Iraqi Army, Sadr's Mahdi Army Battle in Amara
Sadr's Mahdi Army must be reined in
Sadr's Mahdi Army attacked Iraqi police in Amara "after police arrested a member of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia on suspicion of killing a local intelligence officer in a bomb attack," reports AFP. The Associate Press claims the city is fully under the control of the Mahdi Army of "800 black-clad militiamen with Kalashnikovs." This has not been confirmed by the Iraqi government. {Note: the report is updated to state "The Shiite militia run by the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr briefly seized control of the southern Iraqi city... The militiamen later withdrew from the streets after Iraqi soldiers and mediators arrived...}
Reuters states "gunmen with RPGs and AK47s attacked several police stations... The Iraqi Army deployed two companies (around 230 troops) to help defend the police station and British forces provided air surveillance." British forces are on alert to move into the city if needed. The attackers were described as "rogue elements of militias," by a British Army spokesman.
"There are 15 dead, ten of them gunmen, and 90 wounded, including militia, police and civilians. The fighting is continuing," according to Zamil al-Oreibi, Amara's medical director. Five Iraqi police have been wounded. The bulk of the fighting is occurring around the police stations and the Sadr's office.
Sadr apologists have repeatedly claimed that elements of his Mahdi Army have begun to operate outside of his control, however Sadr has done nothing to rein in these "rogue elements," except making vague statements about halting the sectarian violence. He has not identified these out of control militias, closed offices or denounced them specifically. Sadr is playing a double game of maintaining his militia against the law while pretending to be a responsible member of government.
The fighting in Amara follows the arrest of Sheikh Mazen Al Saedi, the leader of Sadr's offices the Baghdad neighborhood of Karkh. U.S. forces detained Saedi after he was implicated in organizing death squads and car bomb cells. Sadr demanded his release and organized a protest in Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki demanded the U.S. release Saedi, which they did. The military was infuriated by this appeasement of Sadr.
Iraq and U.S. forces have been battling Sadr's Mahdi Army openly since the spring when the Mahdi Army began a campaign of sectarian violence following the destruction of the dome of the golden mosque in Samara. There have been major clashes in Baghdad and Diwaniyah, where Sadr's forces suffered heavy losses. These tactical victories have not been exploited, as Sadr remains in power and his militias still roam the streets of Baghdad and southern Iraq.
Maliki is in a tough spot as Sadr is a large block in the ruling coalition. Maliki depends on Sadr to maintain his position as prime minister. But the risk is the sectarian violence will reach the point of no return, and Maliki will either be removed from government or Iraq will descend into a full scale civil war.
Sadr cannot be left to controlling the Mahdi Army and remain in government without risking the disintegration of the Iraqi state. His escalation of the sectarian violence has put Maliki's national reconciliation program on hold, and increases the chance of groups sitting on the fence (such as the Islamic Army in Iraq and the 1920s Revolution Brigades) to turn towards al Qaeda.
The U.S. and Iraqi Army can dismantle Sadr's Mahdi Army by force, but it will come at a great cost in lives. The U.S. midterm elections are but weeks away, and there will not be any major moves against Sadr until after the election. Expect the U.S. to ratchet up the pressure on Maliki to make the necessary moves, both politically and militarily, to put down Sadr's third uprising. The Iraqi government must demonstrate it has a monopoly on force, or cease to be a legitimate entity.



