Securing the Tsunami Relief Effort
The deployment of United States military assets to assist the tsunami ravaged nations in the Indian Ocean is an unprecedented show of military force put to use for humanitarian purposes. Spacewar.com lists the current military assets deployed in the Indian Ocean, which includes the USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group, comprised of the carrier, two destroyers, a guided missile cruiser and an supply ship, all with complimentary helicopters; the 15th MEU, comprised of about 2,200 marines, 2 amphibious ships, a docking ship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a frigate, a submarine and a Coast Guard cutter, all with complimentary helicopters; “16 C-130 cargo planes, nine P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, four KC-135 air refueling tanker planes, and 46 helicopters…[and] longer range C-17 and C-5 aircraft.” Helicopters from South Korea are also being diverted from South to the region, which will double the amount of helicopters to over 90 available for operations. The Adventures of Chester has excellent detailed information on the military deployments and locations of the Navy and Marine relief forces.
The size and scope of the crisis may necessitate the dispersal of the USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group and the 15th MEU, and may create an opportunity for terrorists to strike at American forces while operating in a humanitarian assistance posture. The South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) foresees such a possibility, particularly because U.S. forces will be operating in nations where terrorist groups have a presence (hat tip to Rantburg).
13. The large-scale deployment of highly visible US troops in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand could make them attractive targets for Al Qaeda, the Jemmah Islamiyah and other jihadi terrorist organisations and add to the internal security problems of the affected countries. It would be wishful-thinking to believe that because of the enormous tragedy, the jihadi terrorists will refrain from acts of terrorism in the Tsunami-ravaged countries due to a fear that this could antagonise the local population. They have never cared for public opinion and fears of public revulsion have never been an inhibiting factor for them.14. The tragedy in Thailand has not prevented the jihadi terrorists from continuing with their acts of terrorism in the Muslim majority provinces of southern Thailand.
As the SAAG states, al Qaeda has never concerned itself with public outrage when committing attacks. The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed far more Muslims than Americans; 9-11 was an audacious attack unprecedented in history; the murder of school children in Beslan was never given a second thought; and the current attacks in Iraq are directed at the very heart at attempts to establish a civil society. Fear of a backlash from striking at American forces while conducting relief and recovery operations would be of no concern to al Qaeda.
The potential for al Qaeda to hit at American forces is real. Al Qaeda has extensive ties to regional terrorist groups in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand. The Heritage Foundation documents the web of interconnectivity among terrorist groups in South East Asia (this is discussed in great detail in Rohan Gunaratna’s book, Inside al Qaeda). Aceh’s Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and Thailand’s Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) have all received aid and assistance from al Qaeda, and each are members of the International Islamic Front, the “corporation” of regional terrorist groups aligned with al Qaeda. Hambali, al Qaeda’s chief of operations for South East Asia, was arrested in Thailand. The Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States, and the Sri Lankan government has received military aid and assistance to fight them.
News from the region indicates that terrorism will not abate while humanitarian assistance is provided to the tsunami ravaged nations of the Indian Ocean. Terrorists are blind to the plight of the innocent. Thailand’s PULO has threatened continued violence. The U.S. plans to distribute aid to regions of Sri Lanka under control of the Tamil Tigers, but there has been no promise of a truce. Members of the MMI, the group run by Indonesian terrorist Abu Bakar Bashir, are heading to Aceh to provide “spiritual guidance”.
If al Qaeda affiliates decide to strike American military forces supporting the Tsunami relief efforts in the Indian Ocean, what are the likely tactics that would be used? There are three likely options that fit the profile of al Qaeda.
Seaborne Strike
Al Qaeda has had success in seaborne attacks against military and civilian shipping in the past. In 2000 the USS Cole, and in 2003 the French oil tanker Limburg were struck off of the coast of Yemen by suicide bombers driving explosive laden pontoon boats. The Heritage Foundation reports that Aceh’s GAM has extensive capabilities to attack shipping, as seaborne piracy is their specialty.
Antiaircraft Missiles
Al Qaeda has attempted to use antiaircraft missiles in the past against American cargo planes in Saudi Arabia. Recent news of attempts to target airliners in the United States are not comforting, nor is the proliferation of such weapons systems. Inbound cargo planes and helicopters providing relief to tsunami ravaged areas would be extremely vulnerable to such an attack.
Suicide Bombings
American personnel on the ground would be susceptible to suicide attacks, particularly at field hospitals and logistic nodes set up throughout the region. Field hospitals will receive large amounts of patients per day, and it would be difficult to screen for terrorists. Logistical bases will have an enormous amount of supplies and traffic entering on a daily basis, and screening each shipment would hamper the relief efforts.
Securing the Effort
We must never underestimate al Qaeda capacity for cruelty and disregard for life. The suffering of those impacted by the Tsunami are of no concern to the likes of the Islamofascists. The United States military must take care to provide force protection for ships, aircraft and security for on the ground assets, as they provide a tempting target for al Qaeda. The U.S. Navy learned a deadly lesson in the USS Cole attack and have implemented changes to operations to prevent a similar occurrence. Defenses against antiaircraft missiles and suicide bombings will prove to be more challenging. American forces must keep their guard up while conducting the difficult tasks ahead of them, and take care not to operate in a predictable manner.



