linked to a foiled explosively formed penetrator attack" in the Fadailliyah neighborhood in New Baghdad (number 35 on the map). Another "criminal" was captured in the Taji Qada or county) in northwestern Baghdad province.

Sadr's radio station is shut down

The Iraqi government ordered that the Al Ahad radio station, a news outlet for Sadr's political movement, be shut down. "An Iraqi-U.S. force stopped Al Ahad radio station's broadcast, according to a memo that carried Premier Nouri al-Maliki's signature," Abid Abu Zahra told Voices of Iraq.

The fighting may intensify over the next several days. The closing down of Sadr's newspaper in the spring of 2004 partially fueled the first Mahdi Army uprising. Iraqi soldiers also warned residents to evacuate their homes in the southeastern section of Sadr City. It is unclear if the affected residents are in the neighborhoods inside the concrete barriers or outside the wall.

See US, Iraqi forces kill 18 Mahdi fighters during clashes, raids in Baghdad for more background on the recent fighting in Baghdad.

The 10 senior-most al Qaeda in Iraq leaders killed or captured in April and May. Image from Multinational Forces Iraq. Click to view full size.

US and Iraqi security forces continue to pursue al Qaeda in Iraq's networks as the terror group works to re-establish footholds in Baghdad, Mosul, and northern Diyala province. During the month of May, US and Iraqi security forces have killed or captured 50 senior members of al Qaeda in Iraq’s network over the past month, Major General Kevin Bergner, the spokesman for Multinational Forces Iraq said during an operations briefing today in Baghdad.

Bergner singled out the 10 senior-most al Qaeda leaders. Of the 10 senior al Qaeda leaders identified, US and Iraqi forces have captured four emirs, or leaders, two cell leader, and four facilitators and bomb makers. The capture of these 10 leaders will allow the Coalition and Iraqi forces to conduct interrogation and strike further at al Qaeda in Iraq's network.

Al Qaeda in Iraq's areas of influence, dated March 2008. Map from Multinational Forces Iraq. Click to view.

Mosul remains an al Qaeda hotspot. Three of the leaders captured were responsible for operations in Mosul, and one was responsible for operations in Bayji. In April, US and Iraqi forces killed or captured five senior al Qaeda leaders in Mosul, where al Qaeda is attempting to reestablish its network and disrupt Iraqi and Coalition efforts to secure the city. Al Qaeda in Iraq's last major ratline into Syria spans westward from Mosul into Tal Afar and the crossing point at Sinjar.

Senior Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives killed or captured in Mosul, Baghdad, Salahadin Province:

Mosul:

• Ibrahim Ahmad Umar Nasir al Sabawi: Al Qaeda's emir of eastern Mosul. Sabawi facilitated the movement of foreign al Qaeda operatives into Mosul and worked closely with Abu Yasir al Saudi, also know as Jar Allah, one of two Saudi al Qaeda leaders killed in a US airstrike in Mosul in February.
• Ayyad Jasim Muhammad Ali: Al Qaeda's emir for northeastern Mosul.
• Adnan Muhammad: An al Qaeda cell leader in Mosul.
• Nawaf Ali Muhammad Sultan: An al Qaeda suicide car bomb cell leader in Mosul.
• Husam Asim Sayid Mahmud: An al Qaeda suicide car bomb facilitator for Mosul.

Baghdad:

• Abbas Abd Ahmad Hamad: An al Qaeda car bomb maker for the South Karkh network.
• Riyad Abbas Husayn: Al Qaeda's sharia emir, or religious leader in charge of enforcing al Qaeda's Taliban-like religious rule, in South Karkh.
• Sa'ad Abdullah Salih: An al Qaeda bomb maker who facilitated the movement of foreign al Qaeda operatives into Baghdad.

Salahadin Province:

• Yusif Dhalaf Abd Fayyad: Al Qaeda's security emir in Bayji.
• Najah Husayn Ali Ismail: An Al Qaeda weapons facilitator in Tikrit.

Iraqi Army soldiers stand guard in a tank as they provide security while Multinational Division Baghdad soldiers from Company A, 64th Brigade Support Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, transport concrete barriers in Sadr City on May 3. (US Army photo/Specialist Joseph Rivera Rebolledo)

US and Iraqi troops continue to battle Mahdi Army fighters in Sadr City and greater Baghdad. Eighteen Mahdi Army fighters were killed and 11 captured during raids and attacks, while the Iraqi government arrested 42 policemen for colluding with "outlaws" and arrested 35 hospital workers for treating Mahdi Army fighters.

Latest fighting in Baghdad

The Mahdi Army continues to attack US and Iraqi forces as they erect the barrier on Qods Street, which divides the southern third from the northern portion of Sadr City. US and Iraqi troops responded, killing 18 Mahdi Army fighters and capturing 11 throughout Baghdad.

US and Iraqi troops and US air weapons teams killed 11 Mahdi Army fighters as they attacked barrier emplacement teams and planted roadside bombs in Sadr City on the night of May 5 and the morning of May 6. Iraqi soldiers and police also uncovered numerous weapons caches in northern and eastern Baghdad. In one raid, Iraqi police discovered a weapons cache in the courtyard of the Imam Ali Mosque in the Al Ghadeer neighborhood in New Baghdad (number 31 on map). "The [National Police] found five explosively formed projectiles, two improvised explosive devices, five rocket rails, three grenades and numerous rounds of various ammunitions," Multinational Forces Iraq reported.

Map of Baghdad neighborhoods. Click to view.

Iraqi and US forces continue to conduct intelligence-driven raids against the Special Groups, the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army. The Iraqi Counterterrorism Force teams conducted two raids in Baghdad on May 4 and May 5, killing seven Special Groups operatives and capturing two.

Iraqi security forces take in infiltrators

Iraqi soldiers arrested 42 policemen and detained 35 hospital workers in Baghdad. The policemen are "suspected of collaborating with 'outlaws,'" Reuters reported. It is not clear if the police are local or national police, or are members of the Facilities Protection Services, which guard infrastructure and are part of the Interior Ministry.

Iraqi soldiers also detained 35 hospital workers in the Mohammed Bakr Hakim hospital in the Shula neighborhood in northwestern Baghdad (number 61 on the map). The hospital workers are suspected of treating wounded Mahdi Army fighters.

The hospitals in Sadr City are known to be infiltrated with Mahdi Army and Sadrist bloc members who continue to use the hospitals for criminal activities. The Mahdi Army used hospitals as staging areas for sectarian attacks and weapons storage depots. On May 3, US forces knocked out a Special Groups command and control center situated next to a Sadr City hospital. The Sadrist bloc ran the Health Ministry prior to withdrawing from the government in 2007.

Background on the recent fighting in with the Mahdi Army

Mahdi Army forces openly took up arms against the government after the Iraqi government started the assault on Basrah on March 25 to clear the city of the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed Shia militias. Sadr called for his forces to leave the streets on March 30 just as Iraqi Army and police reinforcements began to arrive in Basrah. Sadr later admitted he ordered his followers within the Army and police to abandon their posts and join the fighting against the government.

In Baghdad alone, US and Iraqi forces killed 173 Mahdi Army fighters during the six days of fighting from March 25 up until Sadr declared a cease-fire. The fighting has not abated in Sadr City and other Mahdi Army-dominated neighborhoods in northern and eastern Baghdad. A total of 520 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25.

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill will now be sent to parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

On April 20, Sadr threatened to conduct a third uprising, but later backed down from his threat, claiming it was directed only at US forces. The Maliki government has stood firm and said operations would continue until the Mahdi Army and other militias disarm and disband. On May 1, the Iraqi government sent a delegation to confront Iran on its involvement with the insurgency, but Sadr, who is currently in Iran, refused to meet with the Iraqi government representatives.

The Long War Journal is pleased to announce a partnership with Covert Radio, which is hosted by Brett Winterble. We will produce a weekly show to explore issues surrounding the War on Terror, or what we call The Long War. This week we take an in depth look at Iraq, the influence of Iran in the region, and the latest in over the horizon strikes in Somalia.

Go to Covert Radio to listen to today's show.

Click to view slideshow of operations in the Rusafa district, Baghdad. Photos by Bill Ardolino.

The US soldiers and Iraqi police living at Joint Security Station Al Qanat at the Northeastern edge of Baghdad’s Rusafa district have “a front row seat” to the fight taking place in Sadr City. As US and Iraqi Army forces clash with the Mahdi Army, hissing RPGs and small arms fire periodically crackle during the day and are punctuated by occasional orange explosions and red tracers streaking out of the Sadr City skyline at night. Two to four Apache attack helicopters constantly prowl the airspace over the battlefield, randomly popping flares as they search for targets. The characteristic whoosh and boom of a hellfire missile sounds when they find one. But although JSS al Qanat is only 200 meters from the Route Pluto, the main thoroughfare that marks the border to Sadr City, the fighting has not significantly spilled over into the northern part of the Rusafa District.

Northern Rusafa is largely composed of middle and upper-class residences, in contrast with the slum of Sadr City and the downtown urbanity of the lower half of the district. The area includes several government agencies, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Police Academy, and is home for some high ranking government officials and their families. The district is mostly Shia with a significant Sunni minority, though American personnel point out that most residents “don’t care” about the religious distinction. Many shop owners and other businessmen live across the border in Sadr City, while many residents of Rusafa work in the Shia slum. Members of the Mahdi Army also commute to their jobs in the district: multiple improvised explosive device/explosively formed penetrator cells lay roadside bombs targeting Iraqi security and coalition forces. Militia operatives also conduct intimidation and black market business activities – notably selling stolen fuel - to fund their organization.

Black market gas fuels the militias

US and Iraqi forces are executing operations to degrade the financing and military activities of Mahdi cells in Rusafa. While conducting a patrol of Northeastern Rusafa on Sunday, Second Platoon of Charlie Troop of the 3rd Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division stopped to question four men selling unauthorized fuel out of plastic cans on the side of the road. Fuel is an especially valuable commodity in Iraq, because corruption drives up legitimate prices and residents need it to run generators that augment an unreliable electric grid.

Parked behind the vendors were two large, gaudily painted commercial buses. Upon searching them, Second Platoon found huge fuel tanks spanning their length, some crudely disguised as bench seats. While selling any amount of black market gas has been declared illegal and is subject to confiscation and arrest, the huge amount found on Sunday was especially suspicious. Though mostly empty, 400-500 gallons remained in tanks designed to hold up to about 2,000 gallons of hidden fuel.

“Usually you see one or two jerry cans out there, but when you see something big like that, you usually think it’s militia or insurgent related,” said 1st Lieutenant Joseph Mobbley, the commander of the second platoon. “They have some financing.”

The US soldiers called in the 3rd Battalion, 8th Brigade, 2nd Division, of the Iraqi National Police to detain the suspects and confiscate the buses. The captured fuel was a welcome find, given the chronic shortages suffered by the National Police as they requisition the resource through a corrupt, arbitrary and inefficient logistical system. The black market haul should run their generators and vehicles for months, depending on how much they choose to sell off themselves. The suspects were detained and face the local peculiarity of the Iraqi legal system: as it’s their first offense, most likely they’ll be entered into a database and released with a warning, after signing a statement swearing to never commit the crime again. If caught selling fuel a second time, the men will face a three-year prison sentence.

“In this culture, actually putting something in writing and signing something is considered a serious contract,” said Mobbley. “It’s very significant to the Iraqis.”

Kicking doors

Another type of anti-militia operation kicked off in the dark, early morning hours the next day. Second Platoon of Charlie Troop conducted a raid on a suspected Mahdi Army improvised explosive device (IED) cell and weapons cache in a northern section of the district. A generally reliable source had provided the tip, and Mobbley and his men opted to use a “hard knock,” or rough, fast entry.

“We use the hard knock if we feel it’s a significant threat of contact (with the enemy) going in, “said Mobbley. “Like this tip of IEDs, a weapons cache, four to five militia members – we want to go in hard and fast, before these guys can run.”

There are a few significant concerns on this type of mission: friendly fire in the confusion of an assault in a confined space, the possibility of civilians getting hurt, resistance from the targeted militiamen, and the odd possibility that a house is wired to explode.

“It hasn’t happened to us, but we’ve seen reports in other areas where these guys will wire their front gate, wire their front door, and there’s been times they’ve wired the whole house, guys go in and it blows up,” said Mobbley. “You keep a sharp eye out. We have code words if we see anything and need to bug out. We’ll try to get [civilians] out of there if we can, because usually there are multiple families in these houses. So if you hear [the code word] ‘booger,’ get the hell out of the house.”

A convoy of humvees dropped off two teams of 3-89 Cav soldiers and one team of Iraqi National Police near the house. The teams fast walked to the target and lined up outside in three “stacks” – the two American groups would go in first, followed by the National Police. On command, a humvee gunned its engine, sharply turned, and smashed through the house’s front gate. The vehicle quickly backed up and the teams flooded through the hole to swarm and secure the target.

The occupants turned out to be three families with several military aged males, who were herded into separate living areas of the cluttered house. Mobbley and the interpreters explained the reason for the raid and asked questions. Most sat quietly, but an elderly woman in a black chador issued a constant, bitter monologue. When asked by a soldier what she was saying, an Iraqi interpreter said, “She is saying what old women like to say – that life is so awful.”

A thorough search turned up one AK-47 and no other weapons or explosives. The “dry hole” was probably the result of a bad tip, with the outside possibility that the source’s information was old and the items had been moved.

“It happens all the time,” grumbled one soldier. “If I had a nickel …”

The soldiers retinal scanned and finger printed the military aged males in the house for entry into a database that can immediately inform personnel on the ground if an individual has been caught or suspected of criminal activity. Mobbley offered that the folks had no illegal weapons or explosives, so they are “innocent, in my mind.” The eldest males in the household -- one an employee of the government -- were a mixture of angry and conciliatory, even when gently pressed by this interviewer for candor.

“I’m mad, because they kicked the doors in and scared my family,” said one middle-aged man. “They explained why they are here, and I understand it, but I don’t understand why someone [the informant] would give bad information about my family. We live peaceful in this home.”

“At first I was mad, because when the soldiers came in my house, they scared my family,” said an elderly man who has lived in the neighborhood for more than 30 years. “But when the lieutenant explained the reason they came here, I don’t have a problem with it. I will cooperate with Iraqi or coalition forces for anything, because I want to keep my neighborhood and country safe.”

Asked about the fighting just north in Sadr City, both offered a dim view of the militias.

“At first, in 2004, the Mahdi Army was good,” said the younger man. “Now they’re not good, so I appreciate the coalition forces and Iraqi security forces, because they kill the militia in Sadr City.”

“My family and I are confused – why is the Mahdi Army fighting the Iraqi security forces?” said the elderly man. “What do they need, what do they want? We don’t know. I think it’s crazy. They try to destroy my country and they have support from Iran, who send the weapons and explosives, and now the militias are soldiers for Iran.”

An hour-and-a-half after breaching the house, the soldiers and police returned to JSS Al Qanat. The next day, a member of the household came to the police station to file a reimbursement claim for the house’s destroyed front gate.

US and Iraqi forces continue to gather intelligence on criminal and terrorist activities, and daily operations against Mahdi Army terrorist cells and black marketeers continue.

Bill Ardolino’s embed is sponsored by the readers of The Long War Journal, Public Multimedia Inc., and The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Please support The Long War Journal by making a tax-deductable donation today.

US Army soldiers from 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division guard construction of a concrete wall running through the Shiite enclave of Sadr City, Baghdad, on Sunday, May 4, 2008. AP Photo.

Clashes between the Mahdi Army and US and Iraqi forces continued in Baghdad over the weekend as efforts to complete the security barriers separating the southern portion of Sadr City from the Mahdi Army-controlled north. The US military has moved another battalion of Strykers into the Sadr City. In the South, Iraqi troops cleared another militia-controlled neighborhood in Basrah.

Baghdad battles

US and Iraqi forces have killed 18 Mahdi Army fighters in Sadr City and New Baghdad since the afternoon of May 3. Nine Mahdi Army fighters were killed in Sadr City and northern and eastern Baghdad during the nighttime and early morning hours of May 4-5 after attacking US forces, planting roadside bombs, or preparing to launch mortars and rockets.

US soldiers killed four more Mahdi Army fighters in the eastern district of New Baghdad after coming under attack on May 4. And US troops killed five more Mahdi Army fighters in Sadr City as they attempted to stop the barrier from being built late May 3 and early May 4. No US soldiers were reported killed in any of the incidents.

US and Iraqi forces have inflicted heavy casualties on the Mahdi Army in Sadr City and surrounding neighborhoods since the fighting broke out in Baghdad on March 25. According to US and Iraqi reports compiled by The Long War Journal, 502 Mahdi Army fighters have been killed in and around Sadr City. These numbers do not include Mahdi Army fighters who may have died after being wounded in the fighting.

Map of Baghdad neighborhoods. Click to view.

With heavy fighting inside Sadr City, the US military is beefing up its forces in the area. Multinational Forces Iraq has moved an additional battalion to the Sadr City region over the past several days. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division has moved from northwestern Baghdad province into the Sadr City area over the past week. This is the ninth US battalion known to be operating inside Sadr City. Two Iraqi Army brigades and a National Police brigade are also operating inside Sadr City.

Raids on the Iranian-backed Special Groups

US and Iraqi special forces teams have renewed their raids against the Special Groups, the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army. Ten Special Groups leaders and operatives have been captured during raids in Baghdad and Hillah since May 2.

On May 4, Coalition special forces captured two Special Groups operatives, including the main target, in the Rashid district in Baghdad. The main target was a commander who was "wanted for facilitating the import of Iranian-made munitions into Iraq" as well as directing mortar and rocket attacks and operating safe houses for his operatives.

Iraqi special forces conducted two raids -- one in Hillah and one in Baghdad -- on May 2. The Hillah Special Weapons and Tactics team captured two men "charged with conducting a series of attacks against a Coalition forces base with indirect fire weapons." Four associates were also captured during the raids.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces captured a "mid-level Special Groups leader" and an associate during a raid in Baghdad on May 2. The Special Groups leader led a 50-man company that conducted mortar and rocket attacks against Iraqi and Coalition forces. The commander also directed kidnappings and murders.

Iraqi troops clear another neighborhood in Basrah

As operations against the Mahdi Army continue in Baghdad, Iraqi security forces press the offensive in Basrah. Soldiers from Quick Reaction Force 1 cleared the Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood of Al Latif.

"The clearing of Al Latif resulted in several cache discoveries, including dozens of automatic weapons, mortars and improvised explosive devices," Multinational Forces Iraq reported in a press release. "The QRF 1 also detained several criminals, and raided and demolished the residence of a known IED maker and militia leader."

Al Latif is the fifth Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood cleared in Basrah since Operation Knights' Assault was launched on March 25. Iraqi security forces have cleared the Al Huteen, Hayaniyah, Taymiyyah, and Qiblah neighborhoods over the past several weeks.

Quick Reaction Force 1 is the new designation for the 1st Iraqi Army Division, the most experienced unit in the Iraqi military. This unit deployed from Anbar province at the opening days of the Basrah operation to assist in the offensive.

An Iraqi policeman in the southern part of the Rusafa district in Baghdad. Photo by Bill Ardolino.

Bill Ardolino interviews an Iraqi Police general in the Rusafa district in central Baghdad. The general discusses the state of the police, the security situation, integration of the Sons of Iraq into the security forces, and problems with the militias.

Few things are simple in Iraq, and that maxim is no more evident than when evaluating Iraqi security forces. Relevant answers to important questions are always a matter of degree. These questions include:

• How well do the Iraqi security forces operate, and to what extent are they still dependent on Americans financially, operationally, and logistically?
• How corrupt is a given Iraqi security forces unit, and does the graft hinder manpower, morale, and operations, or does it simply meet regional cultural standards?
• How much have insurgent groups and militias infiltrated a given Iraqi security forces structure?
• To what extent are those with questionable loyalty hardcore troublemakers vs. individuals playing both sides of the fence for money or because they are subject to mafia-style intimidation?
• And to what extent are such problems moving toward being resolved?

These complexities must be considered in a serious evaluation of whether and when Iraqi security forces will be able to effectively take over control of their country as Coalition forces draw down. The local police forces in Baghdad – and specifically the Rusafa district – are historically troubled. They stand at the crossroads between an effective government institution and a flawed, gang-riddled force mistrusted by the citizenry.

Though their overall assessment is mixed, American officials assert that leadership and operational effectiveness of the Iraqi Police has improved in the past year. The police more effectively man checkpoints, and find weapons caches, roadside bombs, and wanted individuals. This progress is cited as one of the relevant reasons for the recent improvement in Baghdad’s security.

But many problems remain. The leadership of the police units varies in quality. The police are still operationally rough around the edges, are logistically challenged, mistrusted by the citizenry (specifically when compared to the Iraqi Army and local neighborhood watch groups), and are significantly infiltrated by cops associated with some of the same militias being challenged by their government.

General Hamed, who declined to be more specifically identified, commands a significant number of Iraqi Police in central Baghdad and is acutely aware of these problems. While Hamed is a Sunni with 30 years of experience in the Iraqi Police, the majority of the police under his command and the residents of his district are Shia. He is unusually candid and straightforward about challenges facing local police forces, and alternately projects airs of intelligence, calculation, command, pragmatic resignation, and dire cynicism. US military officials are always quick to note that every player in Iraq has “an angle,” and Hamed is no exception. But they generally offer praise of the general. They say he works his job with relatively straightforward intentions and at great personal risk, even as many of the police under his command are viewed with skepticism by American military personnel and Iraqi citizens.

The interview with General Hamed follows:

The Long War Journal: What is your background? How did you get into police work?

Hamed: I was born in Baghdad, I finished my primary school and high school, the academy college in Baghdad and I went to the police academy in 1979. I graduated from the police academy in 1981 as a lieutenant. I’ve worked in a lot of positions, as an IP [Iraqi Police] station director, the transportation department director, the officer in charge of all patrols in Rusafa, and the officer in charge of [several] Iraqi Police stations.

LWJ: You have a lot of experience, obviously. What happened after the US invasion happened and civil order disintegrated? Did the police force lay low, melt away, or stay whole?

Hamed: After April 9, 2003, all of the police and Iraqi Army stayed home, but on the 15th of April, I went back to my station by the police academy.

LWJ: And how many joined you, did you re-establish a police force immediately?

Hamed: Most of the IPs and especially the high ranks went back to their job.

LWJ: But obviously Baghdad has been insecure for a long time. My experience with studying Iraqi Police is in the city of Fallujah. And in Fallujah, the police force was reconstituted from scratch several times. I’m curious about Baghdad. Are a lot of the police who used to work as police prior to the invasion still working as police?

Hamed: After the invasion in 2003, a lot of policemen went to their job again, but a lot of them were threatened, especially the high ranks, so they quit. But after 2003, the Coalition forces and Government of Iraq started establishing a new police force that contains a lot of people, [but it’s] quantity, not quality. A lot of people, but they don’t have a lot of experience and many of them can’t read or write, which is a problem for us. And that’s why we became penetrated by a lot of militias. The force is penetrated by a lot of militias.

LWJ: I’ve heard a lot of assertions that the Iraqi Police, including your police, are penetrated up to 50 percent by militias and Special Groups. Frankly, how much is that still a problem and what do you and the government of Iraq plan to do about it?

Hamed: Lately, the government of Iraq started to notice, especially after what happened in Basrah in April, that the Iraqi Police are penetrated by the militias. Not only the police, but also the Army.

LWJ: And what is going to be done about that, especially since the government of Iraq is confronting the militias on the battlefield?

Hamed: They will clean up the militias from the IPs and IAs [Iraqi Army], and try to recruit new members who are loyal to their country only, not the militias or the political parties. Before we were in the police force, and now we are in the police force, but we don’t care about the specific regime, just our country. We used to work for Saddam and now we work for Maliki, and even if Abdul Kareem Quassam [the President of Iraq in 1959] was in charge, our job is to enforce the laws of the country. Our job is to chase criminals, thieves, and everyone who is trying to break the laws.

LWJ: Have you run into conflicts where some of the police are associated with militia, but are then put in a situation where they are supposed to fight or arrest militia members? Doesn’t that cause problems?

Hamed: The government of Iraq and the people have started to become aware of the situation now, and even the IPs and the IAs are realizing that these people [the militias] are not here to help them; these people are here to hurt them. And of course they have also noticed that these militias work for Iran, that they are here to support everything Iran wants in Iraq. If a given Iraqi soldier or an Iraqi policeman was 100 percent loyal to the militias before, I want to say it’s 10 percent now. Soldiers and cops who were affiliated with the militias have started to hate the Mahdi Army more.

LWJ: Can you describe how security has improved over the past year, and explain the change?

Hamed: A year ago, the security situation was really bad, but when they started the Awakenings across Iraq, they decreased the number of criminals. For example, my area of operations is very secure right now. Before establishing the Awakening members [the Sons of Iraq], we used to find 7-10 corpses every day in my area, and we used to have a lot of [car bombs], because we have the two main markets in all of Baghdad and Iraq. But with the help of the Awakening members, helping us to search people and vehicles, that helped us to decrease the crime. [Editor’s note: Many Iraqis often use the terms Awakening and Sons of Iraq synonymously, but the two groups may not necessarily be the same entities. The Awakening is a political movement originally formed in Anbar and has an armed security component, which is supported by the government. The Sons of Iraq is a program modeled after the Awakening’s armed component. Sons of Iraq units may or may not be associated with the Awakening movement. The Sons of Iraq in Rusafa were inspired by the Awakening but are not part of the movement.]

LWJ: How do you plan to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the police? At your meeting with them the other day there was a lot of conflict and tension. [A local Awakening leader had bitterly complained to the general about his Iraqi Police and the government of Iraq].

Hamed: In everything there is always positive sides and negative sides. With them, we are trying to work together, but in the beginning you have a lot of obstacles in your way. So we are now trying to meet with them every week to talk about the security situation, if they have any issues we can discuss them together. At the same time, the Sons of Iraq are a temporary thing; they will join the Iraqi Police and the Iraq Army. And that will be excellent, as they know their area. So we will try hard to recruit them in their areas; they will not go to other areas because they know their areas very well and they can patrol them better than we do right now.

LWJ: What do you think of the conflict going on up in Sadr City right now? Do you think it’s inevitable or unnecessary; do you think it’s a good thing that the government is fighting the militias, or a bad thing?

Hamed: I encourage the government in what they are doing right now in Sadr City, because it was necessary to chase the militia members that are trying to break the law. Our goal is to force the rule of law in the country, and the only people that can carry weapons are the Iraqi security forces and no one else.

LWJ: What do you think of the American advisers and America’s role in this? And when do you think the Iraqi security forces will be able to stand on their own?

Hamed: To be honest with you, if the Americans leave, a bloody civil war will start the next day, for one reason: the Iraqi security forces cannot stand on their own yet. That is my personal opinion, to be honest with you.

LWJ: And how long do you think it will be before the army and police can stand on their own?

Hamed: In my opinion, three years.

LWJ: And what are the improvements that need to be made to get there?

Hamed: Training, equipment, and choosing the right personnel.

LWJ: What is your opinion of the future? How do you view the future of Baghdad, how do you think Iraq will turn out in the next few years?

Hamed: It makes me feel bad to say this, but if the members of the government were here to help us and to take care of Baghdad, the city would be even better than it was during Saddam’s regime. But they all sit on their butts and are corrupted, and their only concern is money, so say goodbye to Baghdad. They are corrupt. Just being honest.

LWJ: Do you see hope of avoiding that outcome? Could elections in 2009 change the government?

Hamed: Insh’allah [God willing].

Bill Ardolino’s embed is sponsored by the readers of The Long War Journal, Public Multimedia Inc., and The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Please support The Long War Journal by making a tax-deductable donation today.

A member of the Iraqi National Police creates an inventory of illegal weapons confiscated in the Sadr City, as he turns them over to members of the 42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, at Combat Patrol Base Comanche on April 19. (US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Adrian Cadiz)

US and Iraqi forces continue to target the Mahdi Army as an Iraqi delegation visited Iran to confront the country over its support of Shia militias battling the government. The US military conducted a guided rocket attack on a Special Groups headquarters adjacent to a hospital in Sadr City, while 14 Mahdi Army fighters have been killed during clashes over the past 24 hours.

The US Army targeted and destroyed a Special Groups command and control center in a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System strike in Sadr City at 10 AM local time Saturday morning, Multinational Forces Iraq reported. "There were six GMLRS rocket strikes on these Special Groups criminal command and control nodes," Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad, told The Long War Journal while refuting claims that the US used aircraft to attack. "We conducted a precision strike, hopefully got a few leaders, and sent a very strong message."

The Special Groups have been using the location near the hospital for an extended period of time and US intelligence has followed the activities at this site. "We had been tracking it for some time," Stover said. "Operations made the call to hit it. There may have been damages to the hospital - broken glass. There was likely ambulances damaged; however, it was the Special Groups criminal leadership that purposely put their command and control node there."

The Special Groups are a subset of the Mahdi Army that receives backing from Iran's Qods Force, the foreign clandestine operations wing that has supported Shia terror groups in Iraq. The Mahdi Army and the Special Groups have intentionally fought amongst the civilian population and use civilians as human shields in an attempt to inflate civilian casualties and create a media backlash against Iraqi and US operations.

The Rusafa health department media director claimed 28 Iraqi were wounded in the strike, and nine ambulances and 40 civilian vehicles were damaged. The Sadrist bloc ran the Health Ministry prior to withdrawing from the government in 2007, and the hospitals in Sadr City are known to be infiltrated with Mahdi Army and Sadrist bloc members. The Mahdi Army used hospitals as staging areas for sectarian attacks and weapons storage depots.

Construction on the Al Qods barrier continues

US and Iraqi forces killed 14 Mahdi Army fighters in Sadr City and northern and eastern Baghdad over the past 24 hours and the construction the wall continues. The US military described the barrier as a "magnet" for Mahdi Army attacks as they seek to stop the construction effort.

The US military killed 10 Mahdi fighters on May 2 as they attempted to stop the construction of the concrete barrier on Qods Street that is separating the southern third of Sadr City. Four more fighters were killed in the early morning today as they planted roadside bombs and the deadly explosively formed projectile mines supplied by Iran.

Iraqi government confronts Iran on arming Shia terrorists

As the fighting against the Iranian-backed militias continues in Baghdad, the Iraqi government's delegation to Iran has returned after conducting talks on May 1. The delegation was sent to Iran to confront the country's involvement in recruiting, arming, and training Shia militias that have attacked the Iraqi government and security forces and Coalition forces.

"[The delegation] presented a list of names, training camps and cells linked to Iran," Haidar al Ibadi, a member of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Dawa party, told Reuters. "The delegation also carried evidence of the smuggling of weapons and training of individuals in Iran to enter later into Iraq."

The Iranians denied any involvement in Iraq, as they have in the past. "The Iranians did not confess or admit anything," Ibadi told Reuters. "They claim they are not intervening in Iraq and they feel they are being unfairly blamed for everything going on Iraq," he said of Tursday's talks.

The Iraqi government changed its view of Iran's involvement after evidence of Iranian weaponry manufactured in Iran was confiscated during operation in Basrah. "Basra changed it for the Iraqis," an anonymous US military officer told Reuters. "I'm not sure they believed it before. But they went to Basra and saw it first hand."

Iran claimed that talks with the US on Iraq's security crisis were canceled due to Iranian objections of "US savage attacks against the Iraqi people."

"Under the current circumstances and given the US widespread attacks against Iraqi people in different cities, Iran does not feel these negotiations are necessary," an unnamed Iranian official told Fars, an Iranian government-supported news outlet.

But the Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has said operations would continue against "criminals" and illegal militias. The Iraqi government has ignored the Sadrist bloc's request for a negotiated settlement to the fighting in Baghdad, Voices of Iraq reported. "The government has not responded on the initiative to start talk to end the crisis and the Sadrist bloc did not receive an official response from the government on the initiative," Salah al Ubeidi, a spokesman for the Sadrist bloc said on May 2. Maliki has said the government would end the operations once the Mahdi Army puts down its weapons and disbands.

Background on the recent fighting in with the Mahdi Army

Mahdi Army forces openly took up arms against the government after the Iraqi government started the assault on Basrah on March 25 to clear the city of the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed Shia militias. Sadr called for his forces to leave the streets on March 30 just as Iraqi Army and police reinforcements began to arrive in Basrah. Sadr later admitted he ordered his followers within the Army and police to abandon their posts and join the fighting against the government.

In Baghdad alone, US and Iraqi forces killed 173 Mahdi Army fighters during the six days of fighting from March 25 up until Sadr declared a cease-fire. The fighting has not abated in Sadr City and other Mahdi Army-dominated neighborhoods in northern and eastern Baghdad. A total of 465 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25.

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill will now be sent to parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

On April 20, Sadr threatened to conduct a third uprising, but later backed down from his threat, claiming it was directed only at US forces. The Maliki government has stood firm and said operations would continue until the Mahdi Army and other militias disarm and disband.

2nd Lieutenant Mike Hebert leads White Platoon of the Blackfoot Troop, 3-89 Cavalry on a presence patrol of a difficult neighborhood in southern Rusafa district, Baghdad. Photo by Bill Ardolino.

BAGHDAD, IRAQ: The nighttime walk through a difficult neighborhood in southern Rusafa was uneventful; a careful “presence patrol” designed to show local citizens American forces and gauge public opinion. The jumbled maze of brightly lit ramshackle shops and pitch-black back alleys is one of the less secure parts of the district.

The few blocks in Southern Rusafa are “a neighborhood with the most potential to become violent because of the JAM [Mahdi Army] Special Groups networks that are known to operate in that area,” according to Lieutenant Mike Hebert, the patrol’s leader. No one challenged the platoon, and the expressions of Iraqi civilians were studiously neutral. But the Mahdi Army presence was apparent in the nervous energy of shopkeepers who hesitantly spoke with the Americans, a fear that increased when directly asked about the Shia militia.

Rusafa is a large district in central Baghdad bordered by the Tigris River to the southwest and Sadr City to the northeast. The district is predominantly Shia, but contains significant Sunni enclaves and a small Christian population, with a surprising number of openly practicing churches, according to Colonel Craig Collier, the commander of the 3rd Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. The 450 soldiers of the 3-89 Cav are responsible for the district’s security, in conjunction with thousands of Iraqi Army, Iraqi National Police, Iraqi Police, Kurdish private contractors, and Sons of Iraq (neighborhood watch).

Rusafa contains Baghdad’s largest and most famous markets, including the Shorja, Saria, and Bab al Sharji, some of which were the scenes of high-profile suicide bombings during the sectarian-fueled carnage of 2006-2007. Over the past year, and especially over the past six months, the district has calmed significantly. The predominant remaining threats are Mahdi Army mortar rounds aimed at the International Zone that fall short and suicide vest bombers and car bombs that target the markets and Coalition forces. Less successful suicide attacks occur maybe once a month, while once common highly successful “spectacular attacks” have become much less frequent.

The Iraqi security forces show improvement in Rusafa

Soldiers in the 3-89 Cav attribute improved security to a few main factors. As is the case with Iraqi security forces across the country, leadership is everything. Collier believes that changes in leadership of the Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Army have improved the performance of the Iraqi security forces.

“We have now taken over an area, and because the first of the Surge units left, it’s twice the size it was before, and I have less than half the people, and it’s still working, so far,” said Collier. “And that is in good measure because of the quality of Iraqi security forces. I was here two years ago and I’ve seen a noticeable improvement, and it’s really the hope that this country has, that they’re able to do things on their own. And they are -- they’re doing quite a bit on their own.”

Collier said that there remains variation in operational quality among units, but notes that many are performing well. He also states that logistics remain “the biggest weak point” with the Iraqi security forces, but asserts gradual improvement.

“The Iraqi Army battalion 3/4/1 [3rd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 1st Division], which just transitioned here from Fallujah, is one of the most professional battalions I’ve seen,” said Captain John Thornburg, commander of the 3-89’s Bravo Troop, who is responsible for a Joint Security Station (JSS) in southern Rusafa. “They uphold the [operational and uniform] standard on checkpoints, they’re battle-hardened professionals, and are the future of the Iraqi Army that we’d like to see. They’re proud, professional-looking soldiers, and the people see the difference.”

White Platoon of the Blackfoot Troop, 3-89 Cavalry conducts a presence patrol in a difficult neighborhood in southern Rusafa district, Baghdad. Click the image to view. Photo by Bill Ardolino.

A Shia Awakening

But Thornburg attributes most of the improvement in his area in southern Rusafa to the Sons of Iraq, the local neighborhood watchmen who are paid by the US. The Sons of Iraq program was started here seven months ago by local leaders and the 82nd Airborne, the unit last responsible for the southwestern half of Rusafa, which is essentially downtown Baghdad. Local Sons of Iraq leaders claim they were “the first Shia Awakening” against militias and al Qaeda.

“The SOI have exceeded expectations. They’ve turned one of the most violent areas of Baghdad into one of the most quiet,” said Thornburg. “Specifically, they are looking for Mahdi Army. They know who comes into their area, they man checkpoints 24 hours a day, they do vehicle searches, they question people and they patrol. The locals trust them and they are happy with them. They’ve earned a lot of wasta [respect] from the citizens, and the results speak for themselves. It’s a real success story.”

The Sons of Iraq in Al Sadria -- a collection of neighborhoods in southwestern Rusafa -- are about 250-strong and primarily Shia. But Faris Abdul Hassan, their leader, refuses to hire individuals with sectarian allegiances. The Americans still write the contracts for the neighborhood watch, pay them, and issue their security instructions, but the government of Iraq is attempting the process of taking control of the program. The transition is contentious and marked by a lack of trust, as exemplified by a heated meeting that took place on Friday at JSS Babalsheikh. A Sons of Iraq leader from the Al Fahdil area angrily yelled at a local Iraqi Police general that “the government has done nothing for my people in five years.”

Hassan and his Al Sadria Sons of Iraq also mistrust the government, specifically asserting that the Iraqi Police are still infiltrated “maybe 50 percent” by the Special Groups. An American officer agrees that there remains some level of Mahdi Army infiltration in the Iraqi Police. The Al Sadria Sons of Iraq have a more favorable opinion of the Iraqi Army, though overall distrust of the government remains an issue that will make integration with Iraqi security forces a difficult, delicate process.

The Mahdi Army is disliked in Rusafa

Above all, Hassan and his neighborhood watchmen do not like the Mahdi Army.

“Originally, the Jaish al Mahdi [Mahdi Army] in our area used to deceive people by using the name of the religion to do their purposes,” said Dhia, Hassan’s executive officer. “They were all corrupted. They have history in crime, robberies, murders, rapes, and all kinds of bad things. They even reached the level of kidnapping people and demanding ransoms just because they have money. It didn’t matter if he is Shia or Sunni; just because he has money. They gave a bad reputation for Islam.”

American officials assert that the final factor that has improved security is the citizenry’s fatigue with violence and the militias.

“They’re still intimidated by [the Mahdi Army], but they’re tired of them,” said Thornburg.

In the past the Mahdi Army commanded local support because of the need for security in a vacuum and intimidation tactics. But as security improved and other forces are gaining prominence, support for the Mahdi militia in Rusafa is evaporating.

“Right now because of the fighting Sadr City, people have started to despise [the Mahdi Army] because of the situation they created,” said “Rammie,” an Army interpreter raised and living in Rusafa. “People have started to know the truth of [the Mahdi Army] as kidnappers, killers, carjackers, and agents of the Iranian government. But the recent fighting against the [Iraqi security forces] means they are also against the government. They are not trying to just fight the invasion forces as they claim, but they fight whoever interferes with their mafia activity.”

Thus far, the fighting just north in Sadr City has not significantly spilled over into Rusafa, but it is affecting the lives of the district’s residents. Mahdi Army militiamen used to egress from the southeast border of Sadr City to fire rockets and mortars at the International Zone, then duck back into the Shia slum, which served almost like a safe zone where no Iraqi or US military units would follow.

Mahdi mortars and rockets fall short in Rusafa

Since the government operation against the Mahdi Army in Basrah began in March, Mahdi fighters began firing mortars and rockets from Sadr City itself, a move that spurred the recent Iraqi Army and US incursion into the poor Shia enclave. A side effect of this new trajectory for indirect fire is that some rounds fall short of their target and land in southwestern Rusafa, killing civilians and destroying property. US personnel assert that this is angering the district’s populace against the militias, and 3-89 Cav soldiers press the issue by immediately passing out leaflets that explain where the artillery came from after an attack.

Businessmen in Rusafa say that the recent deterioration in security directly impacts their businesses, driving up the prices they pay for goods, and causing consumers to save rather than spend. “Whenever there is peace and safety, my business does well,” said a shopkeeper in southeastern Rusafa. “The prices of goods have increased because of the events [in Sadr City].”

When asked what he thought of the Mahdi Army, his voice dropped precipitously and he nervously glanced around before answering: “This is their country, but everywhere you can find someone who will destroy his own country, his own house.”

Opinion has shifted against the militias and is more gradually moving toward supporting the Iraqi security forces. Yet views about Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al Sadr are varied and complex, as characterized by some individuals who despise both his Special Groups foot soldiers and their Iranian paymasters, but avoid placing blame on the cleric himself.

“These guys [the Mahdi Army] are fighting between the houses [among civilians],” said a corporal in the Iraqi Army. “They use the houses as their armor, so that’s why many innocent people are killed, because they shoot mortars between the houses and run away. Iran will pay a lot of money for ignorant people to behave crazy. They claim that they belong to Muqtada al Sadr, but they do not belong to Muqtada, they belong to Iran.”

Others have developed a distaste for the radical cleric. Rammie asserts that “many educated people” know that both the Mahdi Army and Iran are affiliated with Sadr, and that his popularity is waning in Rusafa as a result. “He is in Iran, not even here fighting with his own people,” Rammie said.

“Muqtada is an immature guy,” said Hassan. “He is not mature enough to lead such a militia and I don’t think he even controls or leads the Mahdi Army, he’s being directed by higher people.”

Efforts to stabilize the area continue as surge units draw down and the battle in Sadr City escalates. Some American officials believe that the Iraqi government’s confrontation with the militia is giving the Iraqi Army momentum and further shifting public opinion.

“We are so close to establishing a fully legitimized ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] structure,” said Captain Nathan Hubbard, the commander of the 3-83 Cav’s Alpha Troop, which is responsible for a Joint Security Station in the Al Fahdil area of Rusafa. “I would say that with the successful conclusion of Basrah and the continuation of [the offensive in] Sadr City -- the closing off of the criminal elements down there -- you’ll see a significant swing in public belief in the ISF. More [Iraqis] would buy into ISF being a legit force. Right now, the citizens are maybe 40 percent pro-government, 40 percent on the fence, and some seriously anti-ISF guys on the side. The people want a force that is willing to go after any terrorists, including AQI [al Qaeda in Iraq], Mahdi Army, the PKK [the Kurdistan Workers’ Party]. They just like to see the government doing something.”

Bill Ardolino’s embed is sponsored by the readers of The Long War Journal, Public Multimedia Inc., and The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Please support The Long War Journal by making a tax-deductable donation today.

Iraqi and Coalition forces Order of Battle as of April 30, 2008.

The May 2008 updates to the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle are now available at the ISF OOB homepage. The significant changes to the Order of Battle that occurred in April are summarized below.

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)

During General Petraeus' testimony on April 8, the schedule for Iraq’s provinces taking primary responsibility for their own security was listed on one of the slides. In the plan for Provincial Iraqi Control, Anbar is scheduled for June 2008, Qadisiyah for July, Babil and Wasit for November, Baghdad and Diyala for December, Ninewa and Salahaddin for January 2009, and Kirkuk (Tamin) is to be determined. The schedules for Provincial Control regularly have slid backward and should be looked at as tentative until each handover ceremony is actually held.

Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) Quick Reaction Forces (QRF)

The 1st Iraqi Army Division has officially joined the 9th Iraqi Army Mechanized Division as a part of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Quick Reaction Forces. The forces currently under 1st Division in Basrah are the 1st, 3rd, 14th, and 26th Brigades from Anbar and Salahadin Provinces. Their rapid deployment to Basrah with no notice indicated a significant improvement in Iraqi Army capabilities. In August 2006, the Iraqi Army couldn't deploy three battalions to Baghdad with a month's notice. They had some difficulty deploying three brigades to Baghdad in early 2007 with plenty of notice. Now they are able to deploy an entire division to Basrah in five days with no notice. This would be difficult even for the US Army to accomplish.

The forces belonging to the 1st and 9th Divisions are almost all deployed out of their garrisons which indicates they have no further reserves in the QRF available at this time.

1st Division HQ based: Habbenayah, Anbar. Deployed to: Basrah.

• 1st Brigade based: Ramadi, Anbar. Deployed to: Basrah.
• 2nd Brigade based: Falujah, Anbar. Deployed to: Taji, north Baghdad (probably for motorization and training).
• 3rd Brigade based: Habbenayah, Anbar. Deployed to: Basrah.
• 4th Brigade based: Abu Ghraib, Anbar. Deployed to: Baghdad (Rusafa).

9th Division HQ based: Taji, north Baghdad. Deployed to: Forward Operating Base Hammer, south Baghdad.

• 34th Brigade based: Taji, north Baghdad. Deployed to: FOB Hammer, south Baghdad.
• 35th Brigade based: Taji, north Baghdad. Deployed to: Baghdad (Sadr City).
• 36th Brigade based: Taji, north Baghdad. Deployed to: Basrah (except one battalion).
• 37th Brigade based: Taji, north Baghdad. Deployed to: Mosul (except one battalion).

The deployment of 14th and 26th Brigades to Basrah indicates that the 4th and 7th Divisions may be added to the Quick Reaction Forces. However, this is unconfirmed. The assignment of the 4th Division would not be likely until the 12th Division finishes splitting off and assuming control of its sector. The assignment of the 7th Division would make all the Iraqi Army forces in Anbar part of the Quick Reaction Force.

Iraqi Army (IA) Force Development

The 29th IA Brigade graduated the Unit Set Fielding program at Habbenayah on April 3. This was the first brigade to graduate this training and equipping program from a location other than Besmaya. This graduation combined with the 1st Iraqi Army Engineer Infrastructure Battalion graduating the same program on April 2 indicates the expansion of the program and an acceleration of unit fielding. The Iraqi Army has been fielding one new brigade per month average over the last year.

On April 20, it was announced that Iraq has engaged in a contract to purchase 411 Symphony counter-improvised explosive device jammers. "After numerous technical and administrative delays, fielding is now under way within the Baghdad area of operation. Along with tier one and two vehicles the system will also be distributed to a number of Iraqi forces as well," said Coen McFarland, Program Office Liaison. "These forces include the Iraqi Special Operation Forces, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior elements to include the Iraqi Army, police, national police and explosive ordinance disposal units." The system is already up and running in a few vehicles with more slated within the next month and the rest of the systems to be fully employed by summer. "To field the remaining systems this summer the fielding efforts will be transitioned from here to Taji," said McFarland. "The Taji National Depot will be our long term Symphony installation and maintenance facility after the transition."

On April 28, the first operational mention of the EE9 equipped 37th Reconnaissance Battalion was noted in reporting. This battalion is apparently advised by US Special Forces. It received its 90mm gun armed armored cars in January.

Issue of M4 and M16s has started at Qayyarah West. This indicates that the northern divisions are now being re-equipped with US personal arms. Previous issues have been from Habbenayah, Taji, and Besmaya. Iraqi Divisions equipped with US personal arms are the 1st, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 14th, and ISOF.

Ministry of Interior

The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi National Police graduated phase III Carabinieri training on April 21. This is the third battalion to graduate this advanced training. The other two are the Emergency Response Unit (Dec 19, 2007) and the 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade (Feb 19, 2008). One battalion per brigade is to receive this training and then that battalion will train the rest of its brigade.

Iraq's Department of Border enforcement has renumbered its 12 brigades. Like the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Police, they are now consecutively numbered.

Speculation on future Corps and the Status of the Peshmerga

Speculation

In "The Real Surge Continues: Iraqi Army Corps Formation," last month's update was corrected. What follows is more speculation on the future organization and strength of the Iraqi Army.

On April 17, the Iraqi Chief of Staff indicated that the two Peshmerga divisions will be under the Ministry of Defense like the other IA Divisions. This is only a quarter of the Peshmerga's size. On April 23, "The Premier announced significant progress on the future and status of the Peshmerga forces, the constitutionally mandated regional guard. Two divisions of the Peshmerga will be incorporated into the Iraqi army and stationed in the Kurdistan Region. The other Peshmerga forces will be funded by a special allocation from Baghdad and form a regional guard for the Kurdistan Region. A commission from the federal Ministry of Defence will travel to the Kurdistan Region to address the issue in the near future." This indicates that the Kurdish Regional Government has negotiated an agreement with the Government of Iraq for a de facto fifth Iraqi Corps: The Kurdish Regional Guards.

This map, from The Washington Post, was created April 24. There is no estimate available on when the barrier will be completed.

The large majority of the direct attacks by the Mahdi Army against US and Iraqi forces in Sadr City are occurring on Qods Street, where a barrier is being erected to separate the Iraqi Army and US controlled sections in the south from the northern portion of the district, the US military told The Long War Journal. The Mahdi Army is attempting to stop the building of the barrier.

US Army engineers are in the process of installing tall concrete barriers along the length of Al Qods Street, a major route that runs approximately east to west in the southern portion of Sadr City. Al Qods Street divides the Ishbilyah and Habbibiyah neighborhoods, which are controlled by the US and Iraqi military, from the northern neighborhoods. US and Iraqi forces hope to restrict the movement of weapons and supplies into the southern neighborhoods, prevent the Mahdi Army from using these areas as launch sites for mortar and rocket attacks against the International Zone, establish the writ of the government, and provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqis living in these areas in order to wrest control from the Mahdi Army.

The Mahdi Army is trying desperately to stop the barrier from being built, and is focusing its attacks on US engineers and patrols as they work to complete it. The Mahdi Army has launched complex attacks and ambushes using small-arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and roadside bombs.

“[The barrier is] a magnet,” said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad in response to email questions on the recent fighting in Sadr City. “In that area, for the past three days we've seen some pretty heavy, prolonged engagements. Elsewhere, it's mostly IEDs [improvised explosive devices, or roadside bombs], IDF [indirect fire, or rockets and mortars] and harassment fire.”

Map of Baghdad neighborhoods. Click to view.

These attacks have not stopped the barrier from being built, said Stover, who visited the construction sites on Qods Street on May 1. “As the engineers were emplacing the barriers an M1A1 Abrams fired a main gun round at militants across the street,” Stover said. “We fired 5 Hellfire missiles and dropped two JDAMs from fixed wing aircraft. It got a bit hot today, but our Soldiers continued emplacing the barriers.” Two Mahdi Army fighters were confirmed killed during four engagements along Al Qods Street on May 1. More Mahdi fighters probably were killed, according to the press release, but a full count was not available. Three US soldiers were wounded in the fighting.

One of the largest battles in Sadr City occurred along Al Qods street on April 28. The Mahdi Army took advantage of the lack of US air cover due to a sand storm to launch an ambush against US forces as they patrolled the road while other soldiers were building the barrier. Mahdi Army forces launched the complex attack from the region north of Al Qods Street. The US soldiers counterattacked and killed 28 Mahdi Army fighters while taking six wounded.

The next day, The Associated Press ran an article on the engagement titled “Militiamen ambush drives back US patrol in Sadr City.” But Stover said the ambush failed to force the US soldiers to withdraw. “The barrier emplacement never stopped,” Stover told The Long War Journal.

Background on the recent fighting in with the Mahdi Army

Mahdi Army forces openly took up arms against the government after the Iraqi government started the assault on Basrah on March 25 to clear the city of the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed Shia militias. Sadr called for his forces to leave the streets on March 30 just as Iraqi Army and police reinforcements began to arrive in Basrah. Sadr later admitted he ordered his followers within the Army and police to abandon their posts and join the fighting against the government.

In Baghdad alone, US and Iraqi forces killed 173 Mahdi Army fighters during the six days of fighting from March 25 up until Sadr declared a cease-fire. The fighting has not abated in Sadr City and other Mahdi Army-dominated neighborhoods in northern and eastern Baghdad. A total of 465 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25.

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill will now be sent to parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

On April 20, Sadr threatened to conduct a third uprising, but later backed down from his threat, claiming it was directed only at US forces. The Maliki government has stood firm and said operations would continue until the Mahdi Army and other militias disarm and disband. The Iraqi government has sent a delegation to Iran to ask the Iranian government to halt its support for attacks inside Iraq and to stop arming and training Shia terror groups.

The apparent respite in yesterday's fighting was illusory as US forces killed an additional 27 Mahdi Army fighters and a senior Special Groups leader during a series of engagements in the afternoon and throughout the night in Sadr City. One of the larger clashes occurred as US forces were attacked while constructing the barrier that divides the southern portion of Sadr city where US and Iraqi troops have established a foothold.

The fighting began just before noon as Mahdi Army fighters attacked US troops with rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire as they were building the concrete security barrier in Sadr City. US soldiers responded and killed three Mahdi fighters. Ten minutes later, US troops killed seven Mahdi Army fighters after they attacked the soldiers with mortars and machine guns. No US soldiers were reported killed in either incident.

US troops killed another 17 Mahdi Army fighters in a series of engagements throughout the day as they transported weapons, set up rockets for launching, planted roadside bombs, and attacked US troops in Sadr City.

Coalition Special Forces also conducted a daylight strike today inside Sadr City. A Coalition airstrike targeted a "known Iranian-sponsored senior Special Groups leader" inside Sadr City this afternoon Baghdad time. "According to our operational reports the 'Special Groups leader' ... was killed," Multinational Forces Iraq said in answer to an e-mail inquiry by The Long War Journal. The Special Groups are Iranian-trained, financed, and armed elements of the Mahdi Army.

The Mahdi Army has taken heavy casualties in Sadr City since the fighting broke out on March 25. According to US and Iraqi reports compiled by The Long War Journal, 463 Mahdi Army fighters have been killed in and around Sadr City. These numbers do not include Mahdi Army fighters who may have died hours after being wounded in the fighting.

A buildup in Sadr City

The US and Iraqi military have rapidly built up their forces in and around Sadr City over the past several weeks. Two Iraqi Army brigades and elements from an Iraqi armored brigade and an Iraqi National Police brigade, along with eight US Army battalions, have been reported in military press releases to be operating inside Sadr City over the past several weeks. In early April, only two US Army battalions, an Iraqi Army brigade, and elements from an Iraqi National Police brigade were known to be operating inside Sadr City.

A US Army brigade, three Iraqi National Police brigades, and an Iraqi Army brigade are also operating in the neighborhoods adjacent to Sadr City. This unprecedented buildup of forces indicates the Iraqi government and the US military are serious about advancing into Sadr City beyond the southern third of the district, which is being hemmed in by the security barriers under construction.

Units Operating inside Sadr City:

US Army:

• 1st Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment
• 4th Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment, 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division
• 1st Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)
• 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
• 1st Combined Arms Battalion, 68th Armored Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
• 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division
• 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
• 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

Iraqi Army:

• 42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division
• 44th Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division
• Elements from the 35th Tank Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Mechanized Division

Iraqi Police:

• Elements from the 8th Brigade, 2nd National Police Division