The Long War Journal: The Partition Solution Illusion

Written by Bill Roggio on January 1, 2005 12:05 PM to The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/01/the_partition_s_1.php

An oft-repeated solution to the violence in Iraq is partitioning the nation along religious and ethnic lines. Partitioning Iraq would entail dividing the country into a Kurdish North, a Sunni Center and a Shiite South. Is this a viable solution to decreasing the violence in Iraq, promoting democracy in the Middle East and decreasing the threat of global terrorism? This post will look at the obstacles to partitioning Iraq and explain why this solution will not secure the major goals in the War on Terror.

Borders:

Exactly how would the borders of a Balkanized Iraq be drawn? Splitting Iraq into a Kurdish North, a Sunni Center and a Shiite South is not as easy as suggested. The population is made up of more than Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Sunni Kurds. There are Shiite Kurds, Chaldeans (Assyrian Christians), Turkomen and other minorities in Iraq to be considered as well. Iraq is not neatly split into three ethnic/religious geographic zones, with Kurds living exclusively in the north, Sunnis living in the heartland and Shiites living in the south. The populations are intermixed. Baghdad is split between Shiite and Sunnis, with various other groups making up a percentage of the population. During Saddam's rule, he implemented resettlement policies, which included repopulating traditional Kurdish and Shiite regions with Sunnis. Splitting Iraq into regions along ethnic and religious lines is easier said than done, and likely would create much friction in cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Basra and in other areas.

Oil and Natural Gas:

Oil and natural gas make up a large percentage of Iraq's revenue. According to the Department of Energy, the majority of the oil and natural gas reserves are located in either the Kurdish North or Shiite South of the country

Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Canada), concentrated overwhelmingly (80% or so) in southern Iraq…Main sources of Iraqi associated natural gas are the Kirkuk, Ain Zalah, Butma, and Bai Hassan oil fields in northern Iraq, as well as the North and South Rumaila and Zubair fields in the south.

The oil and natural gas reserves not the only considerations when discussing a division of resources. Extraction and transportations infrastructure such as pumping stations, pipelines, refineries and ocean tanker terminals must also be considered. The infrastructure was designed for use as a nation, not as three independent countries. (Click on map for larger image to see greater detail on pipelines, refineries, terminals and oil fields).

It is simple to see who would draw the short straws when it comes to natural resources. The Sunnis would not be happy with any arrangement that does not give them a significant share of the oil and gas reserves, as they are accustomed to.

The Foreign Opposition:

An independent Kurdish state would be resisted by Turkey, Syria and Iran, each of which have their own independent-minded Kurdish populations that have traditionally fought the central government for freedom. The Syrians feel threatened by their Kurdish citizens, the Iranians fought a Kurdish uprisng from 1979 to 1983, and as recently as the mid 1990s, the Turks fought a fierce insurgency against Kurdish rebels. An independent Kurdistan in the north of Iraq might give their Kurdish neighbors in Iran, Syria and Turkey a reason to push for their own autonomy and great discomfort in the host governments.

Against the Goals of the War

Not only would partitioning Iraq be a difficult proposition based on its ethnic/religious makeup, distribution of natural resources and foreign opposition, partitioning the country would contradict the very reasons for fighting in Iraq. A major objective of invading Iraq was to establish a beachhead in the Middle East to fight the war on terror politically, diplomatically and militarily. Creating a democratic state on the borders of authoritarian Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran provides an example of change and threatens these regimes' grip on power. Splitting Iraq would create a rump Sunni state, which would likely form a Taliban-style Islamofascist government if Fallujah is any indication, on the border with Syria. This would be a new safe haven for Baathists and al Qaeda to build their strength and potentially attack their neighbors. Remember the Sunnis would be unhappy with any arrangement that denies them access to oil [power]. This would place us back on the defensive, fighting infiltrators into the new Kurdish and Shiite states.

There are psychological downfalls to partitioning Iraq as well. This would be an admission of America's lack of will to fight Islamofascist terrorists and provide a morale boost to the enemy. Sunnis that cooperated against the Islamofascists prior to the split would be at the complete mercy of the Taliban Sunni state; they would be abandoned just as we abandoned the Shiites and Kurds just after the uprisings after the First Gulf War. We would lose the trust and confidence of allies if we are willing to abandon a group of people that worked with us and we promised to protect. Finally, the creation of a Sunni state gives the Shiites and Kurds the incentive to stop fighting the Islamofascists in the Sunni state. Once they have their independence, they may decide to wash their hands of the Sunnis and cut a deal to be left alone. Currently there are Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis working together to defeat the insurgency and root out al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists. Keeping Iraq as a complete countrye allows us to share the same goals.

Partitioning Iraq only makes sense if the goal is strictly disengagement, and is akin to cutting and running from Iraq and the Middle East.