(7)Training the Iraqi Army and the Order of Battle
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| Iraq's regional training facilities. Click map to view. |
Facts do not support the claim that the U.S. military has abandoned the training of the Iraqi Security Forces
In the conventional template of reporting on Iraq, glossy, controversial headlines often fail to reflect the reality of the situation on the ground. Take the latest reporting by McClatchy Newspapers' Nancy A. Youssef concerning the purported shift of U.S. military power away from training Iraqi Security Forces and back toward stability operations. The Detroit Free Press titles the article "U.S. plan backs off training of Iraqis," with a subtitle of "Policy shift entrusts security to American troop buildup." The Kansas City Star leads with "In a reversal, U.S. reliance on Iraqi army is fading," and subtitles with "Training troops is no longer a priority, changing the role of American forces." Forget the fact that Youssef provides no evidence within the article to back up such bold assertions. She relies on vague or nonexistent quotes from unnamed Pentagon and Washington officials, as well as Defense Secretary Robert Gates' failure to mention training last Thursday, to support her unfounded claim. In fact, many of the named officials in her article refute her assertion.
The fact is that the U.S. and Iraqi government continue to push the training of additional Iraqi combat and support troops, and are funding a dramatic growth in the capabilities in the Iraqi Security Forces. The Congress' failure to pass the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Supplemental Budget is the only thing holding up the growth and training of the Iraqi military. In the FY07 budget, Congress has inserted the demand for a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, a demand which has prompted President Bush to insist he will veto the legislation.
The decrease in the training of the Iraqi Security Forces Youssef is detecting is the first effect of delaying the FY07 supplemental budget. The money to train the Iraqi units has dried up. While about 75 percent of the expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces is funded by the Iraqi government, this money is focused on equipping and training new combat units, including upgrading units to armored and mechanized divisions. The funds to train and equip over 33,000 Iraqi Army logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and support personnel comes from the U.S. FY07 supplemental budget.
Currently, the Iraqi Army has about 13,000 support personnel to sustain a 138,000 man force. The expansion of support personnel by 33,000 troops by the end of 2007 would provide the bare minimum support necessary for independent operations. The money to train the support units cannot be legally reappropriated from U.S. budgets to fund a foreign military equipment/training program, so the programs has stopped. This weakness in current Iraqi Security Forces structure is the focus of U.S. training in the "Year of Logistics."
It is highly unusual for U.S. generals to weigh in on disputes between the executive and legislative branches. The cut in funding for the training programming has caused U.S. generals to mention the situation no less than four times since the delay in the FY07 Supplemental Budget became a critical issue. "At the current moment, because of this lack of funding, MNSTC-I is unable to continue at the pace they were in the developmental process of the Iraqi Security Forces," Major General William Caldwell said in a recent press briefing. "It is starting to have some impact today, and will only have more of an impact over time."
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| The recently established Besmaya range outside of Baghdad. Click map to view. |
Youssef's article also fails to note some very real and significant changes which are occurring with the structure and development of the Iraqi Army. The Army is expanding from 10 to 12 divisions. The current Iraqi Army has nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division. This will expand to 12 divisions, with one armored division and two additional mechanized divisions, which will significantly increase the Army's mobility and striking power. To augment these new heavy divisions and to accelerate the motorization of the light infantry divisions, the Iraqi government is in the process of purchasing somewhere between 600 to 800 U.S. made M60 tanks and over 4,000 assorted armored personnel carriers.
In order to man these divisions, the Iraqi Army is using existing units as incubators. The 4th Iraqi Army Division is creating a 4th Brigade and the 7th Division is creating a 4th Brigade as well, both will help form the nucleus of a new Iraqi division. Over 6,000 recruits are being raised in the Kirkuk region--they will likely form the nucleus of the 11th Division, and another 5,000 troops are being raised in Basra.
Unfortunately, the expansion of the Iraqi Army by two divisions will force the service to poach trained cadres from existing units. This will result in a short term decrease in combat effectiveness for the cannibalized units, causing some to fall from an "in the lead" status to a lower level that requires Coalition partnering until they can increase their skill sets. When this happens, it will undoubtedly will be used to show the Iraqi Army is failing in its mission to take over security.
The U.S. military and Iraqi Ministry of Defense continue to raise troops and are in the process of an intensive training Program. Brigadier General Terry Wolff, the commander of the Military Assistant Training Team, highlighted this in a briefing in early March. "And you asked about replenishing the forces that were here as part of Baghdad security. Well, many of the young soldiers are going through basic training right now, and there are about 7,000 that are in basic training... Additionally, there are three training battalions in this force, and the training battalions are putting and are preparing soldiers for those units I described in the prime minister's initiative... So all total, about 15,000 soldiers training. You know, we've been as low as 6,000 at different cycles, based on whether we've got basic training running heavily or not, up to 15,000 is the highest I've seen.
The training isn't stopping with the foot soldiers, mechanized troops and supply and logistics soldiers. Multinational Forces Iraq established the 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group and Squadron at the New Al Muthana Air Base on April 22. The 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group is training the nucleus of the nascent Iraqi Air Force. And an Iraqi Military Intelligence Academy has recently been established to "prepare Iraqi security force graduates for counter-insurgency tactical and urban military intelligence operations."
Unlike what some would claim, training for the Iraqi Security Forces could only be higher if the FY07 supplemental budget submitted in February was not delayed for political reasons. The proponents of this delay claim that they want to bring the troops home sooner but, the delay in standing up their replacements (the Iraqi Security Forces) caused by Congress' actions has had the opposite effect of delaying the eventual reductions and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
To put it bluntly, the facts do not support Nancy Youssef's highly provocative and patently false claim that the U.S. military has abandoned the training of the Iraqi Security Forces in order to fight al Qaeda and the insurgency. We've established the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle to document the progress and setbacks in the development of the Iraqi Army, police and other services, and there are no indications the training has been curtailed, other than what is being restricted by the U.S. Congress' failure to pass the supplemental funding bill. Youssef should do her homework before making such provocative and inaccurate statements.
READER COMMENTS: "Training the Iraqi Army and the Order of Battle"
Posted by @thepointyend at April 26, 2007 1:26 PM ET:
Great, Bill! Glad we can jump on again.
As I shared with you, thought I'd share my exchange with Nancy on her take on training the Iraqis with the rest of the group:
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Nancy -
I'm not sure where you get the idea that somehow there is a shift away from training the Iraqi Army. While the number of transition teams has not increased, those teams are now being augmented with forces from the U.S. combat formations with which they are associated in an effort to increase training capacity. Just because there is a new push in the security arena doesn't mean that training has lost importance. Further, we are relying MORE on Iraqi forces than ever before to conduct the overall mission in Iraq, especially as we surge capability into Baghdad to secure the capital. Your story does not adequately reflect this.
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Dear LTC Price:
I hope this finds you well. Thank you for writing and sharing your thoughts. I obviously disagree with your conclusion but welcome a lively, engaging discussion. The piece says that training Iraqi troops is no longer the priority and the concept of "as they stand up, we stand down" has not worked. To me, the ultimate proof that the training efforts did not work is the fact we are sending more troops in. That is, we are not standing down but increasing troops. Moreover, those troops are not going in to train Iraqis but to regain control of the city. Our hope that an Iraq protected by its own forces would be safer did not pan out.
You are right when you say that the Iraqis are working side by side and that training remains an important part of the mission. And that one could look at the troops working side-by-side as a form of training. But training is no longer the core of the mission. Instead, the focus is on regaining control and stopping the spread of sectarian violence. That is our priority now. Indeed, while working side by side with the Iraqis, more U.S. troops have died than their Iraqi counterparts.
That doesn't mean training isn't important, at least in my mind. But it does mean that the surged troops are there first and foremost to stop the violence. And that is a shift from where we were just a few months ago when the top brass here in Washington assured the public that if we trained more troops, Iraq would be safer and we could leave. The new approach is more nuanced then that now and an acknowledgment that training alone was not enough. I think it is important that readers know that shift.
I spent three years covering the war in Iraq and am keenly sensitive to policy changes and what they mean for those on the ground. And I think it is important to tell readers when those shifts happened.
Those are my feelings about it, but again, I welcome your very thoughtful comments.
Thank you again for writing. I enjoyed reading your feedback.
Regards,
Nancy
Nancy A. Youssef
Pentagon Correspondent
McClatchy (formerly Knight Ridder) Newspapers
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Nancy -
I appreciate greatly that you took the time to respond to my comment. I want to say that I agree with much of what you say below, although not all of it, but I don't feel that even the position below was the one posited in the article in question.
I still disagree that the concept of "as they stand up, we stand down" has not worked - it is, in fact, and ongoing process. In the end, it must work if we are to succeed. But granted, in some areas of Iraq a move to stand down has been delayed and will be for some time. Of course, when I was with the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in the summer of '04, we were planning the sequential turn over of the city to the Iraqis. The fact that we have not completed that effort almost three years later doesn't mean the concept has not panned out, only that it has not panned out yet.
The surge is not a sign of failure in the training / transition mission. Iraqis continue to increase the load they shoulder day to day. The surge merely shows that not only did we need to raise the Iraqis up, but had to beat the insurgents back to a degree in order to hand the effort over to a fledgling military and government.
You are correct that the surged troops are their primarily to stop the violence, and to that end there is a shift in effort. But that shift is apparent to anyone not living under a rock during the last four months as the debate about the future conduct of the war has continued. Again, my point is that it is not a shift away from training, as if the two are mutually exclusive. It is rather complementary - we are surging to provide breathing room for a new government so they can engage in reconciliation and rebuilding a nation. While the surge, and its associated combat requirements, signals a change in Baghdad, much of the rest of the country continues to focus on clearing, holding and building, using the same coalition forces as before, and does so hand in hand with the Iraqis.
So we may be talking in circles here, about nuance perhaps, but I still feel that your article did not do justice to the ongoing efforts of Coalition Forces or of the Iraqis themselves, who are struggling every day to field a better trained and equipped Army and to take the lead in their own affairs.
Thanks again for taking the time to respond to my initial concerns.
Very respectfully,
erp
Posted by @thepointyend at April 26, 2007 1:35 PM ET:
Bill - By the way, great write up. It amazes me that so many folks on the other side of the aisle (and unfortunately, a few in the President's party) think that some how we can stop combat ops and still win this thing. I did appreciate that Nancy was willing to discuss this with me, and even if I didn't change her mind, perhaps I gave a few things to think about.
For those who want to suddenly beat the "we're no longer training the Iraqis" drum, keep this in mind:
Ops in Iraq were planned essentially from the begining along multiple lines of operation and those lines of operation continue. They are:
Combat Operations
Train & Employ Security Forces
Essential Services
Promote Governance
Economic Pluralism
Now some of the specifics may have changed, but the basic premise has not. We have to establish security (the first two) and get the country back on its feet, both physically (essential services) and constitutionally (governance and economy). All of those things are going on and have been almost since the beginning. The mix of efforts (i.e. how much emphasis is placed on one versus the others) has changed according to the situation on the ground, and varies regionally as well. For instance, we're not busting our asses up north with governance (compared to say, Baghdad) because the locals have that pretty well in hand. More importantly, the efforts are NOT mutually exclusive. In fact, the one that has fluctuated the most is probably combat ops. We've scaled back on numerous occasions to give the Iraqis a chance to take the lead. Sometimes, we've been successful, sometimes we've not. But training efforts have only increased over all of this time - we have never backed off on training, nor will we as long as the requirement exists, because as mentioned before, to win we have to both fight AND train.
By fighting we try to kill the jihadists/extremists and tamp down sectarianism, and create breathing room for the fledgling government. So combat operations help us in training Iraqis to fight, and in establishing better services and governance by protecting government and infrastructure.
It is all tied together. The idea that you can pull troops, or restrict the mission to training only is ludicrous. We have multiple lines of operation, because we need progress on all five fronts to be successful - and it takes the cooperative effort of all five lines, meaning that while troops may not improve the economy directly, they help contribute to the conditions that will help the economy recover.
There is no time to waste with ad numeram / populum arguments. The warisn't wrong just because a simple majority in the congress or even across the population think it is.
It is time that we either stand with those tasked to achieve success in Iraq, or come up with an alternative method for success [not a plan for defeat].
Okay, I guess I better get back to Army work now... Keep fightin' the good fight, Bill.
Posted by anand at April 26, 2007 2:37 PM ET:
Thanks for your service LTC Price.
Gen Petraeus is on for one hour tonight on Charlie Rose. He's going to have to spend some time with the US press to change the perception that "we're no longer training the Iraqis."
Posted by Neo-andertal at April 26, 2007 7:43 PM ET:
"The piece says that training Iraqi troops is no longer the priority and the concept of "as they stand up, we stand down" has not worked. To me, the ultimate proof that the training efforts did not work is the fact we are sending more troops in. That is, we are not standing down but increasing troops. Moreover, those troops are not going in to train Iraqis but to regain control of the city."
There is a strong element of truth in some of what she has to say but her conclusions go to far. First, where I agree with her. The principle of "as they stand up, we will stand down" clearly did not work in 2006. The attempt to turn much of security over to the Iraqi's at that point was premature at best. There were not enough experienced personnel in much of the Iraqi Army, combined that with a weak government still in it's infancy, add on top of that the compromised state of the INP. These effectively eroded the ability of Iraqi forces to stand up under conditions of heavy pressure that existed in Baghdad during 2006. They clearly could not effectively stand against the concentrated 2006 AQI offensive on Baghdad along with sectarian conflict brought on by AQI's unrelenting attacks against civilians and also the Shiite response to the Shrine bombing. These problems where compounded by too many US combat forces being taken out of the theater post parliamentary election and an overly defensive posture for those forces that remained.
The US recognizes that there has been a constant problem with having enough counterinsurgency trained troops, forces available for policing, and support personnel for Iraqi units. It is also recognized that targets for Iraqi troop levels were also too low. The new strategy relies on an increase in both US and Iraqi troop numbers. Also, it relies on a more extensive relationship between US troops embedded with IA troops. Not only is there training and further evaluation of new IA units but existing they get further unit training before they are rotated into a hot combat zone. They also get further extensive on site training from their American imbeds. IA troops are not just utilized for policing and guarding duties but are being utilized in a full range of roles in accordance to varying levels of capability. I should point that the Iraqi Army has no real equivalent of heavy infantry and cannot be expected to fill such a role at this point.
The current offensive involves simultaneously pursuing a number of objectives.
1. Clearing the streets of Baghdad of militia and insurgent units.
2. Securing the outer ring of suburbs around Baghdad.
3. Reducing the number of mass casualty bombings within secure areas.
4. Keeping the Mahdi Army in check.
5. Augmenting the checkpoints set up in Baghdad with security barriers, walls, obstacles, so that it takes fewer troops to patrol areas.
6. Pursuing gains made in Anbar province against AQI.
7. An offensive against AQI in Diyala Province.
8. Backfilling for units taken from less active provinces to support operations in Baghdad.
9. Creating new IA units to secure the east bank of the Tigris river after the Diyala Campaign.
That lists just combat operations and doesn't include training, intelligence, infrastructure, and political support. I don't know how someone gets "training Iraqi troops is no longer the priority" out of all this. They're going to need all the Iraqi troops they can get and there is a massive ongoing effort to train existing IA troops on the job. Also, none of the existing evidence supports any less of a priority on training Iraqi units.
The point that we won't be standing down as Iraqi troops stand up is well taken. We won't be standing down until the proficiency of the Iraqi Army gets much better. For right now their standing up anything that has legs and will take orders. How soon we can get back to drawing down troop levels is argument for another day.
Posted by Marcello at April 27, 2007 7:59 AM ET:
"the Iraqi government is in the process of purchasing somewhere between 600 to 800 U.S. made M60 tanks and over 4,000 assorted armored personnel carriers"
Is there more info about that?
Which version of M60? M60A3?
What types of APCs? M113s/HMMW or even other stuff?
Posted by DJ Elliott at April 27, 2007 8:15 AM ET:
Marcello
I wish I knew what varient and how many.
This is from the article cited above:
Two more divisions should become operational in June, and their M60 main battle tanks, M113 armored personnel carriers and other mostly U.S.- and Western-built heavy weapons will arrive in the second half of the year.
"The objective is to have 10 divisions - six infantry, three mechanized and one armored - fully ready and equipped," Ghaidan said. "The armament process has been slow, but it seems to be picking up at the moment and we hope it is complete soon."
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2681008&C=navwar
So far, I have been unable to find details on the M60s/M113s and where purchased. The lack of notice to Congress indicates they are getting them from one of the other 29 countries that have them.
I have gotten confirmation from MNSTC-I PAO that the article is accurate.
Recommend the ISF OOB page for other weapons. It is updated monthly...
Posted by anand at April 30, 2007 2:22 PM ET:
Quite a few details regarding the ISF are in the following report:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070426_iraqiforces_rev.pdf
Note that the details in the 297 page report are much more positive than the summary section suggests.