(5)CTC and The Militant Ideology Atlas
The Combating Terrorism Center report on jihadi intellectuals and a strategy to fight them; media reports of bin Laden and Zawahiri "losing influence" misinterpretted the findings
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| Jihadi circles of influence. Click image to view. |
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has released a study "of the Jihadi Movement's top thinkers and their most popular writings." Titled The Militant Ideology Atlas, the report provides a look at the writings and a brief profile of each of Jihadist movement's top ideological leaders, as well as information on who is citing who.
In the executive summary of The Militant Ideology Atlas, recommendations are made on how to fight the radical Islamist ideology. The authors identify the layers of the Sunni "jihadi constituents," with Muslims on the outer ring, then Islamists, Salafist and then the Jihadis on the inner ring.
The report recommends a renaming of the jihadist movement, influencing and promoting statements made by Salafists and Jihadist that oppose terrorists' actions and tactics, and explain the implications of what happens if the Jihadists come into power. For example, Abd al-`Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu` "famously argues for the legitimacy of killing women, children and the elderly in the course of jihad." This is a common theme in jihadi literature and should be made known to mainstream Muslims.
The first item is interesting, as the CTC notes that the term "jihadi" (like muhajideen) is actually a badge of honor to the terrorists, like calling an American soldier a patriot. The CTC recommends calling them Qutbists, after Sayyid Qutb, the most influential of the ideologues. This would 'humanize' their identity (something they abhor) instead of connecting their actions to the mainstream concept of jihad.
The report notes that "Since Western governments lack credibility in the Muslim world, they should pursue these efforts indirectly" (page 283.) This means that non-Muslims are not suited to make Islamic arguments to convince the Muslim world as a whole. The West must quietly foster elements within the Muslim world to fight radical Islam. This war has always been a war within Islam.
Unfortunately, the report was misinterpreted by some mainstream news outlets. The New York Times ran a headline stating "Qaeda Leaders Losing Sway Over Militants, Study Finds", as the report noted that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are not cited that often by the jihadi intellectuals. This theme was repeated by Reuters. The CTC devoted one paragraph to this subject, in its 23 page executive summary and 383 page analysis:
Not surprisingly, Bin Ladin makes our list of influential ideologues (see Appendix II: Most Cited Authors), although he matters much less in the intellectual network than Maqdisi and others (see Appendix I: Ideological Influence Map). His lieutenant, Zawahiri, often portrayed by Western media as the main brain in the Jihadi Movement, is totally insignificant in the Jihadi intellectual universe. To be sure, both men have had an enormous impact on the wider Jihadi Movement, but our data shows that they have had little to no impact on Jihadi thinkers. (Page 10, executive summary)
This does not mean bin Laden and Zawahiri are 'losing influence" or declining in stature in al Qaeda. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the political and military leaders of al Qaeda, who are on the front lines of jihad. They are reverently referred to as the Shiekh and the Doctor. New recruits and commanders in al Qaeda swear bayat (an oath of loyalty) to them, and not to Qutb, Tantari or Maqdisi. Bin Laden and Zawahiri plot and approve strategy, rally the rank and file, produce propaganda tapes, raise money and are the face of jihad. The ideologues provide the religious and moral underpinnings for al Qaeda to exist and thrive.
Just as western military strategists would likely site Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, NiccolΓ² Machiavelli, John Boyd or a host of contemporaries, so to do the Islamist thinkers cite their ideological predecessors. That Osama and Zawahiri are not often cited does not mean they are losing influence or being sidelined from the movement
This report does highlight our lack of a strategic communications and our failure to target ideological leaders. Some of these jihadi theorists, such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi and Abu Qatada operate openly in England.
Resources:
Executive Report, Militant Ideology Atlas [PDF format]
Research Compendium, Militant Ideology Atlas [PDF format]
READER COMMENTS: "CTC and The Militant Ideology Atlas"
Posted by thanos at November 19, 2006 11:18 AM ET:
Thanks for the post and the link to the report. I think it's important to shut down the intellectuals in the longer term. However like you I don't think Bin Laden or Zawahiri are less influential, they are the tactical frontline leadership along with Mullah Omar.
I'll read this in detail a bit later.
Posted by Anand at November 19, 2006 1:25 PM ET:
Bill, excellent report. How many senior US gov't officials understand all of this . . . even if they do not act upon it? Are there departments that get it more than others (Pentagon civilians, military officers, NSC, CIA, State, White House staff, Congress, or subsets within these larger groups)?
Do some of our GIs in Iraq get it more than others? How much do officials in other governments understand this?
Thanks,
Posted by Kevin at November 19, 2006 3:58 PM ET:
Bill, thank you for the best summary of the CTC data yet. My .02: you have to reach back to the Civil War to understand bin Laden's place in the scheme of things. He's a modern John Brown and, like JB, neither a great intellectual nor a great general, but a reflection of the zeitgeist of a telling part of Islam -- our "Spirit of Christmas Present."
Posted by Kevin at November 19, 2006 3:58 PM ET:
Bill, thank you for the best summary of the CTC data yet. My .02: you have to reach back to the Civil War to understand bin Laden's place in the scheme of things. He's a modern John Brown and, like JB, neither a great intellectual nor a great general, but a reflection of the zeitgeist of a telling part of Islam -- our "Spirit of Christmas Present."
Posted by dlp at November 22, 2006 2:35 AM ET:
Thanks Bill for posting this. It is a great piece of work in some ways. The extensive catalog of influential writers and thinkers in the Jihadi movement is surely a valuable tool against Jihadist terror. But the problem is how it is interpreted and used. I have a number of criticisms which in my view need to be taken seriously by the intelligence and political communities:
For a start, the nested diagram of "Jihadi Constituencies" is perhaps misleading more than it is useful. Salafists are sunnis, and not all Jihadists are sunnis. Following Walid Phares in Future Jihad, there three kinds of Jihadists and these are 1) Salafists (Wahhabists) 2) Associates of the Muslim Brotherhood and 3) Khomeinists (shia). Despite its appealing aesthetic this diagram oversimplifies the enemy.
More seriously, in relation to the conclusions in the Executive Report:
1. Labelling Jihadists as "Qutbists" obscures the relation of the perpetrators of Islamic terrorism to the concept of jihad, and its historical implementation in the fatah (Islamic conquests). Qutb may have exerted considerable influence over modern day Jihadists, as Paul Berman has documented in the Philosopher of Terror. But Qutb is not the root cause of Jihadist ideology. The root lies within Islam itself, in the Quran, hadiths and sunna, as Robert Spencer and Hugh Fitzgerald painstakingly point out on a daily basis at Jihad Watch. Sure, Jihadists might get irked by being called Qutbists, but irking them is not a substitute for accuracy, nor a reliable strategy. The supposed benefit of labelling them as part of "a deviant sect" is precisely the problem, when the question is begged as to the root cause of the ideology. Labelling in this way would actually work against us.
2. The suggestion to "highlight statements by influential Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia that denouncing Jihadi terrorism" sounds commendable but this pays no attention whatsoever the reality. Is there a list of denouncements by 'influential' Saudi clerics? Saudi Arabia has funded a massive infiltration of American and European universities and other public institutions of vehemently anti-American and anti-Semitic Islam. Where are such denouncements going to be heard and taken note from? More than this, we need a comprehensive communications strategy as one component of a long term counterterrorism plan, integrating policy directions on immigration and education amongst other things.
3. The notion of convincing Jihadi intellectuals to "renounce certain targets and tactics" makes a mockery of an approach to counter Jihad. Renouncing suicide bombing as a tactic, for example, does not alter the long term Jihadi game plan of setting up a global caliphate. This confusion as to the long term thinking of Islamists, Salafists and Jihadists in the report arises again on page 6 where these supposedly different groups are described. Saying that Islamists want "cultural identity in a state" overplays the importance of statehood in Islam and underplays the function of states as stepping stones to establishing a greater state, the caliphate. In Islam the religion and state are one. A cursory read of Islamic history from a trusted scholar, such as Andrew Bostom, will suffice to realise this.
4. Focusing on the "divisive issues" ( such as tactics and targets) to "delegitimize violence" treats Jihadi terrorism as a criminal issue and not one of ideologically-based warfare. The problem is not about 'violence' and 'deviation' from a religion. It is an irony that many of the writers and thinkers examined in this report sanction Islamic violence and reference the Quran, hadiths and the sunna. Why didn't the report analyse the citations of the Quran? Then it might have produced a very different message: that violence is just part of an ideologically-driven war upon the infidel, the non-believers, and that there is a genuine issue within Islam to reform or take sides in a war we haven't seen anything of yet.
5. The messages presented here are abstracted from any thought-through plan of action or strategy. Who is to deliver these messages and to whom? Even so, a dangerous misunderstanding of Islam embedded in the thinking that Jihadis are giving Islam a "bad reputation". This also begs the question as to the source of Jihadi ideology.
6. "Remind people of what what happens when Jihadis come to power." Who needs reminding? Commercials and documentaries are a great idea, and especially when the dominant stream of thinking in the academia and media are sympathetic to Islamic 'victims' of American hegemony and Israeli oppression, when Islam is constantly touted as a 'religion of peace' despite the theological and historical evidence to the contrary.
The final word about "moderate" Muslims is farcical. The concession that "if by the definition of 'moderate' one means an acceptance of secularism, capitalism, democracy, gender equality, and a commitment to religious pluralism, then Salafis would be extremist on all counts" belies the extent of dhimmitude inherent in the research team's fundamental assumptions. Of course this is what we mean by moderate. What's the alternative? 'Moderate' Muslims who will not accept other religions? Hardly. The report admits the lack of Muslim religious leaders that are moderate by this definition, but then claims that until there are many moderate leadesr we should aim to alienate "JIhadis from the broader Salafi movement". This totally misunderstands the extent to which Islam ideologically tolerates other religions: there aren't going to be "many" "moderates" any time soon. And it totally misconstrues the importance of abating the violence with tackling a violent ideology rooted deep within Islam itlsef. Whilst this report provides us with a valuable tool for understanding Jihadi thinking, we need to A) continue this research with a thorough grounding in the Islamic nature of JIhadi violence (as opposed to its mere 'Qutbist' nature), B) expand research into the links between what the Jihadi thinkers are saying and what is in the Quran and other Islamic texts (hadith and sunna), C) devise a proper communications strategy within which key messages are disseminated within the media and academia to rectify our mistaken notions of Islam and win so-called moderates over in a campaign to reform Islam for the modern age. Either this, or it is all out war.