The first strike targeted "a militant hideout" in Jaar, a city in Abyan province that is currently under al Qaeda control, CNN reported. The eight civilians were killed after they attempted to recover the bodies of AQAP fighters, apparently after the unmanned US Predators or Reapers launched a second salvo of missiles into the hideout.

The second strike targeted a home in Jaar that was thought to be used as an AQAP safe house. Three AQAP leaders are said to have been killed in that strike.

Jaar, which is just north of Zinjibar, is a known stronghold for AQAP, and US drones have now hit targets in the city five times this year. The US attacked AQAP in Jaar just five days ago, and killed 8 AQAP fighters. The drones also struck twice in March. One strike targeted a a weapons storage depot on Jabal Khanfar, a hill that overlooks the city. AQAP was moving weapons, including tanks, that had been seized during raids on Yemeni Army bases outside of Zinjibar.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least six drone strikes in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 35 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Abyan province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 29 airstrikes in Yemen, with 19 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 19 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Left and right images: Abu Hamza al Omani. Images from the SITE Intelligence Group.

An Omani jihadist was among several foreign fighters who were killed in a recent US drone strike in the "Khorasan," according to a statement released on jihadist Internet forums.

The statement, which was unsigned, said that Abu Hamza al Omani, also known as Imran bin Abdullah bin Khamis al Balochi, was killed in a US airstrike on May 5, 2012 along with several other "brothers and supporters" who were not identified.

"The courageous knight dismounted on the night of Saturday, 5 May 2012, when the planes of the infidel enemy targeted a center in which there were several mujahideen. The brother fell as a martyr, accompanied by a number of his brothers and supporters...," said the statement, which was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Although the location of the "center" was not disclosed, the statement claimed that Abu Hamza al Omani and the other fighters were killed in "the land of Khorasan," which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan.

On May 5, the US carried out a drone strike in the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan. The strike targeted a compound known to be used as a training center, killing 10 "militants" [see LWJ report, US drones kill 10 in North Waziristan]. Situated near the Afghan border, the Shawal Valley is a known operating area for al Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Taliban fighters under the command of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the leader of the Taliban in North Waziristan.

Al Qaeda and the Khorasan

The term "Khorasan" refers to a region that encompasses large areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Jihadists consider the Khorasan to be the area where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of Armageddon. The final battle is to take place in the Levant - Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

Mentions of the Khorasan have begun to increase in al Qaeda's propaganda over the past several years. After al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq, the group began shifting its rhetoric from promoting Iraq as the central front in its jihad and has placed the focus on the Khorasan.

Al Qaeda typically is referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas when it mentions Khorasan. In February 2012, a senior al Qaeda operative said that al Qaeda is "still standing" despite repeated US drone strikes in the Khorasan; the US drone program in the region primarily kills al Qaeda leaders and fighters in Pakistan's tribal areas. Also in February 2012, al Qaeda released images of leaders and fighters who were killed in drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas and in airstrikes in Afghanistan.

Abu Hamza and jihad

According to Abu Hamza's martyrdom statement, he "grew up in a humble home in Barka province" (likely a reference to the coastal city of Barka in northern Oman) and "completed his secondary education and enrolled in the High Technical College." Abu Hamza then abandoned his degree and moved "to the land of migration and jihad," or Afghanistan, with others about one year ago.

The statement claimed that Abu Hamza traveled to the Khorasan with Abu Obedia al Omani, who was killed while fighting along the Afghan-Pakistan border on Jan. 8, 2012. Abu Hamza and others were wounded in the "bombing by the planes of the infidel enemy" that killed Abu Obedai.

Abu Hamza served as a trainer, according to the statement.

"He quickly mastered the art of fighting and he specialized in the cannon and would train his brothers on it," his martyrdom statement said. "His brothers knew him only as a person who was stationed in the front lines of combat, committed to his front," the statement continued, in all likelihood referring to Afghanistan. "[A]nd whenever he left one he would go to another, seeking combat or death."

Al Qaeda is known to embed small teams of trainers with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and in the east is known to fight on the battlefield in small units. [See LWJ reports, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army' and 'Foreign trainers' active in southeastern Afghan province, for more information on al Qaeda's role in Afghanistan.]

The martyrdom statement indicated that a group of Omanis is still operating along the Afghan-Pakistani border. In addition to the statement that Abu Hamza traveled to the Khorasan with several other Omanis, one of the pictures showed "a group of Omani brothers while heading out for one of the operations."

The Mullah Dadullah Front, or Mullah Dadullah Mahaz, told a Pakistani newspaper that it assassinated Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council who had served as a deputy education minister during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, in a shooting in Kabul yesterday.

Qari Hamza, a spokesperson for the Mullah Dadullah Front, said that the group assassinated Rahmani for negotiating with the Taliban on behalf of the Afghan government.

"We claim responsibility for the killing of Arsala," Hamza told The Express Tribune in a text message. "The infidel forces had assigned Arsala to sell out the mujahideen to non-Muslims, so that the non-Muslims continue their occupation of Afghanistan. We will target and eliminate all such people."

Yesterday, the Taliban's official spokesman, Zahibullah Mujahid, denied the group was involved in Rahmani's assassination.

The Mullah Dadullah Front is a powerful wing of the Taliban in the south that has adopted al Qaeda's tactics and ideology, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal in December 2010. The Mullah Dadullah Front is led by none other than Mullah Adbul Qayoum Zakir, the former Guantanamo Bay detainee who has since been promoted as the Taliban's top military commander and co-leader of the Taliban's Quetta Shura. In December 2010, Coalition and Afghan special operations troops captured a senior Mullah Dadullah Front financier and weapons facilitator.

Zakir and other Taliban leaders operate from the Pakistani border city of Chaman in Baluchistan, as the location shields them from US and NATO operations. The Taliban maintain a command and control center in Chaman, but the Pakistani military and intelligence services have refused to move against the Taliban there.

The Mullah Dadullah Front operates largely in the southern Afghan provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan, and is considered the most effective and dangerous Taliban group in the region. The group has been active in attempting to sabotage negotiations between the Afghan government and lower-level Taliban leaders and fighters in the south.

The Taliban subgroup has executed numerous complex attacks, suicide assaults, and assassinations in the region.

Zakir is also responsible for a purge of Taliban leaders who have conducted negotiations with the Afghan government, including Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura.

A car pulled alongside Rahmani's vehicle and a gunman opened fire, killing him immediately. The assassins escaped.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid denied that his group was responsible for Rahmani's assassination.

"Others are involved in this," Mujahid said, according to Reuters. "We don't believe it's a big blow to peace efforts because the peace council has achieved nothing."

Rahmani was one of several Taliban commanders to reconcile with the Afghan government after the US invasion following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. He was named to the Afghan High Peace Council two years ago, and has been optimistic about efforts to strike a peace agreement with the Taliban.

Rahmani is the second member of the Afghan High Peace Council to have been assassinated in Kabul in seven months. On Sept. 20, 2011, a suicide bomber killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, the chief of the High Peace Council and former president of Afghanistan. The suicide bomber gained entrance to Rabbani's home under the guise of conducting negotiations on behalf of the Taliban. The suicide bomb was hidden in his turban.

The Taliban had initially claimed credit for the suicide attack on Rabbani, and then retracted the claim.

The International Security Assistance Force condemned today's assassination of Rahmani, and said it was an effort to derail the moribund peace process.

"The only possible aim of this attack is to intimidate those, who like Rahmani, want to help make Afghanistan a better place for its citizens and the region," ISAF said in a statement released on its website. "This attack is clear evidence that those who oppose the legitimate government of Afghanistan have absolutely no interest in supporting the peace process on any level but through murder, thuggery, and intimidation."

Attempts by NATO and the US to get the Taliban to conduct negotiations have collapsed over the past year. The US and NATO are hoping to reach a political settlement with the Taliban's top leadership as the Coalition draws down forces and ends combat operations in 2014.

The Taliban have denied conducting negotiations, and instead have characterized contacts with the US as "dialogue" for arranging a prisoner exchange. In mid-March, the Taliban announced the "suspension of dialogue" with the US, and said they would continue to wage "jihadi" operations in Afghanistan [see LWJ report, Taliban suspend 'dialogue' with US].

Rahmani's assassination occurred as the Taliban appear to be conducting a purge of leaders who have shown a willingness to negotiate with the Afghan government. This spring, the Taliban executed Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura, after accusing him of engaging in backdoor talks with the Afghan government and of accepting large sums of money to participate in such talks. In addition, 26 other Taliban leaders have been killed for talking with the Afghan government over the past several months [see LWJ reports,Taliban leader confirms infighting and vows revenge, plots to kill Quetta Shura leadership, and Afghan intel confirms death of senior Afghan Taliban leader, possibly 25 others].

Two ISAF soldiers, who are British, according to Pajhwok, were killed and two more were wounded in an attack today by members of the Afghan Uniformed Police in Helmand province. The International Security Assistance Force confirmed the attack, but would not say if the attackers were Afghan policemen.

"ISAF confirms that two individuals wearing Afghan Police uniforms turned their weapons against coalition service members in southern Afghanistan today, killing two service members," ISAF stated in a press release. ISAF said that one of the attackers was killed and another escaped.

Today's attack was preceded by another yesterday, in which an Afghan soldier killed a US soldier and wounded two others in Kunar province, according to The Associated Press.

No motive has been given for either of the attacks. ISAF has said that the two attacks are under investigation.

The Taliban claimed credit for yesterday's attack, in a statement released on their propaganda website, Voice of jihad. The Taliban claimed that 12 US troops were killed and 12 more were wounded, and that the Afghan soldier "joined [the] Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate" after escaping. The Taliban routinely exaggerate the effects of their attacks. Today's Taliban propaganda did not mention the Helmand attack that killed two British soldiers.

A rise in green-on-blue attacks in 2012

The green-on-blue attacks, in which a member of the Afghan security forces kills a Coalition soldier, have skyrocketed this year. Afghan security forces personnel have now killed 23 ISAF soldiers since the beginning of the year.

Afghan security personnel are now estimated to have killed 85 ISAF soldiers since May 2007. Twenty-three of the 85 ISAF soldiers, or more than 25 percent, have been killed this year. These attacks have taken place in all areas in Afghanistan, not just in the south and east.

ISAF has not disclosed the number of incidents in which ISAF soldiers were wounded by ANSF personnel, or the attacks on ISAF personnel that did not result in casualties. ISAF told The Long War Journal in March that "these statistics ... [are ] ... classified."

"[A]ttacks by ANSF on Coalition Forces...either resulting in non-injury, injury or death....these stats as a whole (the total # attacks) are what is classified and not releasable," Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Cummings, ISAF's Press Desk Chief, told The Long War Journal. Cummings said that ISAF is "looking to declassify this number." Nearly two months later, the data remains classified.

Inquiries as to why the overall statistic is classified went unanswered.

The rise in attacks against ISAF troops by Afghan personnel takes place as ISAF is seeking to accelerate the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces. The plan calls for an increase in the number of ISAF trainers as well as more partnering of ISAF and Afghan units, and will heighten Coalition troops' exposure to green-on-blue attacks. The US military has become so concerned with the green-on-blue attacks that it has ordered units to designate "guardian angels" in each unit whose job is to provide security for troops working with Afghans.

An Egyptian fighter, who was not named, was among six AQAP members killed in the first strike in an area of Marib province close to Shabwa, according to The Associated Press. Five more AQAP fighters were killed when the unmanned Predators or Reapers fired missiles at a car traveling in Marib. No senior leaders have been reported killed in the strikes.

Egyptian fighters have been targeted in previous US strikes in Yemen. Last month, Abu Musab al Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who fought alongside AQAP, was killed along with several other foreign fighters in a US drone strike in the Karma area near Azzan in Shabwa province. An Egyptian known as Abu Ayman was targeted in a strike in January 2010, but survived. And Ibrahim al Bana, AQAP's media emir, was targeted in the October 2011 strike that killed Abdulrahman al Awlaki; Bana survived the strike.

The US has conducted three drone strikes in Marib province so far this year. The province has been a battleground between AQAP and government forces. Marib is one of several provinces with a strong AQAP presence and is known to host terror training camps.

US strikes in Yemen

Today's strikes in Marib are the third and fourth that are confirmed to have been carried out by the US in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US. The last strike took place on May 10; eight fighters were killed in the AQAP-controlled city of Jaar.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 33 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Marib. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 27 airstrikes in Yemen, with 17 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 17 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike took place on May 6, when the US killed senior AQAP leader Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province on Jan. 31. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled this week. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Mullah Ghulam Hassan, from his videotape.

A senior Taliban commander has issued a scathing statement about the death of Maluvi Mohammad Ismail, the former Deputy Military Council Chairman for the Taliban's Quetta Shura, who was reportedly killed in Taliban infighting last month. Mullah Ghulam Hassan, a senior Taliban commander once based in Ghazni province and a close ally of Ismail, blamed Afghan, Pakistani, and American intelligence agencies for creating divisions among the Taliban.

Hassan also threatened several senior Taliban officials for their part in conspiring against the unity of the Taliban, in a videotaped statement sent to a Pashto news website called Taand on May 10, 2012. It is not exactly clear when the videotape was made. [Click here for video.]

Maluvi Mohammad Ismail, a top Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan who had long been under suspicion by other Taliban for graft, extortion, and robbery, was reportedly arrested by Taliban fighters in April. In early May, former Taliban members and Afghan intelligence officers confirmed that Ismail had been executed by Taliban fighters linked to Pakistani intelligence, for allegedly engaging in backdoor talks with the Afghan Government and for accepting large sums of money to participate in such talks.

In the nearly 28-minute-long interview, titled "Taliban Commander says Mullah Ismail is innocent," Hassan leveled a number of serious charges against the senior Taliban leadership, marking the first time that ferocious infighting among the Quetta Shura's most senior members has been thrust into the media spotlight so publicly.

Hassan accused Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, the Military Council Chairman for the Quetta Shura and Ismail's replacement, of orchestrating the kidnapping and torture of Ismail at the discretion of a number of Taliban commanders who had problems with Ismail. In the most daring revelation of the interview, Hassan vowed to avenge the mistreatment and dishonor brought upon him and Mullah Ismail, by killing Zakir and four other top Taliban leaders; including Hafez Majeed Noorzai, a prominent and fearsome old guard Taliban commander from Kandahar province, Mullah Salim Hotaki, and Kamil Tamim.

Placing blame

In March, the Taliban claimed that they had arrested Mullah Ghulam Hassan along with Mullah Ahad Agha from Zabul province. The Taliban accused the two leaders of conspiring with the Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leaders in Afghanistan and accepting unspecified large payments for participating in backdoor peace talks with the Afghan government. In light of the Taliban's claim to have detained him, it is not immediately clear how Ghulam Hassan was able to make his video interview, but reports in March and April confirming Hassan's arrest might have been misinterpreted.

Hassan's videotaped statement rejected all allegations of misconduct against him and Ismail, and he identified Taliban commander Maluvi Sadiqullah as having contacts with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) office in Kandahar. Hassan also denied accusations that he had contacts with the Afghan government and that he had mishandled 8 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $88,000). To the contrary, Hassan claimed that he had been instrumental in securing the release of several Taliban commanders from Afghan custody, and blamed Sadiqullah as being one of the conspirators against him and Ismail.

At one point in the videotape, Hassan addressed Taliban members and religious clerics directly, warning them that some senior Taliban officials such as Maluvi Sharafuddin and "some others" were behind this conspiracy against him and Ismail. On April 17, Sharafuddin, the Taliban's shadow governor for Zabul province, was reported to have been gunned down, along with his aide Murad Khan Kamil [possibly Kamil Tamim] and three others, by unknown assassins in the Saro Nasar neighborhood of Quetta, Pakistan.

Conspiracy behind the rift

Hassan claimed that the Taliban have targeted him and Ismail because of their deep knowledge of crimes committed by senior Taliban leadership, including many of those serving as Council Chairmen for the Quetta Shura. Hassan accused Hafiz Majeed, a legendary Taliban commander who once served as the Quetta Shura's Intelligence Chief, of having sold advanced surface-to-air missile platforms, including American "Stinger" missiles, to Western intelligence organizations. It was unclear whether Hassan was implying that Majeed had participated in the "Stinger buy-back" program launched by the US in 2005.

Hassan also claimed to know which Taliban members had been behind the conspiracy to release Ismail Khan, the current Afghan Minister for Water and Energy, from a heavily fortified Taliban prison in Kandahar while the Taliban regime was in power. Khan, a leading anti-Taliban mujahideen commander, was arrested by the Taliban in 1997 and escaped from custody under mysterious circumstances in 1999.

Hassan vowed to disclose the names of those Taliban leaders behind the release of a seven-man Russian cargo plane crew that was captured after being forced to land in Kandahar province in August 1995. The flight crew was supplying lethal aid to the anti-Taliban bloc known as the United Islamic Front when the plane was intercepted by Taliban aircraft and forced to land. The crew members were tortured, starved, and imprisoned for 378 days before they staged a daring escape -- convincing guards to allow them to conduct maintenance on the marooned aircraft -- the ruse gave the crew enough time to quickly power up the cargo jet and take off, eventually reaching safety in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. The incident has long been a source of conspiracy and friction among Taliban factions as a major intelligence and security failure.

Hassan went on to accuse the Quetta Shura and its top leaders of graft and embezzlement, and said that Azizurahman, a Taliban official based in Qatar, was mishandling funds ($2 million) and maintaining links to US intelligence organizations and to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).

Hassan's lengthy and fiery diatribe against senior Taliban figures and the powerful Quetta Shura is the latest indicator that unity and cohesion among various Taliban factions is in serious jeopardy. The apparent execution of Maluvi Ismail last month, the reported assassination of Maluvi Sharafuddin in Quetta, and now Hassan's vow to hunt down and kill senior Quetta Shura members all reveal a side of Taliban political posturing rarely exposed to outside observers.

One suicide bomber detonated his car packed with explosives outside of the Palestine Branch Military Intelligence headquarters at 8:00 a.m. local time, just as employees were arriving, Reuters reported. A second suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car as emergency personnel were responding to the attack and tending to the wounded.

The blasts were so powerful that the outer facade of the military intelligence headquarters and other buildings in the area collapsed, according to Al Jazeera.

There have been no claims of responsibility for the attack, but it was likely carried out by the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, a jihadist group that has claimed credit for three other suicide attacks in Syria. The Al Nusrah Front announced its formation on Jan. 23, in a video statement that was released on YouTube.

Another jihadist group, the Al Baraa Ibn Malik Martyrdom Brigade, announced its formation in February, and said it would conduct suicide operations against the Syrian government. The Al Baraa Ibn Malik Martyrdom Brigade has yet to claim credit for any suicide attacks in Syria.

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri has recently urged Muslims inside and outside of Syria to take up arms against the Syrian government. In a statement issued on Feb. 11 and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, Zawahiri said: "I appeal to every Muslim and every free, honorable one in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, to rise to help his brothers in Syria with all what he can, with his life, money, wonders, opinion, and information." Telling Syrians not to trust Turkey, the Arab League, or the West, he exhorted the "lions of the Levant" to "[d]evelop the intention of jihad in the Cause of Allah to establish a state that defends the Muslim countries and seeks to liberate the Golan and continue its jihad until it raises the banners of victory above the usurped hills of Jerusalem."

Al Qaeda in Iraq already has a strong presence in Syria [see LWJ report, Eastern Syria becoming a new al Qaeda haven]. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a regional al Qaeda affiliate, also is known to operate in Syria. Two of its senior leaders, Saudi citizens Saleh al Qarawi and Suleiman Hamad Al Hablain, have been added to the US's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists since November 2011. The terror group has denied any involvement in the Dec. 23 suicide attack.

In the past, the Syrian resistance has denied that anti-government groups have carried out suicide attacks in Syria, and instead has blamed the bombings on the Syrian security services. However, the Free Syrian army resistance force recently bombed a carwash that allegedly catered to Assad's forces; three people were killed in the blast, and 21 more were wounded.

President Bashir al Assad's regime has been battling the Free Syrian Army in several of the country's major cities. Assad's security forces have ruthlessly attempted to suppress the rebellion. Syrian government forces have killed nearly 10,000 Syrians over the past year, indiscriminately shelling civilian areas and using armored vehicles and snipers to fire on civilians.

The early morning strike by the remotely piloted Predators or Reapers targeted a convoy that is thought to have been transporting senior leaders of Ansar al Sharia, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's political front, according to CNN. No senior leaders have been identified as being killed.

In addition to the strike that hit a convoy, The Associated Press reported that an airstrike leveled a home that housed five "militants." Among those reported killed was "a senior member of the terror network in charge of armament." It is unclear if the strike was carried out by US or Yemeni aircraft. Yemeni warplanes are said to have been conducting strikes in Jaar as well.

Jaar is a known stronghold for AQAP, and US drones struck in Jaar twice in March. One strike targeted a a weapons storage depot on Jabal Khanfar, a hill that overlooks the city. AQAP was moving weapons, including tanks, that had been seized during raids on Yemeni Army bases outside of Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan.

Today's strike takes place just four days after the US killed senior AQAP leader Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

US strikes in Yemen

Today's strike in Abyan is the second that is confirmed to have been carried out by the US in Yemen this month. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 31 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Abyan. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 25 airstrikes in Yemen, with 15 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three of this year's 15 strikes have killed a senior AQAP operative in Yemen. In addition to Fahd al Quso, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province on Jan. 31. Fatahani was involved in the October 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden that killed 17 US sailors, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US drones also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

Additionally, Abu Musab al Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who fought alongside AQAP, was killed along with several other foreign fighters in a US drone strike in the Karma area near Azzan in Shabwa province.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled this week. The terror group has plotted multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

One of the documents is a Dec. 3, 2010 letter to Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan; the letter was written jointly by Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who at the time served as bin Laden's chief of staff, and Abu Yahya al Libi, a top religious leader who is now Ayman al Zawahiri's deputy. In the letter, the two al Qaeda leaders critique Hakeemullah's leadership style and comment further on a "draft" document that Hakeemullah had previously submitted to al Qaeda. In addition, the two al Qaeda leaders admonish Hakeemullah for attempting to give orders to an al Qaeda commander operating in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. [See LWJ report, Bin Laden docs: Al Qaeda asserts authority in letter to Pakistani Taliban leader.]

The al Qaeda commander was identified as Badr Mansoor, who was subsequently killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in February of this year. Atiyah and Abu Yahya tell Hakeemulah to stop issuing orders to Mansoor and to quit attempting to recruit his men.

"We make it clear to you that the brother Badr (Mansoor) is one of the soldiers of the Qaedat al-Jihad Organization who swore allegiance to Sheikh Osama (bin Laden), is with us, under our command, the Emir of a company of ours," they wrote. "Badr Mansoor and other members of our group are not to be approached to join another organization or to deploy to other locations. Good manners and group work mandate that such a request be presented to his Tanzim (al Qaeda) Emir and superiors," Atiyah and Abu Yahya said.

The statement is significant as it identified Badr Mansoor as a leader of but one "company" of al Qaeda forces operating in Pakistan.

At the time of his death, Mansoor was described as al Qaeda's leader in Pakistan who was closely linked to other Pakistani terror groups. Mansoor was able to funnel in recruits from Pakistani terror groups such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, with which he was closely linked.

Mansoor was known to have a large cadre of fighters at his disposal. According to Central Asia Online, Mansoor's company had "more than 2,200 members with 350 hardcore fighters and more than 150 suicide bombers." Mansoor's group is believed to have participated in terror attacks in Pakistan's major cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, indicating that its network is not confined to Pakistan's tribal areas.

The US government has consistently estimated the number of al Qaeda leaders and operatives in Pakistan at between 300 and 400. This estimate has remained static since 2010, and does not appear to account for al Qaeda's Pakistani companies.

Other al Qaeda units in Pakistan

Al Qaeda is also known to have several other units in Pakistan besides the Badr Mansoor Group. Ilyas Kashmiri's Brigade 313 is considered one of the most dangerous and effective al Qaeda formations in Pakistan. While the size of Brigade 313 is not known, US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that it is at least as large as the Badr Mansoor group. Brigade 313's members are recruited from the Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jundallah (the Karachi-based, al Qaeda-linked group), and several other Pakistani terror groups. Kashmiri was killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in June 2011. Before his death, Kashmiri served as al Qaeda's overall military commander; Mansoor was one of his deputies.

Another known al Qaeda "company" commander operating in Pakistan is Asmatullah Muawiya, a former Jaish-e-Mohammad commander. While the size of Asmatullah's force is not publicly known, a US intelligence official estimated that the group has "several hundred jihadis."

The Qari Zafar Group is another al Qaeda "company" that operates in Pakistan. Named after Qari Mohammad Zafar, a Laskhar-e-Jhangvi leader who also led the Fedayeen-e-Islam and was killed in a US drone strike North Waziristan in February 2010, the group has conducted attacks in Karachi, Islamabad, and in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Qari Zafar Group is thought to have thousands of fighters and supporters in Pakistan.

The alliance between al Qaeda and the numerous Pakistani terror groups allows al Qaeda to maintain what US intelligence officials call a "deep bench" of talent that is available to replace leaders and fighters killed in drone strikes and fighting.

"Al Qaeda is taking advantage of decades of networking in Pakistan, not just in the tribal areas, but in Pakistan proper, to develop a deep bench of leaders and foot soldiers who can be brought into the organization when there are vacancies," a US official told The Long War Journal after Badr Mansoor was killed in February.

That point was demonstrated by the speed with which al Qaeda backfilled Badr Mansoor's position. According to the Pakistani press, al Qaeda swiftly named Farman Shinwari as Mansoor's successor. Like Mansoor, Shinwari has close ties to Pakistani terror groups, and specifically the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

"All of Farman Shinwari's brothers are affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan) and other militant groups," The News reported. "His elder brother Hazrat Nabi Shinwari, alias Tamanchy Mulla, was a theology teacher in a government-run school in Landikotal. He was leading the TTP in Khyber Agency in 2005 and also used to send militants to Kashmir and Afghanistan. He has remained the head of Harkatul Mujahideen and is nowadays said to be leading his group of TTP men in Waziristan."

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which operates openly in Pakistan with the support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, has long supported al Qaeda. Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil, the leader of HUM, is living in the open in a suburb of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Osama bin Laden consulted Khalil before issuing his infamous fatwa against the US. Khalil's group has been involved in numerous acts of terror in the region, including the hijacking of an Indian airplane, an attack on the US Consulate in Karachi, the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, and a series of terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. According to The New York Times, one of bin Laden's most trusted couriers, who was killed during the Abbottabad raid, had phone numbers linking him to the HUM.

Additionally, leaked threat assessments authored by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) contain further revelations about the relationship between Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and al Qaeda [see LWJ report, Bin Laden's courier tied to Pakistani-backed terror group]. Daniel Pearl was murdered in the home of Saud Memon, who was identified by several members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami (HUMA), an offshoot with close ties to its parent organization, as their "chief financial backer." According to the JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he referred to Memon as "al Qaeda's finance chief in Pakistan."

The ties between AQ and HUM are also corroborated by the JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Mohammed Ilyas, a known Pakistani jihadist who served as a recruiter and trainer at a Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami camp in Mansehra, Pakistan. A footnote in the report states that HUMA is tied to al Qaeda.

"Kamran Atif, a terrorist who was recently arrested by the Pakistani Crime Investigation Department (CID) Police revealed that HUMA [Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami] has links with al Qaeda and that HUMA and AQ are 'in complete contact with each other,'" the footnote said.

Both Ilyas and Atif have been involved multiple terrorist attacks in Pakistan that have also been linked to al Qaeda.

Bin Laden orders movement of hundreds of operatives to Afghanistan

The other document from the 17 publicly released bin Laden files that suggests a substantial al Qaeda presence in Pakistan is a letter from bin Laden dated Oct. 21, 2010 and addressed to Atiyah. In the letter, the al Qaeda emir advises that "hundreds of the brothers" be relocated from North and South Waziristan to Kunar province in Afghanistan in order to avoid drone strikes.

"Note: there is no comparison between the fortification of Kunar and Zabul and Ghazni [provinces]," bin Laden says. "Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher terrain and the many mountains, rivers, and trees and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy."

Bin Laden also said, however, that not all of the fighters should leave Waziristan, and that some should remain.

"Regarding the brothers in Waziristan in general, whoever can keep a low profile and take the necessary precautions, should stay in the area and those who cannot do so, their first option is to go to Nuristan in Kunar [sic], Ghazni or Zabul. I am leaning toward getting most of the brothers out of the area," bin Laden said.

Although it is unclear to what extent bin Laden's instructions were followed, ISAF has noted that al Qaeda operatives have been killed and captured in Kunar, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces in 2011.

The thwarted plot, which involved a suicide bomber wearing an underwear bomb on an airliner bound for the US, was disrupted within the past 10 days when US authorities seized the device, according to Reuters. It is unclear whether the would-be bomber has been detained or is still at large. The bomber was apparently based in Yemen, the Associated Press reported yesterday.

In announcing the foiling of the attack, the Obama administration stated that because the plot had been discovered at an early stage, it never presented a danger to the public. The president had been made aware of the plot in April. On April 26 and May 1, the US government issued statements saying that it had no credible information about specific terrorist plots that were timed to coincide with the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death.

US officials said that infiltration by a "Yemen insider" led to the breakup of the plot, according to the BBC. Other intelligence agencies aided the CIA in the seizure of the bomb device, which is currently being examined by the FBI. The Yemeni source has apparently been moved to a safe location out of the country.

The bomb itself is reported to be a more sophisticated version of the underwear bomb devised by master AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri for the failed Christmas Day 2009 airliner plot. According to Reuters, a US official said the latest bomb reflected an improved capacity for detonation, and was probably the work of Asiri. And like previous bombs developed by him, it is non-metallic, so less detectable by airport scanners. A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that it is also possible the bomb was made by one of Asiri's "students."

The recent airliner bomb plot has surfaced as the US is increasingly turning its attention to Yemen and al Qaeda's affiliate there, AQAP. Over the past year, AQAP has gained control of vast areas of southern Yemen. In an attempt to counter the growing strength of the al Qaeda affiliate, the US has ramped up drone and conventional airstrikes in Yemen, with 14 confirmed strikes already this year compared to 10 strikes in all of 2011. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Two days ago, the US killed senior al Qaeda operative Fahd al Quso in a drone strike in Shabwa province. Quso was wanted for his role in the failed Christmas Day 2009 airline plot as well as the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and he led a terror cell in Yemen. US Representative Peter King said the strike that killed Quso was part of the same operation that foiled the latest underwear bomb plot, the BBC reported.

US and European officials are currently on the lookout for other AQAP bombs that may have as yet escaped detection, according to ABC. It was reported last week that increasing numbers of air marshals have been deployed to protect US-bound flights originating from Europe. Security officials are also concerned that terrorist bombmakers may resort to internal bombs, which are surgically implanted in suicide bombers. Asiri developed a similar bomb used in February 2009 against a Saudi official.

Senior AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri remains at large. He was thought to have been killed in the September 2011 US drone strike that killed senior AQAP ideologue Anwar al Awlaki, but Asiri was subsequently reported to be alive.

Afghan National Security Forces

With the US committed to withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the ANSF will soon have to take over security responsibility for all of Afghanistan. Therefore, the development of the ANSF is of critical importance. The DoD report highlights the improvements in the ANSF. Both that report and the Congressional testimony of General John Allen, commander of ISAF forces, state that progress for ANSF has been "better than expected."

The Afghan National Army has reached it end state goal of 195,000 troops, six months earlier than planned. The Afghan National Police has nearly reached its goal of 157,000. These are significant milestones, since training priority can now shift from growing the forces to improving their quality and technical capability. Personnel attrition rates, a major problem last year, have improved, according to the DoD. Literacy training has made substantial progress. The ANSF has filled its billet for officers, although there is still a shortage of non-commissioned officers.

Performance evaluations indicate that the quality of the ANSF is improving. Combat units have improved their ability to conduct operations with less and less support from ISAF forces. Government security ministries have made progress in developing the institutional capacity necessary to oversee, manage, and sustain the ANSF. The report particularly notes the Afghan National Army Special Forces, which has emerged as the most capable component of the ANSF and has made significant progress toward becoming an independent and effective force. In addition, the local defense initiatives Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are proving to be a successful means for local villages to provide for their own defense.

On the other hand, the development of support and logistic functions has lagged. This is to be expected, since fielding fighting units was intentionally given a higher priority over support units. Also lagging, however, is the Air Force, which is technically the most challenging and complex service and suffers the most from lack of human capital. And the Afghan National Police continues to lag behind the Afghan National Army in creating an effective and less corrupt force.

With increased capability, the ANSF has been taking over security responsibility for more areas. Since July 2011, large areas of the country have transitioned to ANSF, so that today, 50% of the Afghan population lives in areas of ANSF security responsibility. [See map below.] Thus far, the ANSF in the transitioned areas has performed adequately.

While the progress achieved is gratifying, there are also major risks. This is due largely to the fact that the ANSF has not yet been tested under heavy stress. So far, the areas transferred to ANSF responsibility have been the more benign ones, the areas less affected by the Taliban insurgency. The more difficult and dangerous areas will follow soon. By late 2012, 66% of Afghan population will likely be under ANSF responsibility, and including some of more problematic areas will be unavoidable.

Even more significant, the US and ISAF will conduct a major drawdown of their forces this summer. ANSF units partnered with US/ISAF combat forces will see them replaced with much smaller contingents of advisors. Then by mid-2013, US/ISAF will end all combat operations, transitioning them entirely to the ANSF. The speed of this transition is pushing the ANSF into the fore faster than US commanders would have preferred.

Taliban insurgency

According to the report, a number of ANSF and ISAF operations were executed over the winter in strategically important areas, significantly the insurgents' capability.

In southern Afghanistan, security has improved in Kandahar City and in the Arghandab River Valley to the west. This summer the insurgency will likely try to defend Maiwand district, as it is a strategic, logistical, financial, and support area. The insurgency will also try to regain influence in neighboring Zharay and Panjwai districts, west of Kandahar City. Currently about two-thirds of the insurgent attacks in southern Afghanistan are concentrated in the three districts.

In southwestern Afghanistan, the security situation has continued to improve in central and southern Helmand province. Insurgents have been pushed back to a few strongholds in northern Helmand. Operations are ongoing in Now Zad and Musa Qala districts.

In northern Afghanistan, security has improved dramatically, with insurgent attacks down 60%.

Eastern Afghanistan remains the most problematic area. The eastern border districts of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces are the location of important border passes between the Taliban's safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. ANSF and ISAF personnel have conducted operations in these areas to improved security at border check points and along insurgent supply routes. These operations have decreased insurgent ability to refit and resupply for the coming summer fighting season, the DoD claimed.

The most vulnerable area is the insurgent infiltration route from Pakistan's Kurram Agency into Afghanistan's Logar and Wardak provinces. The route provides the insurgency with staging areas for attacks into the capital of Kabul. ANSF and ISAF operations have focused on limiting insurgent movements, disrupting insurgency activities, and forcing the Taliban to relocate command and control nodes, all of which, according to the report, has degraded the Taliban's ability to conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul.

While these accomplishments cited in the report are extensive, it is too soon to say how effective they really are. They occurred during winter, which is the low season for insurgent activity due to the severity of the weather. The true indications will come this summer, when the Taliban will attempt to retake lost areas and step up attacks in Kabul and in provincial capitals. Then answers will come to the important questions that remain: Has Taliban capability been degraded significantly? Are the Afghan/ISAF gains sustainable, preventing the insurgency from mounting major operations over the summer or beyond?

The report states that a five-year trend of increasing insurgent attacks has been halted and reversed. For the first time, attacks were down, by 9% in 2011 and a further 16% so far in 2012. Decline is the right direction, but it should be noted that the decline is not large. It certainly is not large enough to indicate that the insurgency has been significantly degraded. Given the US and ISAF surge of forces over the last two years, and the fact the surge is coming to an end, the relatively small decline is underwhelming.

The report notes that opium production continues in southern Afghanistan. In fact, production is expected to increase by a small amount this year. Opium production has been and continues to be a major source of the Taliban's income. The original purpose of sending such a large portion of the surge forces into Helmand province was specifically to cut this revenue stream. The fact that this goal has not been accomplished is a significant failure of the surge.

The most significant remaining risk is that the Taliban continue to receive critical support and sanctuary from safe havens in Pakistan. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan's military intelligence agency, still supports the most effective of the Taliban organizations, the Haqqani Network. As long as the Taliban can rest and refit in the safety of Pakistan (and continue to receive revenue from opium production) there is little prospect for an insurgent strategic defeat. The best that can be realistically hoped for is a stalemate with fighting continuing for a long time to come.

Afghan governance

The performance of the Afghan government remains another major risk. The report states that the capacity and effectiveness of the government are undermined by widespread corruption, limited human capital, and concentrations of power within the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. These factors slow the reinforcement of security gains and threaten the legitimacy and long-term viability of the Afghan government.

The risk assessment

The real tests for the ANSF and the Afghan government will begin this summer. Risk starts to rise with the return of the summer fighting season, the drawdown of US troops, and the further transfers of security responsibility to the ANSF.

Longer term, risk will continue to increase in 2013 as the US ends combat operations and the ANSF picks up responsibility for more difficult and dangerous areas. It will increase further through 2014 as US and ISAF forces complete their withdrawal, the ANSF assumes responsibility for all of Afghanistan, and US oversight of the government and the monitoring of corruption becomes minimal. And risk will mount even higher after 2014, if a proposed plan to reduce the size of ANSF is implemented. The plan, put forward by the US, would cut the size of the ANSF by a third starting in 2015 in order to save costs. It is based on the assumption the Taliban insurgency will be in decline by then.

In a recently released report on Osama bin Laden's files ("Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?"), the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point begins its discussion of the relationship between al Qaeda and Iran by noting that it "is one of the least understood aspects about al Qaeda's history." This is true, but the CTC's report is of little use for understanding this relationship and gets basic facts wrong.

The CTC argues there is a "scarcity of reliable public information to elucidate the nature of this connection" and therefore "theories vary widely." The footnote to that sentence points to the testimony of an al Qaeda operative named Jamal al Fadl, who was a key government witness during the trial of some of the al Qaeda operatives responsible for the Aug. 7, 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Those attacks were al Qaeda's most successful operation prior to Sept. 11, 2001.

Al Fadl told authorities, as noted by the CTC, that al Qaeda members received training from Hezbollah in the early 1990s. During his testimony, al Fadl said that he spoke with two al Qaeda operatives who told him they went to Lebanon to receive Hezbollah's training. One of the operatives, Abu Talha al Sudani, told al Fadl that "the training is very good." Al Sudani brought back "some tapes with him" from the training, according to al Fadl, and al Sudani showed the tapes to his al Qaeda comrades. "I saw one of the tapes," al Fadl explained, "and he tell me they train about how to explosives [sic] big buildings."

Clinton administration officials have argued that al Fadl's testimony provided a key window into al Qaeda's activities at a time when intelligence was sparse. But the CTC report's authors try to downplay the significance of al Fadl's testimony with respect to Iran and al Qaeda, when they write: "To the authors' knowledge, this information has not been corroborated."

In fact, al Fadl's information was corroborated by another key government witness: Ali Mohamed, who conducted surveillance used to plot the embassy bombings.

Corroborating testimony

Mohamed corroborated al Fadl's testimony when agreeing to a plea deal with the government. A transcript of Mohamed's testimony is freely available online at the same web site the CTC uses to cite al Fadl's testimony.

Mohamed was trusted by both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri to run some of al Qaeda's most sensitive missions. During one such assignment, Mohamed handled the security for a sit down between Hezbollah's terror chief, Imad Mugniyah, and Osama bin Laden. Mugniyah orchestrated Hezbollah's earliest terrorist attacks against American forces in Lebanon in the 1980s, including the Oct. 23, 1983 Beirut barracks bombings. During that attack, two suicide bombers detonated nearly simultaneously at the headquarters for the US Marines and French paratroopers, killing 241 American servicemen.

Years later, in the early 1990s, bin Laden wanted to know how to replicate these attacks. And al Qaeda's CEO asked Iran and Hezbollah for help.

Mohamed explained to authorities [emphasis added]:

I was aware of certain contacts between al Qaeda and [Egyptian Islamic] al Jihad organization, on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah on the other side. I arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between Mugniyah, Hezbollah's chief, and bin Laden.

Hezbollah provided explosives training for al Qaeda and al Jihad. Iran supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons. Iran also used Hezbollah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.

Therefore, contrary to the CTC's claim, Mohamed directly corroborated al Fadl's testimony about al Qaeda operatives training in Hezbollah's camps.

Mohamed further explained that al Qaeda consciously modeled its operations on Hezbollah's: Mugniyah's group successfully drove the US out of Lebanon in the 1980s with a series of attacks, and al Qaeda sought to force the same type of retreat from the Middle East. (The same thinking applied to America's presence in Africa.)

Mohamed elaborated:

I was involved in the [Egyptian] Islamic Jihad organization, and the Islamic Jihad organization has a very close link to al Qaeda, the organization, for bin Laden. And the objective of all this, just to attack any Western target in the Middle East, to force the government of the Western countries just to pull out from the Middle East.

...Based on the Marine explosion in Beirut in 1984 [sic: 1983] and the American pull-out from Beirut, they will be the same method, to force the United States to pull out from Saudi Arabia.

Clinton administration prosecutors

Based on the testimony of these two well-placed al Qaeda operatives, Jamal al Fadl and Ali Mohamed, as well as other evidence, Clinton administration prosecutors concluded that Iran, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda had struck a deal. One of the first federal indictments of bin Laden and al Qaeda reads:

Osama bin Laden, the defendant, and al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah, for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.

When testifying before the 9/11 Commission years later, in June 2004, federal prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald understood that Hezbollah's training of al Qaeda operatives was especially important. Fitzgerald investigated the embassy bombings for the government, and took testimony from both al Fadl and Mohamed. Fitzgerald explained to the commission that "in the middle of the 1990's, al Qaeda members received sophisticated explosives training from Hezbollah, despite the deep religious differences between the Sunni members of al Qaeda and the Shiite members of Hezbollah."

The 9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission itself found that the training described by al Fadl and Mohamed took place. At the time of the sit down between Mugniyah and bin Laden, al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan, which was then run by the National Islamic Front's (NIF) Hassan al Turabi - a radical Islamist ideologue. Unlike the stereotypical version of Sunni extremists so many analysts assume cannot cooperate with Shiites, Turabi "sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy." Turabi's efforts proved fruitful.

The 9/11 Commission explained [emphasis added]:

In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support - even if only training - for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 US Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations.

And when explaining how al Qaeda acquired the capability to attack American embassies in August 1998, the 9/11 Commission added:

Al Qaeda had begun developing the tactical expertise for such attacks months earlier, when some of its operatives - top military committee members and several operatives who were involved with the Kenya cell among them - were sent to Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon.

The footnote for this sentence from the 9/11 Commission report cites al Fadl's and Mohamed's testimony, FBI investigative reports, and "intelligence reports." Two of the intelligence reports are dated Jan. 31, 1997 and titled "Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Laden, Iran, and the NIF" and "Cooperation Among Usama Bin Laden's Islamic Army, Iran and the NIF."

Iran found liable for embassy bombings

Late last year, a DC district court reviewed the available evidence concerning Hezbollah's training of al Qaeda operatives. Like all of the parties mentioned above, the court found that the training did take place and that al Qaeda "did not possess the technical expertise required to carry out the embassy bombings" prior to Iran's and Hezbollah's assistance.

The district court found that the Iranians were liable for the embassy bombings because of the training provided to al Qaeda. Iran did not contest the case, as is typical in cases involving state sponsors of terrorism, and so the court issued a default judgment. Given the well-documented record, however, it is doubtful that Iran would have prevailed in explaining away its lethal assistance even if it had contested the lawsuit.

This may seem like ancient history at this point. But as evidenced by the CTC report, many counterterrorism analysts still do not have a basic understanding of the ties between Iran and al Qaeda. This makes putting new evidence, such as a small sample of files captured in Osama bin Laden's lair, into context much more difficult.

None of Osama bin Laden's files pertaining to the embassy bombings, if they exist, have been released to the public. US intelligence officials tell the Long War Journal that bin Laden's files go back to the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Even without those files we can be sure that Hezbollah's training of al Qaeda operatives took place, despite the CTC's doubts. The evidence for this fact was good enough for two federal courts, the FBI, the 9/11 Commission, and Clinton-era federal prosecutors.

It is also obvious that al Qaeda's embassy bombings were modeled after Hezbollah's 1983 attacks, as Ali Mohamed explained. Both, for example, relied on the same modus operandi - suicide truck bombers striking multiple targets nearly simultaneously.

The 1998 embassy bombings marked the first time al Qaeda employed such methods - after receiving help from Iran and Hezbollah.

The AQAP assault teams overran two bases in Dawfas and Al Koud, areas outside of the city of Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan, according to The Yemen Post. At least 32 Yemeni soldiers were killed and 40 more were wounded in the attacks. A spokesman for Ansar al Sharia, the political front for AQAP, claimed they captured 28 Yemeni soldiers and seized one tank during the battles, Reuters reported.

Today's attacks took place just one day after the US killed Fahd al Quso, the wanted al Qaeda operative who was involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and other terror plots against the US. Quso was killed in a US drone strike in the Rafth area of Abyan.

AQAP has overrun several Yemeni military bases in the past several months. The biggest assault took place in Al Koud on March 4, when a large AQAP force attacked a Yemeni Army base that housed a mechanized battalion. The AQAP fighters overran the base and decimated the battalion, killing 185 soldiers, wounding 150, and capturing 73 more. AQAP also seized heavy weapons, including tanks, during the assault. The 73 soldiers were later released.

On March 17, AQAP fighters stormed a military outpost in the town of Al Milah in Lahj province and killed 17 Yemeni soldiers and seized a tank. And on April 1, AQAP fighters overran an outpost in the Shibam area of Hadramout province, and brutally executed seven soldiers. Also, in mid-April, AQAP fighters overran a military base in Lawdar and seized several tanks. The military claimed that more than 200 AQAP fighters, including foreign al Qaeda fighters, were killed as the terror group sought to take control of the city. AQAP has also assaulted other military bases in Abyan, Baydah, and Marib provinces over the past several months, sparking heavy fighting with Yemeni troops.

AQAP has been openly battling the Yemeni military for nearly a year, and has seized numerous towns and cities. AQAP has held its ground in Zinjibar despite the efforts of a division of Yemeni troops. Zinjibar has been under AQAP's control since it fell to the terror group in late May 2011. Although the Yemeni military has claimed it liberated Zinjibar in September 2011, and again last month, US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that the city is best described as "contested."

The US has aided the Yemeni military with drone and conventional airstrikes, but the added airpower has done little to halt AQAP's territorial expansion. AQAP has expanded its control in the south even as the US has ramped up airstrikes in southern and central Yemen. At the end of March, the coastal town of Radum in Shabwa province was the latest population center to fall to AQAP.

Background on AQAP and Ansar al Sharia

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been fighting under the banner of the Ansar al Sharia. Ansar al Sharia constitutes "AQAP's version of the Islamic State of Iraq," which is al Qaeda's political and military front in Iraq, a senior US intelligence official told The Long War Journal last year.

"Ansar al Sharia is pulling in allied Islamist groups and sympathetic tribes into its orbit, and seeks to implement an Islamic State much like the Taliban did in Afghanistan and al Qaeda attempted in Iraq," the official said.

In an official statement released by Ansar al Sharia in May 2011, the group said it wishes to take control of "all administrative, political, economic, cultural, monitoring, and other responsibilities" in Yemen.

AQAP is seeking to build an army to back up its Islamic state. In 2010, Qasim al Raymi, the military commander for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Mohammed Said al Umdah Gharib al T'aizzi, a senior AQAP military commander in southern Yemen, both claimed that the terror group had raised a 12,000-fighter-strong army in the southern Yemeni provinces. Yemeni officials recently told Al Hayah that "al Qaeda fighters in Zinjibar (the capital of Abyan) number in the hundreds, and perhaps exceed 2,000 gunmen."

The terror group continues to use al Qaeda's tactic of suicide bombings. In August 2011, Ansar al Sharia released a videotape of a suicide bomber attacking a Yemeni armored column as it traveled from Aden to Zinjibar.

AQAP has taken advantage of the political turmoil in Yemen to seize control of vast areas of the Yemeni south. Since the onset of large anti-government protests in March 2011, AQAP has openly taken control of areas in Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramout, Marib, and Lahj provinces. Government forces have withdrawn from several major cities in the south, leaving an opening for al Qaeda and allied Islamist groups to seize control of several areas. Zinjibar, Al Koud, Ja'ar, and Shaqra in Abyan province, and Azzan in Shabwa province are currently under AQAP control. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government. Yemenis have described the southern port city of Aden as ripe for an AQAP takeover.

The US in turn has taken advantage of the security vacuum in Yemen to step up attacks against AQAP's top leaders and its network. In 2011, the US killed two American AQAP propagandists, Anwar al Awlaki and Samir Khan, in a Predator airstrike in September 2011, and targeted AQAP emir Nasir al Wuhayshi and media emir Ibrahim al Bana. Wuhayshi and al Bana are believed to have survived the strikes.

The drone program in Yemen was put on hold in October 2011 after Anwar al Awlaki's son, Abdul Rahman, was killed in an airstrike that targeted al Bana. Abdul Rahman was a 16-year-old American citizen who had said he hoped "to attain martyrdom as my father attained it" just hours before he was killed, according to a Yemeni journalist.

The air campaign was restarted in January, and intensified in March, when the US launched six strikes. The US launched six more strikes in April, and one more this month. There have been 14 strikes total so far this year. The US conducted 10 drone, air, and cruise missile strikes in all of 2011, and has carried out 27 strikes total since 2002 [for more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012].

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP has taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The terror group has plotted multiple attacks against targets in the US, including an attempt to blow up an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009.

Al Qaeda has released its first video of Warren Weinstein, an American citizen who was kidnapped in Lahore, Pakistan in August 2011. In the videotape, Weinstein pleaded with US President Barack Obama to submit to al Qaeda's demands to ensure his release before he is killed.

The videotape, which was produced by As Sahab, al Qaeda's propaganda department, and released on jihadist websites yesterday, is titled "A Message from the Prisoner Warren Weinstein to His President." In the video, Weinstein directly addresses Obama, and begs for the president to accept al Qaeda's terms for his release.

"And I'd like to talk to President Obama and ask him - beg him - that he accept and respond to the demands of the mujahideen, for my life is in your hands, Mr. President," Weinstein said, according to a transcript of his statement which was provided by the SITE Intelligence Group. "If you accept the demands, I live; if you don't accept the demands, then I die. It's important you accept the demands and act quickly and don't delay. They'll be no benefit in delaying, it will just make things more difficult for me."

Weinstein appealed to Obama as a father, and then claimed the president is "not paying any attention or care about my problem or my needs."

Weinstein, who is 70 years old, was clearly under duress. He has been in captivity since he was kidnapped in his home in the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore on Aug. 13, 2011. He worked for J.E. Austin Associates, where he directed development projects.

The video of Weinstein confirms that al Qaeda is indeed holding him. He was rumored to have been kidnapped by al Qaeda, but it wasn't clear that the terror group was holding him until Ayman al Zawahiri, the group's emir, released a statement on Dec. 1, 2011. Zawahiri mentioned him in a video that also announced the death of Atiyah Abd al Rahman and addressed the people of Egypt.

In the Dec. 1, 2011 video, Zawahiri referred to Weinstein as the "American Jew" and said he was taken prisoner just as the US takes al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners.

"Just as the Americans detain all whom they suspect of links to al Qaeda and the Taliban, even remotely, we detained this man who is neck-deep in American aid to Pakistan since the seventies," Zawahiri said, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which translated his statement.

Zawahiri said that Weinstein would be released if the US halted drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and freed terrorist prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as well as Omar Abdul Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, Sayyid Nosair, and Abu Musab al Suri. Zawahiri also called the US "to release everyone who was detained on charges of belonging to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, even if they were handed over to another country."

The four jihadists who were explicitly named by Zawahiri have deep ties to terrorism. Rahman, who is better known as the "Blind Sheikh"; Yousef, whose uncle is Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, the architect of 9/11; and Nosair, an American citizen, were sentenced to life in US federal prison for their involvement in the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center in New York City. Al Suri is a top al Qaeda strategist and ideologue who is rumored to have been freed by the Syrian government late last year, just after Zawahiri's speech was released.

Screen shot of Warren Weinstein, from al Qaeda's hostage video. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al Quso.

A senior al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader who is wanted for his involvement in the USS Cole attack in 2000 and a failed airplane bombing over Detroit in 2009, and who currently leads a terrorist cell in Yemen, was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen today. AQAP confirmed the report.

The Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C. issued a statement saying that Fahd al Quso was killed in an airstrike in Rafth in Shabwa province.

"Today, an airstrike killed Fahd al Quso (Alias: Abu Huthayfa) in Rafth, Shabwa," said the statement by the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C. that was received by The Long War Journal.

AQAP also announced Quso's death, in a statement that was released by the Madad news Agency.

"Qaedat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed that the mujahid sheikh, the memorizer and reader of the Qur'an, Fahd al-Quso al-Awlaki, fell today's afternoon as a martyr - Allah permitting - after an American bombing in Wadi Rafadh in Shabwa province of southern Yemen," the statement said, according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group. The statement also said that one other AQAP fighter was killed in the airstrike.

While the Yemeni Embassy did not say that Quso was killed in a US airstrike, a US intelligence official involved in operations on the Arabian Peninsula confirmed that Quso was indeed the target of a drone strike today. The official would not comment on the claims by the Yemeni Embassy or AQAP that Quso had been killed.

Quso was traveling in a car with at least two other AQAP operatives when the unmanned Predators or Reapers fired missiles at his car, an intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Three AQAP operatives are believed to have been killed in the strike, which occurred at nighttime.

Quso has been sheltered by the Awlaki tribe, the same tribe that sheltered US cleric and AQAP ideologue and operational commander Anwar al Awlaki, who was killed in a US drone strike in September 2011.

The wanted AQAP leader has been the target of at least one other US airstrike, in July 2011. A convoy transporting Quso in Abyan province was hit by US aircraft, killing eight AQAP fighters. Quso survived the strike.

Previously, Quso was rumored to have been killed in a US Predator airstrike in Pakistan in September 2010. In October 2010, US intelligence officials warned The Long War Journal that the US had been unable to confirm Quso's death. Al Qaeda did not release a martyrdom statement announcing Quso's death.

On Dec. 7, 2010, the US State Department added Quso to the list of specially designed global terrorists, and the chief of State's Terrorist Designations Unit told The Long War Journal that the US did not believe reports that Quso had been killed. Nine days later, Quso was interviewed by Al Sharq al Awsat and expressed surprise that people thought he had been killed in Pakistan.

Quso is considered to be a senior AQAP leader. According to the State Dept.'s designation in December 2010, he leads an al Qaeda cell in Yemen, and "is connected to other designated AQAP senior leaders, including Anwar al Awlaki [a top ideologue and propagandist], Nasir al Wuhayshi [AQAP's leader], and Said Ali al Shihri [AQAP's deputy leader]." In May 2010, Quso appeared in an AQAP propaganda video and threatened to attack the US and its interests abroad, including embassies and warships.

Quso is wanted by the FBI for his role in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. The suicide attack on the warship killed 17 US sailors. Quso is also known to have provided funds to a key planner of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US. Quso was detained by Yemeni security forces after the Sept. 11 attacks, but escaped from prison in 2003. He was later recaptured in 2004, but released again by the Yemeni government in 2007, and quickly rejoined al Qaeda in Yemen.

Additionally, Quso has been identified as one of the AQAP operatives involved in the failed airline bombing attack over Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009.

US strikes in Yemen

Today's strike in Shabwa is the first that is confirmed to have been carried out by the US in Yemen since April 23. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US carried out six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have carried out at least 30 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Shabwa. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 24 airstrikes in Yemen. Fourteen of those strikes have taken place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting AQAP foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three of this year's 14 strikes have killed a senior AQAP operative in Yemen. US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province on Jan. 31. Fatahani was involved in the October 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden that killed 17 US sailors, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US drones also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (also known as Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib. Umda had served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen. He had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan before the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Al Umda was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg and escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

Additionally, Abu Musab al Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who fought alongside AQAP, was one of several foreign fighters killed in a US drone strike in the Karma area near Azzan in Shabwa province.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Ja'ar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also controls Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The terror group has plotted multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

The answer to that question would be affirmative, according to a report published by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point on May 3. CTC's analysts concluded: "References to Iran [in bin Laden's files] show that the relationship is not one of alliance, but of indirect and unpleasant negotiations over the release of detained jihadis and their families, including members of Bin Ladin's family." The CTC went on to characterize the relationship between al Qaeda and Iran as "antagonistic."

The CTC's report was based on a slim release of just 17 declassified documents, and only some of those deal with Iran. Thousands of other files seized during the Abbottabad raid have been translated but were not included in the CTC's release. The CTC's broad conclusion about Iran and al Qaeda is based on a narrow set of documents that focus on the abduction of an Iranian diplomat named Hesmatollah Atharzadeh and other unspecified covert activities. Al Qaeda had pressured Iran to speed up the release of al Qaeda operatives and family members in exchange for Atharzadeh's freedom.

According to senior US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal, however, the documents dealing with this tense detainee exchange present just one window on a broader relationship. Other documents from bin Laden's files that were not included in the document release point to instances of collusion between al Qaeda and Iran.

Some of the documents not included in the CTC's release deal with a top al Qaeda operative known as Yasin al Suri, according to one senior US intelligence official. This same official said that the documents pertaining to al Suri in bin Laden's files were used to support the US Treasury Department's July 28, 2011 terrorist designation of al Suri and five other al Qaeda operatives who are part of an Iran-based network that exists under an "agreement" between the Iranian government and al Qaeda.

"Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today," Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen said when announcing the designation. "By exposing Iran's secret deal with al Qaeda allowing it to funnel funds and operatives through its territory, we are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran's unmatched support for terrorism. Today's action also seeks to disrupt this key network and deny al Qaeda's senior leadership much-needed support."

The Treasury Department described al Suri as "an Iran based senior al Qaeda facilitator currently living and operating in Iran under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian government." Treasury also described al Suri's network as a "core pipeline through which al Qaeda moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, including to Atiyah Abd al Rahman, a key al Qaeda leader based in Pakistan, also designated today." Rahman was subsequently killed in a US drone strike in August 2011.

On Dec. 22, 2011, the US Treasury Department and State Department announced that a reward of $10 million was being offered for information leading to al Suri's capture. The reward is one of the highest offered by the US government for any terrorist.

"Under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Government of Iran, Yasin al Suri has helped move money and recruits through Iran to al Qaeda leaders in neighboring countries in the region," Robert Hartung, the State Department Assistant Director for Threat Investigations and Analysis, explained during the briefing announcing the reward.

Less than two months later, on Feb. 16, 2012, the Treasury Department issued another designation saying that Iran was supporting al Qaeda. It is not clear if bin Laden's files played any part in the February designation. The Treasury Department accused Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) of assisting al Qaeda in a variety of ways.

According to Treasury, the "MOIS has facilitated the movement of al Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports." In addition, the MOIS has "provided money and weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)...and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives."

Over the course of just seven months, therefore, the Obama administration accused Iran of directly supporting al Qaeda on three occasions. And less than three months before the CTC came to its conclusion about Iran and al Qaeda, the Treasury Department publicly accused the Iranian MOIS of supporting al Qaeda.

Obviously, the US government's reporting is at odds with the CTC's conclusion, which is based on a tiny collection of documents. The reason for this disparity is simple. The CTC looked at only a small part of the overall relationship between Iran and al Qaeda.

Al Suri's network in Iran

While the authors of the CTC report make a footnote mention of Yasin al Suri and the Treasury Department's July 2011 designation of him, they ignore the logical contradiction between their report's sweeping conclusion and the Treasury Department's analysis.

The CTC speculated that al Suri's network may have been involved in returning al Qaeda detainees to points in Pakistan, using al Qaeda transit points in eastern Iran. The CTC did not note that al Qaeda fighters and operatives selected to target the West have also used those transit points, or that those routes exist as part of an "agreement" between Iran and al Qaeda.

In March, an al Qaeda recruit named Ahmad Wali Siddiqui went on trial in Koblenz, Germany. Siddiqui and his fellow al Qaeda operatives had been selected to take part in one of the last plots ordered by Osama bin Laden - a Mumbai-style assault on Europe. The plot was broken up in 2010 after Siddiqui was arrested in Afghanistan and divulged the details.

During the trial, and beforehand, evidence emerged that Siddiqui's compatriots transited through Iran into northern Pakistan using al Suri's network. Some of the operatives were told to go back to Iran to receive their final instructions for the plot from senior al Qaeda leaders. And, as of Jan. 2012, the surviving leadership of Siddiqui's cell was being harbored inside Iran. [See LWJ report, Leaders of German al Qaeda cell living in Iran.]

"Western intelligence officials are suspicious not just of the men's intentions, but also of Iran," The New York Times reported in January, referring to the leaders of Siddiqui's cell. "While not directing these men, Iran appears to be harboring them in hopes that, when and if they leave, they will cause trouble in the West."

Needless to say, this aspect of Iran-al Qaeda relations is not "antagonistic."

'Al Qaeda's emissary in Iran'

One of the key authors and recipients of the letters mentioned in the CTC's report is Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who was also designated by the US Treasury Department in July 2011, before his death in a US drone strike.

The Treasury Department described Rahman as al Qaeda's "overall commander in Pakistan's tribal areas and as of late 2010, the leader of al Qaeda in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan."

The Treasury Department also added: "Rahman was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al Qaeda's emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials."

Prior to his demise, Rahman was one of the senior al Qaeda leaders who benefited from Yasin al Suri's Iran-based network. Through Iran, according to the Treasury Department, Al Suri delivered recruits and operatives to Rahman in northern Pakistan.

Although Rahman's role as bin Laden's "emissary in Iran" has long been known, it is not mentioned in the CTC report. Nor do the CTC report's authors delve into two interesting observations about Rahman contained in the publicly released bin Laden files. Both of these observations undermine the claim that the documents show only "mutual distrust and antagonism" between the two sides.

One document, CTC says, is dated March 28, 2007 and "is addressed to a legal scholar by the name of Hafiz Sultan, and it is authored by someone who is of Egyptian origin." The author asks for "guidance...on the issue of using chlorine gas technology." At the time, al Qaeda in Iraq was involved in a spree of bombings that used just such "technology."

The author continues by saying that "the brothers where Mahmud is...have the potential to use [chlorine gas] on the forces of the apostates," Iraqi president Jalal Talibani and the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masud Barzani. The al Qaeda-linked operatives "have already considered using it," the author says. Mahmud, as the translator notes, is Atiyah Abd al Rahman. The translator adds that the author is making a "possible reference" to Rahman "being in Iran."

If this is the meaning of the underlying text, then it implies that al Qaeda operatives inside Iran are plotting chlorine gas attacks inside Iraq. Taking it one step further, this suggests a fairly permissive operating environment inside Iran -- an observation which is buttressed by other evidence, as described above. The text is fairly murky, however, and it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion.

In any event, the author "informed" the al Qaeda operatives "that matters as serious as this required centralized [coordination] and permission from the senior [al Qaeda] leadership, because the gas could be difficult to control and might harm some people, which could tarnish our image, alienate people from us, and so on." The project was put "on hold for now."

The second reference is less murky. In a letter written sometime in late 2006, Rahman responds to a request for advice from Jaysh al Islam, an al Qaeda-linked Palestinian terrorist group. The Jaysh al Islam correspondent notes that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) "[r]eceives vast sums from abroad (Iran, in particular), and some of their people have adopted Shiite thought, God forbid." But the Jaysh al Islam man continues, saying of the PIJ:

However, they have offered funding to us, in exchange for which we are to work with them and participate jointly in qualitative operations, as a sort of propaganda; the catch being that we would conduct the operation with funding through them, and afterwards it would be announced that we cooperated with them [Translator's Note (TN): in the operation].

Rahman offers a lengthy response, citing a hadith and discussing what is and is not permissible in terms of raising funds for jihad. But here is the crux of Rahman's response with respect to Iranian funds [emphasis added]:

As the al-Jihad movement's funding comes primarily from support (TN: provided by) the Rafidite (TN: "refuser"; common euphemism for Shi'ite) nation (Iran), which is not in and of itself harmful, by which I mean that it is permitted to eat of what is given of it and to accept it, God willing. It (TN: Iran) is to us an infidel state, and accepting monies from infidel states and kings is permitted, in and of itself, unless another prohibiting factor arises.

There is no mention in the CTC report that Rahman said al Qaeda and its allies were permitted to take funds from Iran and the PIJ, a longtime proxy of Iran. This argument, coming from al Qaeda's one-time "emissary in Iran," is noteworthy as it shows the flexibility al Qaeda maintains when it comes to cooperating with other actors. While objecting to financial gains from the sale of wine, pork, and "improperly slaughtered animals," Rahman did not object to receiving funds from the "infidel" Iran.

"So take it, if there is no other way [to finance yourselves], and strike the Jews," Rahman concludes.

The documents released by CTC do not deal directly with Rahman's longstanding ties to the Iranian regime outside the context of the al Qaeda-Iran detainee swap, even though Rahman's relationship with Iran dated to long before this episode. Rahman is known to have had dealings with Iran beginning in the 1990s. And there are reports that Rahman was dealing with the Iranians as recently as just a few months before his death.

All of the documents dealing with Rahman's ties to the Iranian regime, if more exist, should be released to the public.

A narrow window

The CTC's broad conclusion about Iran and al Qaeda is based on a narrow set of documents showing that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat in order to force the release of detained al Qaeda operatives and family members. The tension between al Qaeda and Iran over this issue was very real.

The CTC report's authors claim, however, that the "documents provide evidence for the first time of al Qaeda's covert campaign against Iran."

But that is not true. The basic outline of the story told in the documents released by the CTC was first reported by slain Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad. In both his articles online for the Asia Times and his book, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Shahzad described the kidnapping of Hesmatollah Atharzadeh and a subsequent deal between Iran and al Qaeda.

Shahzad's take on this episode was more sophisticated than the CTC's interpretation. Shahzad saw the move as a form of power politics in which al Qaeda used this operation to not only free detainees that Iran continued to hold despite al Qaeda's objections, but also for "broadening ties with Iran."

This may seem counterintuitive to those analysts who take a myopic view of human behavior. But Shahzad's analysis of the relationship between al Qaeda and Iran is consistent with al Qaeda's preferred methods of using violence and pressure to force others to do its bidding. Indeed, bin Laden reportedly first threatened the Iranians in 2003, when he demanded that al Qaeda members be freed from house arrest. Bin Laden promised terrorist attacks if he didn't get his way. The attacks never came, Iran continued to hold some detainees under house arrest, and the two sides continued to cooperate on other issues. Years later, tensions surrounding this issue boiled over.

The details of Shahzad's account cannot be verified in full, and in some cases they do not ring true. But when analyzing the kidnapping of Atharzadeh, Shahzad looked at more of the picture than the CTC's analysts did. Shahzad even reported that, as a result of the deal for Atharzadeh, "Iran supplied weapons to a top Taliban commander allied with al Qaeda."

In a letter accompanying the CTC report, General John Abizaid cautioned that the 17 declassified documents released to the public "likely represent only a fraction of the materials reportedly taken from" bin Laden's compound. Abizaid also warned that the report should not be taken as a "definitive commentary on al Qaeda's evolution or the group's current status." Abizaid continued by explaining that "analysis based on captured documents alone is fraught with risk," and the documents "are most valuable when contextualized with information drawn from other sources."

The CTC's analysts proceeded to ignore these cautionary remarks and issued a strongly-worded conclusion, based on a paltry set of documents, about Iran's relationship with al Qaeda. In the process, they ignored everything - including Yasin al Suri's network and the "agreement" between Iran and al Qaeda that allows it to exist on Iranian soil - that got in the way of their apparently preconceived conclusion.

A senior US intelligence official tells the Long War Journal that additional documents dealing with the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda were excluded from what the CTC was shown. Those documents are a "mixed bag," the official says, with some showing other "antagonistic" incidents and still others showing collusion.

The American public should see all of these documents, not just the small set released through the CTC.

**Editor's Note: Part 2 of this series will be released on Monday, May 7.

The letter, which is dated Dec. 3, 2010, was written by Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who at the time served as bin Laden's chief of staff, and Abu Yahya al Libi, a top religious leader who is now Ayman al Zawahiri's deputy. In the document, the two al Qaeda leaders are critiquing Hakeemullah's leadership style as well as responding further to a "draft" of a document that Hakeemullah had previously submitted to al Qaeda. And although the letter to the Taliban emir is contentious, and even ends with a threat from al Qaeda, there is no evidence that the letter caused a rift between the two terror groups.

While the contents of Hakeemullah's "draft" to al Qaeda are not found among the 17 documents from bin Laden's compound that were released to the public this week, Hakeemullah appears to have submitted a proposal to al Qaeda that outlines his role as a leader in Pakistan's jihad. Al Qaeda's response to Hakeemullah in the Dec. 3 letter appears to be part of its efforts to organize the large Taliban groups in Pakistan's tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan and refocus their energies on Afghanistan. That effort ultimately succeeded in late 2011, when four major Taliban groups, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, formed the Shura-e-Murakeba. Abu Yahya al Libi, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Mansour, a senior Taliban leader who operates in eastern Afghanistan, and an al Qaeda leader known as Abdur Rehman Al Saudi were responsible for brokering the creation of the Shura-e-Murakeba.

Atiyah and Abu Yahya's letter is addressed "to the good brother Hakeemullah." But the niceties stop there, as the al Qaeda leaders upbraided Hakeemullah for his "mistakes."

"We have several important comments that cover the concept, approach, and behavior of the TTP [Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan] in Pakistan, which we believe are passive behavior and clear legal and religious mistakes which might result in a negative deviation from the set path of the Jihadists Movement in Pakistan, which also are contrary to the objectives of Jihad and to the efforts exerted by us," the al Qaeda leaders said. They cited the killing of Muslims and using people as "shields" as part of these mistakes.

The authors then said that Hakeemullah's demand that other jihadists, presumably members of other Taliban groups and even al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, swear fealty to him, may spark fighting between jihadist groups.

"Considering Hakeemullah as the sole Emir for everyone to swear allegiance to, whoever oppose him and isn't a member of the movement is an adulterer, the none differentiation between the Jihad Emirate and the Great Imam post, and neglecting the daily conditions of the Muslims; all of which according to the Sharia (Muslim laws) are a misconception of the real situation, and may cause an inter-Mujahidin fighting," Atiyah and Abu Yahya wrote.

Atiyah and Abu Yahya then turned to "the draft that was written by Hakeemullah Mehsud" and said it is "unacceptable and we don't approve it because it contains political and Sharia mistakes." The two al Qaeda leaders' letter goes on to demonstrate that they have been in communication with Hakeemullah over the draft.

"We already sent our comments on this draft," they said.

Atiyah and Abu Yahya then chastised Hakeemullah for calling al Qaeda "guests" in Pakistan.

"We want to make it clear to you that we, the al Qaeda is an Islamist Jihadist organization that is not restricted to a country or race, and that we in Afghanistan swore allegiance to the Emir Mullah Muhammad (Omar) who allowed us to carry Jihad," they said. "Those that call us as guests do that for political reasons and don't base this attribute on the Sharia, and we ask you and all the Mujahidin not to use this attribute."

The two al Qaeda leaders also instructed Hakemullah not to poach fighters from Badr Mansoor, or give him commands. Atiyah and Abu Yahya are telling Hakeemullah to obey the chain of command. Badr Mansoor was al Qaeda's commander in Pakistan, who was killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in February 2012.

"We make it clear to you that the brother Badr (Mansoor) is one of the soldiers of the Qaedat al-Jihad Organization who swore allegiance to Sheikh Osam (bin Laden), is with us, under our command, the Emir of a of a company of ours," they wrote. "Badr Mansoor and other members of our group are not to be approached to join another organization or to deploy to other locations. Good manners and group work mandate that such a request be presented to his Tanzim (al Qaeda) Emir and superiors."

Atiyah and Abu Yahya concluded the letter by issuing a threat to Hakeemullah that he would be punished if he did not correct his "grave mistakes."

"We stress on the fact that real reform is the duty of all, and to succeed we should look for and correct our mistakes and take the advice of others. We hope that you will take the necessary action to correct your actions and avoid these grave mistakes; otherwise we have to take decisive actions from our end," they stated.

While the two al Qaeda leaders threatened to take "decisive actions," there is no evidence that the letter caused fissures between the two groups. There have been no reports of clashes between al Qaeda and Hakeemullah's forces in North Waziristan or elsewhere. In fact, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan still shelters and supports al Qaeda leaders.

Hakeemullah even signed on to al Qaeda plans for the Pakistani Taliban groups to coordinate actions and end infighting, when he joined the Shura-e-Murakeba nearly one year later, which indicates that the advice, chastisements, and threats he received in the Dec. 3, 2010 letter did not damage the relationship beyond repair.

The unmanned Predators or the more heavily armed Reapers fired four missiles at a compound in the village of Darr-e-Nishtar in the Shawal Valley. Ten "militants' were killed and one more was wounded in the strike, The Express Tribune reported. Another report, from The Associated Press, stated that eight missiles were fired at the compound and eight militants were killed. No senior Taliban or al Qaeda leaders have been reported killed.

The compound was known to be used as a training center, according to Dawn. It is unclear which terror group in the area ran the compound. Al Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Taliban fighters under the command of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the leader of the Taliban in North Waziristan, are all known to operate in the Shawal Valley, which is near the border with Afghanistan.

Bahadar administers the Shawal Valley. In 2009, Bahadar sheltered the families of of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the group's leader in South Waziristan, after the Pakistani military launched an offensive in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan [see LWJ report, Taliban escape South Waziristan operation].

Bahadar, Hakeemullah, South Waziristan Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, and Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani Network, are members of the Shura-e-Murakeba, an alliance formed in late 2011. The four commanders agreed to cease attacks against Pakistani security forces, refocus efforts against the US and NATO in Afghanistan, and end kidnappings and other criminal activities in the tribal areas.

The deal was brokered by senior al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al Libi as well as by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational leader of the Haqqani Network, and Mullah Mansour, a senior Taliban leader who operates in eastern Afghanistan. An al Qaeda leader known as Abdur Rehman Al Saudi was also involved in the negotiations. Mullah Omar, the overall leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is said to have dispatched Siraj and Mansour to help negotiate the agreement [see LWJ report, Al Qaeda brokers new anti-US Taliban alliance in Pakistan and Afghanistan].

US strikes in Pakistan in 2012

Today's strike in Miramshah is the second in five days, and the first this month. Prior to the April 29 strike, which took place in North Waziristan in the main bazaar of the town of Miramshah, the US paused the program for one month while Pakistan's parliament debated the US program. Pakistan's parliament has since demanded that the US end the drone strikes in the tribal areas as a condition for the reopening of the NATO supply line that runs through Pakistan into Afghanistan.

The US has carried out 13 strikes so far this year. Three took place in South Waziristan, and 10 in North Waziristan; seven of those strikes have been executed in or around Miramshah.

The program has been scaled down from its peak in 2010, when the US conducted 117 strikes, according to data collected by The Long War Journal. In 2011, the US carried out just 64 strikes in Pakistan's border regions. With only 13 strikes in the first five months of 2012, the US is on a pace to carry out just 36 strikes in Pakistan this year.

The first strike this year took place on Jan. 11; it was the first by the US in Pakistan in 55 days. The previous strike took place on Nov. 16, 2011. The pause was the longest since the program was ramped up at the end of July 2008 [see LWJ report, US drone strikes in Pakistan on longest pause since 2008, from Dec. 19, 2011].

The program was put on hold from the end of November to the second week in January, following a clash between US forces and Pakistani Frontier Corps troops on the border of the Afghan province of Kunar and the Pakistani tribal area of Mohmand on Nov. 25-26. The US troops struck in Pakistan after taking mortar and machine gun fire on the Afghan side of the border from Pakistani troops. Twenty-four Pakistani Frontier Corps troops were killed.

The clash led to Pakistan's closure of the border crossings in Chaman and Khyber to NATO supply columns destined for Afghanistan; the supply lines remain closed to this day. In the aftermath of the Mohmand incident, Pakistan also threatened to shoot down US drones flying in Pakistani airspace, and ejected US drones and personnel from the Shamsi Airbase in Baluchistan.

US officials told The Long War Journal on Dec. 12, 2011 that the program had been put "on hold" due to tensions over the Mohmand incident, but that the drones would strike again if a high value terrorist target that could not be ignored was spotted.

The Jan. 11 strike killed Aslam Awan, a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's external operations network. Awan was a Pakistani citizen from Abbottabad, the same town where Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in a cross-border raid in May 2011. Awan is the most senior al Qaeda leader killed in a drone strike since mid-October, when Abu Miqdad al Masri, a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis who also was involved in al Qaeda's external operations, was killed. [For a list of senior terrorist leaders and operatives killed in drone strikes, see LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012.]

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was also rumored to have been killed in the Jan. 11 strike. His death has not been confirmed, however, and the Pakistani Taliban have denied he was killed.

The US also killed Badr Mansoor, a senior Taliban and al Qaeda leader, in a Feb. 8 strike in Miramshah's bazaar. Mansoor ran training camps in the area and sent fighters to battle NATO and Afghan forces across the border, and linked up members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen with al Qaeda to fight in Afghanistan

Additionally, the US killed a German jihadist known as Samir H. in the March 9 airstrike in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of South Waziristan. Samir was a member of the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Despite the US airstrikes, al Qaeda operatives claim they are still capable of conducting training and operations in the area. Abu Zubaydah al Lubnani, a Lebanese member of al Qaeda who operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border, has said that while the drones have "delayed some operations or even stopped them," the terror group is still functioning in the region.

"I want here to confirm that Qaedat al-Jihad is still standing in Khorasan, solid and strong, despite what hit it, and it is still producing operations and it doesn't know the path of despair...," Lubnani said in statement that was recently released on jihadist forums and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

A document seized during the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden showed that the terror chief was concerned about the drone program and had ordered those leaders and fighters who could leave the kill box in North and South Waziristan to move to the Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Zabul, and Ghazni.

The attack took place at a place at a checkpoint near a bazaar in Khar, the administrative seat of Bajaur, earlier today. Officials said that 20 people, including a senior police official and two police officers, were killed and 45 more were wounded in the deadly attack.

Taliban spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan took credit for today's attack.

"We carried out the attack today. We are very happy today that we have achieved our target," he told Reuters.

Today's suicide attack was preceded by a double bombing in Bajaur just yesterday. The Taliban detonated a roadside bomb that killed two anti-Taliban tribal leaders in Chamarkand, according to The Nation. Three paramilitary Frontier Corps soldiers were killed in a second IED attack as they responded to the first bombing.

The Taliban have ruthlessly attacked the anti-Taliban militias that have sprung up throughout the northwest. The terror group has countered thee militias, which are known as lashkars, by targeting attacking tribal meetings and killing senior leaders. The largest such attack against tribal leaders took place in December 2010, when a suicide bomber killed 50 people and wounded more than 100 in an attack on a government official's office in Ghalalnai, the administrative seat of the tribal agency of Mohmand, which borders Bajaur to the south. In January 2011, a suicide bomber killed 37 people attending the funeral of a relative of Hakeem Khan, a Pashtun tribal leader who has raised a local militia against the Taliban in the Matni area in Peshawar.

Over the past several years, the Taliban have mounted a savage campaign against tribal leaders in the greater northwest who oppose them. Tribal opposition has been violently attacked and defeated in Peshawar, Dir, Arakzai, Khyber, and Swat. Suicide bombers have struck at tribal meetings held at mosques, schools, hotels, and homes. [See LWJ report, Anti-Taliban tribal militia leader assassinated in Pakistan's northwest, for more information on the difficulties of raising tribal lashkars in Pakistan's northwest.]

Although the military has conducted several operations in Bajaur, it has failed to eject the Taliban. Since 2008, the Pakistani military has twice claimed victory over the Taliban in Bajaur. During the same time period, the military has launched several major operations in an effort to clear the Taliban from the tribal agency. The campaign has been described as brutal, as the military used scorched earth tactics in an effort to eject the terrorist group.

But the military has failed to kill or capture the top Taliban leaders in Bajaur. The leadership cadre and most of the fighters escaped to neighboring tribal agencies or slipped across the border into the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, only to return and restart operations.

In the past, Bajaur has served as a command and control center for al Qaeda for operations in northeastern Afghanistan. The Taliban's former emir in Bajaur, Faqir Mohammed, who was relieved of command earlier this year, was closely linked to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri. In 2007, US Predators targeted one of Faqir's madrassas in Bajaur. The target of the attack was Zawahiri, who is said to have left the madrassa just hours before the strike.