The Long War Journal: al-Tiananmen Square?

Written by Bill Roggio on March 8, 2005 1:32 AM to The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/03/altiananmen_squ.php

THE WORD UNHEARD follows up on yesterday's post, Siding with Syria, with a few questions on the motivations of Hezbollah backing the Syrian occupation. Will the modern Arabic version of Tiananmen Square ensue?

[T]he question that begs to be answered is: Was there really any choice Hizballah was seriously considering? Any serious debate within the leadership of Hizballah is hard to imagine, as their fortunes have been tightly bound to the tacit support from and for both Syria and Iran.

Taking this into account, Hizballah's public call for 'peaceful' demonstrations to counter the democracy- and independence-seeking opposition rallies heightens the fears (at least from this observer) that they will not be peaceful counter-demonstrations at all. Of course they publicly call for peaceful demonstrations, but one would be prudent to speculate that privately, the goons are being gathered.

Could the 24/7 unarmed pro-independence demonstrations be facing a Tiananmen Square-like crushing at the hands of armed Hizballah terrorists?

THE WORD UNHEARD speculates that any unrest would bolster Syria's claims on Lebanon, and act as an excuse to continue the occupation to maintain order.

If this all proves to be, the Hizballah aim is surely to be able to allow Syria & Baby Assad to say, "See? If we pull out now, it will be chaos and civil war all over again. We just can't abandon the people of Lebanon like that.

The scenario is sound from the perspective of Syria. "Baby Assad" has been known to repeatedly miscalculate on the international stage, and misjudge American reactions numerous times; it is not implausible to think he could do so again. And Assad would have no compunctions about the destruction of Hezbollah if it preserved Syria's position in Lebanon.

From the perspective of Hezbollah, Nasrallah likely sees few options other than supporting Assad's gambits. The loss of Lebanon as a base of operations would mean complete enslavement to Syria, as Hezbollah's unique position in Lebanon gives it some freedom of actions. Hezbollah's ability to attack Israel via Lebanon would be degraded, removing a major source of its popularity and international funding.

The Unfrozen Caveman Linguist looks at Nasrallah's motivations for backing Syria and staging a counter-protest. Peaceful demonstrations are not Hezbollah's bailiwick, and no matter what the motivations for demonstrating – peaceful or not – the protest can spin out of control. The result would be a loss of local and international support for Hezbollah.

But why the risk? Undoubtedly, a pro-Syria mob chanting anti-Israel and anti-America slogans (which is usually what Hizbullah members do when they are gathered in large numbers), regardless of how disciplined, by its very nature takes on the appearance of a mob intent on doing violence to something. In this context, Nasrallah appears to be heading into territory he does not firmly control - that of the peacemaker. It remains to be seen if his followers will even understand what he was talking about Sunday when he gave his speech - assembling in large numbers, presenting their ability to influence or even to intimidate the opposition protesters just a few hundred meters away, and overall making lots and lots of noise. The temptation to provoke, if Hizbullah's Ashoura demonstrations are any indication, increases exponentially upon the presence of those who may easily be provoked - members of the Lebanese Forces party, for example. Nasrallah has created a huge challenge for himself and for his party in putting forth this demonstration to occur tomorrow. Any hint of violence on the part of his party stands to cost it some support locally, and will greatly strengthen any case made by the U.S. or France that Hizbullah's presence in Lebanon is not in anyone's best interests.

The Unfrozen Caveman Linguist continues to discuss the very difficult bind Hezbollah finds itself in. Domestication would mean certain death for the terrorist arm, while maintaining the militia ensures Hezbollah cannot fully enter the political process.

However, Nasrallah knows that Hizbullah sits in a state of political limbo at this point, and its position in Lebanon is not clear politically (for some background, see here, here, and here). Since Israel's withdrawal in 2000, it has had few occasions to create real trouble for the Israeli army, and simultaneously it has made attempts to increase its political visibility. In short, Hizbullah sits at a political crossroads, and the only way forward is to consider how to redefine itself within a Lebanese political framework. Largely, the "Lebanonization" program initiated by Hizbullah's spiritual leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, in which the party adopted as its primary mission the achievement of acceptance within mainstream Lebanese politics, is bearing fruit as we speak. At the same time, however, Hizbullah's pragmatism brings with it questions regarding its possession of weapons and whether it plans eventually to integrate itself into the Lebanese army in order to remove any other discrepancies about its status as an armed movement. Hizbullah has made its position clear on this, and paradoxically so: it will not give up its weapons, it will not join the Lebanese army, and it will continue to augment its level of political participation in the Lebanese state.

The choices facing Hezbollah were poor to begin with. Hezbollah inspired violence against the pro-freedom protestors, either intentional or not, may lead to the prolonging of the Syrian occupation, but will greatly erode its domestic and international support as well as increase the potential of a military campaign directed against it. Backing the opposition all but ensures the withdrawal of Syria, and risks relations with its sponsors, Iran and Syria. Entering the Lebanese political process would ensure its survival as a political organization but would call for the dismantlement of its terrorist wing, removing the reason for its existence – resistance to Israel and acting as the proxy of Syria and Iran. Hezbollah chose to back Syria's occupation politically and will holding "peaceful" demonstrations. This has eroded its support among the Lebanese opposition. Will Hezbollah execute another bad choice and escalate violence against the vanguard of the Cedar Revolution? We will know shortly.

Hezbollah has not made the choice that would have limited American action against it –the peaceful entry into Lebanese politics. This would have provided Hezbollah with legitimacy, making it difficult for diplomatic and military operations to be conducted against it. Hezbollah's need to maintain the military arm has opened the door for tougher action against it. Hezbollah was founded on violence and terror, it is its lifeblood, and will not give up its terror capabilities, even if it would ensure its survival.

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THE WORD UNHEARD also has a Lebanon roundup, including links to Lebanese live-blogging the protests.