The Long War Journal: Finding Osama

Written by Bill Roggio on August 18, 2004 12:06 AM to The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2004/08/finding_osama_1.php

Since the battle of Tora Bora, it is believed that Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al Qaeda, has been on the run. His current whereabouts are unknown and speculation abounds: he died at Tora Bora; he is in Iran; he is constantly crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; or he is already in our custody. While the real-time value of Osama's knowledge of current al Qaeda operations may be limited, he would provide a wealth of information on al Qaeda's structure, financing and personal contacts throught the Arab and Muslim world. The psychological aspects of his death or capture cannot be underestimated. This would be a serious blow to the stature of the al Qaeda and jihadi movement, and a morale boost to both the American public and troops in the field.

Leaving aside the speculation that he is either dead or in our custody awaiting an October Surprise, what are the best methods to capture or kill Osama? The United States military and intelligence service has invested an extraordinary amount of time, energy, money and material into the hunt for Osama but has come up empty. Pakistan has also exerted energy in policing the tribal regions without success. Over two and a half years have passed with little success in pinning him down. Richard Rahn argues that capturing Osama requires market solutions, and offers a simple suggestion: raise the $25 million bounty on Osama’s head by $5 million each month, until he is captured.

A couple of years ago, the U.S. government offered a bounty of $25 million for his head. Many in Washington believe this shows bounties don't work. In fact, it shows the price was too low. Suppose we increased the bounty $5 million a month until he was brought in dead or alive. What do you think would happen? The reason $25 million has not worked is that getting bin Laden is both dangerous and expensive, and you would probably need a team to do it. So by the time you add up your expenses and divide the net amount after taxes among your team, the risk-reward ratio is not sufficiently attractive. At some price, getting bin Laden becomes attractive to many reasonably competent people, and some brave and enterprising soul would get him. At the moment, $25 million plus $5 million a month since September 11, 2001, adds up to a bounty of about $200 million. That may sound like a lot of money, but it only works out less than a dollar for each American, and we have already spent many times that sum trying to find him. I expect $200 million is a large enough pot to even induce thousands of American trial lawyers to start combing the hills of Afghanistan, like gold prospectors in California in 1849 — and nothing could be more beneficial to the U.S. economy.

He assumes that the bounty would entice mercenaries to actively hunt Osama, but almost every arrest or takedown of high value targets were made by a inside tips: Saddam, Uday & Kusay, Khallid Shaikh Muhammed. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, in the course of telling the story of the trial in Afghan court of ‘Jack’ Idema – a former special operator turned mercenary tracker of Osama, demonstrates that the current bounty is sufficient for some to take the risks, however. The article also outlines some of the challenges that face the U.S. special operations teams while pursuing al Qaeda in the Afghanistan – Pakistan border, most importantly bureaucratic inertia. The mercenary has an advantage of not being changed by the risk averse and hidebound military chain of command.

Jim Morris, Special Forces three-tour Vietnam vet, author, war correspondent for SOF [Soldier of Fortune Magazine] and for Rolling Stone, who has known Idema for twelve years, said, "The press deems it perfectly acceptable and sensible for the government to offer a huge reward for the capture of OBL, Mullah Omar, and others, but somehow disreputable for anyone to try to collect it. "There is little question that Keith would have accepted the reward if he had captured someone significant. He is in business; he has expenses.

"I should like to point out that a trained and experienced privateer, in Afghanistan or anyplace else, has an advantage that no one else has. He doesn't have to get permission from some bureaucrat, scared to death that he will ruin his career, to make his move. "Time after time, and I know this from active duty Special Forces operators in Afghanistan and Iraq, leads have been blown while higher dithered. "An ancient rule of thumb for guerrillas and terrorists is that you never stay in one place for more than seventy-two hours, and, in today's world, seldom for more than twelve. Bureaucracies can't make decisions to move that fast. That is the sole reason OBL and Mullah Omar are still at large. A privateer doesn't have the resources of the government, but he can move fast and take chances no bureaucrat would ever countenance. Apparently no journalist will either," said Morris.

Mr. Rahn’s belief that flooding the zone with mercenaries is an efficient way to capture Osama and other al Qaeda holdouts falls to pieces in light of the above Soldier of Fortune article on Mr. Idema. He is currently on trial in Afghanistan for kidnapping Afghanis and torturing them for information, and has also been accused of misleading NATO forces of his identity (he claimed he was a U.S. government agent) in order to receive NATO assistance. For $25 million, Mr. Idema appears to have been willing to use any means necessary to capture Osama. For $200 million, Afghanistan and Pakistan would be inundated with the likes of Mr. Idema, willing to use any tactic to collect the bounty. This can prove both dangerous and disruptive to coalition forces and the Afghani public, and may prove counterproductive to the mission of stabilizing Afghanistan.

The turn over every stone strategy is unlikely to yield Osama, which is why a major U.S. military presence has not been undertaken in Afghanistan. Difficult terrain, weather, the intransigence of the local Afghani and Pakistani populations, and other factors make the search for Osama extremely difficult, and the advantage goes to the hunted. The likely avenue for finding Osama lies in intelligence and military operations, as this has been demonstrated to be most fruitful in capturing many high ranking al Qaeda leaders the past several years in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Patrols and strikes at the Afghan – Pakistan border along with continuing operations by Pakistan in the tribal regions places enormous pressure on al Qaeda’s structure, and it is possible Osama can be caught in transit. If the rules of engagement prevent special operations teams and conventional forces from acting on the situation on the ground, then these teams should be given greater license in the decision making processes. If al Qaeda can be dislodged from the tribal regions, the likelihood of Osama being found in an apartment complex in Lahore, Peshawar or Quetta greatly increases. The military and intelligence efforts are time consuming and costly, but they are proven methods that should be fine tuned for success. Abdicating the hunt to mercenaries and bounty hunters that do not understand the complex realities on the ground is not the solution.