The Long War Journal: Finding the Exit

Written by Bill Roggio on March 26, 2005 9:44 AM to The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/03/finding_the_exi.php

Critics of the Iraq war have derided the Bush Administration for failing to have a coveted "Exit Strategy" to disengage. The answer has always been that we will disengage from Iraq when the Iraqis form a stable government and are ready to provide for their own security (note: disengagement does not exclude basing/garrisoning of troops, but actively fighting the insurgency). In two posts, Importance of the Election 101 and Importance of the Election 201, we discussed how the January 30th election would drive a wedge between the native Iraqi fighters and the more radical foreign and homegrown Islamist terrorists. Today's Financial Times provides further evidence that the election has in fact accomplished this goal. It seems the a good percentage of the fighters in Iraq are the ones looking for the exit (tip 'o the hat to Instapundit):

Iraq's insurgents ‘seek exit strategy

Many of Iraq's predominantly Sunni Arab insurgents would lay down their arms and join the political process in exchange for guarantees of their safety and that of their co-religionists, according to a prominent Sunni politician.

Sharif Ali Bin al-Hussein, who heads Iraq's main monarchist movement and is in contact with guerrilla leaders, said many insurgents including former officials of the ruling Ba'ath party, army officers, and Islamists have been searching for a way to end their campaign against US troops and Iraqi government forces since the January 30 election.

“Firstly, they want to ensure their own security,” says Sharif Ali, who last week hosted a pan-Sunni conference attended by tribal sheikhs and other local leaders speaking on behalf of the insurgents.
Insurgent leaders fear coming out into the open to talk for fear of being targeted by US military or Iraqi Security Forces' raids, he said.

Sharif Ali distinguishes many Sunni insurgents, whom he says took up arms in reaction to the invasive raids in search of Ba'athist leaders and other “humiliations” soon after the 2003 war, from the radical jihadist branch associated with Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Unlike Mr Zarqawi's followers, who are thought to be responsible for the big suicide bomb attacks on Iraqi civilian targets, the other Sunni insurgents are more likely to plant bombs and carry out ambushes against security forces and US troops active near their homes.

Sharif Ali said the success of Iraq's elections dealt the insurgents a demoralising blow, prompting them to consider the need to enter the political process.

Note how Sharif Ali distances himself from the likes of Zarqawi. All week we have discussed the progress in Iraq, which is becoming more and more difficult to ignore. We must also put this success into the context of the greater war as well. If the insurgency can be split, al Qaeda in Iraq suddenly has an infinitely more difficult task to try and maintain basing, supply, logistics, recruiting, safe houses and operational support. No doubt elements of the organization would have to be fingered in exchange for amnesty by the Iraqi government.

If al Qaeda cannot rally the obvious anti-American elements of the Iraqi population to continue the fight, the insurgency is effectively dead and all al Qaeda can do is to continue to dispense indiscriminate violence and poison the Iraqi population against it. Like Afghanistan, this would be a monumental defeat for al Qaeda, further demonstrating their political, military and ideological ineptness to the Arab Street.