Newly released documents seized from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abottabad show that the jihadist leader exercised control over the terrorist organization during the summer of 2010, when the US drone campaign against al Qaeda’s leadership node in Afghanistan and Pakistan was at its apex. An exchange between bin Laden and his general manager, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, over the possible appointment of al Qaeda’s operations chief for Pakistan to the group’s shura majlis, or executive council, also sheds light on how al Qaeda elevates leaders to the group’s inner circle.
Letters between bin Laden and Rahman, who was killed in a US drone strike in August 2011, discuss the merits of Abu ‘Uthman al Shahri, who served as al Qaeda’s operations chief for Pakistan. Abu ‘Uthman took over as al Qaeda’s operations chief for Pakistan after his predecessor, Osama al Kini, was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in January 2009.
The letters between the two al Qaeda leaders were introduced as evidence in the recent trial of Abid Naseer, who is alleged to have taken part in al Qaeda’s plotting of attacks in Europe and New York City.
Rahman mentioned Abu ‘Uthman in a letter dated June 19, 2010. “We want your assessment, for you to follow the issue, and then give us guidance,” Rahman wrote to bin Laden. The general manager asked if Abu ‘Uthman swore “fealty” to bin Laden. If ‘Uthman hadn’t made his pledge directly to bin Laden, it was “renewed” by “Sheikh Sa’id,” Rahman assured the al Qaeda emir. Sheikh Sa’id, better known as Sheikh Sa’id al Masri and Mustapha Abu Yazid, was Rahman’s predecessor, and was killed in a US drone strike in May 2010.
Rahman then proceeded to list several of Abu ‘Uthman’s “flaws,” which included “the way he interacts and how he talks resembles diplomatic talk; lots of exaggeration and lack of precision. Some people nastily described him as ‘beating around the bush!’ And so on.”
Most egregious is Abu ‘Uthman’s “continued fondness for ‘the party’ and the ‘engineer,’ as he [Abu ‘Uthman] calls him,” as well as his disrespect for Taliban emir Mullah Mohammad Omar. The “engineer” to whom Rahman refers is without doubt Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the “party” is Hekmatyar’s faction of the Hizb-i-Islami, which initially rivaled, but then allied with the Taliban. “He talks about it sometimes, though we have emphasized to him that he should not talk about it. Some of our Pakistani brothers (Pashtuns and Punjabis) caught wind of it… They said that when he mentions the Amir al-Mu’minin [Commander of the Faithful], he calls him ‘our brother Mullah Mohammed Omar!’” Rahman wrote.
In other words, Abu ‘Uthman was referring to Mullah Omar merely as his “brother,” and not giving him the honorific he deserved as the “Commander of the Faithful,” a title usually reserved for the Caliph. This internal discussion shows that al Qaeda’s public allegiance to Mullah Omar is not a show, as they hold him in the highest regard behind closed doors.
Despite the criticism of Abu ‘Uthman, however, Rahman and a large number of influential al Qaeda leaders nominated him to serve on al Qaeda’s top council.
“He has virtually all of the required nominations but I have put a halt on making it official,” Rahman wrote. “Abu ‘Uthman was one of the candidates who received the most votes (one of the requirements for him to be a member of the Shura is for him to lead an important operations sector, for him it is Pakistan operations).”
Despite Rahman’s recommendation, bin Laden ordered that Abu ‘Uthman’s nomination to the council be put on hold in a letter written on Aug. 7, 2010. Bin Laden thought Abu ‘Uthman was too close to Hekmatyar and his party. It is also likely that Abu ‘Uthman’s casual attitude to Mullah Omar played a role in bin Laden’s decision, given the close ties between the groups and the al Qaeda emir’s pledge of fealty to Omar.
“As for our brother, the friend of the engineer, I see that we should wait for another time to nominate him. You can give him advice once in a while, as he is easy going even though he’s too focused on engineering,” bin Laden wrote.
Shortly after bin Laden declined Abu ‘Uthman’s promotion, the Pakistan operations chief was killed. While the exact date of his death is not clear, by the end of November 2010 Rahman noted that Abu ‘Uthman is dead and has been quickly replaced by his cousin, Abu Hafs al Shahri.
“Brother Abu Hafs al Shahri (a cousin of Abu Uthman – May God rest his soul, who now manages the work in Abu Uthman’s stead, and we believe he is even better than Abu Uthman), as he is a veteran,” Rahman wrote in a letter to bin Laden dated Nov. 23, 2010. The portion of the letter was describing new al Qaeda leaders. The term “May God rest his soul” is used to describe jihadist leaders who have been killed.
Rahman did not state when or where Abu ‘Uthman was killed, but it is possible that he died in a US airstrike in Kunar province, Afghanistan on Sept. 25, 2010. An al Qaeda leader known as Sa’ad Mohammad al Shahri was killed in that strike. According to the Gulf Times, Sa’ad was a cousin of Abu Hafs al Shahri (just as Rahman described him), as well as “an associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hizb-i-Islami party.”
Abu Hafs al Shahri’s tenure as the head of al Qaeda’s operations in Pakistan was short-lived. He was killed on Sept. 11, 2011 in a drone strike in Pakistan, nearly one year after taking over for his cousin. A Haqqani Network commander named Hafeezullah and a “foreigner,” a term often used to describe Arabs and other non-Pakistanis, were among four “militants” reported killed in the Sept. 11, 2011 airstrike. The presence of a Haqqani commander with Abu Hafs at the time of his death is unsurprising, as al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network are known to operate closely. The new batch of documents have multiple references to the close connections between the two jihadist groups.
The job of al Qaeda’s operations chief in Pakistan is a dangerous one, as it requires the leader to serve from the front lines in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where US strike aircraft are constantly hunting. Abu Hafs was succeeded by Badr Mansoor (killed in February 2012), then Farman Shinwari (killed in 2013), and then Sufyan al Maghribi (killed in the summer of 2014). Mansoor commanded an al Qaeda “company,” according to bin Laden, and was also a leader in the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is currently running training camps in Afghanistan, according to the US State Department. Shinwari also served as a HUM leader. Al Maghribi was a veteran al Qaeda commander from Morocco.
The identity of al Qaeda’s current operations chief for Pakistan is not known. In fact, most of the al Qaeda leaders who served in this capacity were not known to the general public until after their death. The position likely was subsumed into Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), a new al Qaeda branch which was formed in 2014 that likely includes a host of jihadist groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.
The discussion of the fate of Abu Uthman is but one of many instances of Osama bin Laden and Rahman talking over the appointment of leaders and the group’s plans for its leadership cadre that are contained within the newly released documents. The conversations dispute the oft-repeated narrative that bin Laden was a “lion in winter” who was disconnected and isolated from the group, its leaders, and operations.
7 Comments
Very inside baseball, Bill. The octopus of AQ and its allies. I wish the Bush administration (IC) had understood how effective and cunning old Binnie was, even in hiding. The spreading out of AQ, and its resilience, are largely the fruits of his vision and response to US military moves post-9/11. The Islamic State is AQ on steroids, bringing up Bin Laden’s plans by about a decade. Baghdadi doesn’t want to recognize Zawahiri because he thinks he (Baghadi) is OBL’s legitimate heir by virtue of victory in combat and a purer bloodline to the, ahem, Prophet.
Mullah Omar is an ISI asset and needs to die. Talking to the Taliban is a complete and utter waste of time because nothing, repeat nothing, will be honored by them post-agreement. The ISI are laughing in their Johnnie Walker at how pathetically naïve we gringos are…
On an unrelated note, I wish LWJ would bring back the old website. The layout and graphics on the new one are too large and chunky.
I agree with your assessment…notably, your point on “talking with the Taliban.” Obama’s obsession with “engagement, negotiation, communication” are considered signs of weakness by Islamic radicals. Like the Japs in WWII, what fanatics, radicals, and terrorists really understand and respect is overwhelming firepower applied repeatedly without recriminations.
this reminds me of when Nixon & Kissinger ‘threw’ South Vietnam ‘under the bus’
buy a larger Monitor
There is one notable difference between IS and AQ, which Graeme Wood points out in that Atlantic article everyone’s freaking out over. IS needs to hold territory to retain legitimacy. If we put boots on the ground, it might be possible to undermine Baghdadi entirely in one quick campaign.
It could be over by Christmas. Right guys? If only we hadn’t wasted our wars.
I agree with Fred that US (and allied) boots could the job. But we have zero credibility and little will to jump back in the sandbox. I’m afraid we’ll need a stronger catalyst than just Muslims killing Muslims, so unless they come hard against Israel, Europe or America, half-measures will be all we’ll see.
These jihadi/terrorist maggots all dead real soon. Whole world jumping on board. Days are numbered for sure. 10-20 year wars are over, not gonna be tolerated.