It happens that the Defense Department is interested in the question of "measuring" victory, as reported recently in the Weekly Standard. They have developed several metrics -- "measures of effectiveness," or MOE in the military jargon -- that can apply. The question of Iraq has to be judged in the context of the global campaign's effect on ideology:

* Terrorist attacks that take place on U.S. territory show a continuous decline.

* The number of states in the Arab and Islamic worlds with representative or inclusive governments that oppose terrorism is increasing.

* Roughly 90 percent of Islamic clergy are preaching against terrorism.

* The majority of Arab language media are editorializing against the use of terrorism and giving negative reportage to acts of terrorism.

* Polling index of Arab/Muslim opinion polls are increasingly favorable.

* Groups previously identified as terrorists but have chosen to adopt non-violent means are increasing.

These trends are not limited to the Arab world, but are taking place in Islam's other center of gravity as well -- Southeast Asia. Just as the Arab world is the center of Islam's imagination and history, Southeast Asia is the center of its largest population. Although Indonesia lost one of its leading moderates today to liver and kidney failure, the trends are positive in that country.

All of this argues from a position that is usually rejected at the start by anti-war activists. "Fine to talk about Asia," they will say, "but I want to hear how you mean to win in Iraq." The transformative effect of Iraq and Afghanistan on the rest of the world is, of course, entirely the point; refusing to allow that into the debate is to disallow the most powerful arguments in favor.

Nevertheless, there is some sense to the objection: winning in Iraq is a necessary condition. How, then, can we measure victory?

Well, first, what is the way to victory? Once we have established its direction, we can look for some landmarks to judge our progress. So, let's look back a bit to see what is behind us, and then we can see if we are proceeding in the right direction.

Back in 2003, I wrote that we would be able to succeed by engaging the heroic tribal culture in Iraq.

Islam is not, as it has become fashionable to call it, a religion of peace. Islam is a heroic epic. The core ideal of Islam is that the Muslim is joined in a great war to bring the whole world under the peace of rule, not according to fallible human rules, but according to the revealed design of God. That is an epic struggle, and the Muslim is encouraged to think of himself as a mujahid, one of the holy warriors in the fight.

It happens that this fits perfectly with tribal culture. The philosophy of the tribe is informal--that is, it is the natural philosophy of mankind. The bonds of family are to be defended; the power of the family, extended. Peace can finally be had only by destroying those outside the family, or by bringing them within the family. This is the mujahedeen's ethic. It is the ethic of jihad. This is why the tribal parts of the Islamic world have been a strong recruiting ground--Baluchistan, for example, and the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan.

It is also why Islamism is appealing to those radical young Muslims who have been educated in the West. In the Western philosophy, they see an abandonment of this older, traditional ethic, this natural ethic which feels so very right because it comes from our evolved nature. That is a core problem that needs to be fixed if we are to achieve a lasting peace.

In traditional cultures, such bonds stand for all types of relationships. A merchant has a family relationship with his clients that is either like father and son, brothers, or uncle and nephew. These are the terms on which they naturally relate. A tribal ally is greeted as a brother or, if they are far more powerful, a father. In this, al Qaeda would seem to have an advantage -- unlike us, they could operate by declaring themselves to be "brother Arabs," or "brother Sunnis."

Victory is possible when and if al Qaeda's claim to a family bond fails. At that point, the tribal component will not be honor-bound to support the insurgency. If they are not family, they are enemy.

What kind of activity can break that bond? There are only two types.

1) Activity on the Coalition's part that makes the tribes feel a stronger family bond to us than to al Qaeda.

2) Activity on al Qaeda's part that will be interpreted as kinslaying.

The first type of activity is what I was advocating in that post: a reinvigoration of the heroic epic code of the West.

Consider also hospitality, another heroic duty. What does it mean that there are many areas of tribal Iraq where Americans only travel in heavily armed convoys? CENTCOM ought to be arranging dinners with tribal chiefs. Go and take dinner with the chief of a tribe, in his home. Take your bodyguards as far as his door, but not into his house. Eat his food, and share his water. Then, make it a point to push this behavior down the chain: so that soldiers regularly accept invitations to dine, trusting in their hosts to protect them, and so that tribal figures are regularly asked to dine with Americans in our tents. Do this, and their honor will be concerned with protecting you. Hospitality will fight the war for you: their honor will demand it....

The heroic ethic will take us forward to victory, in Iraq as elsewhere. It is the best kind of victory--not the one that destroys our opponents, but the one that brings us all within a family. Just as Saladin sent his personal physicians to treat Richard the Lionheart, as he had come to respect and love that man's courage and chivalry, so can we today win the hearts of our enemies. It is time to make right the opportunity missed between Saladin and Richard, who almost concluded a marriage pact that would have joined Islam and Christendom in friendship.

It was only between warriors that such a peace could be made. It is only between warriors that it can be made today.

There, then, is something we can measure. Is there evidence of tribal, family bonds being formed between the Coalition forces and the tribes in Iraq?

There is, at the operational level. Here is a post about Captain Leggett, USMC, who was given the title of "Sheikh" along with a tribal headdress. Army Staff Sergeant Dale Horn was elected shiekh in his area of operations, and given land and sheep to make it legal. The embrace of hospitality and tribal relationships is also discussed here and here. There is also the example of Colonel Kurilla, brought to us ably by Michael Yon. Kurilla represents the engaged commander: drinking tea in the homes of the people on his watch, working hand in hand with the nascent police and security forces, and showing the best of the Western Heroic Ethic in the streets.

It seems that the soldiers and officers in the field have developed an understanding of the concept. Among the Marines I know in Iraq, there is a certain "natural philosophy" at work too -- some rant about the "Hajiis," but by that they mean the enemy. When one of their native translators or other Iraqi friends is hurt, they are every bit as outraged as when they lose Marines.

I think that the movement at the ground level is in the right direction, then. It could be better at the strategic level, as those officers more removed from the field seem not to understand the issue as well as they should. That is a personal impression, but I think it is borne out -- when was the last time you heard a senior general talking about establishing relationships with the tribes? When did you last hear them recognize the importance of gift-giving, to raise another traditional part of the heroic ethic? The sheiks gave our Sergeant herd animals and land to honor him and make him one of them. We are building schools and roads and waterways -- but what are we naming them? Are we having the sheiks to the ribbon cuttings, and calling the things after their families? Invoking their honor in the rebuilding project obligies them to protect it.

That, at least, is one metric: the establishment of relationships. The second one is whether al Qaeda is engaged in kinslaying behavior, which repudiate existing family relationships. Again, I think we are seeing that.

Bill's post of this week is one of several he's made which underline this evidence. Two others are here and here.

What does victory in Iraq mean? It means developing these relationships while allowing al Qaeda to undermine its own. Its strategy of bombing civilians as a primary means of warfighting makes kinslaying inevitable. Our strategic-level thinkers need to focus on recognizing and exploiting the diplomatic opportunities created by these acts.

"Diplomacy" here cannot be the diplomacy as we normally think of it: the diplomacy of suits and ties, the diplomacy of the United Nations. It must be the diplomacy of warriors, going fearlessly to take coffee with men they regard as enemies but hope to come to regard as brothers. They are the only ones who will understand the culture they are interacting with, because they are the ones closest to it.

These are not "traditional" military objectives, it is true. They are traditional in the more usual sense of the word. They require seeing things through the lense of the natural, tribal philosophy of men: the philosophy of the Iliad, the philosophy of the Beowulf.

Our men on the ground think like warriors and heroes because they are warriors and heroes. It will be harder for our journalists and politicians to think that way. Yet if they can, they will see that the situation in Iraq is both different from, and more interesting than, the picture they have painted in their minds.

Seeing it that way allows it to be more readily seen also as a part of the larger battle. It explains why the Coalition's purpose in Iraq can win victories in Indonesia and Australia. It is important to be able to see the war in this way because that is how it is seen to the people over whom we are fighting: not only to our Marines and al Qaeda's militants, but to the tribal youth and the Muslim who may be recruited to one side or the other.

Both have a worldview that is essentially epic, and they will see these struggles in those terms. If you can't see it that way yourself, you will not understand where the fight is, or who is winning it. If you can, you can see that the war in Iraq is a string on a great lyre that, when plucked, will echo through the world. This will be true whether the note is pure or whether it is sour. If it is pure, it will speed the needful changes in how America is viewed throughout the Islamic world. If it is sour, it will strengthen our enemy's cause.

Victory means doing right in Iraq -- standing fast, seeking out ways to embrace the tribes and tie them to democratic Iraq with webs of honor and hospitality, shared victories and gifts. If we do that, we will win. In winning, we shall come to be understood by the Islamic tribes as an honorable and fearless people, a tribe of warriors and true men. In coming to be seen that way, we shall find the peace that comes from being seen that way: the peace of the strong horse, the man no one wishes to trouble.