Omar Hammami, an American who quickly rose through the ranks in Shabaab and was rumored to have been killed after publishing a video that claimed his life was in danger, has released the first part of his autobiography. The document refutes the rumors that he was executed early last month by Shabaab for releasing the video. Shabaab has denied Hammami's life is in danger.

Hammami, who is known as Abu Mansour al Amriki, serves as a top military commander, propagandist, and recruiter for Shabaab. The notice of his autobiography was recently released on YouTube by a user known as somalimuhajirwarrior, the same person who uploaded the short video in which Hammami claimed his life was in danger. The autobiography, titled "The Story of an American Jihaadi, Part One," has been published on Scribd.

The introduction to the voluminous 127-page autobiography is signed by Hammami as "Still alive and well (by May 16 2012), Omar Hammami, Somaalia."

In the autobiography, Hammami provides intimate details about his childhood, including his family history; his relationship with his parents, siblings, and grandparents; and information about his activities in school, including teachers, friendships, and enemies. Hammami describes himself as a soccer "star" and president of his seventh grade class.

Much of the autobiography focuses on his religious upbringing, and the void he felt as a child until he was introduced to Islam in the seventh grade. After this, he became alienated from friends and family as he became immersed in religion. He even felt distant from family and friends in Syria after a visit to the country in the eleventh grade.

"I remember I had to leave all of those Sufi friends [in Syria] and I began socializing with other practicing people and going to the Masjids," Hammami writes. "The only problem that year was that I had become more religious than my family over there."

Hammami frequently clashed with students and teachers in high school over religion. He was able to leave a year early, attended college, dropped out, and then worked various jobs.

He describes his feelings after learning of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US, which he ultimately celebrated.

"I was mixed between the 'hatred of terrorism' instilled by the 'Salafis' and between my real hatred for America, the disbelievers, and their oppression of the Muslims," he writes. "Although I did go through a denial phase and blamed it on the Muslims for not engaging in enough Dacwah (as is reported by the USA school newspaper the Vanguard) I still remember finding myself alone in the Masjid that day and I jumped up and said: Allaahu Akbar!"

But Hammami ultimately attributes his radicalization to an unnamed "well-known scholar" who debated a "Salafi" cleric. Hammami says he learned that the "whole 'Salafi' movement," which he clearly holds in contempt, "are only engaged in talking about one another."

Hammami describes a visit to Syria with his father, and claims he planned to leave the country and travel to Yemen to study Islam with the unnamed "scholar" he admired. But his family blocked him, and he returned to the US, where he worked at at a flea market and a store that sold hip-hop clothing. Hammami then claims that the FBI attempted to entice him into discussing jihad.

"While working at the flea market and also on other occasions while selling Islaamic books or chilling at the Masjid, it seemed obvious that the FBI was trying to send me reformed crack heads as spies to entice me to talk to them about Jihaad," he writes. I began realizing how true that hunch of mine was once I saw how many brothers went to the slammer for such stupidity after my departure."

Hammami traveled to Canada, where he married a Somali woman, and then moved his family to Eygpt. While living there he heard and read sermons from Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, the influential, radical Jordanian cleric, that convinced him he was a jihadist.

"Any remaining doubts in my head that were instilled by my early days as a "Salafi" (i.e. neo-Salafi) had been removed," he states. "Jihaad is truly an individual obligation upon all of us. We do not have to wait for a Khaliifah [Caliphate] to establish this obligation of Jihaad. There is nothing wrong with making Takfiir [declaring a Muslim an unbeliever] of the rulers and those who judge by other than the Sharicah and make friends with the Disbelievers. I had become a Jihaadi (call it Salafi Jihaadi if you want, or even call it Muslims who believe in adhering to all of the Sharicah, and not just some parts, if you choose)."

Hammami abandoned his family and traveled to Somalia shortly afterward. After arriving in Mogadishu, he was detained by the authorities. Hammami told the Islamic Courts that he was in Somalia to visit his wife's family.

While Hammami does not say when exactly he traveled to Somalia, he is known to have arrived in November 2006, when the Islamic Courts Union controlled the country. Hammami confirms this when he mentions that he was interrogated by "the famed terrorist Fazul, may Allaah accept him as a martyr." Fazul is none other than Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, al Qaeda's leader in East Africa and a senior Shabaab commander, who was killed at a Somali military checkpoint in Mogadishu in June 2011.

Hammami stayed with family and his friend, Abu Mohammed, who met him later in Somalia. The two traveled to Kismayo with other fighters and a man whom he describes as an American "spy" who claimed to be an al Qaeda leader. He and Abu Mohammed trained at a camp in Kismayo and later joined with other foreigners, including Eritrean, Ethiopian, and British citizens, to fight on "the front line" during the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006.

Hammami maintains that the Islamic Courts made strategic errors by fighting the Ethiopian forces in conventional battles and overextending their supply lines by taking areas such as Baidoa, far from Mogadishu and Kismayo.

"Even if the war was to be fought conventionally, the Courts should have used their strategic depth to their advantage by drawing the Ethiopians all the way to Mogadishu," Hammami writes. "If the conventional battle failed, the capital city would be within reach for the fighters to fade into the populace for urban guerrilla warfare. Instead of such a strategy, the Courts ended up simply running away after a short conventional fight (which sapped them of most of their manpower, weapons, and equipment) far from refuge; without laying any ambushes for the oncoming Ethiopians and without allowing for urban warfare in Mogadishu."

"Unfortunately, it would take many failures for the Mujaahidiin to realize that ambushes and irregular urban warfare were the true keys to success against a much stronger occupier," he observes.

Hammami goes on to describe the Islamic Courts' retreat to Ras Kamboni (or Chiamboni). While there, he again met Fazal Mohammed and future Shabaab emir Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr. He describes the "Cabdul Qaadir Kommandos," an elite group of jihadist fighters that attempts to get the Islamic Courts fighters to regroup and make a stand against the Ethiopians.

He relates the group's movements in southern Somalia in the jungles along the Kenyan border, and tells of meeting Somali jihadi luminaries such as Hassan Turki, whom he describes as an al Qaeda leader, and Hassan Dahir Aweys. According to Hammami's account, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the current president of Somalia, even gave a sermon extolling the virtues of jihad.

Hammami also tells about his time at another training camp and provides an anecdote about how Shabaab was formed from a cadre of Islamic Courts leaders, such as Zubayr, Shaykh Muhammad Abu Fa'id, and Ibrahim al Afghani. Hammami explains that Turki's decision not join Shabaab was due to leadership differences.

Hammami's role in Shabaab is said to be covered in part two of his autobiography, which has not yet been released.

Today the US Treasury Department added a Taliban financier and a Haqqani Network "communications official" to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

Abdul Baqi Bari, the Taliban leader, has funneled money to both al Qaeda and the Taliban, and has accepted funds from Osama bin Laden. Bakht Gul, the Haqqani Network operative, serves as a top aide to Badruddin Haqqani, and has helped "foreign fighters" enter Afghanistan.

Abdul Baqi Bari

Treasury said that Bari "has served as a Taliban money launderer and financial manager since at least 2001." He has used his businesses inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan to fund al Qaeda and Taliban operations, and has worked directly with both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Bari has used banks, money exchanges, and hawalas to mask the movement of large sums of cash.

Bari is known to have received, handled, and distributed millions of dollars in cash. "In the twilight of the Taliban government," Bari was one of several individuals to have received a portion of more than $168 million from Afghanistan's national bank. "Bari was at the top of the list, according to the chief of Interpol in Afghanistan," Treasury stated. Also in 2002, Bari disbursed "$2.6 million in Taliban money" to an unnamed associate "to deposit in separate bank accounts."

Bari has interacted with al Qaeda in at least two instances. In 2001, Mullah Omar instructed Bari "to pay al Qaeda and Taliban supporters."

In 2002, Osama bin Laden "provided Bari and an associate $500,000 to purchase a
factory" for an unnamed company, "and Taliban personnel subsequently established satellite offices throughout Afghanistan," apparently using the company as cover for activities.

Additionally, "Bari used money exchange businesses in Pakistan to funnel financial support to the Taliban and al Qaeda and, in one instance, conducted a $400,000 hawala transfer for Mullah Omar," Treasury stated.

In addition to serving as a top financial official for the Taliban and al Qaeda, Bari facilitated the purchase of weapons for the Taliban.

In 2006, the Pakistani government is reported to have frozen 31 bank accounts belonging to Bari and his sons, as well as 15 accounts belonging to two companies owned by Bari, his family members, and Mullah Omar.

Bakht Gul

Treasury described Gul as "a key Haqqani Network communications official since at least 2009" who "works directly for senior Haqqani Network leader Badruddin Haqqani" and serves as his "gatekeeper." Treasury's description of Gul indicates he serves as Badruddin's chief of staff.

"Gul's responsibilities include relaying reports from commanders in Afghanistan to senior Haqqani Network officials, Taliban media officials, and legitimate media outlets in Afghanistan," the designation said. He also "relayed operational orders from Badruddin Haqqani to fighters in Afghanistan." Additionally he aids in "the movement of Haqqani insurgents, foreign fighters, and weapons," and has handed out funds to commanders traveling to Afghanistan.

Badruddin Haqqani is one of the Haqqani Network's top commanders, and was designated by the US as a terrorist in May 2011 for supporting operations in Afghanistan and aiding al Qaeda.

Top Haqqani Network leaders designated as terrorists

Gul is the latest Haqqani Network leader to have been added to the US's list of designated terrorists. Since 2008, nine top Haqqani Network leaders have been placed on the list; six of them were designated in 2011. All of them have ties to al Qaeda.

Despite the terror group's close ties to al Qaeda and its actions in Afghanistan, the US has not added the Haqqani Network to the list of Specially Designation Global Terrorist Entities. Members of Congress have urged the Obama administration to add the Haqqani Network as a terrorist entity.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, the overall leader of the Haqqani Network as well as the leader of the Taliban's Miramshah Regional Military Shura, was designated by the State Department as a terrorist in March 2008; and in March 2009, the State Department put out a bounty of $5 million for information leading to his capture. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that Siraj is a member of al Qaeda's top council. In April 2010, Siraj said that cooperation between al Qaeda fighters and the Taliban "is at the highest limits."

Nasiruddin Haqqani, one of Siraj's brothers, was placed on the US's terrorist list in July 2010. Nasiruddin is a key financier and "emissary" for the Haqqani Network, and is known to have traveled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2004-2009 to carry out fundraising for the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.

Khalil al Rahman Haqqani, Siraj's uncle, was added to the US's list of terrorists in February 2011. Khalil is a key fundraiser, financier, and operational commander for the Haqqani Network, and has been crucial in aiding and supporting al Qaeda's military, the Lashkar al Zil or Shadow Army.

Badruddin Haqqani, another one of Siraj's brothers, was designated by the State Department on May 11, 2011. Badruddin sits on the Miramshah Shura, is an operational commander of the Haqqani Network, and provides support to al Qaeda and allied terror groups.

Ahmed Jan Wazir and Fazl Rabi were added to the list of designated terrorists in June 2011. Wazir serves as a deputy, advisor, and spokesman for Siraj, has represented the Haqqani Network at the Quetta Shura, and has close ties to al Qaeda's network in Ghazni. Rabi is a key financial official for both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network who has also aided the terror group in executing suicide attacks in Afghanistan and has traveled to the Gulf countries to raise money for Jalaluddin and Siraj.

Mullah Sangeen Zadran, who serves as a senior lieutenant to Siraj and as the Taliban's shadow governor for Paktika province in Afghanistan, was added to the list of designated terrorists on Aug. 16, 2011. US military officials have told The Long War Journal that Sangeen is considered to be one of the most dangerous operational commanders in eastern Afghanistan. Sangeen has organized numerous assaults on US and Afghan combat outposts in the region, and is currently holding Bowe Bergdahl, the only US soldier who has been captured alive in the Afghan theater.

Haji Mali Khan, who has been described by the US military as "one of the highest ranking members of the Haqqani Network and a revered elder of the Haqqani clan," was added on Nov. 1, 2011. Khan was captured by US special operations forces during a raid on Sept. 27 in the Musa Khel district in Afghanistan's eastern province of Khost.

Jalaluddin Haqqani, who is the father of Siraj, Nasiruddin, and Badruddin and also the brother of Khalil, has not been added to the US's list of terrorists, despite his close links to both the Taliban and al Qaeda. In an interview with Al Somood, the Taliban's official magazine, Jalaluddin admitted he served on the Taliban's executive council, which is known as the Quetta Shura.

Background on the Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network operates primarily in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, but also has an extensive presence in Kabul, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Kandahar, and Kunduz. In addition, the network has expanded its operations into the distant Afghan provinces of Badakhshan and Faryab.

The terror group has close links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and its relationship with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) has allowed the network to survive and thrive in its fortress stronghold of North Waziristan, a tribal agency in Pakistan. The Haqqani Network has also extended its presence into the Pakistani tribal agency of Kurram.

In North Waziristan, the Haqqanis control large swaths of the tribal area and run a parallel administration with courts, recruiting centers, tax offices, and security forces. In addition, the Haqqanis have established multiple training camps and safe houses that are used by al Qaeda leaders and operatives and by Taliban foot soldiers preparing to fight in Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network has been implicated in some of the biggest terror attacks in the Afghan capital city of Kabul, including the January 2008 suicide assault on the Serena hotel, the February 2009 assault on Afghan ministries, and the July 2008 and October 2009 suicide attacks against the Indian embassy.

The terror group collaborated with elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence service in at least one of these attacks. In the past, American intelligence agencies confronted the Pakistani government with evidence, including communications intercepts, which proved the ISI's direct involvement in the 2008 Indian embassy bombing. [See LWJ report Pakistan's Jihad and Threat Matrix report Pakistan backs Afghan Taliban for additional information on the ISI's complicity in attacks in Afghanistan and the region.]

Last summer and fall, the US and the Afghan government linked the Haqqani Network and Pakistan's intelligence service to the June 2010 assault on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in June 2011 and the attack on the US Embassy and ISAF headquarters in September. Shortly after the attack, Admiral Michael Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the Haqqani Network of being one of several "[e]xtremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan."

The US military has been hunting top Haqqani Network commanders in special operations raids in the Afghan east, while the CIA has targeted the network with a series of unmanned Predator airstrikes in Pakistan's tribal agency of North Waziristan. Both Siraj and Sangeen have been the targets of past strikes. Mohammed Haqqani, a mid-level Haqqani Network military commander and a brother of Siraj, was killed in a Predator airstrike in February 2010.

In October 2011, the Predators were successful in killing Jan Baz Zadran, who was considered to be the Haqqani Network's third in command, during an Oct. 13 airstrike in the Miramshah area of North Waziristan. Jan Baz, a powerful leader in the Haqqani Network, was believed to be the top aide to the network's operational commander, Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jan Baz served as the Haqqani Network's logistical and financial coordinator, and also acquired weapons and ammunition for the network. He is thought to be the most senior Haqqani Network leader killed or captured since the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

While the US is targeting the Haqqani Network in military operations and with financial sanctions, it also seeks to negotiate with the terror group to help end the insurgency in Afghanistan. The US is pursuing a policy of "fight, talk, build" with the Haqqanis and other Taliban groups. US officials are said to have met with Ibrahim Haqqani in August 2011 as he was visiting the United Arab Emirates, in an attempt to gauge the Haqqani Network's willingness to negotiate. The talks have failed. Siraj Haqqani has publicly said the group will not independently negotiate with the US and would only do so under the banner of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

View Larger Map

The US killed two al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters in an airstrike in eastern Yemen today. The strike is the sixth by the US in the past week, and takes place as the Yemeni government is intensifying military operations against AQAP strongholds in the south.

Today's strike took place in the town of Shibam in eastern Hadramout province. Unmanned US drones, the Reapers or Predators, fired missiles at a vehicle as it was traveling in the eastern city, according to AFP. Two AQAP operatives were killed in the airstrike. The identities of those killed have not been disclosed.

Shibam is known to have an AQAP presence. On April 1, AQAP fighters overran an outpost in Shibam and brutally executed seven soldiers. The US has not conducted an airstrike in Hadramout province since the campaign began in late 2009.

The Yemeni military has launched an offensive against AQAP in Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan, as well as in Jaar and Lawdar, two other cities in the southern province. More than 20,000 Yemeni troops, backed by US CIA and military advisers and air and naval forces, are involved in the offensive.

AQAP is in control of Zinjibar and Jaar, and had a strong presence outside of Lawdar, where fighting has been heavy. Yemeni troops are also said to have entered Zinjibar. More than 150 Yemenis are reported to have been killed over the past several days.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least seven drone strikes in Yemen this month; six of the seven have taken place over the past week. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 36 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Hadramout province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 30 airstrikes in Yemen, with 20 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government, with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 20 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Hakeemullah Mehsud [right] as he organized the attack on a prison in Bannu.

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan released a propaganda video that details the April 15 jailbreak in Bannu that freed 384 prisoners, including an estimated 200 Taliban members and an al Qaeda-linked terrorist who attempted to assassinate former President Pervez Musharraf. Two of the top leaders of he Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, who are often reported to be at odds with each other, are shown organizing the attack and mustering more than 150 fighters.

The 34-minute-long video, which was produced by Umar Studio, the propaganda arm of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was originally being sold in bazaars in North and South Waziristan, according to the International News Network. The videotape was then published in three parts on YouTube by the Khyber News Channel [see parts 1, 2 and 3].

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the emir of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the group's leader in South Waziristan, both appear in the video. Both men give speeches, and Hakeemullah vows to fight the Pakistani government and military to "the last bullet and the last man." Hakeemullah and Waliur Rehman are routinely said to be in violent opposition to each other, and were even wrongly reported to have killed each other during a shura meeting in August 2009 to select Baitullah Mehsud's successor.

In the video, both Hakeemullah and Waliur Rehman are shown directing an estimated 150 fighters who are gathering to conduct the attack. The Taliban leaders are organizing the large Taliban group in the daylight out in the open. The location of the meeting place is not clear.

The Taliban appear to have had good intelligence on the layout of the Bannu prison. A Taliban leader, whose face is digitally blurred, uses a detailed hand-drawn map to brief the Taliban commanders and fighters on the plan of attack.

The fighters are then shown eating and praying before being put into vans and driven to the Bannu prison. The tape shows the nighttime assault as the Taliban attack the prison with rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine-guns, and assault rifles. The Taliban are then shown opening the jail cells and releasing the prisoners.

The video also includes interviews of the freed commanders and prisoners. Adnan Rasheed, a Pakistani terrorist who was involved in the Dec. 14, 2003 assassination attempt against then-President Pervez Musharraf, is among those interviewed. Rasheed was a member of the Pakistani Air Force and has been sentenced to death for his role.

Rasheed worked for Amjad Farooqi, the Pakistani terrorist who engineered the two assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 at the behest of al Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al Libi; Farooqi is suspected of involvement in other terror attacks as well. Farooqi was a member of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; the Harkat-ul-Ansar and its successor, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami; and Jaish-e-Mohammed. He served as a close aide to Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. In addition, Farooqi served as the group's representative to al Qaeda's International Islamic Front.

The US launched two drone strikes today in a city in southern Yemen that is currently under the control of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Seven AQAP fighters and eight civilians are reported to have been killed in the airstrikes.

The first strike targeted "a militant hideout" in Jaar, a city in Abyan province that is currently under al Qaeda control, CNN reported. The eight civilians were killed after they attempted to recover the bodies of AQAP fighters, apparently after the unmanned US Predators or Reapers launched a second salvo of missiles into the hideout.

The second strike targeted a home in Jaar that was thought to be used as an AQAP safe house. Three AQAP leaders are said to have been killed in that strike.

Jaar, which is just north of Zinjibar, is a known stronghold for AQAP, and US drones have now hit targets in the city five times this year. The US attacked AQAP in Jaar just five days ago, and killed 8 AQAP fighters. The drones also struck twice in March. One strike targeted a a weapons storage depot on Jabal Khanfar, a hill that overlooks the city. AQAP was moving weapons, including tanks, that had been seized during raids on Yemeni Army bases outside of Zinjibar.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least six drone strikes in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 35 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Abyan province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 29 airstrikes in Yemen, with 19 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 19 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Left and right images: Abu Hamza al Omani. Images from the SITE Intelligence Group.

An Omani jihadist was among several foreign fighters who were killed in a recent US drone strike in the "Khorasan," according to a statement released on jihadist Internet forums.

The statement, which was unsigned, said that Abu Hamza al Omani, also known as Imran bin Abdullah bin Khamis al Balochi, was killed in a US airstrike on May 5, 2012 along with several other "brothers and supporters" who were not identified.

"The courageous knight dismounted on the night of Saturday, 5 May 2012, when the planes of the infidel enemy targeted a center in which there were several mujahideen. The brother fell as a martyr, accompanied by a number of his brothers and supporters...," said the statement, which was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Although the location of the "center" was not disclosed, the statement claimed that Abu Hamza al Omani and the other fighters were killed in "the land of Khorasan," which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan.

On May 5, the US carried out a drone strike in the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan. The strike targeted a compound known to be used as a training center, killing 10 "militants" [see LWJ report, US drones kill 10 in North Waziristan]. Situated near the Afghan border, the Shawal Valley is a known operating area for al Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Taliban fighters under the command of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the leader of the Taliban in North Waziristan.

Al Qaeda and the Khorasan

The term "Khorasan" refers to a region that encompasses large areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Jihadists consider the Khorasan to be the area where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of Armageddon. The final battle is to take place in the Levant - Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

Mentions of the Khorasan have begun to increase in al Qaeda's propaganda over the past several years. After al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq, the group began shifting its rhetoric from promoting Iraq as the central front in its jihad and has placed the focus on the Khorasan.

Al Qaeda typically is referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas when it mentions Khorasan. In February 2012, a senior al Qaeda operative said that al Qaeda is "still standing" despite repeated US drone strikes in the Khorasan; the US drone program in the region primarily kills al Qaeda leaders and fighters in Pakistan's tribal areas. Also in February 2012, al Qaeda released images of leaders and fighters who were killed in drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas and in airstrikes in Afghanistan.

Abu Hamza and jihad

According to Abu Hamza's martyrdom statement, he "grew up in a humble home in Barka province" (likely a reference to the coastal city of Barka in northern Oman) and "completed his secondary education and enrolled in the High Technical College." Abu Hamza then abandoned his degree and moved "to the land of migration and jihad," or Afghanistan, with others about one year ago.

The statement claimed that Abu Hamza traveled to the Khorasan with Abu Obedia al Omani, who was killed while fighting along the Afghan-Pakistan border on Jan. 8, 2012. Abu Hamza and others were wounded in the "bombing by the planes of the infidel enemy" that killed Abu Obedai.

Abu Hamza served as a trainer, according to the statement.

"He quickly mastered the art of fighting and he specialized in the cannon and would train his brothers on it," his martyrdom statement said. "His brothers knew him only as a person who was stationed in the front lines of combat, committed to his front," the statement continued, in all likelihood referring to Afghanistan. "[A]nd whenever he left one he would go to another, seeking combat or death."

Al Qaeda is known to embed small teams of trainers with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and in the east is known to fight on the battlefield in small units. [See LWJ reports, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army' and 'Foreign trainers' active in southeastern Afghan province, for more information on al Qaeda's role in Afghanistan.]

The martyrdom statement indicated that a group of Omanis is still operating along the Afghan-Pakistani border. In addition to the statement that Abu Hamza traveled to the Khorasan with several other Omanis, one of the pictures showed "a group of Omani brothers while heading out for one of the operations."

The Mullah Dadullah Front, a Taliban group closely linked to al Qaeda, claimed credit for yesterday's assassination of a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council.

The Mullah Dadullah Front, or Mullah Dadullah Mahaz, told a Pakistani newspaper that it assassinated Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council who had served as a deputy education minister during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, in a shooting in Kabul yesterday.

Qari Hamza, a spokesperson for the Mullah Dadullah Front, said that the group assassinated Rahmani for negotiating with the Taliban on behalf of the Afghan government.

"We claim responsibility for the killing of Arsala," Hamza told The Express Tribune in a text message. "The infidel forces had assigned Arsala to sell out the mujahideen to non-Muslims, so that the non-Muslims continue their occupation of Afghanistan. We will target and eliminate all such people."

Yesterday, the Taliban's official spokesman, Zahibullah Mujahid, denied the group was involved in Rahmani's assassination.

The Mullah Dadullah Front is a powerful wing of the Taliban in the south that has adopted al Qaeda's tactics and ideology, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal in December 2010. The Mullah Dadullah Front is led by none other than Mullah Adbul Qayoum Zakir, the former Guantanamo Bay detainee who has since been promoted as the Taliban's top military commander and co-leader of the Taliban's Quetta Shura. In December 2010, Coalition and Afghan special operations troops captured a senior Mullah Dadullah Front financier and weapons facilitator.

Zakir and other Taliban leaders operate from the Pakistani border city of Chaman in Baluchistan, as the location shields them from US and NATO operations. The Taliban maintain a command and control center in Chaman, but the Pakistani military and intelligence services have refused to move against the Taliban there.

The Mullah Dadullah Front operates largely in the southern Afghan provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan, and is considered the most effective and dangerous Taliban group in the region. The group has been active in attempting to sabotage negotiations between the Afghan government and lower-level Taliban leaders and fighters in the south.

The Taliban subgroup has executed numerous complex attacks, suicide assaults, and assassinations in the region.

Zakir is also responsible for a purge of Taliban leaders who have conducted negotiations with the Afghan government, including Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura.

Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council who had served as a deputy education minister during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, was shot and killed while driving in Kabul today.

A car pulled alongside Rahmani's vehicle and a gunman opened fire, killing him immediately. The assassins escaped.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid denied that his group was responsible for Rahmani's assassination.

"Others are involved in this," Mujahid said, according to Reuters. "We don't believe it's a big blow to peace efforts because the peace council has achieved nothing."

Rahmani was one of several Taliban commanders to reconcile with the Afghan government after the US invasion following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. He was named to the Afghan High Peace Council two years ago, and has been optimistic about efforts to strike a peace agreement with the Taliban.

Rahmani is the second member of the Afghan High Peace Council to have been assassinated in Kabul in seven months. On Sept. 20, 2011, a suicide bomber killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, the chief of the High Peace Council and former president of Afghanistan. The suicide bomber gained entrance to Rabbani's home under the guise of conducting negotiations on behalf of the Taliban. The suicide bomb was hidden in his turban.

The Taliban had initially claimed credit for the suicide attack on Rabbani, and then retracted the claim.

The International Security Assistance Force condemned today's assassination of Rahmani, and said it was an effort to derail the moribund peace process.

"The only possible aim of this attack is to intimidate those, who like Rahmani, want to help make Afghanistan a better place for its citizens and the region," ISAF said in a statement released on its website. "This attack is clear evidence that those who oppose the legitimate government of Afghanistan have absolutely no interest in supporting the peace process on any level but through murder, thuggery, and intimidation."

Attempts by NATO and the US to get the Taliban to conduct negotiations have collapsed over the past year. The US and NATO are hoping to reach a political settlement with the Taliban's top leadership as the Coalition draws down forces and ends combat operations in 2014.

The Taliban have denied conducting negotiations, and instead have characterized contacts with the US as "dialogue" for arranging a prisoner exchange. In mid-March, the Taliban announced the "suspension of dialogue" with the US, and said they would continue to wage "jihadi" operations in Afghanistan [see LWJ report, Taliban suspend 'dialogue' with US].

Rahmani's assassination occurred as the Taliban appear to be conducting a purge of leaders who have shown a willingness to negotiate with the Afghan government. This spring, the Taliban executed Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura, after accusing him of engaging in backdoor talks with the Afghan government and of accepting large sums of money to participate in such talks. In addition, 26 other Taliban leaders have been killed for talking with the Afghan government over the past several months [see LWJ reports,Taliban leader confirms infighting and vows revenge, plots to kill Quetta Shura leadership, and Afghan intel confirms death of senior Afghan Taliban leader, possibly 25 others].

Three Coalition soldiers were killed by members of the Afghan security forces in two separate attacks over the past two days. Afghan security forces have now killed 23 ISAF soldiers in 2012.

Two ISAF soldiers, who are British, according to Pajhwok, were killed and two more were wounded in an attack today by members of the Afghan Uniformed Police in Helmand province. The International Security Assistance Force confirmed the attack, but would not say if the attackers were Afghan policemen.

"ISAF confirms that two individuals wearing Afghan Police uniforms turned their weapons against coalition service members in southern Afghanistan today, killing two service members," ISAF stated in a press release. ISAF said that one of the attackers was killed and another escaped.

Today's attack was preceded by another yesterday, in which an Afghan soldier killed a US soldier and wounded two others in Kunar province, according to The Associated Press.

No motive has been given for either of the attacks. ISAF has said that the two attacks are under investigation.

The Taliban claimed credit for yesterday's attack, in a statement released on their propaganda website, Voice of jihad. The Taliban claimed that 12 US troops were killed and 12 more were wounded, and that the Afghan soldier "joined [the] Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate" after escaping. The Taliban routinely exaggerate the effects of their attacks. Today's Taliban propaganda did not mention the Helmand attack that killed two British soldiers.

A rise in green-on-blue attacks in 2012

The green-on-blue attacks, in which a member of the Afghan security forces kills a Coalition soldier, have skyrocketed this year. Afghan security forces personnel have now killed 23 ISAF soldiers since the beginning of the year.

Afghan security personnel are now estimated to have killed 85 ISAF soldiers since May 2007. Twenty-three of the 85 ISAF soldiers, or more than 25 percent, have been killed this year. These attacks have taken place in all areas in Afghanistan, not just in the south and east.

ISAF has not disclosed the number of incidents in which ISAF soldiers were wounded by ANSF personnel, or the attacks on ISAF personnel that did not result in casualties. ISAF told The Long War Journal in March that "these statistics ... [are ] ... classified."

"[A]ttacks by ANSF on Coalition Forces...either resulting in non-injury, injury or death....these stats as a whole (the total # attacks) are what is classified and not releasable," Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Cummings, ISAF's Press Desk Chief, told The Long War Journal. Cummings said that ISAF is "looking to declassify this number." Nearly two months later, the data remains classified.

Inquiries as to why the overall statistic is classified went unanswered.

The rise in attacks against ISAF troops by Afghan personnel takes place as ISAF is seeking to accelerate the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces. The plan calls for an increase in the number of ISAF trainers as well as more partnering of ISAF and Afghan units, and will heighten Coalition troops' exposure to green-on-blue attacks. The US military has become so concerned with the green-on-blue attacks that it has ordered units to designate "guardian angels" in each unit whose job is to provide security for troops working with Afghans.

US drones killed 11 al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters, including an Egyptian, in a pair of strikes in central Yemen today. The US has now launched three airstrikes in Yemen in three days.

An Egyptian fighter, who was not named, was among six AQAP members killed in the first strike in an area of Marib province close to Shabwa, according to The Associated Press. Five more AQAP fighters were killed when the unmanned Predators or Reapers fired missiles at a car traveling in Marib. No senior leaders have been reported killed in the strikes.

Egyptian fighters have been targeted in previous US strikes in Yemen. Last month, Abu Musab al Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who fought alongside AQAP, was killed along with several other foreign fighters in a US drone strike in the Karma area near Azzan in Shabwa province. An Egyptian known as Abu Ayman was targeted in a strike in January 2010, but survived. And Ibrahim al Bana, AQAP's media emir, was targeted in the October 2011 strike that killed Abdulrahman al Awlaki; Bana survived the strike.

The US has conducted three drone strikes in Marib province so far this year. The province has been a battleground between AQAP and government forces. Marib is one of several provinces with a strong AQAP presence and is known to host terror training camps.

US strikes in Yemen

Today's strikes in Marib are the third and fourth that are confirmed to have been carried out by the US in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US. The last strike took place on May 10; eight fighters were killed in the AQAP-controlled city of Jaar.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 33 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Marib. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 27 airstrikes in Yemen, with 17 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 17 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike took place on May 6, when the US killed senior AQAP leader Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province on Jan. 31. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled this week. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Mullah Ghulam Hassan, from his videotape.

A senior Taliban commander has issued a scathing statement about the death of Maluvi Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura, who was reportedly killed in Taliban infighting last month. Mullah Ghulam Hassan, a senior Taliban commander once based in Ghazni province and a close ally of Ismail, blamed Afghan, Pakistani, and American intelligence agencies for creating divisions among the Taliban.

Hassan also threatened several senior Taliban officials for their part in conspiring against the unity of the Taliban, in a videotaped statement sent to a Pashto news website called Taand on May 10, 2012. It is not exactly clear when the videotape was made. [Click here for video.]

Maluvi Mohammad Ismail, a top Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan who had long been under suspicion by other Taliban for graft, extortion, and robbery, was reportedly arrested by Taliban fighters in April. In early May, former Taliban members and Afghan intelligence officers confirmed that Ismail had been executed by Taliban fighters linked to Pakistani intelligence, for allegedly engaging in backdoor talks with the Afghan Government and for accepting large sums of money to participate in such talks.

In the nearly 28-minute-long interview, titled "Taliban Commander says Mullah Ismail is innocent," Hassan leveled a number of serious charges against the senior Taliban leadership, marking the first time that ferocious infighting among the Quetta Shura's most senior members has been thrust into the media spotlight so publicly.

Hassan accused Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, the Military Council Chairman for the Quetta Shura and Ismail's replacement, of orchestrating the kidnapping and torture of Ismail at the discretion of a number of Taliban commanders who had problems with Ismail. In the most daring revelation of the interview, Hassan vowed to avenge the mistreatment and dishonor brought upon him and Mullah Ismail, by killing Zakir and four other top Taliban leaders; including Hafez Majeed Noorzai, a prominent and fearsome old guard Taliban commander from Kandahar province, Mullah Salim Hotaki, and Kamil Tamim.

Placing blame

In March, the Taliban claimed that they had arrested Mullah Ghulam Hassan along with Mullah Ahad Agha from Zabul province. The Taliban accused the two leaders of conspiring with the Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leaders in Afghanistan and accepting unspecified large payments for participating in backdoor peace talks with the Afghan government. In light of the Taliban's claim to have detained him, it is not immediately clear how Ghulam Hassan was able to make his video interview, but reports in March and April confirming Hassan's arrest might have been misinterpreted.

Hassan's videotaped statement rejected all allegations of misconduct against him and Ismail, and he identified Taliban commander Maluvi Sadiqullah as having contacts with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) office in Kandahar. Hassan also denied accusations that he had contacts with the Afghan government and that he had mishandled 8 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $88,000). To the contrary, Hassan claimed that he had been instrumental in securing the release of several Taliban commanders from Afghan custody, and blamed Sadiqullah as being one of the conspirators against him and Ismail.

At one point in the videotape, Hassan addressed Taliban members and religious clerics directly, warning them that some senior Taliban officials such as Maluvi Sharafuddin and "some others" were behind this conspiracy against him and Ismail. On April 17, Sharafuddin, the Taliban's shadow governor for Zabul province, was reported to have been gunned down, along with his aide Murad Khan Kamil [possibly Kamil Tamim] and three others, by unknown assassins in the Saro Nasar neighborhood of Quetta, Pakistan.

Conspiracy behind the rift

Hassan claimed that the Taliban have targeted him and Ismail because of their deep knowledge of crimes committed by senior Taliban leadership, including many of those serving as Council Chairmen for the Quetta Shura. Hassan accused Hafiz Majeed, a legendary Taliban commander who once served as the Quetta Shura's Intelligence Chief, of having sold advanced surface-to-air missile platforms, including American "Stinger" missiles, to Western intelligence organizations. It was unclear whether Hassan was implying that Majeed had participated in the "Stinger buy-back" program launched by the US in 2005.

Hassan also claimed to know which Taliban members had been behind the conspiracy to release Ismail Khan, the current Afghan Minister for Water and Energy, from a heavily fortified Taliban prison in Kandahar while the Taliban regime was in power. Khan, a leading anti-Taliban mujahideen commander, was arrested by the Taliban in 1997 and escaped from custody under mysterious circumstances in 1999.

Hassan vowed to disclose the names of those Taliban leaders behind the release of a seven-man Russian cargo plane crew that was captured after being forced to land in Kandahar province in August 1995. The flight crew was supplying lethal aid to the anti-Taliban bloc known as the United Islamic Front when the plane was intercepted by Taliban aircraft and forced to land. The crew members were tortured, starved, and imprisoned for 378 days before they staged a daring escape -- convincing guards to allow them to conduct maintenance on the marooned aircraft -- the ruse gave the crew enough time to quickly power up the cargo jet and take off, eventually reaching safety in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. The incident has long been a source of conspiracy and friction among Taliban factions as a major intelligence and security failure.

Hassan went on to accuse the Quetta Shura and its top leaders of graft and embezzlement, and said that Azizurahman, a Taliban official based in Qatar, was mishandling funds ($2 million) and maintaining links to US intelligence organizations and to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).

Hassan's lengthy and fiery diatribe against senior Taliban figures and the powerful Quetta Shura is the latest indicator that unity and cohesion among various Taliban factions is in serious jeopardy. The apparent execution of Maluvi Ismail last month, the reported assassination of Maluvi Sharafuddin in Quetta, and now Hassan's vow to hunt down and kill senior Quetta Shura members all reveal a side of Taliban political posturing rarely exposed to outside observers.

A pair of suicide bombers killed at least 55 people and wounded 372 more in a coordinated attack on a military intelligence headquarters in the Syrian capital of Damascus.

One suicide bomber detonated his car packed with explosives outside of the Palestine Branch Military Intelligence headquarters at 8:00 a.m. local time, just as employees were arriving, Reuters reported. A second suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car as emergency personnel were responding to the attack and tending to the wounded.

The blasts were so powerful that the outer facade of the military intelligence headquarters and other buildings in the area collapsed, according to Al Jazeera.

There have been no claims of responsibility for the attack, but it was likely carried out by the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, a jihadist group that has claimed credit for three other suicide attacks in Syria. The Al Nusrah Front announced its formation on Jan. 23, in a video statement that was released on YouTube.

Another jihadist group, the Al Baraa Ibn Malik Martyrdom Brigade, announced its formation in February, and said it would conduct suicide operations against the Syrian government. The Al Baraa Ibn Malik Martyrdom Brigade has yet to claim credit for any suicide attacks in Syria.

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri has recently urged Muslims inside and outside of Syria to take up arms against the Syrian government. In a statement issued on Feb. 11 and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, Zawahiri said: "I appeal to every Muslim and every free, honorable one in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, to rise to help his brothers in Syria with all what he can, with his life, money, wonders, opinion, and information." Telling Syrians not to trust Turkey, the Arab League, or the West, he exhorted the "lions of the Levant" to "[d]evelop the intention of jihad in the Cause of Allah to establish a state that defends the Muslim countries and seeks to liberate the Golan and continue its jihad until it raises the banners of victory above the usurped hills of Jerusalem."

Al Qaeda in Iraq already has a strong presence in Syria [see LWJ report, Eastern Syria becoming a new al Qaeda haven]. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a regional al Qaeda affiliate, also is known to operate in Syria. Two of its senior leaders, Saudi citizens Saleh al Qarawi and Suleiman Hamad Al Hablain, have been added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists since November 2011. The terror group has denied any involvement in the Dec. 23 suicide attack.

In the past, the Syrian resistance has denied that anti-government groups have carried out suicide attacks in Syria, and instead has blamed the bombings on the Syrian security services. However, the Free Syrian army resistance force recently bombed a carwash that allegedly catered to Assad's forces; three people were killed in the blast, and 21 more were wounded.

President Bashir al Assad's regime has been battling the Free Syrian Army in several of the country's major cities. Assad's security forces have ruthlessly attempted to suppress the rebellion. Syrian government forces have killed nearly 10,000 Syrians over the past year, indiscriminately shelling civilian areas and using armored vehicles and snipers to fire on civilians.

The US killed eight al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters in an airstrike today in the terrorist-controlled city of Jaar in Abyan province.

The early morning strike by the remotely piloted Predators or Reapers targeted a convoy that is thought to have been transporting senior leaders of Ansar al Sharia, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's political front, according to CNN. No senior leaders have been identified as being killed.

In addition to the strike that hit a convoy, The Associated Press reported that an airstrike leveled a home that housed five "militants." Among those reported killed was "a senior member of the terror network in charge of armament." It is unclear if the strike was carried out by US or Yemeni aircraft. Yemeni warplanes are said to have been conducting strikes in Jaar as well.

Jaar is a known stronghold for AQAP, and US drones struck in Jaar twice in March. One strike targeted a a weapons storage depot on Jabal Khanfar, a hill that overlooks the city. AQAP was moving weapons, including tanks, that had been seized during raids on Yemeni Army bases outside of Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan.

Today's strike takes place just four days after the US killed senior AQAP leader Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

US strikes in Yemen

Today's strike in Abyan is the second that is confirmed to have been carried out by the US in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 31 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Abyan. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 25 airstrikes in Yemen, with 15 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three of this year's 15 strikes have killed a senior AQAP operative in Yemen. In addition to Fahd al Quso, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province on Jan. 31. Fatahani was involved in the October 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden that killed 17 US sailors, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US drones also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

Additionally, Abu Musab al Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who fought alongside AQAP, was killed along with several other foreign fighters in a US drone strike in the Karma area near Azzan in Shabwa province.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled this week. The terror group has plotted multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Two of the 17 documents released by the US government from the large cache seized during the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound indicate that al Qaeda has a much larger footprint in Pakistan than US officials have claimed.

One of the documents is a Dec. 3, 2010 letter to Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan; the letter was written jointly by Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who at the time served as bin Laden's chief of staff, and Abu Yahya al Libi, a top religious leader who is now Ayman al Zawahiri's deputy. In the letter, the two al Qaeda leaders critique Hakeemullah's leadership style and comment further on a "draft" document that Hakeemullah had previously submitted to al Qaeda. In addition, the two al Qaeda leaders admonish Hakeemullah for attempting to give orders to an al Qaeda commander operating in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. [See LWJ report, Bin Laden docs: Al Qaeda asserts authority in letter to Pakistani Taliban leader.]

The al Qaeda commander was identified as Badr Mansoor, who was subsequently killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in February of this year. Atiyah and Abu Yahya tell Hakeemulah to stop issuing orders to Mansoor and to quit attempting to recruit his men.

"We make it clear to you that the brother Badr (Mansoor) is one of the soldiers of the Qaedat al-Jihad Organization who swore allegiance to Sheikh Osama (bin Laden), is with us, under our command, the Emir of a company of ours," they wrote. "Badr Mansoor and other members of our group are not to be approached to join another organization or to deploy to other locations. Good manners and group work mandate that such a request be presented to his Tanzim (al Qaeda) Emir and superiors," Atiyah and Abu Yahya said.

The statement is significant as it identified Badr Mansoor as a leader of but one "company" of al Qaeda forces operating in Pakistan.

At the time of his death, Mansoor was described as al Qaeda's leader in Pakistan who was closely linked to other Pakistani terror groups. Mansoor was able to funnel in recruits from Pakistani terror groups such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, with which he was closely linked.

Mansoor was known to have a large cadre of fighters at his disposal. According to Central Asia Online, Mansoor's company had "more than 2,200 members with 350 hardcore fighters and more than 150 suicide bombers." Mansoor's group is believed to have participated in terror attacks in Pakistan's major cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, indicating that its network is not confined to Pakistan's tribal areas.

The US government has consistently estimated the number of al Qaeda leaders and operatives in Pakistan at between 300 and 400. This estimate has remained static since 2010, and does not appear to account for al Qaeda's Pakistani companies.

Other al Qaeda units in Pakistan

Al Qaeda is also known to have several other units in Pakistan besides the Badr Mansoor Group. Ilyas Kashmiri's Brigade 313 is considered one of the most dangerous and effective al Qaeda formations in Pakistan. While the size of Brigade 313 is not known, US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that it is at least as large as the Badr Mansoor group. Brigade 313's members are recruited from the Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jundallah (the Karachi-based, al Qaeda-linked group), and several other Pakistani terror groups. Kashmiri was killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in June 2011. Before his death, Kashmiri served as al Qaeda's overall military commander; Mansoor was one of his deputies.

Another known al Qaeda "company" commander operating in Pakistan is Asmatullah Muawiya, a former Jaish-e-Mohammad commander. While the size of Asmatullah's force is not publicly known, a US intelligence official estimated that the group has "several hundred jihadis."

The Qari Zafar Group is another al Qaeda "company" that operates in Pakistan. Named after Qari Mohammad Zafar, a Laskhar-e-Jhangvi leader who also led the Fedayeen-e-Islam and was killed in a US drone strike North Waziristan in February 2010, the group has conducted attacks in Karachi, Islamabad, and in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Qari Zafar Group is thought to have thousands of fighters and supporters in Pakistan.

The alliance between al Qaeda and the numerous Pakistani terror groups allows al Qaeda to maintain what US intelligence officials call a "deep bench" of talent that is available to replace leaders and fighters killed in drone strikes and fighting.

"Al Qaeda is taking advantage of decades of networking in Pakistan, not just in the tribal areas, but in Pakistan proper, to develop a deep bench of leaders and foot soldiers who can be brought into the organization when there are vacancies," a US official told The Long War Journal after Badr Mansoor was killed in February.

That point was demonstrated by the speed with which al Qaeda backfilled Badr Mansoor's position. According to the Pakistani press, al Qaeda swiftly named Farman Shinwari as Mansoor's successor. Like Mansoor, Shinwari has close ties to Pakistani terror groups, and specifically the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

"All of Farman Shinwari's brothers are affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan) and other militant groups," The News reported. "His elder brother Hazrat Nabi Shinwari, alias Tamanchy Mulla, was a theology teacher in a government-run school in Landikotal. He was leading the TTP in Khyber Agency in 2005 and also used to send militants to Kashmir and Afghanistan. He has remained the head of Harkatul Mujahideen and is nowadays said to be leading his group of TTP men in Waziristan."

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which operates openly in Pakistan with the support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, has long supported al Qaeda. Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil, the leader of HUM, is living in the open in a suburb of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Osama bin Laden consulted Khalil before issuing his infamous fatwa against the US. Khalil's group has been involved in numerous acts of terror in the region, including the hijacking of an Indian airplane, an attack on the US Consulate in Karachi, the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, and a series of terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. According to The New York Times, one of bin Laden's most trusted couriers, who was killed during the Abbottabad raid, had phone numbers linking him to the HUM.

Additionally, leaked threat assessments authored by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) contain further revelations about the relationship between Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and al Qaeda [see LWJ report, Bin Laden's courier tied to Pakistani-backed terror group]. Daniel Pearl was murdered in the home of Saud Memon, who was identified by several members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami (HUMA), an offshoot with close ties to its parent organization, as their "chief financial backer." According to the JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he referred to Memon as "al Qaeda's finance chief in Pakistan."

The ties between AQ and HUM are also corroborated by the JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Mohammed Ilyas, a known Pakistani jihadist who served as a recruiter and trainer at a Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami camp in Mansehra, Pakistan. A footnote in the report states that HUMA is tied to al Qaeda.

"Kamran Atif, a terrorist who was recently arrested by the Pakistani Crime Investigation Department (CID) Police revealed that HUMA [Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami] has links with al Qaeda and that HUMA and AQ are 'in complete contact with each other,'" the footnote said.

Both Ilyas and Atif have been involved multiple terrorist attacks in Pakistan that have also been linked to al Qaeda.

Bin Laden orders movement of hundreds of operatives to Afghanistan

The other document from the 17 publicly released bin Laden files that suggests a substantial al Qaeda presence in Pakistan is a letter from bin Laden dated Oct. 21, 2010 and addressed to Atiyah. In the letter, the al Qaeda emir advises that "hundreds of the brothers" be relocated from North and South Waziristan to Kunar province in Afghanistan in order to avoid drone strikes.

"Note: there is no comparison between the fortification of Kunar and Zabul and Ghazni [provinces]," bin Laden says. "Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher terrain and the many mountains, rivers, and trees and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy."

Bin Laden also said, however, that not all of the fighters should leave Waziristan, and that some should remain.

"Regarding the brothers in Waziristan in general, whoever can keep a low profile and take the necessary precautions, should stay in the area and those who cannot do so, their first option is to go to Nuristan in Kunar [sic], Ghazni or Zabul. I am leaning toward getting most of the brothers out of the area," bin Laden said.

Although it is unclear to what extent bin Laden's instructions were followed, ISAF has noted that al Qaeda operatives have been killed and captured in Kunar, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces in 2011.

US officials announced yesterday that the CIA had foiled a major bomb plot by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula against the United States which had been apparently timed for the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death, May 2.

The thwarted plot, which involved a suicide bomber wearing an underwear bomb on an airliner bound for the US, was disrupted within the past 10 days when US authorities seized the device, according to Reuters. It is unclear whether the would-be bomber has been detained or is still at large. The bomber was apparently based in Yemen, the Associated Press reported yesterday.

In announcing the foiling of the attack, the Obama administration stated that because the plot had been discovered at an early stage, it never presented a danger to the public. The president had been made aware of the plot in April. On April 26 and May 1, the US government issued statements saying that it had no credible information about specific terrorist plots that were timed to coincide with the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death.

US officials said that infiltration by a "Yemen insider" led to the breakup of the plot, according to the BBC. Other intelligence agencies aided the CIA in the seizure of the bomb device, which is currently being examined by the FBI. The Yemeni source has apparently been moved to a safe location out of the country.

The bomb itself is reported to be a more sophisticated version of the underwear bomb devised by master AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri for the failed Christmas Day 2009 airliner plot. According to Reuters, a US official said the latest bomb reflected an improved capacity for detonation, and was probably the work of Asiri. And like previous bombs developed by him, it is non-metallic, so less detectable by airport scanners. A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that it is also possible the bomb was made by one of Asiri's "students."

The recent airliner bomb plot has surfaced as the US is increasingly turning its attention to Yemen and al Qaeda's affiliate there, AQAP. Over the past year, AQAP has gained control of vast areas of southern Yemen. In an attempt to counter the growing strength of the al Qaeda affiliate, the US has ramped up drone and conventional airstrikes in Yemen, with 14 confirmed strikes already this year compared to 10 strikes in all of 2011. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Two days ago, the US killed senior al Qaeda operative Fahd al Quso in a drone strike in Shabwa province. Quso was wanted for his role in the failed Christmas Day 2009 airline plot as well as the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and he led a terror cell in Yemen. US Representative Peter King said the strike that killed Quso was part of the same operation that foiled the latest underwear bomb plot, the BBC reported.

US and European officials are currently on the lookout for other AQAP bombs that may have as yet escaped detection, according to ABC. It was reported last week that increasing numbers of air marshals have been deployed to protect US-bound flights originating from Europe. Security officials are also concerned that terrorist bombmakers may resort to internal bombs, which are surgically implanted in suicide bombers. Asiri developed a similar bomb used in February 2009 against a Saudi official.

Senior AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri remains at large. He was thought to have been killed in the September 2011 US drone strike that killed senior AQAP ideologue Anwar al Awlaki, but Asiri was subsequently reported to be alive.