The Long War Journal: The Baghdad Security Operation Order of Battle: April 30, 2007

Written by Bill Roggio on April 30, 2007 3:07 PM to The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/the_baghdad_security_5.php

The city of Baghdad continues to see a drop in sectarian violence attributed to death squads, while suicide car bombings remain al Qaeda's most deadly tool. After prior week's car bomb offensive by al Qaeda, which included 11 major suicide attacks over five days, the past week inside the city has been relatively free of major attacks. While roadside bombs, mortar attacks and other small scale attacks remain a regular occurrence inside Baghdad, al Qaeda was unable to pull off any large scale attacks which threaten to reignite the sectarian bloodshed.

Part of the success of the Anbar Salvation Council is that it provides the Sunnis in Anbar with a political voice as well as security against al Qaeda. The Anbar Salvation Council's political component is the Anbar Awakening. Seven new tribes have just joined the political party. The Awakening is now expanding beyond Anbar province, and is becoming a national movement. The Anbar Awakening is facilitating the creation of the Iraq Awakening, a national political party which would "oppose insurgents such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and reengage with Iraq's political process." The Iraq Awakening is scheduled to meet in May, and will be the first Sunni political party to openly oppose al Qaeda in Iraq.

Sensing that the Awakening movement was gaining steam in Iraq--branches are said to be forming in Salahadin and Diyala--I asked Omar Fadhil, and Iraqi blogger living in Baghdad, about the perception of the movement inside Baghdad and prospects of the Awakening expanding into the capital. Omar responded that the tribal dynamics were different, and that it was difficult to draw conclusions about Baghdad based on trends in Ramadi.

The following day, Omar noted a report in As Sabah on the creation of the Adhamiya Awakening. "Some community leaders in Adhamiya are working on forming a salvation council for their own district they will be calling The Adhamiya Awakening," reported Omar. "Sources close to the leaders said they [the leaders] have managed to win the support of some hundred people who agree with the new position. The sources asserted that the goal of the Awakening is to rid Adhamiya of the terrorists."

During last week's Pentagon press briefing, General Petraeus stated that al Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat to security, but also highlighted Iran's role in the insurgency. General Petraeus noted that the Iranians were backing Sunni and Shia groups alike, but focused on two examples of Iranian backing of Shia violence--the Karbala raid in January 2007 and the capture of major players in the Sheibani group.

General Petraeus outlined Iranian Qods Force's involvement with the February 20 attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, which led to the aborted kidnapping and subsequent murder of five U.S. soldiers. Qods Force armed, trained, and advised the Qazili network, which carried out the attack. U.S. forces detained several senior leaders of the Qazili network, and captured a "22-page memorandum on a computer that detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala," said Gen. Petraeus.

Petraeus also discussed the Sheibani network, "which brings explosively formed projectiles into Iraq from Iran," as well as other deadly weapons from Iran. A senior leader of the network was detained by U.S. forces. An American military intelligence official informs us the Sheibani network is one of Qods Force's foreign networks in Iraq, just as Hezbollah is an Iranian arm in Lebanon.

This latest news of Iranian complicity in the Shia insurgency came as the U.S. announced the capture of Abn Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi, a senior al Qaeda operative responsible for coordinating al Qaeda's networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. Abd Al-Hadi was captured crossing the border from Iran into Iraq. He was a major in Saddam's Army, ran al Qaeda training camps, was a military commander in Pakistan and Afghanistan, set up Zarqawi's network in Iraq along with Saif al Adel, who was in Iranian custody at the time, and served on al Qaeda's senior military and political shura, or councils. Abd Al-Hadi was reported to have been captured sometime late in 2006.

U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces have been pressing hard against al Qaeda's network nationwide. A single raid against a "constellation" of targets over the weekend resulted in the capture of 72 al Qaeda operatives. Coalition forces killed Abu Abd al-Satter, a senior al Qaeda leader during a raid northwest of Baghdad on April 20. Satter is described as "a known al Qaeda terrorist leader known to operate in Karmah and Ameriyah areas and was the al Qaeda in Iraq Security Emir of the eastern Anbar Province." Satter's car bomb cell "used 12- to 13-year-old children as VBIED drivers" to conduct its attacks.

Multinational Forces Iraq still has two infantry brigades to deploy in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. Three have already deployed, and the fourth, the 4th Special Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (Strykers) was reported to have entered Iraq in mid April, however there has been a reporting blackout on any information on the brigade.

General Petraeus and the Iraqi government have made some positive moves in the ten weeks since the kickoff of the Baghdad security Plan. However, he cautions it is still too soon to draw definitive conclusions. The proper time to make a preliminary assessment will be in September. But, increasingly, the war is being fought in the halls Congress. Senior politicians have declared the war lost, and the delay in the supplemental funding bill is preventing the training of the Iraqi Army. It would behoove the Bush administration and the Department of Defense to speed up the deployment of the remaining U.S. combat brigades into Iraq to smash al Qaeda's sanctuary in Diyala but a lack of political support at home is likely to hamper any such effort.