(11)The Baghdad Security Operation Order of Battle: April 30, 2007
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| The Baghdad Order Of Battle as of April 30, 2007. Click map to view. |
The city of Baghdad continues to see a drop in sectarian violence attributed to death squads, while suicide car bombings remain al Qaeda's most deadly tool. After prior week's car bomb offensive by al Qaeda, which included 11 major suicide attacks over five days, the past week inside the city has been relatively free of major attacks. While roadside bombs, mortar attacks and other small scale attacks remain a regular occurrence inside Baghdad, al Qaeda was unable to pull off any large scale attacks which threaten to reignite the sectarian bloodshed.
Part of the success of the Anbar Salvation Council is that it provides the Sunnis in Anbar with a political voice as well as security against al Qaeda. The Anbar Salvation Council's political component is the Anbar Awakening. Seven new tribes have just joined the political party. The Awakening is now expanding beyond Anbar province, and is becoming a national movement. The Anbar Awakening is facilitating the creation of the Iraq Awakening, a national political party which would "oppose insurgents such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and reengage with Iraq's political process." The Iraq Awakening is scheduled to meet in May, and will be the first Sunni political party to openly oppose al Qaeda in Iraq.
Sensing that the Awakening movement was gaining steam in Iraq--branches are said to be forming in Salahadin and Diyala--I asked Omar Fadhil, and Iraqi blogger living in Baghdad, about the perception of the movement inside Baghdad and prospects of the Awakening expanding into the capital. Omar responded that the tribal dynamics were different, and that it was difficult to draw conclusions about Baghdad based on trends in Ramadi.
The following day, Omar noted a report in As Sabah on the creation of the Adhamiya Awakening. "Some community leaders in Adhamiya are working on forming a salvation council for their own district they will be calling The Adhamiya Awakening," reported Omar. "Sources close to the leaders said they [the leaders] have managed to win the support of some hundred people who agree with the new position. The sources asserted that the goal of the Awakening is to rid Adhamiya of the terrorists."
During last week's Pentagon press briefing, General Petraeus stated that al Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat to security, but also highlighted Iran's role in the insurgency. General Petraeus noted that the Iranians were backing Sunni and Shia groups alike, but focused on two examples of Iranian backing of Shia violence--the Karbala raid in January 2007 and the capture of major players in the Sheibani group.
General Petraeus outlined Iranian Qods Force's involvement with the February 20 attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, which led to the aborted kidnapping and subsequent murder of five U.S. soldiers. Qods Force armed, trained, and advised the Qazili network, which carried out the attack. U.S. forces detained several senior leaders of the Qazili network, and captured a "22-page memorandum on a computer that detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala," said Gen. Petraeus.
Petraeus also discussed the Sheibani network, "which brings explosively formed projectiles into Iraq from Iran," as well as other deadly weapons from Iran. A senior leader of the network was detained by U.S. forces. An American military intelligence official informs us the Sheibani network is one of Qods Force's foreign networks in Iraq, just as Hezbollah is an Iranian arm in Lebanon.
This latest news of Iranian complicity in the Shia insurgency came as the U.S. announced the capture of Abn Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi, a senior al Qaeda operative responsible for coordinating al Qaeda's networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. Abd Al-Hadi was captured crossing the border from Iran into Iraq. He was a major in Saddam's Army, ran al Qaeda training camps, was a military commander in Pakistan and Afghanistan, set up Zarqawi's network in Iraq along with Saif al Adel, who was in Iranian custody at the time, and served on al Qaeda's senior military and political shura, or councils. Abd Al-Hadi was reported to have been captured sometime late in 2006.
U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces have been pressing hard against al Qaeda's network nationwide. A single raid against a "constellation" of targets over the weekend resulted in the capture of 72 al Qaeda operatives. Coalition forces killed Abu Abd al-Satter, a senior al Qaeda leader during a raid northwest of Baghdad on April 20. Satter is described as "a known al Qaeda terrorist leader known to operate in Karmah and Ameriyah areas and was the al Qaeda in Iraq Security Emir of the eastern Anbar Province." Satter's car bomb cell "used 12- to 13-year-old children as VBIED drivers" to conduct its attacks.
Multinational Forces Iraq still has two infantry brigades to deploy in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. Three have already deployed, and the fourth, the 4th Special Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (Strykers) was reported to have entered Iraq in mid April, however there has been a reporting blackout on any information on the brigade.
General Petraeus and the Iraqi government have made some positive moves in the ten weeks since the kickoff of the Baghdad security Plan. However, he cautions it is still too soon to draw definitive conclusions. The proper time to make a preliminary assessment will be in September. But, increasingly, the war is being fought in the halls Congress. Senior politicians have declared the war lost, and the delay in the supplemental funding bill is preventing the training of the Iraqi Army. It would behoove the Bush administration and the Department of Defense to speed up the deployment of the remaining U.S. combat brigades into Iraq to smash al Qaeda's sanctuary in Diyala but a lack of political support at home is likely to hamper any such effort.
READER COMMENTS: "The Baghdad Security Operation Order of Battle: April 30, 2007"
Posted by ECH at April 30, 2007 6:13 PM ET:
How many extra ERUs is the Anbar Salvation Council going to be building Bill? I heard they wanted to build more then the origional 8. The ERUs are I think the best stopgap measure to make up for the US and the Iraqi police and Army not having enough forces in Iraq to secure large parts of the country.
I also hear that the Son's of Anbar the Iraqi Army unit for Anbar province made up of ASC members is coming along quite well.
If the US could help to foster a Salvation Council in Baghdad it would be great. But, in Diyala and Baghdad I see a tougher going then Anbar building the type of Salvation Council we see in Anbar.
Posted by ECH at April 30, 2007 6:51 PM ET:
I was just thinking, given the success of the Anbar Salvation Council, perhaps it is best to increase our weapons and support to the ASC and at the same time move several of the battalions we added to Anbar and that we were going to add to Anbar to Diyala.
The Anbar Salvation Council has alot of dirty work to do and I think weapons, equipment and air support is what they need not significant US troops as backup.
Posted by Neo-andertal at April 30, 2007 10:08 PM ET:
ECH,
"I was just thinking, given the success of the Anbar Salvation Council, perhaps it is best to increase our weapons and support to the ASC and at the same time move several of the battalions we added to Anbar and that we were going to add to Anbar to Diyala."
I think your getting a little ahead of things there. Al Quada in Iraq very much wants to destroy ASC. Both the leaders and their population need active support not only to stay alive but to keep things rolling. That means keeping both IA and US support alongside them. Another priority would is to make some adjustments so that IA and ASC units can work effectively with each other. In some cases the ASC folks don't want us around. Having either IA or US units can be either cumbersome or disruptive in some cases. In other cases they need the extra firepower. I know there are specific efforts to integrate more Sunni's into IA units. Maybe we could get DJ to give us another run down sometime on efforts to integrate Sunni's into IA units within Sunni dominated areas.
There are indications that ASC units are spreading their operating areas into adjacent areas,mainly Northern Babil province. I'm not sure if this is just incursions into North West Babil province or something much bigger. I don't know whether this has anything to do with our recent increased activities against AQI in Northern Babil province either. I'm a little fuzzy on my knowledge of the tribes but I think the Anbar tribes are closely associated with Sunni tribes in Northern Babil. That also might be true to an extent of the poorer Sunni's from the Dora suburb. The Sunni's along the Tigris are more closely associated with Iraq's ruling class. This includes Adhamiyh to some extent. We will have to see if the ASC translates well into that area. Once you get into more urban and developed regions that tribal affiliations often don't mean much. We will have to watch how things develop I'm betting that ASC activity will spread to south and west of Baghdad, if it hasn't already.
Posted by ECH at April 30, 2007 10:28 PM ET:
Neo-andertal,
Certainly the ASC is spreading out and it will continue doing so.
The problem as Bill makes clear is Diyala. We need to come down hard on Diyala like a hammer. US forces in Diyala have basically had to resume major combat operations there with heavy bombings even using B-1B Lancers. But, I believe strongly we need more ground pounders there as well as does Bill.
"Colonel Sutherland's brigade has really adopted a muscular approach to counterinsurgency up there. And since when we left, it appears that they have almost resumed major combat operations. "
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june07/diyala_04-24.html
al-Qaeda must be driven out of Diyala and we have very very little time to spare.
Posted by Army Mom Joy at April 30, 2007 11:05 PM ET:
I love these reports. I know where 4BCT-2ID is because that is where my son is at and he has written. Please keep these coming. I mean how much should we say? Maybe you don't say for a reason. I don't want to give help to our enemy... Should I worry about this? No answer expected. Just wondering out loud. I know how busy you are. Thank you for this website. Between you and blackfive I only read MSNBC and Foxnews for recipes and E.D. Hill. This is where to get the real news. Ian and are grateful for your site.
Posted by ECH at May 1, 2007 12:44 AM ET:
Neo-andertal,
If it were up to me I would go all out letting the Anbar Salvation Council create its own National Guard/militia to protect the Sunnis as the Kurds have in the North with the Peshmerga.
The Sunnis know we will be leaving in the next two years and are incredibly afraid of being shut out of the new Iraq in every way including by having Medhi Army militiamen kill them and their families.
The trick is to get the Sunnis to see the Anbar Salvation Council as the Sunni armed force that will protect them and their interests not the insurgents.
As long as Sunnis rightly believe that Sunni military force is the only thing protecting their interests from being totally ignored by Sadr and Hakim then they are going to want an armed force. The key is to replace the insurgency with the Salvation Council in the minds of Sunnis as the protectors of their interests.
I know the Pentagon is paranoid about having another militia in Iraq and the Iraqi government certainly doesn't want a Sunni militia. But, militias in the right hands are not a bad thing as we see with the Kurds. If I were a Sunni I wouldn't trust Sadr, Hakim, or the rest of the Shia leadership to not kill me when the US leaves either.
Posted by Neo-andertal at May 1, 2007 1:27 AM ET:
Quote from the PBS interview,
"PHILLIP CARTER: Well, it looks like this is the unintended consequence of the surge. That is, you squeeze the bad guys out of Baghdad, and they pop like a water balloon up into the Diyala province, which borders Baghdad."
"unintended consequence" excuse me! That would make him the only person that didn't know exactly where the insurgents were going. I'm more inclined to think our Captain isn't so ignorant but just fed the PBS folks the flavor of cheese they wanted. Careful about the sound bites Mr. former Captain!
The insurgent buildup in Diyala and its' significance to Baghdad has been a hot topic of discussion here since last November at the least. What really gives me heartburn on this is the fact that the main part the current operation began only in February and spread out into the suburbs in March and April. Give it some time folks.
Posted by Neo at May 1, 2007 1:29 AM ET:
The PBS interview I refer to was ECH's link above.
Posted by Neo-andertal at May 1, 2007 1:58 AM ET:
ECH,
"If it were up to me I would go all out letting the Anbar Salvation Council create its own National Guard/militia to protect the Sunnis as the Kurds have in the North with the Peshmerga."
I don't totally disagree with you on that. In the short term in their own and adjacent areas they will be the home guard and a political power in their own right. But the political situation is more complicated. They will eventually need to join up with other Sunni's from places like Mosul and perhaps tap into one of the already existing political blocks. This will no doubt cause a shift within the Sunni power block. Than they have to figure out how they fit into the larger scheme of things.
On an altogether different level it is important to get Sunni dominated units readied to police areas where the continued use of Shiite dominated IA units is problematical. These ethnic units eventually need to be interconnected so that the IA becomes more of a truly national institution. That is further down the road but the pieces are in the works.
The ASC situation is a political ground fire that's speeding along a lot faster than anyone ever predicted. It's hard to predict that sort of thing. The first battle of Fallujah was very much like that. This time the other side is getting burned.
Posted by David M at May 1, 2007 11:14 AM ET:
Trackbacked by The Thunder Run - Web Reconnaissance for 05/01/2007
A short recon of what's out there that might draw your attention.
Posted by DJ Elliott at May 2, 2007 8:53 AM ET:
MNF-I finally announced the 4th (Stealth) Stryker Brigade Combat Team/2nd (Invisible) Infantry Division arriving.
Notice how vague they are...
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11725&Itemid=128
Best OPSEC outside of SOF that I have seen in last two years for a US unit.